

UNIwersYTET SZCZECIŃSKI



STUDIA MARITIMA

VOLUME XXXIV

2021

Redakcja naukowa Adam Makowski

Rada Naukowa

Andrzej Groth (Gdynia), Bolesław Hajduk (Szczecin–Gdańsk)
Adam Makowski (Szczecin), Jens E. Olesen (Greifswald), Raimo Pullat (Tallinn)
Jacek Wijaczka (Toruń), Eugeniusz Kruszewski (Kopenhaga)

Komitet Redakcyjny

Adam Makowski (redaktor naczelny), Jörg Hackmann (zastępca redaktora naczelnego)
Renata Nowaczewska (sekretarz redakcji)

Redaktor tomu

Adam Makowski

Redakcja językowa i korekta

Renata Nowaczewska

Projekt okadki

Joanna Dubois-Mosora

Skład

Joanna Dubois-Mosora

Adres Redakcji

Uniwersytet Szczeciński
Instytut Historyczny
PL 71-017 Szczecin, ul. Krakowska 71-79
e-mail: adam.makowski@usz.edu.pl

Lista recenzentów jest dostępna na stronie: www.wnus.edu.pl/sm.pl

Wersja elektroniczna czasopisma: www.smp.am.szczecin.pl

Wersja papierowa jest wersją pierwotną

Streszczenia lub pełne wersje opublikowanych artykułów są dostępne online w bazach danych:
Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ) European Reference Index for the Humanities and
Social Science (ERIH PLUS) Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL) Central
European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (CEJSH) oraz z BazHum

© Copyright Uniwersytet Szczeciński 2021

ISSN (print) 0137-3587 ISSN (online) 2353-303X

WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIWERSYTETU SZCZECIŃSKIEGO

Nakład 60 egz. Ark. wyd. 14,0. Ark. druk. 12,6. Format B5.

SPIS TREŚCI

Marek Smoliński

West Pomerania's part in the war for the throne of the Archbishop
of Magdeburg in 1277–1283 5

Jakub Morawiec

A skald in royal service – the case Þórarinn loftunga.
Part 2: Poetics and ideology of Tøgdrápa 33

Krystyna Szelągowska

Casting a glance across Balticum – Poland and her past in Arild Huitfeldt's
Chronicle 61

Jarosław Drozd

Register Files of The State Enterprise and the Joint Stock Company
“Żegluga Polska” in Gdynia as a Source in Research on the Polish Merchant
Navy under the Second Polish Republic 87

Maciej Franz

Bulletin of the Maritime and Colonial League of May 1939
(from the collection of the State Archives of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast) 103

Emilia Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak

Polish civilian forced labourers and prisoners of war in the Organisation
Todt – Einsatzgruppe Wiking, 1941–1945 125

Grzegorz Strauchold

The Maritime League. A study of the dissolution of a social institution 161

Krzysztof Kubiak

East Timor 1974–1975. End of Portuguese rule 185



Marek Smoliński

Institute of History
University of Gdańsk
mszczuj1294@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0003-1231-6531

West Pomerania's part in the war for the throne of the Archbishop of Magdeburg in 1277–1283

Keywords: Archbishopric of Magdeburg, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Archbishop Günther von Schwalenberg, Archbishop Bernhard von Wölpe, Archbishop Eric, son of the Margrave of Brandenburg John I, Margraves of Brandenburg: John II, Otto IV, Conrad, Otto V, Albert III, Pomeranian dukes: Barnim I, Bogislaw IV

15 January 1277 saw the death of Archbishop of Magdeburg Conrad von Sternberg, who had an inimical attitude towards the Margraves of Brandenburg from the Johannine line¹. Among the several things that negatively affected the Archbishop's relations with the sons of John I: John II, Otto IV and Conrad, was the fact that they supported the ecclesiastical career of their brother Eric, canon of the Monastery in Halberstadt. They determinedly and stubbornly promoted their brother to important positions in the chapter in Magdeburg. From 1264, he held the prebend in Magdeburg. The successive steps of his well-planned church career were to lead him, first to the office of bishop coadjutor and then to the throne of the Archbishops of Magdeburg. The Johannine margraves made an attempt to strengthen Eric's position in the structure of the chapter in Magdeburg as early as in 1272. Their actions led to a sharp conflict and a war with the incumbent archbishop Konrad von Sternberg and his allies. On 1 May 1272, Archbishop Konrad made a pact with Lord Nicholas of Werle, Count Gunzelin of Schwerin, Lord Henry of Mecklenburg, and Waldemar of Rostock and his sons that they would support the archbishop with all their might

1 Georg Adalbert von Mülverstedt, bearb., *Regesta archiepiscopatus Magdeburgensis. Sammlung von Auszügen aus Urkunden und Annalisten zur Geschichte des Erzstifts und Herzogtums Magdeburg*, Bd. 3: *Von 1270 bis 1305* (Magdeburg: Verlag E. Baensch, 1886), 248–249; Hermann Krabbo, Georg Winter, bearb., *Regesten der Markgrafen von Brandenburg aus askanischem Hause*, Lief. 1–12 (Leipzig et al.: Verlag von Duncker & Humblod, Selbstverlage des Vereins Geschäftsstelle Berlin–Dahlem, Selbstverlag für Geschichte des Mark Brandenburg, 1910–1955), 1102a.

against the Margraves of Brandenburg and every other enemy except for Duke Albert of Brunswick, Margrave Dietrich of Landsberg and the Dukes of Saxony: John and Albert. Konrad and his chapter were promised help in the war against the margraves and their brother Eric². This coalition was joined by Vitslav II of Rügen, and Barnim I, Duke of Pomerania. The Duke of Greater Poland, Boleslaw (Boleslaus) the Pious, and the Duke of East Pomerania, Mestwin II were also interested in this anti-Brandenburg venture³. After the Margraves of Brandenburg had been driven from Gdańsk in the spring of 1272, Boleslaw the Pious' nephew, Przemysł (Premyslas) II attacked the territory governed directly by Margrave Conrad, who came from the Johannine line of margraves and was Eric's brother⁴. The alliance between Pomerania and Greater Poland was reinforced by the marriage of Przemysł II with Ludgarda, who was the daughter of Henry, Lord of Mecklenburg, and Anastasia, the daughter of Duke Barnim. The marriage took place in 1273 in Szczecin (Stettin), at Barnim I's court⁵. Since it was planned at the time when Barnim I was engaged in the war against the margraves, this union heralded the accession to the anti-Brandenburg coalition of the Dukes of Greater Poland (Boleslaw the Pious and Przemysł II), and thus probably also the Duke of East Pomerania. Mestwin II, however, approached the durability of this alliance with

-
- 2 Georg Christian Friedrich Lisch *et al.*, hrsg. von, *Meklenburgische Urkundebuch* (hereinafter: MUB), Bd. II (1251–1280) (Schwerin: in Commission der Stiller'schen Hofbuchhandlung, 1864), 1250; Rodgero Prümers, hrsg. von, *Pommersches Urkundenbuch I* (hereinafter: PommUB), Bd. II (Abth. I–II) (Stettin: In Commission bei Th. von der Rahmer, Friedr. Nagelsche Buchhandlung, Paul Rikammer, 1885), 956; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1021; 1022; Georg Adalbert Mülverstedt, "Die Erzbischöfe von Magdeburg Günter (1277–1279), Bernhard (1279–1282) und Erich (1283–1295) vor ihrer Wahl", *Geschichtsblätter für Stadt und Land Magdeburg* 5 (1870): 150–152; Dietmar Lucht, "Die Außenpolitik Herzog Barnims I. von Pommern", *Baltische Studien. Neue Folge* 51 (1965): 29–30; Józef Spors, *Dzieje polityczne ziem sławieńskiej, słupskiej i białogardzkiej XII–XIV w.* (Słupsk–Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1973), 137; Edward Rymar, "Walka o Pomorze Gdańskie w latach 1269–1272", *Rocznik Gdański* 44 (1987): 26; Marek Smoliński, "Sytuacja na pograniczu askańsko-meklemburskim w II połowie XIII w. i na przełomie XIII/XIV w. i najazd Brandenburgii na Pomorze Sławieńskie w 1306 r.", *Gdańskie Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza*, Issue 7: Mazowsze, Pomorze, Prusy (2000): 186–188.
 - 3 Bronisław Nowacki, *Przemysł II odnowiciel Królestwa Polskiego* (Kraków: Avalon, 2007), 57 *et seq.*; Marcin Hlebionek, *Bolesław Pobożny i Wielkopolska jego czasów* (Kraków: Avalon, 2010), 109; Błażej Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II (1224–1294) książę wschodniopomorski (gdański)* (Warszawa: DiG, 2016), 191 *et seq.*
 - 4 Brigida Kürbis, ed. "Rocznik kapituły poznańskiej", in: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica* (hereinafter MPH), series II, vol. VI (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1962), cap. 118, 50–51; Brigida Kürbis, ed. "Kronika wielkopolska", in: MPH, series II, vol. VIII (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe 1970), cap. 163, 128; ostatnio Edward Rymar, *Historia polityczna i społeczna Nowej Marchii w średniowieczu (do roku 1535)* (Gorzów Wielkopolski: Wojewódzka i Miejska Biblioteka Publiczna im. Zbigniewa Herberta 2015), 180.
 - 5 Kürbis, ed., "Kronika wielkopolska", cap. 164, 128; Kazimierz Jasiński, "Genealogia Piastów wielkopolskich", *Kronika Miasta Poznania*, 2 (1995): 54.

great reserve due to the fact that at that time the Sławno land was in the hands of the margraves' adversary Vitslav II of Rügen.

The war allowed, for the time being, to curb the Ascanians' appetites and their attempts to subjugate the Archbishopric of Magdeburg. However, it ended with poor results for Barnim I. In 1273, the Ascanians invaded the areas in the vicinity of Pyrzyce (Pyrütz), Szczecin and probably also Kamień (Cammin). During that invasion, the Cistercian monastery in Kołbacz (Kolbatz) also sustained losses⁶. In the same year (1273), the Johannine margraves concluded a treaty with Mestwin II in the presence of Bishop of Cammin Hermann von Gleichen, on the Drawa (Drage) Bridge⁷. It is not known when exactly they managed to placate Barnim I. The hostility between the Griffin and the margraves may have lingered for some time. On other fronts of this war, fighting continued until 1274⁸ and perhaps even until 1275⁹. The fear of the Brandenburg margraves' actions persisted even into 1276–77, when, on 30 April, Barnim I concluded a treaty with bishop Hermann on the part of the Kolberg land belonging to the Duke. Barnim I sold the land (with borders as previously designated by the Burggraves of Kolberg, Borko and Kazimierz) to the bishop for 3,500 silver ingots (grzywnas) and two villages in order to receive it back from him as a fief. The treaty was made under the condition that the bishop would not pass this land over to the margraves of Brandenburg. Barnim I pledged on his own behalf and the behalf of his heirs, that he would not create any difficulties for the bishop in terms of his ownership of this land¹⁰.

-
- 6 Rodgero Prümers, hrsg. von, "Annales Colbacenses", in: PommUB, Zweite Abtheilung, Bd. I (Stettin: In Commission bei Th. von der Rahmer, Friedr. Nagelsche Buchhandlung, Paul Rikammer 1877), 485; Otto Heinemann hrsg. von, *Johannes Bugenhagens, Pomerania* (Stettin: Herrcke & Lebeting; Verlag von Léon Saunier's Buchhandlung, 1900), 110; Edward Rymar, "Wojny na Pomorzu Zachodnim i wojenne czyny Pomorza poza Pomorzem XII – początek XVII wieku (Kalendarium)", in: *Pomorze militarne XII–XXI wiek. Materials from a scientific session held on 27 November 2003 at the Ducal Castle in Szczecin*, ed. Kazimierz Kozłowski, Edward Rymar, vol. 1 (Szczecin: Oficyna Wydawnicza Archiwum Państwowego w Szczecinie "Dokument", 2004), 147; Rymar, "Władcy Brandenburgii (Askańczycy) na dzisiejszych ziemiach polskich, zwłaszcza w Nowej Marchii i na Pomorzu w latach 1200–1319 (itinerarium): ed. II.", *Nadwarciański Rocznik Historyczno-Archivalny* 15 (2008): 24.
- 7 Max Perlbach, hrsg. von, *Pommerellisches Urkundenbuch* (Danzig: Westpreussischer Geschichtsverein. 1882), 253; Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II*, 177 *et seq.*; Rymar, "Mściwoj II jako lennik margrabiów brandenburskich (w latach 1269–1273)", *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 23 (2019): 235 *et seq.*
- 8 In 1274, some Germans, supposedly the margraves, attacked Poznań. Kürbis, ed., "Spominki poznańskie", in: MPH Series II, vol. VI, 126; Józef Spors, "Agresja brandenburska wobec Wielkopolski do 1278 roku", *Roczniki Historyczne* 40 (1974): 119.
- 9 Lucht, "Die Außenpolitik Herzog Barnims I.", 30. In May 1276, the Margraves of Brandenburg John II, Otto IV and Conrad established a border on the river Havel, which separated the property of their ministeriales from the property of the ministeriales of the Magdeburg Archbishopric (Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1087). This was possible due to the ongoing peace.
- 10 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1060; Friedrich Wilhelm Barthold, *Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen*, Teil 2: *Von der Bekehrung Pommerns zum Christenthume bis zum Tode Barnims I. i. J. 1278. Nebst einer Höhen und Fluß-Karte von Pommern* (Hamburg: Friedrich Perches, 1840), 554–555; Wilhelm Wichard Waldemar von Sommerfeld, *Geschichte der Germanisierung des Herzogtums Pommern*

Participation in the war of the early 1270s did not bring any tangible benefits to the Duchy of Pomerania. Actually, it can be counted as one in a series of failures that Barnim I suffered in his relations with Brandenburg at the end of the 1260s and the beginning of the 1270s. They resulted in the Duke's losing control over his estates in the Choszczno (Arnswald) land and parts of the Stargard and Korytowo lands¹¹. An armed attack against the Johannine margraves around 1273 was perhaps Barnim's last attempt to confront them (he died in 1278).

As already mentioned, the next stage of the fight for influence in the Archbishopric of Magdeburg and for the throne of the Archbishop of Magdeburg broke out in January 1277 after Konrad von Sternberg's death. After the Archbishop died, the chapter in Magdeburg failed to hold an election, the result of which would be acceptable to all interested parties. This fact started a fierce ecclesiastical and political feud. In the years 1277–1283, the feud turned into an armed conflict which involved the supporters of the individual candidates for the Archbishop's throne. The most serious candidates were those of the cathedral waiter and Archdeacon of Waldeser – Bernhard von Wölpe, canon Burchard (= Busse) von Querfurt, Cathedral Provost Günther von Schwalenberg, and the then Provost of St. Boniface and Maurice's Cathedral in Halberstadt – Eric, the aforementioned son of the Margrave of Brandenburg, John I. Apart from enjoying prestige, political influence and a position of importance in the Reich, every Archbishop of Magdeburg at that time was the feudal overlord of allodial land of the Margraves of Brandenburg located in the March of Brandenburg. This office was therefore very attractive to all the key political parties operating in the north-eastern part of the Reich.

The tumult, initiated in Magdeburg by the supporters of Burchard von Querfurt a day before the elections, made it impossible for all the parties to participate in it together peacefully. In general, the victor of the elections, which were held in such unusual circumstances, was Günther von Schwalenberg, the late Archbishop Konrad's

oder Slavien (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1896), 218; Martin Wehrmann, *Geschichte von Pommerns*, Bd. 1 (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1919), 103; Friedrich Salis, "Forschungen zur älteren Geschichte des Bistums Kammin", *Baltische Studien*. Neue Folge, 26 (1924): 141; Hellmuth Heyden, *Kirchengeschichte von Pommern*, Bd. 1, *Von den Anfängen des Christentums bis zur Reformationszeit* (Stettin: Verlag Fischer & Schmidt, 1937), 86; Kazimierz Ślaski, *Dzieje ziemi kołobrzeszkiej do czasów jej germanizacji* (Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, 1948): 52–53; Dariusz Wybranowski, "Początki świeckiego kręgu wasali biskupa kamińskiego Hermana von Gleichen (1251–1288/89) na tle jego działalności politycznej i kolonizacyjnej. Część 2 (1275–1280)", *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza*, 12: *Krzyżacy, szpitalnicy, kondotierzy* (2006): 331; Marek Smoliński, "Między dwoma organizmami państwowymi – biskup kamiński Herman von Gleichen i jego stosunki z księżętami Pomorza Zachodniego oraz margrabiami brandenburskimi", *Średniowiecze Polskie i Powszechnie* 3 (2011), 7: 36.

11 Paul von Nießen, *Geschichte der Neumark im Zeitalter ihrer Entstehung und Besiedlung (Von den ältesten Zeiten bis zum Aussterben der Askanier)* (Landsberg: Landsberg a. In: Dermietzel & Schmidt, 1905), 234; Rymar, "Walka o Pomorze Gdańskie", 19–20.

uncle. While the party of Burchard von Querfurt turned out to be too weak to question the result of the election, provost Eric and his supporters did not accept it¹². They considered the Ascanian to be the winner of the elections. Apart from some members of the chapter in Magdeburg, Eric was supported by his older brothers: Margraves John II, Otto IV and Conrad. Their most important ally was their uncle, Duke of Brunswick Albert I the Tall, the Dukes of Saxony Albert and John, and Otto IV's brother-in-law, Adolph V, Count of Holstein. Otto IV was the leader of this coalition.

Apart from the support of the chapter, Günther von Schwalenberg obtained help from the Magdeburg townsmen, Count of Anhalt (-Aschersleben) Otto I, and his brother-in-law Otto, Bishop of Hildesheim (a brother of the Brunswick Duke Albert I the Tall). Before the end of 1277, the coalition was joined by the Duke of Lüneburg, John (who incidentally was a brother of the Duke of Brunswick, Albert I the Tall and the Bishop of Hildesheim, Otto). The Archbishop of Bremen, Gieselbrecht, and, most importantly, the Margraves of Brandenburg from the Ottonian line, Otto V and Albert III, also joined it. The alliance formed in this way meant a fratricidal conflict that affected the Margraves of Brandenburg from the Johannine and Ottonian lines and the sons of Otto I the Child of the House of Welf, i.e. the Dukes of Brunswick. This dispute was also of utmost importance for the higher diocesan clergy from the regions under the above-mentioned rulers. The conflict over the throne of the Archbishop of Magdeburg could have ended in 1279, when Günther von Schwalenberg resigned from this office¹³. His resignation was prompted by the lack of papal approval. It is possible that he also lost faith in the support among the ranks of the Magdeburg Chapter. Some of its members began to secretly negotiate with the Johannine Ascanians and take money from them¹⁴.

After Günther von Schwalenberg's resignation, Bernhard von Wölpe, the waiter of the Magdeburg Chapter, was elected archbishop in 1279¹⁵. Eric's Ascanian supporters again refused to accept this majority decision. The election was protested by the cathedral provost Albrecht von Arnstein, one of the would-be candidates for the disputed office, who as early as in 1277 had already joined the party of the Johannine Ascanians. The effective diplomacy of the senior margrave line managed to block the papal approval of this election also in this case. The war for the appointment of the Archbishop

12 Karl Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik* (= Die Chroniken der deutschen Städte, Bd. 7: *Die Chroniken der niederdeutschen Städte*, Bd. 1) (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1869), 160, Krabbo, Winter (bearb.), *Regesten*, 1103, 1105.

