Analiza i Egzystencja

ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2016.35-05

Lista wydań / 35 (2016)
Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji

Autorzy: Paweł Zięba
Uniwersytet Jagielloński
Słowa kluczowe: halucynacja percepcja relacja współkonstytuowania relacja przyczynowa alternatywizm dysjunktywizm uzasadnienie epistemiczne
Rok wydania:2016
Liczba stron:25 (87-111)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:


DISJUNCTIVISM AND THE NATURE OF PERCEPTUAL RELATIONSummaryThis paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysicaland epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logicalstructure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two mainconclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is notsuch a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of theseviews could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests,disjunctivism can be correctly expressed without the employment of disjunction.
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