Analiza i Egzystencja


ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2018.43-01
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Issue archive / 43 (2018)
On the notion of well-being

Authors: Katarzyna Lazari-Radek ORCID
Uniwersytet Lódzki
Keywords: well-being good for us good for the world resonance requirement F. Feldman P. Railton H. Sidgwick Sumner
Data publikacji całości:2018
Page range:18 (5-22)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

The aim of the article is to present a formal definition of well-being and to search for a quality that would allow to differentiate prudential values from other kinds of values. In order to achieve this aim, I will first look at a historical discussion run in analytical philosophy. This will allow me to state how not to understand the notion of well-being. Then, I will concentrate on a positive definition. I hope to be able to offer a necessary (though not sufficient) requirement for all prudential values.
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