13 Wilhelm Schum, hrsg. von, "Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium", in: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores* (hereinafter: MGH SS), Bd. XXV (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani, 1883), 424; Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik*, 160; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1171a.

14 For more on this see Schum, hrsg. von, *Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium*, cap. 37, 424.

15 Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik*, 162; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1186a.

of Magdeburg therefore continued, formally until 1283. Its cause was finally removed by Pope Martin IV. He simply forbade the Magdeburg chapter from holding elections. He further rejected Bernard von Wölpe's efforts to be approved in the office. Referring to the appeal that was supposedly submitted to the papacy by the chapter, archbishopric suffragans, Dominicans and Franciscans, as well as other clergy and laity, he appointed Eric the Archbishop of Magdeburg¹⁶. The victory of the Ascanian was announced in the winter of 1282/1283 in the Magdeburg Cathedral. The outrage caused by the publicly presented papal ruling prompted Eric to flee Magdeburg again and take refuge with his brother Otto IV in Wolmirstedt¹⁷. For some time, Eric had serious difficulties in holding his office. His appointment was formally completed in June 1283¹⁸. Even before these events, however, the margraves of both lines had already reached an agreement and ceased any hostile actions against each other. Having finally obtained the assurance that Eric would maintain his office, the Johannine Margraves could proceed to intensify military activities in those regions where the rulers decided to get rid of their political dependence on the margraves of Brandenburg.

The history of the above-mentioned conflict was introduced in a systematic way on the pages of historical studies by Georg Sello¹⁹. In an overview of Brandenburg-Magdeburg relations, this historian arranged the source information on the dispute between margraves and archbishops-elects of Magdeburg. Contemporary historians are also indebted to him for his attempt to critically evaluate the sources discussing this conflict. Apart from the normative documents, which did not raise as many doubts, there are also narrative sources, often edited later but based on accounts from the 13th or 14th centuries. Among them, we should mention the sources containing the most information about the history of the conflict. Those include the chronicle of the rulers of Saxony²⁰, the so-called deeds of the Archbishops of Magdeburg²¹, and especially the

16 Krabbo, Winter (bearb.), *Regesten*, 1113a, 1321, 1326.

17 Schum, hrsg. von, *Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium*, cap. 38, 425; Krabbo, Winter (bearb.), *Regesten*, 1314.

18 Krabbo, Winter (bearb.), *Regesten*, 1326, 1331.

19 Georg Sello, "Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen 1266–1283", *Geschichtsblätter für Stadt und Land Magdeburg* 23 (1888): 71–98, 131–184.

20 Oswald Holder-Egger, hrsg. von, "Chronica principum Saxoniae", in: MGH SS, Bd. XXV (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani, 1888), 472–480; Oswald Holder-Egger, "Über die Braunschweiger und Sächsische Fürstengeschichte und verwandte Quellen", *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* 17 (1892): 159–184; Klaus Nass, "Zur Cronica Saxonum und verwandten Braunschweiger Werken", *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 49 (1993): 557–582.

21 Schum, hrsg. von, "Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium", 374–484; Wilhelm Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter bis zur Mitte des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts*, 2 (Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, 1894), 349–350; Keith von Sinclair, Herbert Grundmann, "Ein Fragment der Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium", *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 18 (1962): 247.

book of Magdeburg jurors with the earliest part written on the basis of the content of medieval Magdeburg annals as well as the chronicles / deeds of the Archbishops of Brandenburg. A rhymed Brunswick chronicle, which in significant fragments focuses on the person of Albert I the Tall²². The chronicle of the bishops of Hildesheim is also significant²³. The final chronology of the conflict was established by one of the publishers of the records of the margraves of Brandenburg, Herman Krabbo. Historiography also owes to the latter researcher the insights, which are overlooked in today's literature on the subject, about the participation of the Bishop of Cammin Hermann in the discussed conflict.

The war for the appointment of the Archbishop of Magdeburg, just like the events of the early 1270s, also had its Pomeranian episode. First of all, historians noticed the participation of the Pomeranian Duke Barnim I in this conflict. It is evidenced by the agreement concluded by him on 1 June 1278 with Eric's brother, Johannine Margrave Conrad. The conditions of the aforementioned pact (first of all the granting by Conrad in favour of Barnim) were also to be acknowledged by Conrad's brothers, John II and Otto IV, by hanging their seals. Barnim I, through the mediation of the margrave knight Ludwig von Wedel and in the presence of the Bishop of Cammin Hermann, then took into a fief Trzebień (Treben), a village near Dolice (Dölitz), Kolin (Kollin), Rzeplino (Repplin), Bralęcín (Brallentin), the presently lost Sconelinde, Piasecznik (Petznick), Radaczewo (Reichenbach), Ziemomyśl (Schönwerder), Sądów (Sandow), as well as a manor of the monks from Kołbacz (Kolbatz), with the adjacent Slavic village and the Copam manor²⁴. Moreover, the Margrave promised Barnim I 1,500 ingots (grzywnas)

22 Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik*; Wattenbach, *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen*, 349; Gundolf Keil, "Magdeburger Schöppenchronik", in: *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, hrsg. von Liselotte Lutz, Joyce M. McLellan, Ulrich Matzejiet, Frank Weyrich, Gloria Avella-Widhalm, Bd. 6 (München et al.: Artemis & Winkler Verlag, 1995), 79; Klaus Graf, "Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik. Anregungen für die künftige Forschung", *Sachsen und Anhalt* 30 (2018): 131–172; Ludwig Weiland, hrsg., "Braunschweigische Reimchronik", in: MGH Deutsche Chroniken, Bd. 2 (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani, 1877), 430–587; Nass, "Zur Cronica Saxonum", 557–582; Gesine Mierke, "Norddeutsche Reimchroniken – Braunschweigische und Mecklenburgische Reimchronik", in: *Handbuch Chroniken des Mittelalters*, hrsg. von Gerhard Wolf, Norbert H. Ott, Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), 197–224, about the chronicle itself: 203–212.

23 Georg Heinrich Pertz, hrsg. von, "Chronicon Hildesheimense", in: MGH SS, Bd. VI (Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani, 1846), 845–873.

24 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1096; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1146; Barthold, *Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen* II, 570; Smoliński, "Udział Polaków i Pomorzan w bitwie pod Frohse 10 I 1278 r. Próba identyfikacji sojuszników Ottona IV ze Strzałą", *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza*, Issue 14: *Kaci, święci, templariusze* (2008): 287 and note 5, which lists references to the literature on this treaty. In addition to the literature cited there, see Benedykt Zientara, "Rola miast w walce stanów Pomorza Zachodniego z władzą książęcą na przełomie XIII i XIV wieku", *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 4 (1962): 492; Jan M. Piskorski, *Miasta księstwa szczecińskiego do połowy XIV wieku* (Poznań–Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 2005), 166; Rymar, "Wojny na Pomorzu Zachodnim", 147; Rymar, "Udział Pomorza w wojnie koalicyjnej 1283–1285", in:

for participating and helping in the war against the Archbishopric of Magdeburg and all its allies. The only exception in this regard were the margraves of the Ottonian line: Otto V and Albert III and the Slavic lords (i.e. the rulers of Mecklenburg). After receiving the summons, Barnim I was to appear in the land of the Margraves of Brandenburg with 150 armoured horsemen. In return, Margrave Conrad undertook to give the prince a payment, which was to be paid by 11 November 1278, while the Duke promised 30 more knights. 8 days after receiving the summons, the Duke was to report with his army on the border of the Margraves' land. After the expedition, and until the end of the war, he was to leave 60 armoured horsemen at the disposal of the Margraves. The following cities became the guarantors of the agreement on the part of Pomerania: Gardziec (Gartz), Gryfino (Greifenhagen), Pyrzyce (Pyritz) and Stargard. In the event that Barnim I did not fulfil his obligations, these cities would come under the authority of the Margraves. The cities were to be released from granting guarantees at the end of the war against the Archbishopric of Magdeburg. The agreement also stipulated that the taxes should additionally be paid by the people of the Margraves who were granted fiefs by Barnim. It does not appear from the text of the pact that it included the co-regent of Barnim I, his son Bogislaw IV. It is possible that the way this arrangement was interpreted by the Margraves and Bogislaw IV was the underlying cause of a conflict that divided both sides as early as in 1283.

The cited treaty allowed historians to speculate that Barnim I participated in the war on the side of the Johannine margraves already before the agreement. Therefore, the Pomeranian reinforcements he would send to Margrave Otto IV fought under the Ascanian's command, alongside the Margrave's own forces and reinforcements from Czechia and Poland, in the unlucky (for him) Battle of Frohse, which took place on 10 January 1278²⁵. Thus, the participation of Pomerania in this phase of the conflict for the throne of the Archbishop of Magdeburg could be extended at least to the beginning of 1278. However, what is certain, though unnoticed by historians, is the participation

W kręgu idei, polityki i wojska. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Januszowi Farysiowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin, eds. Tomasz Sikorski, Henryk Walczak, Adam Wątor (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2009), 472. On the matter of identifying the village of Trzebień (Treben), see Hermann Hoogeweg, *Die Stifter und Klöster der Provinz Pommern*, Bd. 1 (Leon Sauniers Buchhandlung: Stettin, 1924), 229, 231, 234, 2337–238, 299; Rymar, “Trzebień koło Dolic trwał dłużej niż sądziłem”, *Stargardia. Rocznik Muzeum Archeologiczno-Historyczne w Stargardzie poświęcony przeszłości i kulturze Pomorza* 10 (2015): 315–321. On the potential identification of Copam as the manor at Kopań: Kamil Wasilkiewicz, “Konflikt księcia pomorskiego Bogusława IV z zakonem templariuszy (1283 – ok. 1291)”, *Zapiski Historyczne* 85 (2020), 2: 119.

25 Schum, hrsg. von, *Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium*, cap. 37, 423. For more on the battle, see Franz Winter, “Die Schlacht bei Frohse am 10. Januar 1278”, *Geschichtsblätter für Stadt und Land Magdeburg* 5 (1870): 1–6; Smoliński, “Udział Polaków i Pomorzan w bitwie pod Frohse”, 285–310 and note 3, which provides references to the literature which mentions that battle.

of the Bishop of Cammin Hermann in the events constituting the genesis of the war of 1277–1283.

The lively relations that the Bishop of Cammin Hermann von Gleichen had always kept with his relatives, that is, the Margraves of Brandenburg, were strengthened in 1276. On 18 August of that year, the Bishop sold for 3,000 silver ingots the Lipiany (Lippehne) Land to the Johannine Margraves Jan II, Otto IV and Conrad. The village of Letnin (Lettnin) and half of the village of Kozielice (Köselitz), which the Bishop wanted to keep for himself and his successors, were excluded from the transaction. The Margraves promised to pay 2,000 by 6 January 1277, and the remaining thousand ingots by 28 March 1277. The guarantors of the payment of these sums were Margrave John II and appointed knights of the Margraves, in the number of 14 for the first repayment and 16 for the second, respectively. Should the money not be transferred on time, one of the Margraves, accompanied by the appointed knights, was to meet with the Bishop in Pasewalk 15 days after the deadline for repayment and return the money to him. If there were any circumstances that made it difficult to meet in the aforementioned city, the arrangement included the possibility of designating a different meeting place. The agreement provided for the application of the law known as *obstagium*²⁶.

The letter of Margrave Otto IV from the end of January 1277, sent to the King of the Romans Rudolf of Habsburg, informs about the further cooperation of the Bishop and the Johannine Margraves. It is an account of the events related to the election of the new Archbishop of Magdeburg, which had to take place before 24 January 1277²⁷. Otto IV's story is valuable in that it complements the information from narrative sources from the Magdeburg chapter and the city of Magdeburg, which also described the events accompanying the election of the new archbishop and the later letter of Pope Martin IV. These messages show that after the death of Archbishop Konrad von Sternberg, cathedral canon Albrecht von Arnstein²⁸ sent a letter to the Margrave of Brandenburg, Otto IV and the Duke of Brunswick, Albert I the Tall, in order to invite them to the election and thus certainly increase the chances of choosing Eric,

26 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1042, 1043; Barthold, *Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen* 2, 501; Ernst Friedländer, *Das Einlager. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte* (Münster: Verlag der Theissing'sches Buchhandlung, 1868), 38; Sommerfeld, *Geschichte der Germanisierung*, 221; Salis, "Forschungen zur älteren Geschichte", 86; Heyden, *Kirchengeschichte*, 86; Wybranowski, "Początki świeckiego kręgu wasali biskupa", 330–331; Smoliński, "Między dwoma organizmami państwowymi", 36; Rymar, *Historia polityczna i społeczna*, 184.

27 Oswald Redlich, bearb., *Eine Wiener Briefsammlung zur Geschichte des deutschen Reiches und der österreichischen Länder in der zweiten Hälfte des XIII. Jahrhunderts* (Mittheilungen aus dem Vaticanischen Archive, 2) (Wien: In Commission bei F. Temsky, 1894), 73; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1105; Sello, "Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen", 87.

28 Albrecht was related to the Pomeranian dynasty. He was identified in historiography as the "sororius" nephew of Wartislaw III, Duke of Demmin. See Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 587; Gerd Heinrich, *Die Grafen von Arnstein* (Mitteldeutsche Forschungen, Bd. 21) (Köln–Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1961), 44.

the brother of the mentioned Ascanian and the nephew of the named Welf²⁹. A letter from the Margrave of Brandenburg, Otto IV, mentions that other bishops attended the election with them: Hermann von Schladen from Schwerin (previously holding various offices in the Magdeburg Chapter) and Hermann von Gleichen from Cammin. The party supporting the Ascanians in the Magdeburg chapter along with the invited guests gathered at the local cathedral to elect Eric. However, as already mentioned, a tumult arose in the city. Hostile to the Johannine Margraves, the party with Bernhard von Wölpe managed to mobilize the townspeople who surrounded the cathedral and forced Eric's voters, guests and members of the Ascanian party to barricade themselves in the church. Eric's supporters had become prisoners and they would be released only on the condition that Eric resigned from the office of archbishop. However, the cathedral was not closely guarded. Eric, together with Heinrich von Groneberg, escaped from it at night through a window. Eric's comrade later became a diplomat of the Johannine Margraves. He periodically protested at the papal curia against successive opponents, elected in Magdeburg against Eric. Margrave Otto IV and Duke Albert I the Tall managed to escape from Magdeburg on horses that were not their own, and thus were probably stolen by their servants. It is not known how the bishops of Schwerin and Cammin were released. It can be assumed that they survived this adventure unscathed, as any harm done to them would certainly be reflected in the preserved sources. These events frightened the Ascanian faction in the chapter to such an extent that they failed to block the election of Günther von Schwaleneberg the following day. His victory was announced by a commission of 4 canons. Surprised by this turn of events, even Albrecht von Arnstein did not protest against Günther's election³⁰. A firm protest to the papal curia against this election was later brought by the aforementioned Heinrich von Groneberg³¹.

The first attempt to bring about an agreement between the elected Archbishop and Otto IV and Albert I the Tall was made at the turn of January and February 1277. Günther von Schwaleneberg offered Margrave Otto IV and Duke Albert I the Tall compensation for the disgrace that befell them in Magdeburg. They were to receive 1,000 silver ingots (*grzywnas*). This, however, did not prevent the emerging conflict³². It broke out in full force in the Autumn of 1277. In the preceding period, the Johannine

29 Schum, hrsg. von, *Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium*, cap. 37, 423; Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik*, 160; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1103, 1321; Sello, "Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen", 87.

30 Redlich, bearb., *Eine Wiener Briefsammlung*, 73; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1105.

31 Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1103, 1321.

32 Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik*, 160; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1106; Johannes Schultze, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, Bd. 1: *Entstehung und Entwicklung unter den askanischen Markgrafen (bis 1319)* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1961), 184.

Margraves had tried to build a political alliance that would allow them to confront the Archbishop-elect, his allies and the townsmen of Magdeburg in an armed conflict. Already then, it turned out that they could not count on the support of their relatives from the Ottonian line. The emerging electoral dispute put a shadow on the relations between the representatives of the two lines. After the division of the March between the sons of John I and Otto III, the problem arose as to which line of the Margraves of Brandenburg should have the right to vote in elections for German rulers. This conflict began to smoulder as early as 1273, only to break out in full force in 1292 and 1298³³. Contrary to the Johannine Margraves, their Ottonian relatives in the period before the death of Archbishop Konrad von Sternberg maintained good relations with him³⁴.

On 14 February 1277, two weeks after the attempted agreement between Otto IV, Albert I the Tall and the Archbishop-elect Günther, Margraves John II, Otto IV and Conrad met at the castle of Schildberg with the Bishop of Cammin Hermann von Gleichen. Information about this event comes from a document issued that day by the Margraves for Pyrzyce (Pyritz). The Johannine Ascanians confirmed the town's possession of 10 lahns/hubes between Sitno (Hohenziethen), Kozielice (Köselitz), Mieleno Pyrzyckie (Groß Möllen) and Tetyń (Beyersdorf) with all the adjoining areas that were handed over to the town by the Bishop of Cammin Hermann and the Slavic Princeps Barnim I. This confirmation was issued by the Margraves on the occasion of remeasuring the land belonging to the town. The list of witnesses of the above-mentioned diploma was opened by the aforementioned Bishop³⁵. One can suspect that the meeting could have concerned, inter alia, the repayment of the debt that the Margraves owed for the Lipiany (Lippehne) Land to the Bishop and the recent events that took place in Magdeburg. It is possible that during the Schildberg congress, the Margraves authorised the Bishop to hold talks with Barnim I. As already mentioned, on 30 April 1277, the Bishop, having obtained the rest of the money for the Lippehne Land in March this year, concluded an agreement with Barnim I and his son Bogislaw IV on the purchase

33 Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1049 *et seq.* See also Eberhard Schmidt, *Die Mark Brandenburg unter den Askaniern (1134–1320)* (Köln–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1975), 135; Helmut Assing, “Der Weg der sächsischen und brandenburgischen Askanier zur Kurwürde”, in: *Askanier-Studien der Lauenburgischen Akademie*, hrsg. von, Eckardt Opitz (Kolloquium. Lauenburgische Akademie für Wissenschaft und Kultur, Bd. 16) (Bochum: Lukas Verlag, 2010), 107 *et seq.*

34 Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1094, for more on the treaty of 28 September 1276 concluded between Konrad von Sternberg and Margrave Albert III on Lebus canons. It included a promise of remuneration by Albert and his brother Otto V by 11 November 1276 for all damages suffered by the archbishopric.

35 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1228 (here with an incorrect annual date of 1282); Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1228 (where, due to the death of Margrave John II in 1281, the date of 1282 was disputed and fixed as 1277 as the annual date of issue of the document). Rymar, “Władcy Brandenburgii”, 25, adopted the year 1277, though not ultimately ruling out 1281.

of the ducal part of the Kołobrzeg (Kolberg) land³⁶. Since this agreement included a clause regarding the Margraves of Brandenburg, they were certainly talked of when it was being concluded.

