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Previously: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Studia i Prace WNEiZ


ISSN: 2450-7733    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/sip.2018.53/3-01
CC BY-SA   Open Access 

Issue archive / nr 53/3 2018
Znaczenie kontraktów jako najbardziej kompleksowego czynnika ograniczającego problem agencji
(The importance of contracts as the most comprehensive factor limiting the agency’s problem)

Authors: Bartosz Gościniak
Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny w Poznaniu
Keywords: the theory of the agency agency problem contracts principal–agent
Data publikacji całości:2018
Page range:10 (5-14)
Klasyfikacja JEL: G30
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

A broad analysis of the agency’s problem in world literature shows various possibilities of limiting this problem, but without indicating the best one. Each of the ways has its advantages and disadvantages, but it can also imply other problems for the organization. Therefore, the purpose of the article is to present the contract and other major ways to reduce the problem of the agency, along with an indication of the best due to its complexity. The hypothesis put forward is that appropriate contracting between the principal and the agent is the best way to reduce the agency’s problem from the point of view of effectiveness and comprehensiveness. Achieving both the goal and the hypothesis will take place through a comparative analysis of the main ways of reducing the agency problem presented in the world literature. The article has been divided into an introduction, three descriptive parts, a summary and a list of references. The first part contains an explanation of the concept of the agency problem. The second part indicates the location of this problem in the theories concerning enterprises. The third part is the presentation of particular groups of factors limiting the agency’s problem and the indication of the advantage of contracts among these factors.
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