Acta Iuris Stetinensis

Previously: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Acta Iuris Stetinensis

ISSN: 2083-4373    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/ais.2016.16-07
CC BY-SA   Open Access   DOAJ  CEEOL  ERIH PLUS

Issue archive / 4/2016 (16)
Autonomia – przymus – granice karania (uwagi na tle filozofii Josepha Raza)
(Autonomy, coercion and the limits of criminal law (in the Joseph Raz's philosophy of law))

Authors: Michał Peno
Uniwersytet Szczeciński
Keywords: punishment personal autonomy harm principle liberal state and coercion Joseph Raz theory of punishment
Year of publication:2016
Page range:20 (93-112)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:
Downloads ?: 169

Abstract

This paper suggests that Raz’s concept of autonomy can be used in the philosophy of criminal law. Certainly, criminal law has limits. ‘Harm principle’ is one of the most important proposals for principled limits to the criminal law. Joseph Raz uses the harm principle in the context of the concept of the personal autonomy. It can be seen that his theory explains (partly) the problem of the justification of punishment and its limits (in the liberal societies). It is possible to justify the criminal law (or punishment) as an method of protection ‘collective goods’, and even liberal and democratic ordo iuris. It can be said that the law must be in some sense neutral. On the other hand, Raz claims the law must protect personal autonomy. This paper suggests that according to Raz’sphilosophy of law a state might use criminal law to promote this morality which is coherent with the concept of the person as an autonomous (self-government) agent. Moreover, the article briefly examines three problems connected with punishment, i.e. axiological pluralism, paternalism and legal moralism, and their consequences for the practice of punishment (in the context of criminal policy).
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