In the autumn of 1277, a regular war broke out between the Johannine margraves and their allies and Magdeburg. It was started by an attack and robbery of the wagons of Magdeburg merchants by the men of Margrave Otto IV³⁷. First, the city and its Archbishop were attacked by the Dukes of Saxony: John and Albert, and Adolph, Count of Holstein. Their failures led Otto IV to lead the attack in person. As already mentioned, the Margrave set off against Magdeburg with the support of the Czechs, Poles and Pomeranians. With his own forces and the support of his allies, he marched to Magdeburg to be defeated on 10 January 1278 at the Battle of Frohse. Unfortunately, the terms describing the external support of the Margrave's troops are so imprecise that it is impossible to establish without any doubt the allies of Otto IV³⁸. The older literature of the subject assumed that the aforementioned Czechs were Czech knights from that part of Lusatia, which was a fief of the Johannine line of Margraves³⁹. However, it cannot be ruled out that they were reinforcements sent to Otto IV by the Czech king, Přemysl Ottokar II, who wanted to strengthen the anti-Habsburg alliance.

It is even more difficult to attempt and identify Poles and Pomeranians supporting the Margrave. Whoever sent them can only be inferred by eliminating individual candidates for allies of the Johannine Margraves. Using such an unreliable research method and referring to the events that took place in the summer of 1278, it seems that Bolesław the Pious, or Przemysł II and Barnim I have the best chance of being assigned the role of allies of Otto IV⁴⁰. Among the sources created in the office servicing the margraves of Brandenburg in the 1280's, Poland was identical to the lands from which the wife of Margrave Conrad came. In 1281, when the Margraves Otto IV and Conrad approved the testamentary bequests made by their elder brother John II, they also mentioned the last will of Constance – the late wife of the younger of the aforementioned Margraves. The daughter of Przemysł (Premyslas) I was referred to as “de Polonya” or Lady “de Polonicali”⁴¹. According to the treaty of Vierraden, which was the preliminary peace treaty ending the war between the Margraves and the signato-

36 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1060.

37 Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik*, 160–161; Holder-Egger, hrsg. von, “Chronica principum Saxoniae”, 474; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1124.

38 See Smoliński, “Udział Polaków i Pomorzan w bitwie pod Frohse”, 285–310.

39 Sello, “Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen”, 88.

40 For inquiries on this subject, see Smoliński, “Udział Polaków i Pomorzan w bitwie pod Frohse”, 285–310.

41 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1216; Georg Winter, hrsg. von, *Pommersches Urkundenbuch*, Bd. IV (Abt. I–II) (Stettin: Paul Niekammer, 1902–1903), 3990; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1271, 1274.

ries of the Rostock Landfriede in 1283, Przemysł II, acting on the side of the Johannine Margraves, was defined as the Duke of Kalisz⁴². The office of the Margraves was thus able to quite accurately determine the origin of the rulers of Polish lands. However, it is difficult to say to what extent this knowledge was disseminated among the milieus writing narrative sources, in which the discussed problem of the origin of foreign reinforcements supporting Otto IV was raised.

The involvement of Barnim I in the war on the side of the Johannine Margraves, perhaps in January 1277, and certainly in June this year, indubitably put the Duke of West Pomerania in a rather embarrassing situation. Apart from the fact that Barnim I was a liege subject of both lines of margraves of Brandenburg, his support for the Johannine Ascanians caused conflicts with the families of the former and current wives of the Duke. Margareta, who died around 1260–1261, was the daughter of Nicholas I of Werle and the mother of the Duke's co-regent, i.e. Bogislaw IV. At the time when Barnim I concluded an agreement with Margrave Conrad (1 June 1278), the Duke was married to Matilda, a daughter of Otto III and sister of Otto V and Albert III – Margraves from the Ottonian line⁴³. The desire to avoid a conflict with them was perhaps the reason why in the text of the treaty between Barnim I and Conrad, a security clause was introduced in the form of a statement that the Duke was to help the Margrave and his brothers against everyone, except the Margraves: Otto V and Albert III (i.e. the brothers-in-law of Barnim I) as well as Slavic lords (i.e. in this case the rulers of Mecklenburg, with whom the Pomeranian court continued to maintain lively relations)⁴⁴. The introduction to the text of the Ascanians from the Ottonian line indicates, in any case, that the possibility of fighting them was taken into account at that time.

At the time when Margrave Conrad was securing the support of West Pomerania, his elder brother, Otto IV, had already set off on a military expedition against the archbishopric and Otto I, Prince of Anhalt-Aschersleben, who was supporting it. Before that, however, he needed to buy himself out of the Magdeburg captivity and arrange the help of the Dukes of Saxony. At the beginning of June or July 1277, Otto IV besieged Staßfurt, owned from 1276 by the Archbishopric of Magdeburg through a grant by the same Dukes of Saxony. He managed to take the city. However, the crew of the local castle still resisted. In the end, the siege did not end successfully for Otto IV. Firstly, he was shot in the head with an arrow, after which he had to flee the battlefield, and secondly, the siege of the March army was interrupted by an attack of the troops of

42 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1312; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1366.

43 Rymar, *Rodowód książąt pomorskich* (ed. 2) (Szczecin: Książnica Pomorska im. Stanisława Staszica w Szczecinie, 2005), 146 *et seq.*; Mariola Freza-Olczyk, "Stepmother and stepson: Duchess Matilda in the power struggle after the death of her husband Barnim I the Duke of Pomerania", *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 23 (2019): 84 *et seq.*

44 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1096.

the Bishop of Hildesheim Otto⁴⁵. As already mentioned, he was the brother of the principal ally of the Johannine Margraves, Albert I the Tall. The chronicle of the bishops of Hildesheim mentioned the conflict that broke out between Albert I the Tall, supported by the Margrave of Brandenburg Otto IV, and the brothers of the former: Otto, Bishop of Hildesheim and John, Duke of Lüneburg. The fighting between the two sides must have taken place before 13 December 1277, because on that day John died. As reported in the aforementioned chronicle, the Bishop, attempting to get help against his elder brother, allied himself with the Archbishop of Magdeburg, the Archbishop of Bremen and the Margraves of the Ottonian line: Otto V and Albert III⁴⁶. It is uncertain, of course, whether the Margraves of the younger line were supporting Bishop Otto already in the summer of 1278. Certainly, however, their cooperation with the Bishop and other members of the Magdeburg-supporting alliance had to further worsen the relations between both lines of the Ascanians of Brandenburg.

In August 1278, Otto IV, having somewhat healed the wounds he sustained at Staßfurt, set out to help the Czech king, Přemysl Ottokar II. His forces, as well as reinforcements from some of the Piast and, again, Pomeranian dukes, took part in the Battle on the Marchfeld (Czech: Suché Kruty), in which the forces of Přemysl Ottokar II and Rudolf I Habsburg clashed⁴⁷. Surprisingly, the Czech forces were not supported that time by the Margraves of the Ottonian line, who much more closely associated with Přemysl Ottokar II. According to the so-called Traska's Annals [Rocznik Traski], exactly at the same time as the Battle of Marchfeld (26 August 1278) took place, Bolesław the Pious and Mściwoj II launched an attack on the Neumark⁴⁸. The Polish-Pomeranian offensive was aimed at the estates of the younger line of Margraves. This is evidenced by the later, though trusted by researchers, account by Jan Długosz⁴⁹. The troops of Otto V, who was apparently in charge of the defence, then suffered a defeat at Soldin (presently known as Myślibórz). The result of this expedition was the recovery of Santok (Zantoch) by the Duchy of Greater Poland.

45 Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik*, 162; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1147; Sello, "Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen", 166; Schultze, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, 184.

46 Pertz, hrsg. von, "Chronicon Hildesheimense", 864; see also Weiland, hrsg., "Braunschweigische Reichschronik", 568; Sello, "Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen", 169–170.

47 Smoliński, "W poszukiwaniu Pomorza biorących udział w bitwie pod Suchymi Krutami 26 VIII 1278 r.", in: *Pomerania et alia opuscula Joachimo Zdrenka dedicata*, ed. Joanna Karczewska, Marcelli Tureczek (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek 2017), 77–100.

48 August Bielowski, ed., "Rocznik Traski", in: MPH, vol. II (Lwów: Self-published, 1872), 844.

49 Zofia Kozłowska-Budkowska, Krystyna Pieradzka, ed. and foreword, *Iohannis Dlugossi, Annales seu Cronicae regni Poloniae, Liber VII/VIII* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwa Naukowe, 1975), p. 200; Barthold, *Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen 2*, 557 *et seq.*; Sello, "Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen", 87; Nießen, *Geschichte der Neumark*, 252 *et seq.*; Rymar, "Władcy Brandenburgii (Askańczycy)", 26; Rymar, *Historia polityczna i społeczna*, 187–189; Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II*, 230–231.

Recently, historians tend to look for the reasons for the invasion of the lands of the younger line (if, of course, the Polish-Pomeranian attack truly did not affect the estates of the Johannine Ascanians) in the international situation. The rulers of Greater Poland and Eastern Pomerania were to make the said attack while remaining in alliance with the King of the Romans Rudolf of Habsburg⁵⁰. This hypothesis cannot be ruled out. It seems, however, that the problems with the war for the throne of the Archbishops of Brandenburg were a much more urgent matter for Otto IV. At this stage of the conflict, the Margraves had not yet moved against one another. Nevertheless, the allies of the individual lines had been attacking the Margraves representing the hostile political camps for some time.

The second half of 1278 was a series of setbacks for the Johannine Margraves. The armed expedition to Anhalt, led by the eldest of them, John II, ended with a defeat. The destruction that his troops caused while passing through the property of the Halberstadt bishopric instigated the local bishop Volard to anathemise John II and his brothers. Worse still, the anathema was sanctioned by the Pope⁵¹. To make matters worse, 13 or 14 November 1278 saw the death of an ally of the Johannine line of margraves, Barnim I⁵². West Pomerania was now in the hands of Bogislaw IV, the nominal successor of Barnim I, as well as the widow of the deceased ruler, Matilda, who came from the Ottonian line of margraves, and her children. It seems unlikely that John II, Otto IV and Conrad could count on her support at this point in time. Hence, their political goal was to ensure cooperation with Bogislaw IV. The path to this was also to lead through a marriage with a *Markgräfin*. The heir to the Pomeranian throne was married to one of the Margraves' sisters, whose name was also Matilda. It is not known when exactly they were married. It was probably some time before 1278, or December of that year. On 14 December 1278, Margrave Conrad visited Szczecin in person. In the document issued at that time, he was referred to as "gener", that is, the Duke's brother-in-law⁵³. Coming to Szczecin at that very moment, Conrad wanted to either strengthen Bogislaw IV in cooperation with him and his brothers, or – if that was the time that the *Markgräfin* was married – to initiate such cooperation, to be strengthened by marriage.

The first half of the next year's struggle for the throne of the Archbishop of Magdeburg began a little more favourably for the Johannine Margraves. As already mentioned,

50 Rymar, "Władcy Brandenburgii (Askańczycy)", 26; Rymar, *Historia polityczna i społeczna*, 187–189.

51 Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik*, 162; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1167; Sello, „Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen”, 168.

52 Rymar, *Rodowód*, 145.

53 Prümers, hrsg. von, *PommUB II*, 1118; Barthold, *Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen*, Teil 3: *Vom Tode Barnims I. (1278) bis zum Auftreten der Hohenzollern in der Mark Brandenburg (1411)* (Hamburg: Friedrich Perches 1842), 5; Rymar, *Rodowód*, 145.

in March 1279 Günther von Schwaleneberg resigned from the bishop's office. Unfortunately, the chapter again did not choose Eric this time, but gave the disputed throne to Bernhard von Wölpe. The year 1279 saw an increase in hostilities and the involvement of most of the allies of both sides. The Ottonian Margraves, and above all Albert III, supported with force the Magdeburg party. This led to an almost armed clash between him and Otto IV in July 1279 on the Fuhse River, near the city of Reine⁵⁴. However, it did not happen because of the panic that broke out at night in Albert III's camp with the news of the approaching troops of Otto IV. The fleeing knights of Albert III were to carry him out of the camp with their own hands. Albert III, who failed to meet Otto IV in battle, took refuge in Hildesheim. It is not clear when he managed to leave it, because both the Duke of Brunswick, Albert I the Tall, as well as Margrave Otto IV were determined to capture him and for a long time they took pains to cut off any way out of the city. Albert III probably returned to the March only in the fall of 1279. Then, together with his brother Otto V, who for some time finally broke away from Czech affairs, he issued a document for the nunnery in Diensdorf (near Salzwedel)⁵⁵. Before the end of the year, Albert III went to Ueckermünde, where the widow of Barnim I, Matilda of the Ottonian line of margraves, resided⁵⁶. The Margrave assisted his sister in confirming her deceased husband's privileges for the town of Gartz (presently: Gardziec). This fact gave rise to two reflections in historiography. The first one concerned the Duchess' stay in Ueckermünde. It was sometimes treated as an expression of a conflict at the Pomeranian court and the escape of the widowed Duchess with her children from Szczecin⁵⁷. The second one was related to the observation that Gartz was one of the cities-guarantors of the agreement between Margrave Conrad and Barnim I⁵⁸.

In the first matter, it is of course impossible to rule out a conflict between the widow of Barnim I and her stepson. On the other hand, one should not disregard the opinion of researchers who indicate that Matilda's issuance of a document in Ueckermünde may be a proof, above all, that in 1279 this town was one of the ducal seats⁵⁹.

54 Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik*, 163; Weiland, hrsg., "Braunschweigische Reimchronik", 570-571; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1183, 1184; Sello, "Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen", 174.

55 Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1203.

56 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1205; Barthold, *Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen* 3, 6; Jerzy Walachowicz, *Geneza i ustrój polityczny Nowej Marchii do początków XIV wieku* (Warszawa-Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1980), 62; Freza-Olczyk, *Stepmother and stepson: Duchess Matilda*, 94.

57 Barthold, *Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen* III, 6.

58 Benedykt Zientara, "Rola Szczecina w odrzańskim i bałtyckim handlu zbożem XIII-XIV wiek", Part 1, *Przegląd Historyczny* 52 (1961) 3: 423; Dietmar Lucht, *Die Städtepolitik Herzog Barnims I. von Pommern 1220-1278* (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission für Pommern, H. 10) (Köln-Graz: Böhlau Verlag 1965), 28; Freza-Olczyk, "Stepmother and stepson: Duchess Matilda", 94.

59 As confirmed by Piskorski, *Miasta księstwa szczecińskiego*, 55, note 114.

In the second matter, it should be assumed that the Ottonian Margraves had no influence on the guarantees granted by the Pomeranian towns to the Margraves of the Johannine line. One can only guess that since Margrave Albert III testified on a document that confirmed the rights of Gartz, the Ascanians of the Ottonian line made an attempt to weaken the relations of Pomerania with their relatives of the Johannine line. Albert III and his brothers could not punish Pomeranian towns for the fact that, in their understanding, Bogislaw IV assumed his father's obligations, but did not fulfil them. It would be different if the Pomeranians had actually attacked the Ottonian Margraves. However, there is no proof of this. For the lack of clear source testimonies, there is more supposition on this point than any certainty as to the facts. It seems certain, however, that the disputes between the Ascanians led to the dissipation of their power and prestige in Pomerania. Suffice it to recall in this case that the Margraves managed to force Bogislaw IV, and his stepmother with her sons, to pay a feudal tribute only on 28 August 1284, after the war with the participants of the Rostock Landfriede in the years 1283–1284⁶⁰.

The journey of Margrave Albert III to Pomerania at the end of 1279 could have been an element of a wider campaign aimed at extending the influence of the Ottonian Margraves in the Griffin state. The next step in this direction was to try to win over the Bishop of Cammin, Hermann von Gleichen, and thus weaken the party supporting Eric. Between January and April 1280, Margraves Otto V and Albert III concluded an agreement with the Bishop of Cammin, Hermann von Gleichen, regarding border disputes that were arising between the two parties⁶¹. Information about this dispute was transferred by a later document, which the same Margraves and their younger brother Otto VI issued on 13 July 1280, at Stargard in Mecklenburg, during a meeting held again with Bishop Hermann⁶². The aforementioned dispute arose because of the borders of the so-called "Terra Cinneborch", i.e. in fact the district belonging to the bishopric of Cammin, concentrated around Świdwin (Schivelbein) and Lipie (Arnhausen, south of Białogard/Belgard)⁶³ as well as the Kolberg land. The Bishop of Magdeburg

60 See Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1312; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1366, 1367.

61 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1168; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1213, 1218.

62 Prümers, hrsg. von, PommUB II, 1168; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1218; Eberhard Sauer, *Der Adel während der Besiedlung Ostpommerns (die Länder Kolberg, Belgard, Schlawe, Stolp) 1250–1350* (Stettin: Verlag Leon Sauniers Buchhandlung, 1939), 109–110; Wybranowski, "Początki świeckiego kręgu wasali", 55–56.

63 Hoogeweg, *Die Stifter und Klöster*, 55; Sauer, *Der Adel*, 109–110; Kazimierz Ślaski, *Podziały terytorialne Pomorza w XI–XIII w.* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 1960), 150, 155; Halina Szulc, *Morfogenetyczne typy osiedli wiejskich na Pomorzu Zachodnim* (Wrocław et al.: Prace Geograficzne Instytutu Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Polskiej Akademii Nauk, nr 149, 2008), 99; Rymar, "Rycerstwo ziemi świdwińskiej w XII–XVI wieku", *Przeгляд Zachodniopomorski* 24 (2009), 53: 7 (for more on the location of this territory); Rymar, *Historia polityczna i społeczna*, 191.

Gebhard and other trusted vassals of the Margraves were appointed to arbitrate in it. They ruled that the Cinneborch land, which the Margraves were to acquire from some monks not exactly specified in the document, should maintain the boundaries as defined by Duke Barnim I in his privilege. The Margraves agreed that Bishop Hermann and his church should retain the gord (burgwall) Lipie built by him in their part of the land of Cinneborch, together with the land whose borders had been delimited already by Barnim I by his vassals and some canons of Cammin, as well as the ownership of this part of the land of Kolberg, which the Bishop acquired from Duke Barnim I, along with all the rights and freedoms⁶⁴. The Margraves, however, reserved the right to exercise judicial power in the Bishop's part of the Cinneborch land. As for the details of the border of the disputed area, the Bishop had previously agreed with the knights of the Margraves: Borek, Romel and Ludek de Lassen during the congress in Löcknitz. The gord in Lipie⁶⁵, which was awarded to the Bishop and his church, was to be returned to him only when he fulfilled the conditions of the agreement. Instead of a part of the Kołobrzeg (Kolberg) land bought by Bishop Hermann from Barnim I, the Bishop was to transfer to the Margraves the rights held by him and his church to the land of Pełczyce (Bernstein Land) in the New March (as long as the Margraves manage to hold it). If the Margraves were to return the land of Pełczyce to the son of Barnim I, Duke Bogislaw IV, the Bishop and his church should retain their rights in it. If in the future there was a division in which the Margraves and their relatives (i.e. the Margraves of the Johannine line) would participate, then the Kolberg land bought by the Bishop from the hands of Barnim I should not be the subject of this division, and the Pełczyce/Bernstein Land, being compensation, should remain with the Bishop and his church – as agreed by the trusted knights of the Margraves: Borek, Romel and Ludek as well as the representatives appointed by the canons of Cammin. At the end of the treaty, it was stipulated that the Bishop and the chapter accepted the protection of the Margraves against everyone except their relatives – the Margraves of Brandenburg (of the Johannine line). The Bishop and his chapter, for their part, also pledged their help against any enemy except the Johannine Margraves. This condition must have been particularly important to the Bishop, who certainly desired to remain neutral in the ongoing conflict.

