Studia i Prace WNEiZ US

Previously: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Studia i Prace WNEiZ

ISSN: 2450-7733    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/sip.2018.52/1-08
CC BY-SA   Open Access   CEEOL

Issue archive / nr 52/1 2018
Zarządzanie i nadzór nad firmą rodzinną w kontekście teorii agencji i służebności
(Family business behavior and governance through the lens of stewardship theories)

Authors: Malwina Szczepkowska
Uniwersytet Szczeciński
Keywords: family firm family business corporate governance agency theory stewardship theory
Data publikacji całości:2018
Page range:11 (91-101)
Klasyfikacja JEL: G30 G31 G33
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

The article presents the essence of family businesses and characterise their functioning. Family firm are unique due to the combination of the interests of the company and the family. This specifics makes a great interest of scientists and practitioners. In particular, an answer for the question, what distinguishes them and enables long-term functioning on the market is looked for. And how, usually concentrated family ownership, does affect the family business performance? The article focuses on agency and stewardship theory, which may be a good perspective on analyzing the specifics of family businesses. Therefore the aim of the paper is to present the essence and functioning of the family firm based on agency and stewardship theories.
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