64 For more on this transaction, see one of the latest analyses by Krzysztof Guzikowski, *Obce rycerstwo na Pomorzu Zachodnim do początku XIV wieku* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Humanistycznego US "Minewra", 2013), 90.

65 More on this gord/castle, see Zbigniew Radacki, *Średniowieczne zamki Pomorza Zachodniego* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1976), 214, 248; Eugeniusz Cnotliwy, Tadeusz Nawroński, "Gród wczesnośredniowieczny i zamek późnośredniowieczny w Lipiu, gm. Rąbino, woj. Koszalińskie w świetle badań archeologicznych", *Materiały Zachodniopomorskie* 32 (1968): 182–183, 259; Henryk W. Janocha, Franciszek J. Lachowicz, *Zamki Pomorza Środkowego* (Koszalin: Prasowe Zakłady Graficzne w Koszalinie, 1990), 109–113.

From the reading of the cited document, it appears that at some point hostile actions took place between the Ottonian Margraves and the Bishop of Cammin. The Bishop's construction of a gord (burgwall) in the land considered by the Margraves as theirs should be considered as such. The takeover of this fortified settlement by the Ascanians could not be considered in terms of peace either. However, due to the lack of other sources, we are unable to define the chronology of these events.

Another problem that emerges from the above document concerns the Pełczyce land. One must wonder about the circumstances of its acquisition by Margrave Albert III. The Margrave in the quoted document claimed that he had bought it from certain monks. But what was the reason for placing in the text of the diploma a note about the possibility of returning this land to prince Bogislaw IV? It probably indicates that the Duke did not consider the reign of the Margraves in it to be legal, and that the ruler might attempt to retrieve it from Albert III.

The opinion about the hostile relations between Albert III and Duke Bogislaw IV in the 16th century was delivered by the Pomeranian chronicler Thomas Kantzow. Unfortunately, his account is tainted with accusations of mistakes concerning chronology and names of localities. However, this does not change the essence of the account. The chronicler mentioned in it that Albert III was arguing with Bogislaw IV about the borders of the Pełczyce land. In 1280, the Margrave was to invade Bogislaw IV's estate with all his might and take over the entire land of Pełczyce, including the town itself⁶⁶. It is also certain that Albert III, when entering into negotiations with the Bishop of Cammin in 1280, owned the Pełczyce land and that he was considering the possibility of its return to Bogislaw IV. Referring to Kantzow, as there are no other sources that would try to show the circumstances of the transition of the land of Pełczyce into the hands of the Margrave, it should be assumed that the dispute over its borders broke out after Barnim I's death. The Brandenburg annexation could have occurred at the time when the relations between Bogislaw IV and his stepmother deteriorated. The aim of Albert III's attack could also be to discourage Bogislaw IV from associating himself more closely with the Johannine Margraves. Since the Pomeranian Duke married Matilda, the daughter of John I, Margrave of Brandenburg, Albert III and his brothers had the right to have doubts about the attitude of Bogislaw IV. However, these fears proved to be unfounded.

Bogislaw IV did not intend to get involved in the war for the Archbishopric of Magdeburg. As it was said, from the summer of 1280, the Bishop of Cammin, Hermann von Gleichen, also decided to at least remain neutral in the clash between the two lines of the Margraves. This turned out to be a prudent approach. In the summer

66 Georg Gaebel, hrsg. von, Thomas Kantzow, *Pomerania. Eine pommersche Chronik aus dem sechzehnten Jahrhundert* (Stettin: Paul Niekammer, 1908), 238.

of 1280, a decisive campaign took place in the ongoing war. In the Battle of Wiesenburg (near Belzig), the Magdeburg troops led by Gumprecht von Alvensleben and Burchard Lappe suffered a crushing defeat in a clash with the troops of the Johannine Margraves led by knight Falk, a well-known *Raubritter* then in the service of the Johannine Ascanians, and Konrad von Reden⁶⁷. The Margraves took captive the commanders of the Magdeburg forces along with 320 knights and squires. After this decisive defeat, which actually broke the resistance of Magdeburg, Margrave Albert III undertook to mediate between the Archbishop-elect Bernhard von Wölpe and Margrave Otto IV⁶⁸. The result of these mediations is unfortunately not known. While skirmishes between the ministeriales of the Johannine Margraves and the Archbishopric continued for some time, the war was slowly dying out, and the conflict itself was transferred to the level of a court dispute before Papal arbitration. The mediation undertaken by Albert III is the ultimate proof of the peace established some time earlier (but rather after the Battle of Wiesenburg) between the Margraves of Brandenburg of both lines.

In August 1280, the possibly reconciled Ascanians began to regain their former influence around the Elbe River, in Mecklenburg and in Pomerania. On 24 August 1280, the King of the Romans Rudolf of Habsburg issued a document in which he stated that he handed over to his son-in-law Albert II, Duke of Saxony, and to the Margraves of Brandenburg John II, Otto IV and Conrad the rights to administration, executing power and ownership of Imperial possessions in Saxony and Thuringia, in exactly the same manner as these powers belonged to the deceased Albert I the Tall, Duke of Brunswick, and Albert I, Duke of Saxony, including the right to sovereignty over Lübeck⁶⁹. As the city refused to accept it, the royal act constituted a kind of prelude to the war between Lübeck and the Margraves of Brandenburg⁷⁰. Armed skirmishes, which had been taking place parallel to the diplomatic actions between the Margraves and Lübeck from 1280, in the following years resulted in the conflict's spreading to Saxony, Slavia, Rügen and Pomerania. Some time before 13 June 1283, Bogislaw IV, remaining in alliance with Lübeck, entered the war⁷¹. As mentioned above, his move ended with, inter alia, forcing the Pomeranian Duke to obedience and paying homage to the Margraves of Brandenburg. It was one of the conditions of the preliminary peace

67 Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1219.

68 Janicke, hrsg. von, *Die Magdeburger Schöpffenchronik*, 167; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1220; Sello, "Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen", 177–178; Schultze, *Die Mark Brandenburg*, 185.

69 Johann Friedrich Böhmer, Friedrich Techen, bearb., *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck*, Theil 1, Abtheilung 1 (Lübeck: Friedr. Aschenfeldt, 1843), 403; Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1224.

70 Smolinski, "Międzynarodowe okoliczności odzyskania ziemi sławieńskiej przez Mściwoja II w 1284 r. i zawarcia sojuszu brandenbursko-wielkopolskiego" (in print).

71 Krabbo, Winter, bearb., *Regesten*, 1333; Rymar, "Udział Pomorza w wojnie koalicyjnej 1283–1285", 471–487; Smoliński, "Międzynarodowe okoliczności".

treaty signed by the Johannine Margraves and Bogislaw IV as well as Vitslav II of Rügen on 13 August 1284 in Vierraden⁷². The Pomeranian Duke failed to take advantage of the political turmoil that arose as a result of the dispute over the appointment of the Archbishop of Magdeburg and to defend his independence.

Bibliography

Sources

- Bielowski, August, ed. "Rocznik Traski". In: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*. Vol. II, 826–858. Lwów: Self-published, 1872.
- Böhmer, Johann Friedrich, Friedrich Techen, bearb. *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck*. Theil 1. Abtheilung 1. Lübeck: Friedr. Aschenfeldt, 1843.
- Gaebel, Georg, hrsg. von, Thomas Kantzow. *Pomerania. Eine pommersche Chronik aus dem sechzehnten Jahrhundert*. Stettin: Paul Niekammer, 1908.
- Heinemann, Otto, hrsg. von. *Johannes Bugenhagens, Pomerania*. Stettin: Herrcke & Lebeting; Verlag von Léon Saunier's Buchhandlung, 1900.
- Holder-Egger, Oswald, hrsg. von. "Chronica principum Saxoniae". In: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*, 472–480. Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani, 1888.
- Janicke, Karl, hrsg. von. *Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik* (= Die Chroniken der deutschen Städte. Bd. 7: *Die Chroniken der niederdeutschen Städte*, Bd. 1). Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1869.
- Kozłowska-Budkowa, Zofia, Krystyna Pieradzka, ed. and foreword. *Iohannis Dlugossi, Annales seu Cronicae regni Poloniae*. Liber VII/VIII. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwa Naukowe, 1975.
- Krabbo, Hermann, Georg Winter, bearb. *Regesten der Markgrafen von Brandenburg aus askanischem Hause*, Lief. 1–12. Leipzig et al.: Verlag von Duncker & Humblod, Selbstverlage des Vereins Geschäftsstelle Berlin–Dahlem, Selbstverlag für Geschichte des Mark Brandenburg, 1910–1955.
- Kürbis, Brigida, ed. "Kronika wielkopolska". In: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*. Series II. Vol. VIII. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970.
- Kürbis, Brigida, ed. "Rocznik kapituły poznańskiej". In: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*. Series II. Vol. VI, 21–78. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1962.

72 Prümers, hrsg. v., PommUB II, 1366.

- Kürbis, Brigida, ed. "Spominki poznańskie". In: *Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Monumenta Poloniae Historica. Series II, vol. VI, 123–125*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1962.
- Lisch, Georg Christian Friedrich *et al.*, hrsg. von. *Meklenburgische Urkundebuch*. Bd. II (1251–1280). Schwerin: in Commission der Stiller'schen Hofbuchhandlung, 1864.
- Mülverstedt, Georg Adalbert von, bearb. *Regesta archiepiscopatus Magdeburgensis. Sammlung von Auszügen aus Urkunden und Annalisten zur Geschichte des Erzstifts und Herzogtums Magdeburg*. Bd. 3: *Von 1270 bis 1305*. Magdeburg: Verlag E. Baensch, 1886.
- Perlbaach, Max, hrsg. von. *Pommerellisches Urkundenbuch*. Danzig: Westpreussischer Geschichtsverein, 1882.
- Pertz, Georg Heinrich, hrsg. von. "Chronicon Hildesheimense". In: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*. Bd. VI, 845–873. Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani, 1846.
- Prümers, Rodgero, hrsg. von. *Pommersches Urkundenbuch*. Bd. II (Abth. I–II). Stettin: In Commission bei Th. von der Rahmer, Friedr. Nagelsche Buchhandlung, Paul Rikammer, 1885.
- Prümers, Rodgero, hrsg. von. "Annales Colbacenses". In: *Pommersches Urkundenbuch. Zweite Abtheilung*, Bd. I, 465–473. Stettin: In Commission bei Th. von der Rahmer, Friedr. Nagelsche Buchhandlung, Paul Rikammer, 1877.
- Redlich, Oswald, bearb. *Eine Wiener Briefsammlung zur Geschichte des deutschen Reiches und der österreichischen Länder in der zweiten Hälfte des XIII. Jahrhunderts* (Mittheilungen aus dem Vaticanischen Archive, 2). Wien: In Commission bei F. Temsky, 1894.
- Schum, Wilhelm, hrsg. von. "Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium". In: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Scriptores*. Bd. XXV, 369–374, Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani, 1883.
- Weiland, Ludwig, hrsg., "Braunschweigische Reimchronik". In: *Monumenta Germaniae Historica. Deutsche Chroniken*. Bd. 2, 430–587. Hannover: Impensis Bibliopolii Aulici Haniani, 1877.
- Winter, Georg, hrsg. von. *Pommersches Urkundenbuch*. Bd. IV (Abt. I–II). Stettin: Paul Niekammer, 1902–1903.

Literature

- Assing, Helmut. "Der Weg der sächsischen und brandenburgischen Askanier zur Kurwürde". In: *Askanier-Studien der Lauenburgischen Akademie*, hrsg. von Eckardt Opitz (Kolloquium. Lauenburgische Akademie für Wissenschaft und Kultur. Bd. 16), 71–118. Bochum: Lukas Verlag, 2010.

- Barthold, Friedrich Wilhelm. *Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen*. Teil 2: *Von der Bekehrung Pommerns zum Christenthume bis zum Tode Barnims I. i. J. 1278. Nebst einer Höhen- und Fluß-Karte von Pommern*. Hamburg: Friedrich Perches, 1840.
- Barthold, Friedrich Wilhelm. *Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen*. Teil 3: *Vom Tode Barnims I. (1278) bis zum Auftreten der Hohenzollern in der Mark Brandenburg (1411)*. Hamburg: Friedrich Perches, 1842.
- Cnotliwy, Eugeniusz, Tadeusz Nawrołski. "Gród wczesnośredniowieczny i zamek późnośredniowieczny w Lipiu, gm. Rąbino, woj. Koszalińskie w świetle badań archeologicznych". *Materiały Zachodniopomorskie* 32 (1968): 181–292.
- Freza-Olczyk, Mariola. "Stepmother and stepson: Duchess Matilda in the power struggle after the death of her husband Barnim I the Duke of Pomerania". *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 23 (2019): 83–99.
- Friedländer, Ernst. *Das Einlager. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte*. Münster: Verlag der Theissing'sches Buchhandlung, 1868.
- Graf, Klaus. "Die Magdeburger Schöppenchronik. Anregungen für die künftige Forschung". *Sachsen und Anhalt* 30 (2018): 131–172.
- Gundolf, Keil. *Magdeburger Schöppenchronik*. In: *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, hrsg. von Liselotte Lutz, Joyce M. McLellan, Ulrich Mattejiet, Frank Weyrich, Gloria Avella-Widhalm. Bd. 6, 79. München et al.: Artemis & Winkler Verlag, 1995.
- Guzikowski, Krzysztof. *Obce rycerstwo na Pomorzu Zachodnim do początku XIV wieku*. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Humanistycznego US "Minerwa", 2013.
- Heinrich, Gerd. *Die Grafen von Arnstein* (Mitteldeutsche Forschungen. Bd. 21). Köln–Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1961.
- Heyden, Hellmuth. *Kirchengeschichte von Pommern*. Bd. 1: *Von den Anfängen des Christentums bis zur Reformationszeit*. Stettin: Verlag Fischer & Schmidt, 1937.
- Hlebionek, Marcin. *Bolesław Pobożny i Wielkopolska jego czasów*. Kraków: Avalon, 2010.
- Holder-Egger, Oswald. "Über die Braunschweiger und Sächsische Fürstenchronik und verwandte Quellen". *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde* 17 (1892): 159–184.
- Hoogeweg, Hermann. *Die Stifter und Klöster der Provinz Pommern*. Bd. 1. Stettin: Leon Sauniers Buchhandlung, 1924.
- Janocha, Henryk W., Lachowicz Franciszek J. *Zamki Pomorza Środkowego*. Koszalin: Prasowe Zakłady Graficzne w Koszalinie, 1990.
- Jasiński, Kazimierz. "Genealogia Piastów wielkopolskich". *Kronika Miasta Poznania* 2 (1995): 34–66.
- Keil, Gundolf. "Magdeburger Schöppenchronik". In: *Lexikon des Mittelalters*, hrsg. von Liselotte Lutz, Joyce M. McLellan, Ulrich Mattejiet, Frank Weyrich, Gloria Avella-Widhalm, Bd. 6. München et al.: Artemis & Winkler Verlag, 1995.

- Lucht, Dietmar. "Die Außenpolitik Herzog Barnims I. von Pommern". *Baltische Studien*. Neue Folge 51 (1965): 15–32.
- Lucht, Dietmar. *Die Städtepolitik Herzog Barnims I. von Pommern 1220–1278* (Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission für Pommern. H. 10). Köln–Graz: Böhlau Verlag, 1965.
- Mierke, Gesine. "Norddeutsche Reimchroniken – Braunschweigische und Mecklenburgische Reimchronik". In: *Handbuch Chroniken des Mittelalters*, hrsg. von Gerhard Wolf, Norbert H. Ott, 197–224. Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter, 2016.
- Mülverstedt, Georg Adalbert. "Die Erzbischöfe von Magdeburg Günter (1277–1279), Bernhard (1279–1282) und Erich (1283–1295) vor ihrer Wahl". *Geschichtsblätter für Stadt und Land Magdeburg* 5 (1870): 150–152.
- Nass, Karl. "Zur Cronica Saxonum und verwandten Braunschweiger Werken". *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 49 (1993): 557–582.
- Nießen, Paul von. *Geschichte der Neumark im Zeitalter ihrer Entstehung und Besiedlung (Von den ältesten Zeiten bis zum Aussterben der Askanier)*. Landsberg: Landsberg a. In: Dermietzel & Schmidt, 1905.
- Nowacki, Bronisław. *Przemysł II odnowiciel Królestwa Polskiego*. Kraków: Avalon, 2007.
- Piskorski, Jan M. *Miasta księstwa szczecińskiego do połowy XIV wieku*. Poznań–Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 2005.
- Radacki, Zbigniew. *Średniowieczne zamki Pomorza Zachodniego*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1976.
- Rymar, Edward. "Walka o Pomorze Gdańskie w latach 1269–1272". *Rocznik Gdański* 44 (1987): 5–33.
- Rymar, Edward. "Wojny na Pomorzu Zachodnim i wojenne czynniki Pomorza poza Pomorzem XII – początek XVII wieku (Kalendarium)". In: *Pomorze militarne XII–XXI wiek. Materials from a scientific session held on 27 November 2003 at the Ducal Castle in Szczecin*, ed. Kazimierz Kozłowski, Edward Rymar, 133–174. Vol. 1. Szczecin: Oficyna Wydawnicza Archiwum Państwowego w Szczecinie "Dokument", 2004.
- Rymar, Edward. *Rodowód książąt pomorskich* (ed. 2). Szczecin: Książnica Pomorska im. Stanisława Staszica w Szczecinie, 2005.
- Rymar, Edward. "Władcy Brandenburgii (Askańczycy) na dzisiejszych ziemiach polskich, zwłaszcza w Nowej Marchii i na Pomorzu w latach 1200–1319 (itinerarium): ed. II". *Nadwarciański Rocznik Historyczno-Archiwalny* 15 (2008): 17–40.
- Rymar, Edward. "Rycerstwo ziemi świdwińskiej w XII–XVI wieku". *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 24 (2009), 53: 7–50.

- Rymar, Edward. "Udział Pomorza w wojnie koalicyjnej 1283–1285". In: *W kręgu idei, polityki i wojska. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Januszowi Farysiowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin*, red. Tomasz Sikorski, Henryk Walczak, Adam Wątor, 471–487. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2009.
- Rymar, Edward. *Historia polityczna i społeczna Nowej Marchii w średniowieczu (do roku 1535)*. Gorzów Wielkopolski: Wojewódzka i Miejska Biblioteka Publiczna im. Zbigniewa Herberta, 2015.
- Rymar, Edward. "Trzebień koło Dolic trwał dłużej niż sądziłem". *Stargardia. Rocznik Muzeum Archeologiczno-Historyczne w Stargardzie poświęcony przeszłości i kulturze Pomorza* 10 (2015): 315–321.
- Rymar, Edward. "Mściwoj II jako lennik margrabiów brandenburskich (w latach 1269–1273)". *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 23 (2019): 216–244.
- Salis, Friedrich. "Forschungen zur älteren Geschichte des Bistums Kammin". *Baltische Studien. Neue Folge*, 26 (1924): 1–155.
- Sauer, Eberhard. *Der Adel während der Besiedlung Ostpommerns (die Länder Kolberg, Belgard, Schlawe, Stolp) 1250–1350*. Stettin: Verlag Leon Sauniers Buchhandlung, 1939.
- Schmidt, Eberhard. *Die Mark Brandenburg unter den Askaniern (1134–1320)*. Köln–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1975.
- Schultze, Johannes. *Die Mark Brandenburg*. Bd.: 1 *Entstehung und Entwicklung unter den askanischen Markgrafen (bis 1319)*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1961.
- Sello, Georg. "Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen 1266–1283". *Geschichtsblätter für Stadt und Land Magdeburg* 23 (1888): 71–98, 131–184.
- Sinclair Keith, von, Herbert Grundmann. "Ein Fragment der Gesta archiepiscoporum Magdeburgensium". *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters* 18 (1962): 245–248.
- Smoliński, Marek. "Sytuacja na pograniczu askańsko-meklemburskim w II połowie XIII w. i na przełomie XIII/XIV w. i najazd Brandenburgii na Pomorze Sławińskie w 1306 r.". *Gdańskie Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza*. Issue 7: *Mazowsze, Pomorze, Prusy* (2000): 181–234.
- Smoliński, Marek. "Udział Polaków i Pomorzan w bitwie pod Frohse 10 I 1278 r. Próba identyfikacji sojuszników Ottona IV ze Strzałą". *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza*. Issue 14: *Kaci, święci, templariusze* (2008): 285–310.
- Smoliński, Marek. "Między dwoma organizmami państwowymi – biskup kamieński Herman von Gleichen i jego stosunki z księżętami Pomorza Zachodniego oraz margrabiami brandenburskimi". *Średniowiecze Polskie i Powszechnie* 3 (2011), 7: 25–44.

- Smoliński, Marek. "W poszukiwaniu Pomorzan biorących udział w bitwie pod Suchymi Krutami 26 VIII 1278 r." In: *Pomerania et alia opuscula Joachimo Zdrenka dedicata*, eds. Joanna Karczewska, Marcei Tureczek, 77–100. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2017.
- Smolinski, Marek. *Międzynarodowe okoliczności odzyskania ziemi sławieńskiej przez Mściwoja II w 1284 r. i zawarcia sojuszu brandenbursko-wielkopolskiego* (in print).
- Sommerfeld, Wilhelm Wichard Waldemar, von. *Geschichte der Germanisierung des Herzogtums Pommern oder Slavien*. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1896.
- Spors, Józef. *Dzieje polityczne ziem sławieńskiej, słupskiej i białogardzkiej XII–XIV w. Słupsk–Poznań*: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1973.
- Spors, Józef. "Agresja brandenburska wobec Wielkopolski do 1278 roku". *Roczniki Historyczne* 40 (1974): 107–122.
- Szulc, Halina. *Morfogenetyczne typy osiedli wiejskich na Pomorzu Zachodnim*. Wrocław et al.: Prace Geograficzne Instytutu Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Polskiej Akademii Nauk, nr 149, 2008.
- Ślaski, Kazimierz. *Dzieje ziemi kołobrzeskiej do czasów jej germanizacji*. Toruń: Towarzystwo Naukowe w Toruniu, 1948.
- Ślaski, Kazimierz. *Podziały terytorialne Pomorza w XI–XIII w.* Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk, 1960.
- Śliwiński, Błażej. *Mściwoj II (1224–1294) książę wschodniopomorski (gdański)*. Warszawa: DiG, 2016.
- Walachowicz, Jerzy. *Geneza i ustrój polityczny Nowej Marchii do początków XIV wieku*. Warszawa–Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1980.
- Wasilkiewicz, Kamil. "Konflikt księcia pomorskiego Bogusława IV z zakonem templariuszy (1283 – ok. 1291)". *Zapiski Historyczne* 85 (2020), 2: 113–131.
- Wattenbach, Wilhelm. *Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen im Mittelalter bis zur Mitte des dreizehnten Jahrhunderts*, 2. Berlin: Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, 1894.
- Wehrmann, Martin. *Geschichte von Pommerns*. Bd. 1. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes 1919.
- Winter, Franz. "Die Schlacht bei Frohse am 10. Januar 1278". *Geschichtsblätter für Stadt und Land Magdeburg* 5 (1870): 1–6.
- Wybranowski, Dariusz. "Początki świeckiego kręgu wasali biskupa kamieńskiego Hermana von Gleichen (1251–1288/89) na tle jego działalności politycznej i kolonizacyjnej. Część 2 (1275–1280)". *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza*. Issue 12: *Krzyżacy, szpitalnicy, kondotierzy* (2006): 425–452.
- Zientara, Benedykt. "Rola Szczecina w odrzańskim i bałtyckim handlu zbożem XIII–XIV wiek. Część 1". *Przegląd Historyczny* 52 (1961) 3: 413–444.
- Zientara, Benedykt. "Rola miast w walce stanów Pomorza Zachodniego z władzą książęcą na przełomie XIII i XIV wieku". *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 4 (1962): 489–521.

English version: Radosław Dolecki, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

Between 1277 and 1283, a dispute arose followed by an open war for the appointment of the Archbishop of Magdeburg. Margraves of Brandenburg of the Johannine confronted Günther von Schwalenberg, who was elected first, and then Bernhard von Wölpe. The Margraves attempted to promote the election of their brother Eric to the office in question. On the other side of the dispute were the Margraves of the Ottonian line. This situation potentially led to the outbreak of a civil war in the March of Brandenburg.

The plans of the Margraves of the Johannine line were initially supported by Western Pomerania. On their side was both the Bishop of Cammin, Hermann, and Duke Barnim I. The Pomeranian court, not only because of the feudal duties towards Margraves, but also due to family ties linking Barnim I and his son Bogislaw IV with both lines of the Margraves, could not remain indifferent to these events. It cannot be ruled out that in 1278 the Margraves of the Johannine line managed to persuade into cooperation the Dukes of Greater Poland as well as Mestvin (Mściwoj) II of East Pomerania.

At the end of 1278, Barnim I died, which affected the efforts of representatives of both lines of Margraves of Brandenburg to ensure the cooperation of his successor, Bogislaw IV. The Duke, however, did not seem to intend to support either side. Moreover, in view of the internal problems of the Brandenburg Ascanians, he began to think about political independence. However, these plans came to naught. Already in 1280, the Bishop of Cammin, Hermann von Gleichen, actually announced his neutrality in the dispute between the Margraves. Bogislaw IV tried to defend his independence by entering into an alliance with Lübeck and participating in the anti-Brandenburg Landfriede of Rostock (1283). In 1284, however, he found himself among the defeated belligerents and, apart from making other concessions to the Margraves, he had to pay homage to them.

Pomorze Zachodnie wobec wojny o tron arcybiskupa magdeburgskiego w latach 1277–1283

Słowa kluczowe: Arcybiskupstwo magdeburgskie, Brandenburgia, Pomorze, arcybiskup Günther von Schwalenberg, arcybiskup Bernhard von Wölpe, arcybiskup Eryk, syna margrabię brandenburskiego Jana I, margrabiowie brandenburscy: Jan II, Otton IV, Konrada, Otton V, Albrecht III, księżęta pomorscy: Barnim I, Bogusław IV

STRESZCZENIE

Między 1277 a 1283 r. doszło do sporu, a następnie wojny o urząd arcybiskupa magdeburgskiego. Przeciwno wybranemu najpierw Güntherowi von Schwalenberg, a potem Bernhardowi von Wölpe wystąpili margrabiowie brandenburscy z linii joannickiej. Forsowali oni wybór ich brata Eryka na wspomniany urząd. Po drugiej stronie sporu znaleźli się margrabiowie z linii ottońskiej. Sytuacja ta groziła wybuchem wojny domowej w Marchii Brandenburskiej. Plany margrabiów linii joannickiej poparło pierwotnie Pomorze Zachodnie. Po ich stronie znalazł się tak biskup kamieński Herman, jak i książę Barnim I. Dwór pomorski, nie tylko

ze względu na obowiązki lenne względem margrabiów, ale też i związki rodzinne łączące Barnima I i jego syna Bogusława IV z obiema liniami margrabiów, nie mógł pozostać w stosunku do tych wydarzeń obojętny. Nie można wykluczyć też możliwości, że margrabiom joannickim udało się w 1278 r. namówić do współdziałania książąt wielkopolskich i Mściwoja II wschodniopomorskiego.

Pod koniec 1278 r. zmarł Barnim I, co wpłynęło na zabiegi przedstawicieli obu linii margrabiów brandenburskich, by zapewnić sobie współpracę jego następcy, Bogusława IV. Książę jednak nie zamierzał chyba wspierać żadnej ze stron. Co więcej wobec problemów wewnętrznych Askańczyków brandenburskich, zaczął myśleć o samodzielności politycznej. Plany te jednak się nie powiodły. Jeszcze w 1280 r. swą neutralność w sporze między margrabiami ogłosił faktycznie biskup kamieński Herman von Gleichen. Bogusław IV próbował bronić swej niezależności wchodząc w sojusz z Lubeką i uczestnicząc w antybrandenburskim lantfrydzie Rostockim (1283). W 1284 r. znalazł się jednak w szeregu przegranych i oprócz innych ustępstw na rzecz margrabiów, musiał złożyć im hołd.

Citation

Smoliński, Marek. "West Pomerania's part in the war for the throne of the Archbishop of Magdeburg in 1277–1283". *Studia Maritima* XXXIV (2021): 5–32. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2021.34-01.



Jakub Morawiec

Institute of History
Centre for Nordic and Old English Studies,
University of Silesia in Katowice
kubmo@wp.pl
ORCID: 0000-0003-3942-0566

A skald in royal service – the case Þórarinn loftunga. Part 2: Poetics and ideology of *Tøgdrápa*

Keywords: skaldic poetry, *tøglag* metre, royal ideology

Þórarinn loftunga, an Icelandic poet, was famous for his service for Knútr in ríki, the King of England and Denmark. The skald played an important role in events he described in his poetry. It mainly refers to the taking over of Norway by Knútr in 1028 and efforts to establish Knútr's son Sveinn in Norway in the early 1030s as a follower and heir of the king Óláfr Haraldsson whose status as saint was just about to rise¹.

Knútr, as other rulers of that time, was eager to use skaldic poetry as one of the main channels of royal propaganda. That's why his court in England gathered a substantial number of skalds who were delivering their compositions praising the king and legitimising both his status and achievements². Þórarinn loftunga belonged to this group, being its important member.

The present article is the second part of the threefold study on Þórarinn's poetry with each part devoted to a different skald's composition. As I have already noted in the first part, the main aim of my study is to contextualise Þórarinn's poetry as a whole and determine if it can be treated as a sophisticated insight not only into the politics of Knútr in ríki (and his son Sveinn) but also the skald's own artistic input

-
- 1 Timothy Bolton, *Cnut the Great* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 172–195; Jakub Morawiec, *Knut Wielki. Król Anglii, Danii i Norwegii (ok. 995–1035)* (Kraków: Avalon, 2013), 248–301.
 - 2 Matthew Townend, "Contextualising the Knútsdrápur. Skaldic Praise-Poetry at the Court of Cnut", *Anglo-Saxon England* 30 (2001): 145–179; Jakub Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką. Rozgrywki polityczne w Skandynawii XI wieku w świetle poezji ówczesnych skaldów* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2016), 407–446.

that could have affected his place at the royal court³. The present study is focused on *Tøgdrápa* (Journey *drápa*), a poem Þórarinn devoted to Knútr's expedition to Norway in 1028.

Contrary to *Höfuðlausn*, it is possible to be more precise when it comes to the chronology of *Tøgdrápa*. Its content suggests the skald composed sometime between 1028 and 1030, between the taking control of Norway by Knútr and the death of jarl Hákon of Hlaðir, who was predicted to represent the king in Norway⁴.

The poem depicts the route Knútr and his fleet took on his way to Norway in 1028. The skald enlists spots that either marked crucial stages of the campaign (e.g. Limfjord, where the king's troops from Denmark and England met) or made it easier for an audience to estimate developments of the royal fleet (e.g. Stad). The poem features eight stanzas. Þórarinn used a *klofastef* in his *drápa*. Its second part is missing, thus assumptions that the poem is partially preserved are justified. Its beginning (*Knúts und sólar*) leaves no doubt that, similarly to *Höfuðlausn* – Þórarinn composed *Tøgdrápa* being fully aware of ideological expectations of the king and his court. Stanzas of *Tøgdrápa* are to be found in various narratives. Six out of eight preserved strophes are cited by Snorri in both redactions of his *Óláfs saga helga*. A sequence of the first four stanzas is to be found in the redaction A of *Fagrskinna*. Stanzas 7 and 8 are to be found only in the *Knýtlinga saga* and *Snorra Edda* respectively⁵.

Snorri used the poem while describing Knútr's expedition to Norway in 1028⁶. Providing a whole sequence of six stanzas, in fact, he makes Þórarinn a dominant figure of the chapter. It is the skald, not the saga author, who “speaks” through his poetry and provides a proper account of the encounter of two monarchs. In this very case, Snorri did not feel obliged to either develop or explain the content of the stanzas and one can find it as a consequence of a good opinion he had on Þórarinn as a poet. He concludes the chapter in question with an intriguing comment. Snorri states that, for him who composed the stanzas, an observance of these events was far more important than retelling them (*var sjón sögu ríkri*), as Þórarinn was very proud of being in the company of King Knútr when he came to Norway⁷. This unique statement can be interpreted in different ways. On one hand it could refer to Snorri's general acknowledgment of the skalds as eyewitnesses of various events, articulated in the Prologue of *Heimskringla*.

3 Jakub Morawiec, “A skald in royal service – the case Þórarinn loftunga. Part 1: Ideological contexts of *Höfuðlausn*”, *Studia Maritima* 33 (2020): 30.

4 *Scandinavian Poetry of the Middle Ages, Poetry from the Kings' Sagas I. From Mythical Times to c. 1035*, vol. 2, ed. Diana Whaley (Turnhout: Brepols, 2012), 851 (further cited as SPMA 1).

5 Stanza 8 is cited by all main redactions of *Snorra Edda*. Only redaction A attributes it to Þórarinn. See SPMA 1, 862.

6 *Heimskringla II*, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson, Íslenzk fornrit 26–28 (Reykjavík: Hið íslenska fornrita-félag, 2002), 307–310 (further cited as Hsk II).

7 Hsk II, 310.

On the other, it could, rather indirectly, refer to Snorri's focus on Knútr's generosity as the key factor in a process of gathering followers, needed to overcome King Ólafr the Saint effectively. No matter which alternative one prefers, it is possible to assume that Snorri knew the remaining preserved stanzas of *Tøgdrápa*. Obviously, it is confirmed by the featuring of strophe 8 in *Snorra Edda* where it is used to provide an example of a kenning of a generous man⁸. However, the above-mentioned statement of Snorri clearly suggests that he had also known stanza 7, the very same used by the author of the *Knýtlinga saga*. Þórarinn underlines the fact of meeting the outstanding man (*mannbaldr*) – Knútr and fifty marks (*fimm tega marka*) he was given for his poem⁹. Snorri refers to the very same amount of silver the poet was said to have been given by the king, although according to *Heimskringla* it was a reward for *Hofuðlausn*¹⁰. Besides, it seems very probable that Þórarinn's remark on meeting *mannbaldr* was enough for Snorri to comment on the poet's pride.

The author of *Fagrskinna* decided to cite a sequence of four strophes of *Tøgdrápa* (stanzas 2–5). Similarly to Snorri, he used them to corroborate his own account on Knútr's expedition to Norway in 1028¹¹. The author of the *Knýtlinga saga*, on the other hand, cited stanza 7 of the poem, just to fulfil his account on Þórarinn and his encounters with King Knútr¹².

A distinguished feature of *Tøgdrápa* is its metre – *tøglag* (journey metre). It differs from *dróttkvætt* by having four syllables (instead of six) in each line. Presumably, referring to the title of the poem, the metre was to be used in accounts on war expeditions, and optionally other travels of the king. *Tøglag* seems to be especially bound to Knútr's court. Roberta Frank has very recently referred to the meaning of the prefix *-tøg*. She argues convincingly that, on a more general level, it may mean “campaign, journey”, however its literal meaning: “rope, tie, knot” is particularly intriguing. It seems to refer not only to certain elements of the metre, e.g. *klofastefur* (knotted refrains) but is a synonym of ON *knútr*, alluding directly to the name of the royal patron supervising the origins of the metre¹³.

Perhaps it was a result of numerous journeys undertaken by this monarch (Denmark, Norway, Rome, Saxony) that each time were presented as important and prestigious

8 Snorri Sturluson, *Edda, Skáldskaparmál 1–2*, ed. Anthony Faulkes (London: Viking Society for Northern Research, 1998), 63.

9 SPMA 1, 861.

10 Hsk II, 310.

11 *Fagrskinna*, ed. Bjarni Einarsson, Íslenzk fornrit 29 (Reykjavík: Hið íslenska fornritafélag, 1984), 191–193.

12 *Danakonunga sögur*, ed. Bjarni Guðnason, Íslenzk fornrit 35 (Reykjavík: Hið íslenska fornritafélag, 1982), 125.

13 Roberta Frank, “A taste for knottiness. Skaldic art at Cnut's court”, *Anglo-Saxon England* 47 (2018): 210.

means of Knútr's reign¹⁴. The same metre was used by Sigvatr Þórðarson in his *Knútsdrápa*¹⁵. Matthew Townend argues that the latter poet invented the metre and used it for the first time, but it was Þórarinn's *drápa* that made it well known¹⁶.

The aim of this part is to verify to what extent both Þórarinn and Sigvatr were able to meet requirements of *tøglag* in their poems. Consequently, it should throw some new light on the controversy which of both skalds should be treated as the originator of the metre. To achieve it, it will be necessary to confront compositional practice of both skalds with a theoretical framework of the metre, defined particularly by Snorri in his Edda. The following investigation will include respective statistics referring to basic components of the *tøglag*; it is a number of syllables in line, has proper rhyming and alliteration¹⁷. The other aim of this investigation is to estimate the role Þórarinn played in ideological endeavours that had been developed at the court of Knútr at the time of the takeover of Norway in 1028¹⁸.

Snorri Sturluson used the metre in stanzas 68–70 of his *Háttatal*. Each of them is accompanied by a prose commentary explaining specifics of *tøglag*. The first of them that I propose to label as the Type 1 features:

- four syllables and full rhymes in even lines,
- four regular syllables and the fifth an enclitic syllable in odd lines¹⁹ and half-rhymes in odd lines,
- alliteration as in *dróttkvætt*²⁰.

The stanza 69, the Type 2, is a slight variant of the previous one. It features all components of the Type 1 excerpt for the lack of rhyme in odd lines²¹.

14 See Townend, "Contextualising the Knútsdrápur", 161–163.

15 Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 234.

16 SPMA 1, 852.

17 A statistical analysis in skaldic studies is not a completely new thing. One can recall investigations on an intensity of mythological references in 11th century poetry, very recently summarised by Chris Abram and Mikael Males. See Chris Abram, "Einarr Skúlason, Snorri Sturluson, and the Post-Pagan Mythological Kenning", in: *Eddic, Skaldic and Beyond. Poetic Variety in Medieval Iceland and Norway*, ed. Martin Chase (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 44–61; Mikael Males, *The Poetic Genesis of Old Icelandic Literature* (Berlin-Boston: deGruyter, 2020), 39–43.

18 See Charles Insley, "Why 1016 Matters; or, The Politics of Memory and Identity in Cnut's Kingdom", in: *Conquests in Eleventh-Century England. 1016, 1066*, ed. Laura Ashe, Emily Joan Ward (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2020), 16–17. However, it is difficult to agree with the author's statement that *tøglag* was a simpler metre than *dróttkvætt*. I argue below that its structure, in many aspects similar to the latter, appeared to be challenging enough for both Sigvatr and Þórarinn to find *tøglag* pretty demanding.

19 Snorri Sturluson explains that it refers to very short syllables like "ek" or "eða".

20 Snorri Sturluson, *Edda*, 29.

21 Snorri Sturluson, *Edda*, 30. Margaret Clunies Ross claims that Snorri gives two variants of the metre in *Háttatal*. In my opinion, however, inclusion of the stanza 69 in the poem, accompanied by a separate short commentary on the lack of rhymes in odd lines as its characteristic feature, points at Snorri's

Finally, stanza 70 represents Type 3, that, according to Snorri, should feature:

- four syllables and full rhymes in even lines,
- four syllables and half-rhymes in odd lines,
- alliteration as in *dróttkvætt*²².

Additionally, Snorri states, that it is allowed to provide short and quick syllables in any line of *tøglag* stanza. He also refers to *klofastefur*, another feature of the metre, whose number in the poem relies on the invention of a poet. According to Snorri, each *stef* must have its opening and conclusion²³. The type 3 can be considered as the most perfect incarnation of *tøglag*, especially when being used to embroil in a chain of refrain sections. That's why Snorri called this variant *hagmælt* – skillfully spoken²⁴.

Tøglag was included among the metres both Hallr Þórarinsson and Rognvaldr Kali Kolsson used in their *Háttalykill*. Two stanzas of the poem (25–26) were composed in this very metre²⁵. Similarly to the whole composition, there is no prose commentary on the metre and its usage excerpt for a heading *tødrápu háttr* that precedes both stanzas²⁶.

Unfortunately, what is quite characteristic for the preservation of *Háttalykill*, neither of the four half-stanzas (*helmingar*) are complete and some of their lines are reconstructed by modern editors²⁷. The first line of the *helmingr* 25/1 cannot be reconstructed. However, the remaining three lines feature four syllables each with full rhymes in even lines and a half-rhyme in the third line. Thus, it is very likely that *helmingr* 25/1 corresponds with Snorri's Type 3. Only two lines (2,3) of the *helmingr* 25/2 could be reconstructed. Considering a full rhyme in the even line and the half rhyme in the odd line as well as five syllables in the latter, the *helmingr* corresponds with Snorri's Type 1²⁸. Both *helmingar* of stanza 26 are even more badly preserved. The *helmingr* 26/1 has complete even lines and gaps in both odd lines. Considering the number of syllables and full rhymes in even lines, the *helmingr* can be hypothetically labelled as Snorri's Type 3. The *helmingr* 26/2 has only the first line complete that, intriguingly, features no rhyme. It could point at Snorri's Type 2, however the fragmentary state of the *helmingr* prevents any more precise labelling²⁹.

intention to distinguish it as separate variant of *tøglag*. See Margaret Clunies Ross, *A History of Old Norse Poetry and Poetics* (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer 2005), 32.

22 Snorri Sturluson, *Edda*, 30.

23 Ibidem.

24 Ibidem. See also *Scandinavian Poetry of the Middle Ages, Poetry from Treatises on Poetics*, vol. 2, ed. Kari Ellen Gade, Edith Marold (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 1182 (further cited as SPMA III).

25 SPMA III, 1033–1034.

26 See SPMA III, 1005.

27 See Gade's commentary to both stanzas, SPMA III, 1033–1034.

28 Ibidem, 1033.

29 SPMA III, 1034.

Despite some obvious limitations, caused by the preservation of the poem, both stanzas of *Háttalykill* seem to point to the existence of formal variants of *tøglag* concerning both rhymes and number of syllables. Concerning the postulated status of Hallr's and Rognvaldr's composition as a forerunner of Snorri's *Háttatal*³⁰, it is reasonable to assume that all three poets referred to the same three types of *tøglag* stanza that were for the first time fully introduced and defined in *Snorra Edda*³¹.

The theoretical framework of the metre, provided by Hallr, jarl Rognvaldr, and especially by Snorri, allows one to assume that the invention of *tøglag*, and *Tøgdrápa* as its natural consequence, was a result of poetic concurrency. The main challenge for poets was to keep the same rules of rhymes and alliteration as in *dróttkvaett* but with a lesser number of syllables (4/5 instead of 6) in one line³². That is why an ideal stanza would consist of four lines each including four syllables; the first and third line features half rhymes, the second and fourth lines feature full rhymes. The possibility to add the fifth syllable, as both *Háttalykill* and *Háttatal* indicate, had been cemented with the scope of the metre during the time of skaldic practice. That itself suggests that the challenge was not so easy to match and postulated a shortage of lines in the *helmingr* made it difficult for skalds to match its strict requirements. It resulted with additional Types (1, 2) that made room not only for the additional syllable but also various treatments of rhymes. The composition of both Sigvatr and Þórarinn are traditionally defined as the earliest examples of the usage of *tøglag*. Moreover, scholars assume one of them, in fact, invented the metre. Margaret Clunies Ross and Mikael Males point at Þórarinn, whereas Matthew Townend seems to favour Sigvatr in that role³³. A close, detailed look at both *Tøgdrápa* and *Knútsdrápa* seems necessary not only to shed some new light on the question of authorship of *tøglag* but, more importantly, Þórarinn's personal input into the development of the metre and its usage for skaldic milieu active at the court of Knútr inn ríki.

30 Ibidem, 1005.

31 There are other 12th century instances of *tøglag* compositions: Einarr Skúlason's *Haraldsdrápa II* Þórarinn stuttfeldr's *Stuttfeldardrápa*. Einarr's poem consists of eight Type 3 *helmingar*, sporadically defected by five-syllable lines. Þórarinn's *drápa* features more metrical irregularities. See *Scandinavian Poetry of the Middle Ages, Poetry from the Kings' Sagas 1. From c. 1035 to c. 1300*, vol. 1–2, ed. Kari Ellen Gade (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 473–479, 544–548 (further cited as SPMA II).

32 Mikael Males has recently underlined that the alteration of the length of the line was the main parameter of conscious metrical innovation before the twelfth century. See Males, *The Poetic Genesis*, 24. See also Richard North, "Behold the Front Page. Cnut and the Scyldings in Beowulf", *in press*, 13, who notes, that Þórarinn was able to meet requirements of the metre partly by using compounds *lije veg-Jóta* (*helmingr* 6/1) that could have been inspired by Old English constructions like *suð-Dene*. On possible Old English influences see also SPMA I, 860.

33 Clunies Ross, *A History*, 32; SPMA I, 852; Males, *The Poetic Genesis*, 24.

Metrical analysis of *Tøgdrápa*

Even though both older and the newest editions of both poems provide stanzaic division of both compositions, all calculations made below have a half-stanza (*helmingr*) as its base. Such a treatment of both *drápur* was dictated by two observations. First of all, counting by *helmingar* provides more reliable and visible numbers. Secondly, it provides a much clearer picture of an extent to which both poets used particular types of the metre, especially in the context of rules of *tøglag*, described in *Snorra Edda*. Lastly, both poems feature *helmingar* treated by modern editors as separate stanzas. It refers to stanza 8 of *Tøgdrápa* and stanzas 1, 2 and 11 of *Knútsdrápa* respectively.

Tøgdrápa consists of 15 *helmingar* in total, whereas *Knútsdrápa* lists 19 half-stanzas³⁴. Both poems feature *helmingar* that, due to its metrical irregularities, has been excluded from the counting. It refers to *helmingr* 6/2 of *Tøgdrápa* and *helmingr* 8/2 of *Knútsdrápa*:

*Þá gaf sínum,
segik þat, megi
dals dökksali
Danmørk svana*³⁵.

*En, þeirs kómu,
kilir, vestan til,
of leið liðu
Limafjarðar brim*³⁶.

The irregularities of *helmingr* 6/2 of *Tøgdrápa* feature five syllables in the second line. It consists of an intercalary clause (*segik þat*) that can hardly be defined as an equivalent of the short syllable Snorri describes in *Háttatal*. Besides, three out of four lines (excerpt from the first line) have full rhymes.

The case of *helmingr* 8/2 of *Knútsdrápa* is different. Its irregularities refer to adjustment of the fifth syllable to both even lines. Its odd lines, however, have four syllables. Distribution of rhymes in the *helmingr* is also slightly irregular. Although both even lines have full rhymes and the third line has a half rhyme, the first line has no rhyme. That is why it is difficult to classify both stanzas as examples of any of the three Types. The basic information is summarised in Table 1:

³⁴ Obviously, the incomplete *klofastef* of *Tøgdrápa* points to an incomplete state of the poem. One has to consider also that some *helmingar*/full-stanzas of *Knútsdrápa* had been lost. See SPMA I, 851.

³⁵ SPMA I, 860.

³⁶ Ibidem, 659.

Table 1. Type preference in Þórarinn loftunga's *Tøgdrápa* and Sigvatr Þórðarson's *Knútsdrápa*

Author/poem	Þórarinn loftunga, <i>Tøgdrápa</i>	Sigvatr Þórðarson, <i>Knútsdrápa</i>
Nr of <i>helmingar</i>	15	19
Type 1	0	2
Type 2	1	0
Type 3	13	16
Unclassified <i>helmingar</i>	1 (6/2)	1 (8/2)

Type preference in both poems

Both Þórarinn's and Sigvatr's poems seem to confirm that the three Types of *tøglag* stanza distinguished by Snorri in his *Edda* were used already by the time of the supposed birth of the metre, namely in the 1020s. Both skalds seem to have been eager to stick to strict requirements of the metre, as the vast majority of *helmingar* in their poems belong to Type 3. In the case of Þórarinn loftunga, it is 93% (13 out of 14) of *Tøgdrápa*'s half-stanzas. 89% (16 out of 18) of *helmingar* in Sigvatr Þórðarson's *Knútsdrápa* belongs to the same Type. Both poets used other Types as well, although marginally. *Tøgdrápa* features one Type 2 *helmingr*, whereas *Knútsdrápa* consists of two Type 1 *helmingar*.

Both poets were able to compose the Type 3 *helmingar* that can be described as metrically perfect. Their odd and even lines consist of four syllables each, the odd lines feature half-rhymes and even lines have full-rhymes, alliteration links the lines according to *dróttkvætt* requirements. *Helmingar* 4/2 of *Knútsdrápa* and 6/1 of *Tøgdrápa* are good examples:

*En með annan
Qnundr Qðnum
á hendr at há
her sænskan ferr.*

*Þá gaf sínum
snjallr gørvallan
Nóreg nefa
njótr veg-Jóta³⁷.*

It must be noted, however, that such stanzas do not prevail in any of these poems. 7 out of 14 (50%) *helmingar* of *Tøgdrápa* feature metrical anomalies. In the case of

37 SPMA I, 655, 860.

Knútsdrápa the ratio is even higher – 61% (11 out of 18). Instances of metrical anomalies in both poems refer mainly to rhymes. The ratios for both *drápur* are: 78% (7 out of 9) for *Tøgdrápa* and 66% (10 out of 15) for *Knútsdrápa*.

These numbers show that both poets found it relatively difficult to keep a systematic provision of rhymes throughout their whole compositions. In the case of *Tøgdrápa* it is interesting to note instances of *helmingar* featuring lines with no rhyme: 1/1, 3/1, 4/2, 5/1, 7/1. Of course, Þórarinn was allowed by the metre rules to provide such lines (Type 2) as he did once in *helmingr* 5/2. However, instances in question suggest the skald did not prefer “the easy track” and wanted to remain as faithful to *tøglag* requirements as possible so *helmingar* in question can be classified as instances of defected Type 3. *Helmingar* 3/1 and 5/1 may serve as examples:

Ok fyr Lista
liðu framm viðir
Hádýrs of haf
hart kolsvartir.

Knottu súðir
svangs mjök langar
byrrömm bera
*brimdýr fyr Stim*³⁸.

Sigvatr’s problems with rhymes are of a slightly different kind. In most instances, 9 out of 10, it is a case of unmetrical placement of both full and half-rhymes. *Knútsdrápa* consists of two *helmingar*, 8/2 and 10/1, that feature a line without rhyme. The former is the unclassified half-stanza, whereas the latter, similarly to the above listed *helmingar* of *Tøgdrápa*, can be treated as an instance of defected Type 3:

Kom á fylki
farlyst, þeims bar
hervíg í hug,
*hafanda staf*³⁹.

Contrary to Þórarinn, who used Type 2 once (*helmingr* 5/2) in his *drápa*, Sigvatr did not avoid anomalies in both Type 1 *helmingar* (8/1, 11/1) of his poem:

Ok þøru í byr
blø segl við rø,

38 Ibidem, 855, 858.

39 Ibidem, 661.

*dýr vas dōglings fōr,
drekar landreka.*

*Svá mun fār feril
fetum suðr metinn
hringdrífr hafa.
Höfuðfremstr jōfur⁴⁰.*

The *helmingr* 8/1 has a half rhyme in the second line, instead of the metrical full rhyme. Besides, the fourth line features five syllables, instead of the metrical four. The *helmingr* 11/1 has also disturbed syllabic order in both even and odd lines. Both even lines have five syllables instead of four⁴¹, whereas the third line has four syllables instead of the expected five.

Analysis of both poems suggests that occasional problems Þórarinn and Sigvatr had with provision of rhymes were caused by an ultimate will to keep the required number of syllables in line throughout most of their compositions, especially in the Type 3 *helmingar*. All these observations are summarised in the tables below.

Table 2. Anomalies in type per *helmingr*

Anomalies in type per <i>helmingr</i>	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3
Þórarinn loftunga, <i>Tøgdrápa</i>	0	0	7
Sigvatr Þórðarson, <i>Knútsdrápa</i>	2	0	9

Table 3. Anomalies in type per number

Anomalies in type per number	Þórarinn loftunga, <i>Tøgdrápa</i>			Sigvatr Þórðarson, <i>Knútsdrápa</i>		
	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3
Nr of syllables in line	0	0	1	5	0	0
Rhymes	0	0	7	0	0	10
Alliteration	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	0	0	8	5	0	10

Þórarinn seems to have wanted to stick to the ideal of the metre, not allowing himself to add an additional syllable in most of his *helmingar* and being able to have half of the *helmingar* metrically perfect. The urge to stick to four syllables in line resulted with anomalies noted in half of the preserved *helmingar*. It meant problems with keeping the rules of rhymes.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, 659, 663.

⁴¹ It is possible, however, to count the fourth line as metrical due to fact that it is a part of the poem's *klofastef*.

There are certain distinguished elements of the composition. *Helmingr* 2/1 features tmesis (*Lima-firdi*), that perhaps was based on older examples and pointing at possible sources of Þórarinn's inspiration⁴². The way he distributes the word *Limafjörðr* in the first two lines of the *helmingr* results in an intriguing wordplay in the second line: *gramr Lima* (ruler of Limfjorden). Apart from the main goal of the *helmingr* that was an account on Knútr being able to operate quickly with his fleet between Denmark and England, the skald was able to underline the king's rulership over this key area. *Helmingr* 8/1, as Roberta Frank has recently noted, is distinguished not only by an impressive warrior kenning but also its alliteration, based on the same consonant (g)⁴³. Additionally, the *helmingr* is concluded by a compound *Tøgdrápa*. Matthew Townend has recently considered its function, either as a title or as a technical term, depending on which of two poems, Þórarinn's or Sigvatr's, was older⁴⁴. I agree that both options are possible. However, if my assumption is right, and neither of the poets was the inventor of the metre, I would treat the coupled as a technical term, used by Þórarinn to prove his ability of meeting challenges of the metre. Consequently, his poem could have been titled *Knútsdrápa*, the very same way other skaldic encomia dedicated to the King of England and Denmark are traditionally titled.

Sigvatr also seems to have wanted to stick to the ideal of the metre as much as possible. The vast majority (16 of 18) of *helmingar* belongs to Type 3. All of them feature four syllables. On the other hand, most of them feature metrical anomalies that in all cases (11) refer to rules of rhyme. 2 of 18 *helmingar* belong to Type 1. Intriguingly, all of them feature metrical anomalies that in all cases (4) refer to the number of syllables. In short, depending which Type is concerned, the skald seemed to have problems either with syllables or rhymes. Another intriguing observation refers to manuscript preservation and transmission of the poem. It looks like certain unmetrical variants were corrected in the younger mss. *Helmingr* 4/1 is a good example of this trend. A group of older mss⁴⁵ has a variant *þorðu* in the first line that constitutes unmetrical full rhyme with *norðan*⁴⁶. The other group of mss, that would be labelled as the younger, features a variant *þurðu*, which is metrical as it provides a half rhyme in the first line. One can see a similarly puzzling situation in both *helmingar* of stanza 5. The 18th century paper mss of *Fagrskinna*⁴⁷ features the *helmingr* 5/1 with a variant *marbeðjum* in the third line, that constitutes unmetrical full rhyme with *með*. However, the very same

42 See SPMA I, 853.

43 Frank, "A taste for knottiness", 209–210.

44 SPMA I, 863.

45 The group features the following manuscripts: DG 8 1225–1250 Holm 2 1250–1300, AM 68 fol 1300–1325, AM 61 fol 1350–1375, AM 325 V 4 to 1375–1400.

46 SPMA I, 655.

47 The following manuscripts: OsloUB 371 folx, AM 51 folx, copies of now lost medieval manuscripts.

helmingr in the 13th century mss of the *Legendary Saga of Óláfr the Saint*⁴⁸ features a variant *marbiðjum* that constitutes metrical full rhyme in that line. That is why it looks like the *helmingr* was badly “corrected” during the transmission. An opposite situation can be noted in the *helmingr* 5/2. The paper copies of *Fagrskinna* feature a variant *grōum* in the second line that constitutes metrical full rhyme. Intriguingly, the mss of the *Legendary Saga* features a variant *gráni* in the same line that constitutes unmetrical half rhyme with *lá*. So *grōum*, that replaced *gráni* in the line, could perhaps be treated as a trace of a later correction of the stanza in order to improve it metrically.

Despite limited syllabic space within the line, *Sigvatr* was able to include an intercalary clause in the second line of *helmingr* 4/1. The phrase *namsk þat* (that has been learned) belongs to a typical feature of *Sigvatr*’s poetry, pointing to the role of the skald as the one able to gather reliable data on a subject of his composition⁴⁹. The *helmingr* in question is almost perfect metrically, except for a lack of half-rhyme in the first line in its variants preserved in group of older mss⁵⁰. One can also distinguish the first line of *helmingr* 5/2. It features five syllables that provide advanced rhyming scheme with both either half rhyme (*þars – fyr*, metrically required) or a full rhyme (*þars ad garðr*, unmetrical).

Summing up this part of the article, it is very likely that neither of the poets were, in fact, the inventor of *tøglag*. Rather both, as talented and already distinguished skalds, did not hesitate to accept another artistic challenge, most likely put up by somebody else. It seems reasonable to assume that such a challenge was born at *Knútr*’s court, probably as a side effect of the king’s success in Norway in 1028. The new political situation meant that *Knútr*’s became not only the sole leader of the whole region but also that his court remained the main centre of skaldic production, attracting ambitious and skilful poets⁵¹. Such an artistic milieu was driven not only by royal grace but also by internal competition that was decisive for any poetic innovations, including *tøglag*. Both poets had some difficulties with keeping up with demands of the metre. Even though both not only managed to refer to it in most parts of their compositions but also to enrich their poems with pompous *klofastefur*.

Ideology and symbolism of *Togdrápa*

The extensive and detailed geographical setting of the poetic narrative is one of the most characteristic features of *Þórarinn*’s poem on *Knútr*’s expedition to Norway.

48 DG 8.

49 See Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 334.

50 See SPMA I, 655.

51 See Frank, “A taste for knottiness”, 197.

According to Matthew Townend, such a precision over placenames is generally typical for journey-poems⁵². Six *helmingar* of stanzas 3–5 provide a list of places that mark a track of the Anglo-Danish fleet. Despite some confusions concerning the internal order of the following places⁵³, the list is arranged geographically, in a south-north line, starting, in fact, in Limforden and reaching Nidelven⁵⁴.

The skald's emphasis of the placenames is hardly accidental. Firstly, it seems likely Þórarinn constructed his poem that way to evoke certain memories among recipients of the poem, presumably those who, as the poet himself, took part in the expedition. Using some of the placenames in alliteration had presumably served to strengthen this effect as they were even more decisive for skaldic delivery and memorisation of the whole poem. Secondly, it could have been useful to define the scope of Knútr's *fǫr* and its success by showing that it was the whole of Norway, *gǫrvallr Nóreg* as he puts it in *helmingr* 6/1, that he conquered and kept under his control. There are similar arrangements in the skaldic corpus. Eyvindr skáldaspillir Finnsson, in stanza 12 of his *Hályegjatal*, defining territory under control of jarl Hákon of Hlaðir, described it as *liggr und bægi allt austr til býs Egða* (lies all the way east to the territory of the Egðir)⁵⁵. Einarr skálaglamm Helgason, in stanza 16 of his *Vellekla*, encompassing lands under the reign of the very same jarl, states that *nú liggr allt fyr norðan Vík und jarli* (now everything north of Viken lies under the jarl's rule)⁵⁶. The last example comes from Þórðr Kolbeinsson's *Eiríksdrápa*. In stanza 9, the skald, referring to territories jarl Eiríkr of Hlaðir was to control as an outcome of the battle in Øresund, states: *enn ept víg lagðisk land norðan frá Veigu suðr til Agða eða stundu lengra* (and after the battle the land was subjected from Vega in the north, south as far as Agder or somewhat further)⁵⁷.

The density of verbs describing a movement of the fleet is another characteristic feature of Þórarinn's composition. *Liðu* (*helmingr* 3/1, 4/1), *drifu* (*helmingr* 4/2), *bera* (*helmingr* 5/1), *kom* (*helmingr* 5/2) are clear examples of this practice. The verbs in question not only served to justify an account on a royal *fǫr*. They helped in linking particular areas of Knútr's domain, the king, accompanied by his fleet, was able to conquer and control. It seems that it was especially important to underline the king's ability to reach Limfjorden, a strategic point for his action. Its control meant both a grasp of Denmark and ability to influence conditions in Norway. In other words, as the greatness of the royal fleet (see below) was a significant marker of the king's power,

52 SPMA I, 856.

53 Ibidem, 857.

54 Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 395.

55 SPMA I, 211.

56 Ibidem, 304.

57 Ibidem, 501. See also Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 297–306.

the movement of the fleet, in particular the geographical setting, was to highlight the ability to execute this power.

Þórarinn, consequently, provides us with a picture of a great fleet, owned and commanded by Knútr. The skald states it directly in both *helmingar* of stanza 1: the king was accompanied by *mjök mikit lið, ólittinn floti*⁵⁸. The last word is particularly interesting as it can hardly be found as frequent in the skaldic corpus. For the first time, it is noted in poetry of the grand poets connected with the court of jarls of Hlaðir: Eyvin-dr skáldaspillir Finnson (stanza 11 of *Háleygjatal* and one of *lausavísur*) and Einarr skálaglamm Helgason (stanzas 6 and 29 *Vellekla*)⁵⁹. One cannot exclude a possibility that Þórarinn followed his great predecessors whose compositions, especially *Vellekla*, had presumably accompanied new poets in their artistic upbringing. Most importantly, however, the same word (*floti*) was used by Hallvarðr háreksblei in stanza 3 of his *Knútsdrápa*⁶⁰ and it is very probable that one poet directly inspired another in that case.

Þórarinn underlines a greatness of the royal fleet also in *helmingr* 5/1. This time the skald employs elaborate ship kennings that refer to their outstanding construction, being both scary and effective: *byrrömm brimdýr* (the wind-strong surf-animals) and *mjök langar súðir svangs* (very long planks of the hull)⁶¹. A role of such phrases was similar to those used in *helmingar* 1/1 and 1/2, however they additionally served to show poetic skills of the skald and provide a more picturesque and vivid depiction of Knútr's fleet, making it even more impressive.

The set of placenames present in *Tögdrápa*, mentioned above, also gave Þórarinn an opportunity to underline the vastness of the royal fleet. In *helmingr* 3/2, providing an account on progress of Knútr's ships moving north, the skald states: *allt Eikundasund suðr vas byggt sæskíðum* (the entire Eigersund to the south was inhabited by sea-skis)⁶². It is a visible sign of addressing the poem not only to the king but also to his retainers who were said to be well acquainted with geography of this very place as it could give them a proper impression of the size of the royal fleet, the fleet they, together with Þórarinn, were part of⁶³.

It was not only its number but also its splendour that made the royal fleet so impressive in Þórarinn's vision. Skald puts it directly in *helmingr* 2/2:

*Allt vas gollu
grams skip framit,*

58 SPMA I, 852.

59 Ibidem, 210, 216, 290, 319.

60 SPMA III, 233.

61 SPMA I, 858.

62 Ibidem, 855.

63 See Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 396–397.

*vorum sjón sögu
slíks ríkari*⁶⁴.

The king's ship was all decorated with gold; the sight of such was to me more powerful than [any] telling.

Although the *helmingr* focuses on the king's ship, one can assume that Þórarinn had his whole fleet in mind. Matthew Townend is absolutely right arguing that the reference to gold adornments of the royal ship echoes accounts of *Encomium Emmae Reginae* and Adam of Bremen's *Gesta* on the fleet Knútr led to England in 1015⁶⁵. The richness of the fleet was meant both to amaze the king's followers and frighten his enemies. Þórarinn's account confirms longevity of the motif of Knútr's richness as the key to gaining and developing his power that, with special reference to the conquest of Norway in 1028, was later developed much more extensively by saga authors⁶⁶.

The *helmingr* 2/2 features also a personal note of Þórarinn. The skald's rapture over splendour of the royal fleet is persuasive and most likely was meant to evoke similar feelings among recipients of the poem. In this context, *Tøgdrápa* can be seen as a forerunner of very similar poetry, produced by Þjóðolfr Árnorsson for Haraldr harðráði, featuring analogous rapture over the royal fleet, leaving Nidelven to confront the forces of Sveinn Ulfsson⁶⁷.

Consequently, Þórarinn depicts Knútr as the courageous warlord and steerer of the magnificent fleet. In two *helmingar*, 2/1 and 4/2, the skald calls the king *orbeiðir* (eager/arrow demander)⁶⁸. Interestingly, the noun *beiðir* (demander) had been previously used only by Glúmr Geirason as heiti of a monarch in his *Gráfeldardrápa*⁶⁹. Þórarinn added the prefix *orI* that enabled him to invent a new phrase defining the king's attitude. The significance of the new construct seems to be underlined by the fact that both phrases are used to provide alliteration of a coupled in both respective *helmingar*.

One can assume that making up such a phrase, the poet's intention was to underline the king's willingness to achieve military victory. Considering the fact that the expedition to Norway lacked serious battles, Knútr's (and his *hird*) readiness to fight

64 SPMA I, 854. A variant *lið* present in some of the mss (troop adorned with gold) must be considered. However, the variant *lið búit* is unmetrical, contrary to variant *lið ramit* in the manuscript DG8. No matter which variant, *skip* or *lið*, was original, the sense of the *helmingr* remains the same. The royal ship represents the whole fleet.

65 SPMA I, 855. See also Morawiec, *Knut Wielki*, 108.

66 See Sverre Bagge, "Olav den Hellige som norsk konge (1015–28)", *Historisk tidsskrift* 94 (2015): 581–582; Bolton, *Cnut the Great*, 158.

67 See Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 546.

68 SPMA I, 854, 857. In the first instance the compound is a part of a sophisticated warrior kenning: *orbeiðir svans sigrlana* (eager demander of the swan of victory-heaps).

69 SPMA I, 248.

the enemy was to save the military aspect of the poem. Þórarinn's intentions, if my argument sounds convincing, seem to echo a notion of *Liðsmannaflokkur*, whose anonymous poet also did his best to underline the military skills of the young ruler⁷⁰.

The *helmingr* 5/2 seems to have the same notion. Þórarinn calls the king *herflýtir* (army speeder)⁷¹. Again, the compound as the monarch/war leader kenning looks like the skald's own invention. Similarly to *orbeiðir*, *herflýtir* seems to underline the king's ability to steer his fleet, his ultimate will to lead the army to an encounter and gain a victory. Both compounds, stressing Knútr's readiness to strike and being poetically innovative, had to convince the audience that the king, despite opportunities to face the enemy, was in fact an effective warrior and army leader, serving as an exclusive example of the expected attitude.

The culmination of this process is to be found in both *helmingar* of stanza 7. Each of them features highly sophisticated warrior kennings describing the ruler: *hlyn malm-dyns* (the maple of the battle-din) and *víghagr morðstærir* (the slaying-skilled battle-increaser)⁷². Þórarinn constructs both kennings using rare vocabulary. The noun *hlynr* (the maple) was used earlier only by Þórðr Kolbeinsson in stanza 2 of his *Eiríksdrápa* as a base word for a warrior kenning (*skjald hlynr*)⁷³. A compound *víghagr* (*slaying-skilled*) appears to be Þórarinn's invention, not to be found elsewhere in the corpus. The same goes with another compound in the kenning, *morðstærir* (battle-increaser). The latter, although built of words frequently used by skalds, were tied for the very first time by Þórarinn.

On one hand warrior kennings in stanza 7 were constructed on the basis of typical features: the warrior as the tree, the one who is skilled in warfare and is willing to provide new encounters. On the other hand, Þórarinn refers to these elements using either original vocabulary or matching known words elsewhere into new, sophisticated compounds.

The *for*, undertaken by Knútr and his army, resulted not only with the conquest of Norway but, equally importantly, a political equilibrium in his domain. In a poetic message provided by Þórarinn, the former proved the king was a skilful, brave warrior and army leader; the latter proved he was an effective political executioner and true monarch. One can assume it influenced the arrangement of both *helmingar* of stanza 6

*Þá gaf sínum
snjallr gorrvallan*

70 Russell Poole, *Viking Poems on War and Peace* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 86–115; Jakub Morawiec, "Anonimowy poemat Liðsmannaflokkur i problem jego odbiorcy. Ślad pobytu córki Mieszka I, matki Knuta Wielkiego, w Anglii?", *Studia Źródłoznawcze* 47 (2010): 17–34.

71 SPMA I, 858.

72 Ibidem, 861.

73 Ibidem, 491.

*Nóreg nefa
njótr veg-Jóta.*

*Þá gaf sínum
— segik þat — megi
dals dökksali
Danmørk svana⁷⁴.*

Obviously, it would be hard to find repetition of the first line in both *helmingar* as accidental. It seems likely that the skald did so to underline not only the scope of the king's decision but also that it was his own political arrangement. The skald states in the first *helmingr*: *þá gaf sínum nefa gørvallan Nóreg* (gave his nephew the whole of Norway). The second *helmingr* carries a similar message: *þá gaf sínum megi Danmørk* (gave his son Denmark).

Both statements are evenly distributed in both *helmingar*, presumably because both were equally important and deserved to be underlined in this very way. Both stress not only how Knútr's arranged his dominion after the conquest of Norway, but also that this very arrangement was based on family ties. The king's *nefr* was Hákon Eiríksson, jarl of Hlaðir, who followed his father jarl Eiríkr as a faithful supporter of Knútr and who married the latter's sister, Gyða⁷⁵. The king's *megi* was Hørdaknútr, his only son by Emma of Normandy⁷⁶. The Jelling dynasty was cementing their influences in Norway through an alliance with jarls of Hlaðir, at least since Haraldr Gormsson. Both his son and grandson followed him strictly in this respect. The Danish kings were aware that such an alliance, temporarily abruptly by jarl Hákon Sigurðarsson after 974, was a key to both control of Norway and dominate in the whole region. The conquest of Norway let Knútr not only eliminate the serious opponent, Óláfr Haraldsson, but also reward jarl Hákon for his loyalty. Moreover, it let the king secure not only Danish influences in Norway again but also the position of his own family in Denmark, recently questioned first by jarl Þorkell the Tall, then by Ulfr Þorgilsson, another of Knútr's brothers-in-law⁷⁷. The arrangement of Þórarinn's stanza fully confirms the importance of the new arrangement, and shows that the skald was fully aware how important it presumably was to reflect it properly in his poem. Distribution of both decisions in separate *helmingar* and repetition of the phrase *þá gaf sínum* served not only to properly underline the

⁷⁴ Ibidem, 860.

⁷⁵ Hákon's position at the court of Knútr is confirmed by his attestation of several of royal charters. See Timothy Bolton, *The Empire of Cnut the Great. Conquest and Consolidation of Power in Northern Europe in the Early Eleventh Century* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2009), 69–70; Morawiec, *Knut Wielki*, 138–139.

⁷⁶ Morawiec, *Knut Wielki*, 131.

⁷⁷ Ibidem, 206–212, 321–233; Bolton, *The Empire of Cnut*, 235.

scope of the king's decisions, but also to make sure it would be effectively received by recipients of the poem⁷⁸.

According to Þórarinn, Knútr gave the whole of Norway to jarl Hákon as *snjallr njótr veg-Jóta* (the bold enjoyer of the glory-Jótar). There is rather no doubt whom the skald had in mind constructing this kenning. The *helmingr* 6/2, apart from information of Knútr giving Denmark his son, features another kenning that is slightly more problematic in reading. Matthew Townend, the very recent editor of *Tøgdrápa*, proposes to match *dalr* and *svana* and interpret it as the sea kenning (dale of swans). Its *dokksalar* (dark halls), he argues, symbolise Denmark⁷⁹. Alternative reading of the kenning has been recently proposed by Richard North, who noted that although the words in this kenning are simple, their meanings are not, either individually or together. First, he prefers translating *dalr* as *bow* and transferring *dökk* to *svana*. Consequently, he proposes a shield kenning hall of a bow's dark-swans in which dark-swans are ravens and the bow's ravens are arrows, whose hall is a shield. North goes on further seeing the kenning in question as part of a concept of the Danish king as *skjöldungr*, borrowed directly from *Beowulf*, and claiming that constructing the shield kenning in question Þórarinn had Knútr in mind⁸⁰.

Richard North's proposal seems intriguing and convincing for two reasons. First, it accords with a general arrangement of both *helmingar*. The king as the hall of a bow's dark swans, who gives Denmark his son, is an equivalent to the bold enjoyer of the glory Jótar who gives Norway to his nephew. Secondly, it also accords with other instances of the prospect of Knútr as *skjöldr* (shield)⁸¹ that I would argue point at the king as provider of peace in his dominion and protector of his subjects.

There are other intriguing instances of this prospect in *Tøgdrápa*. In *helmingr* 4/1, Þórarinn depicts Knútr's *hirdmenn* as *gríðfastir friðmenn* (protection-secure men of peace)⁸². That is quite a peculiar way of defining royal warriors, especially in the poem on the war expedition. Matthew Townend offered two possible meanings of this phrase. One of them, putting emphasis on Knútr's followers who enjoy the protection, friendship and peace that is conferred on his household and supporters, sounds very reasonable⁸³. I would develop it a little bit stressing even more that the skald's intention was to convince the recipients of the poem that it was the king himself who, by

78 Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 398–399.

79 SPMA I, 860. Townend follows here a previous attempt to read the kenning provided by E.A. Kock, according to whom, dark halls reflect Denmark's forest-covered islands.

80 North, "Behold the Front Page", 13–14; Frank, "A taste of knottiness", 207. See also Katherine Cross, *Heirs of the Vikings. History and Identity in Normandy and England, c.950–c.1015* (York: York Medieval Press, 2018), 34.

81 North, "Behold the Front Page", 12–13.

82 SPMA I, 857.

83 *Ibidem*, 858.

conquest of Norway, provided and secured peace in his dominion, peace that all his subjects could enjoy.

The *helmingr* 1/1, apart from featuring a part of the poem's *klofastef*, depicts Knútr as Þórarinn's friend (*vinr minn*)⁸⁴. It seems quite intriguing as such references to exclusive relations between given poet and his patron are mainly to be found in *erfidrápur*⁸⁵. Limited space of *töglag* stanza makes this phrase metrically important as the adjective *minn* concludes alliteration of two lines being a main alliterating stave. Besides, the phrase *vinr minn* provides a full rhyme in the line.

It seems reasonable, however, not to limit discussion on this phrase to metrical considerations only and ask why Þórarinn decided to address Knútr this way. Studies, mainly by Jón Viðar Sigurðsson, leave no doubt that friendship was a very important tool in the political games in the Viking Age and medieval Scandinavia. Jón Viðar stresses the importance of friendship for the Norwegian kings to secure support for themselves from local chieftains and householders⁸⁶. Those who established friendship with the king had to accept him as their overlord, although Jón Viðar underlines the instability of this relation, giving the action of the taking control of Norway by Knútr as a clear example of it⁸⁷. Nevertheless, the more loyal the king's friends were, the more secure his position was⁸⁸. Similarly, the more powerful the king's friends were, the more crucial for his rulership ties of friendship were, on condition he was willing to nurture his friendships, mainly through his generosity.

Despite the fact that a king could have been willing to establish friendship not only with powerful chieftains but also with local householders, one can ask if it would be equally advantageous to establish a similar friendship with a skald. Before answering such a question, I would point at instances of the king as a friend in pre- Þórarinn skaldic poetry.

There are four instances of this kind in the corpus. The first one is to be found in stanza 3 of Glúmr Geirason's *Gráfeldardrápa*. The skald recalls the king Haraldr as *vinr gumna* (friend of men)⁸⁹. As the noun *gumi* (man) is quite imprecise, Glúmr could have meant either all the king's subjects or, which seems more likely, his retainers. The second instance is relatively less problematic. Eyvindr Finnsson skáldaspillir calls Odinn, who plays a role of ruler and protagonist of the kin of jarls, in stanza 2 of his

84 Ibidem, 852.

85 Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 194–205.

86 Jón Viðar Sigurðsson, *Viking friendship. The social bond in Iceland and Norway, c. 900–1300* (Ithaca–London, Cornell University Press, 2017), 73.

87 Ibidem, 78–79. It seems important to note Jón Viðar's czy nie powinno być jednak nazwisko? accurate remark on the political shift in Norway in 1028–1030, who states that Knutr was able to win the country because he managed to establish friendships with the most influential chieftains in Norway.

88 Jón Viðar Sigurðsson, *Viking friendship*, 80.

89 SPMA I, 251.

Háleygjatal *vinr skatna* (friend of chieftains/warriors)⁹⁰. Again, the skald presumably referred to chieftains who, as friends of the ruler, fought alongside him. The third instance comes from Hallfreðr Óttarsson's *Erfidrápa Óláfs Tryggvasonar*. The poet, in stanza 9, calls the fallen king *vinr jarla* (friend of jarls)⁹¹. Leaving aside intriguing connotations of this phrase⁹², there is no doubt that royal friendship targets the highest social and political strata. The fourth example comes from stanza 9 of Þórðr Kolbeinson's *Eiríksdrápa*, where the poet recalls certain *hersar* (chieftains) who were *vinir jarla* (friends of the jarls – Eiríkr and his brother Sveinn)⁹³. Treated together, those instances point at friendship between a ruler and either chieftains, who were supposed to support the former with military service or jarls whose friendship could provide a ruler with something even more precious and crucial – political authority.

It is even more intriguing to observe that it was Sigvatr Þórðarson who frequently referred to this concept in his poetry. The poet concludes his *Austrfararvísur* (stanza 21) stating that jarl Rognvaldr Úlfsson from Västergötland was Óláfr Haraldsson's *miklu baztan vin á austrvega* (the best friend in the east)⁹⁴. Leaving aside the political context of both the very stanza and the whole poem⁹⁵, it seems no doubt that Sigvatr's intention was to point at the decisiveness of proper political alliances, here defined as friendships, for effective and stable reign. Only friendship offered by the most powerful chieftains could guarantee a ruler undisturbed control of the country. Moreover, an offer of friendship, expressed by a powerful chieftain, was a clear sign that a ruler was seen as worth such noble support and able to provide political success not only for himself but also for his distinguished supporters. Sigvatr quite forcefully, one may think⁹⁶, sees jarl Rognvaldr in this role when it comes to Óláfr Haraldsson's position in Norway.

The jarl is called the king's best friend which suggests that Óláfr, as any other monarch, could have looked for friends elsewhere, although not as prestigious and influential as *jarlar*⁹⁷. Similarly to the 10th century skalds, Sigvatr did not hesitate to label either one's subjects or, more precisely, his military supporters (*hirðmenn*) as friends. It refers to jarl Erlingr Skjálgrsson in stanza 3 of *Erlingsflokkur*, whose defeat in the fight

90 Ibidem, 199.

91 Ibidem, 414.

92 See Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 276, 302.

93 SPMA I, 501.

94 Ibidem, 613.

95 I elaborate more on this elsewhere, see Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 367–370.

96 His personal engagement in these political endeavours is another matter, too vast to be considered in this study.

97 In one of his *lausavísur*, Sigvatr puts *þegnar* into the category of the king's (it is Óláfr's) friends (*vina þengils*). See SPMA I, 720.

against king Óláfr is completed by the jarl's separation from his friends (*fjarri vinum*)⁹⁸. It refers also to king Magnús inn góði, who, according to Sigvatr in stanza 3 of his Poem about Queen Ástríðr, was given Norway to rule as *vin virða* (the friend of men)⁹⁹.

Finally, in stanza 10 of his *Bersöglisvísur*, Sigvatr refers to himself as a friend of king Magnús inn góði, whom he warns against angry subjects¹⁰⁰. The skald's words (*vinrs, sás býðr vörnuð* – he is a friend who offers a warning) suggest Sigvatr found his poetical warning that in fact is a role of his *Bersöglisvísur*¹⁰¹ as both an excuse and reason to rank himself among royal friends. Consequently, one can assume, the poet treated his poetry in general and this very poem in particular as a sign of friendship, loyalty and support.

It seems likely that Þórarinn was very similarly motivated when calling himself the king's friend. The poet wanted perhaps to underline the importance of his poetry (and himself) for the king, pointing at his ability to fulfil the expectation the king had toward his other friends. As establishing friendship was confirmed by the exchange of gifts¹⁰², Þórarinn could have treated his poetry for Knútr and rewards he obtained as an instance of such trade that allowed him to treat himself as one of the king's friends. The same way the king was dependent of friendship with chieftains and was expected to uphold his obligations, the same way he was dependent on skaldic delivery and loyal service of poets.

It seems fully appropriate to compare the ideology of Þórarinn's *Tögdrápa* with its counterpart, Sigvatr Þórdarson's *Knútsdrápa*. Sigvatr's poem also focuses on the royal fleets, that, remaining in a constant movement, allow the kings to act. This time it refers not only to Knútr but also to his Scandinavian opponents, Óláfr Haraldsson and Qnundr (Anundr Jacob)¹⁰³. Similarly to his peer, Sigvatr provides a relevant poetic picture by using a series of verbs underling the movement of royal ships: *fara* (*helmingr* 3/2), *þurðu* (*helmingr* 4/1), *ferr* (*helmingr* 4/2), *herjaða* (*helmingr* 6/2), *bar* (*helmingr* 7/2), *böru* (*helmingr* 8/1), *kómu*, *liðu* (*helmingr* 8/2). The density of these verbs creates a vivid and lively image of the encounters in question and presumably helped the poet to keep his audience's attention first on the danger caused by both Óláfr and Qnundr (*herjaða Skáney skarpla*) and then on Knútr's reaction who managed to protect his land and his power there.

Sigvatr encompasses the encounter between three Scandinavian monarchs in his poem. Despite the fact that his account depicts the conflict from the Anglo-Danish

98 Ibidem, 633.

99 Ibidem, 649.

100 SPMA II, 21–22.

101 Morawiec, *Między poezją a polityką*, 219, 225, 457, 461.

102 Jón Viðar Sigurðsson, *Viking friendship*, 82.

103 SPMA I, 653, 655.

point of view, the poet is able to underline the status of Knútr's opponents. Picturing enemy fleets rushing towards Denmark from the north in stanza 4, he evenly shares both *helmingar* between Óláfr and Qnundr depicting them both as leaders of their own fleets¹⁰⁴. The same situation is to be observed in stanza 5, which confronts both Knútr and Óláfr Haraldsson¹⁰⁵. The first *helmingr* presents the former whereas the second the latter. Moreover, the skald stresses the military prowess of both kings as they are depicted as owners of their own fleets. Such even distribution of direct references to opposite sides in *helmingar* suggests a certain level of Sigvatr's political awareness similar to the one Þórarinn showed in stanza 6 of his *Tøgdrápa*.

Finally, Sigvatr, similarly to Þórarinn, focuses on Knútr as the brave warlord (*gramr liðs*) who, having a magnificent fleet (*varrglæstr viðr*), is able to answer effectively to a threat caused by both Óláfr and Qnundr. Addressing Knútr as the enemy of Æthelred (*andskoti Aðalráðs*) presumably served this very purpose. Similarly to *Tøgdrápa*, Sigvatr's poem underlines Knútr's energy in acting. Sigvatr calls it *farlyst* (desire for a journey), which, as such, seems a source of royal praise. It is especially seen in stanzas 7 and 8 that describe crucial moments of the confrontation between monarchs. Knútr first *frá austan* and then his ship carried him *vestan*. Sigvatr continues this picture in stanza 8: royal *drekar þoru blö segl við ro í byr*. Knútr's quick reaction results with the success as his enemies are forced to retreat. The skald can conclude then: *för döglinga vas dýr* and present the king as the protector of Danes (*hlífskjöldr Dana*)¹⁰⁶.

Sigvatr's *Knútsdrápa* goes close to Þórarinn's *Tøgdrápa* not only on a general, conceptual level. There are several direct verbal correspondences that suggest either mutual influence or close collaboration. Calling Knútr *hlífskjöldr Dana* seems to correspond with and Þórarinn's depiction of Knútr's army as *friðmenn* and strengthens Richard North's argument concerning the concept of Knútr as a shield that protects all parts of his dominion.

Other intriguing similarities between both poems can be seen in stanza 8. Sigvatr's conclusion in the first *helmingr*: *för döglinga vas dýr* seems to correspond with *för orbeiðis svans sigrlana* Þórarinn which is referred to in stanza 2 of his *Tøgdrápa*. The second *helmingr* of stanza 8 depicts Knútr's fleet approaching Limfjord: *liðu brim Limafjarðar of leið*. Again, this very phrase seems to correspond with Þórarinn's account, in *helmingr* 1/2 of his *Tøgdrápa*, on Knútr bringing his fleet *út ór Limafirði*.

The second *helmingr* of stanza 10 of Sigvatr's *Knútsdrápa* belongs undoubtedly to the most significant features of the composition:

104 Ibidem, 655.

105 Ibidem, 656.

106 Ibidem, 658–659.

*Rauf ræsir af
Rúms veg suman
kærr keisara
klúss Pétrúsi*¹⁰⁷.

Roberta Frank has pointed out the skald's effective usage of loanwords from Latin, Old English, German and French¹⁰⁸. Its content makes one speculate that perhaps an idea to create *toglag* was dictated by a will to celebrate and praise all recent journeys of Knútr: to Denmark in 1026, to Rome in 1027 and to Norway in 1028. The proper praise of latter *för*, to paraphrase both poets, was designated to Þórarinn.

Very recently, Charles Insley has argued that an image of Knútr one can find in skaldic encomia is different from the one presented in both of the king's letters to his English subjects issued in 1020 and 1027. The former, Insley argues, are focused on Knútr's and his ancestors' victories over the English whereas the latter present the ruler as Edgard's heir¹⁰⁹. Both my previous and present analysis of Þórarinn's compositions as well as Richard North's considerations of the *Skjöldungr* concept make Insley's claims hardly acceptable. The idea of *himinríki* (the heavenly kingdom), employed by Þórarinn in the refrain of his *Höfuðlausn*, was very likely influenced by the very similar rhetoric found both in Knútr's charters and his letters¹¹⁰.

The ideology of *Skjöldr*, expressed, among others, by calling the king the protector of Danes (*hlífskjöldr Dana*) by Sigvatr, as Richard North convincingly argues, bound Knútr as the king of England with his dominion in Denmark¹¹¹. It corresponds with Þórarinn's depiction of the ruler's *hirdmenn* as *friðmenn* (men of peace) and points at an idea of peace in the king's dominion. This very idea could have been derived directly from the 1027 Letter, as its particular fragments seem to indicate. Knútr, reporting his negotiations with both the pope and the emperor, points at: *the needs of all the people of my entire realm, both English and Danes, that they concede fairer law and securer peace to them on the road to Rome...might go to and return...in firm peace and secure in a just law*.

This very rhetoric is kept in both his declarations: *I am going to Denmark to establish peace and I humbly vowed to Almighty God to lead my life justly in all things from now on, and to rule justly and piously the kingdoms and peoples subject to me*.

107 Ibidem, 661.

108 Frank, "A taste for knottiness", 209–210.

109 Insley, *Why 1016 Matters*, 18.

110 See Morawiec, "A skald in royal service", 43–45.

111 North, "Behold the Front Page", 20–21. See also Cross, *Heirs of the Vikings*, 34.

Finally, Knútr states, that: *when peace has been established with those nations who live around us and my whole kingdom here in the east... I intend to come to England*¹¹².

These fragments, in my opinion, provide an additional ground to argue that both *Tøgdrápa* and *Knútsdrápa* were composed in full accordance with the ideological message of the 1027 Letter¹¹³. Moreover, contrary to Insley's view, it seems likely that both the skaldic poems and the king's letters were intended to provide quite a similar picture of Knútr and make his subjects believe he is fully able to widen his dominion and fully control it. Securing peace was meant to be the most crucial criterium of these abilities.

Taking control over Norway in 1028 concluded perhaps the most significant part of Knútr's reign in both England and Denmark. The king had just defended his position in Denmark, made a very prestigious visit to Rome where he assisted imperial coronation of Conrad II and, finally, was able to add a new territory to his vast dominion. Without doubt, recognition at imperial court and in papal curia as well as the ability to eliminate his main rivals, truly made *Knútr rikr konungr*.

It is not surprising at all that such grand endeavours, marking royal dominancy, demanded proper praise and record. There had already been a circle of poets functioning at the royal court that did his job as the series of *Knútsdrápur* indicate. The preserved poems prove that skalds used their artistic potency to the maximum to match the significance and impact of Knútr's political and military achievements. Þórarinn's *Tøgdrápa*, with its new metre and original vocabulary, alongside Sigvatr Þórðarson's *Knútsdrápa*, is a very good example of this phenomenon. It shows Þórarinn as a poet ready to challenge his poetical skills and talents to impress both the king and his, equally excellent, peers. Both poems prove that Knútr's skalds were not only distinguished poets, competing against and inspiring each other, but also mature retainers, aware of the complexity of policy of their patron.

112 "[...] *de necessitatibus totius populi uniuersi regni mei, tam Anglorum quam Danorum, ut eis concederetur lex equior et pax securior in uia Romam adeundi, et ne tot clausuris per uiam artentur et propter thelon iniustum fatigentur*". "[...] *Nunc itaque notum sit omnibus uobis, quia ipsi Deo omnipotenti supplex deuoui uitam meam amodo in omnibus iustificare et regna mihi subdita populosque iuste et pie regere equumque indicium per omnia obseruare*". "[...] *Danemarciam eo, pacem et firmum pactum [...]*". „*Composita denique pace cum gentibus que in circuitu nostro sunt, dispositoque et pacato omni regno nostro hic in oriente [...] Angliam uenire dispone [...]*". *Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, ed. Felix Liebermann vol. 1 (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1903), 276–277; Elaine Treharne, *Living Through Conquest. The Politics of Early English 1020–1220* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 32–33.

113 See also Bolton, *Cnut the Great*, 156.

Bibliography

Primary sources

- Danakonunga sögur*, ed. Bjarni Guðnason, Íslenzk fornrit 35. Reykjavík: Hið íslenska fornritafélag, 1982.
- Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen*, red. Felix Liebermann, vol. 1. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1903. *Fagrskinna*, ed. Bjarni Einarsson, Íslenzk fornrit 29. Reykjavík: Hið íslenska fornritafélag, 1984.
- Heimskringla II*, ed. Bjarni Aðalbjarnarson, Íslenzk fornrit 26–28. Reykjavík: Hið íslenska fornritafélag, 2002.
- Scandinavian Poetry of the Middle Ages, Poetry from the Kings' Sagas 1. From c. 1035 to c. 1300*, vol. 1–2, ed. Kari Ellen Gade. Turnhout: Brepols, 2009.
- Scandinavian Poetry of the Middle Ages, Poetry from the Kings' Sagas 1. From Mythical Times to c. 1035*, vol. 2, ed. Diana Whaley. Turnhout: Brepols, 2012.
- Scandinavian Poetry of the Middle Ages, Poetry from Treaties on Poetics*, ed. Kari Ellen Gade, Edith Marold. Turnhout: Brepols, 2017.
- Snorri Sturluson, *Edda, Skáldskaparmál 1–2*, ed. Anthony Faulkes. London: Viking Society for Northern Research, 1998.

Secondary works

- Abram, Chris. “Einarr Skúlason, Snorri Sturluson, and the Post-Pagan Mythological Kenning”. In: *Eddic, Skaldic and Beyond. Poetic Variety in Medieval Iceland and Norway*, ed. Martin Chase, 44–61. New York: Fordham University Press, 2014.
- Bagge, Sverre. “Olav den Hellige som norsk konge (1015–28)”. *Historisk tidsskrift* 94 (2015): 555–587.
- Bolton, Timothy. *The Empire of Cnut the Great. Conquest and Consolidation of Power in Northern Europe in the Early Eleventh Century*. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2009.
- Bolton, Timothy. *Cnut the Great*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017.
- Clunies Ross, Margaret. *A History of Old Norse Poetry and Poetics*. Cambridge: D.S. Brewer 2005.
- Cross, Katherine. *Heirs of the Vikings. History and Identity in Normandy and England, c. 950–c. 1015*. York: York Medieval Press, 2018.
- Frank, Roberta. “A taste for knottiness. Skaldic art at Cnut’s court”. *Anglo-Saxon England* 47 (2018): 197–217.
- Insley, Charles. “Why 1016 Matters; or, The Politics of Memory and Identity in Cnut’s Kingdom”. In: *Conquests in Eleventh-Century England. 1016, 1066*, ed. Laura Ashe, Emily Joan Ward, 3–22. Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2020.

- Jón Viðar Sigurðsson. *Viking friendship. The social bond in Iceland and Norway, c. 900–1300*. Ithaca-London, Cornell University Press, 2017.
- Males, Mikael. *The Poetic Genesis of Old Icelandic Literature*. Berlin–Boston: deGruyter, 2020.
- Morawiec, Jakub. “Anonimowy poemat Liðsmannaflokkur i problem jego odbiorcy. Ślad pobytu córki Mieszka I, matki Knuta Wielkiego, w Anglii?”. *Studia Źródłoznawcze* 47 (2010): 17–34.
- Morawiec, Jakub. *Knut Wielki. Król Anglii, Danii i Norwegii (ok. 995–1035)*. Kraków: Avalon, 2013.
- Morawiec, Jakub. “A skald in royal service – the case Þórarinn loftunga. Part 1: Ideological contexts of Höfuðlausn”, *Studia Maritima* 33 (2020): 29–48.
- North, Richard. “Behold the Front Page. Cnut and the Scyldings in Beowulf”, *in press*.
- Poole, Russell. *Viking Poems on War and Peace*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.
- Treharne, Elaine. *Living Through Conquest. The Politics of Early English 1020–1220*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
- Townend, Matthew. “Contextualising the Knútsdrápur. Skaldic Praise-Poetry at the Court of Cnut”. *Anglo-Saxon England* 30 (2001): 145–179.

English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The present study is focused on *Tøgdrápa* (Journey drápa), a poem Þórarinn devoted to Knútr's expedition to Norway in 1028. A distinguished feature of *Tøgdrápa* is its metre – *tøglag* (journey metre). It differs from *dróttkvætt* by having four syllables (instead of six) in each line. Presumably, referring to the title of the poem, the metre was to be used in accounts on war expeditions, optionally other travels of the king. *Tøglag* seems to be especially bound to Knútr's court. Close metrical analysis of the poem as well as comparison with Sigvatr Þórðarson's *Knútsdrápa* suggests that, contrary to previous assumptions, it is very likely that neither of the poets was an inventor of *tøglag*. Rather both, as talented and already distinguished skalds, did not hesitate to take another artistic challenge, most likely put up by somebody else. It seems reasonable to assume that such a challenge was born at Knútr's court, probably as a side effect of the king's success in Norway in 1028.

Skald w służbie królewskiej – przypadek Þórarina loftunga. Część 2: Ideowe i kompozycyjne aspekty *Tøgdrápy*

Słowa kluczowe: poezja skaldów, metrum *tøglag*, ideologia władzy królewskiej

STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł poświęcony jest *Tøgdrápie* (Wiersz o wyprawie), utworowi skomponowanemu przez Þórarina, w którym opisuje wyprawę Knuta Wielkiego do Norwegii w 1028 roku. Wiersz wyróżnia zastosowane przez skalda metrum – *tøglag* (metrum podrózne). Od *dróttkvætt* różni go występowanie czterech (zamiast sześciu) sylab w każdej linii zwrotki. Prawdopodobnie, odnosząc się do tytułu wiersza, metrum to było stosowane w kompozycjach poświęconych wyprawom wojennym, ewentualnie innym podróżom podejmowanym przez władcę. Użytkowanie *tøglag* wydaje się być szczególnie związane z dworem Knuta Wielkiego w Anglii. Dokładna analiza metryczna poematu Þórarina, jak również porównanie go z *Knútsdrápa* Sigvata Þórðarsona, wskazują na to, że, wbrew wcześniejszym sądom, żaden z dwójki poetów nie powinien być uważany za twórcę tego metrum. Raczej, obaj skaldowie, już jako wzięci i utalentowani twórcy, bez obaw podjęli poetyckie wyzwanie, które najpewniej podsunął im ktoś inny. Wydaje się słusznym założenie, że pomysł ten zrodził się na dworze Knuta Wielkiego, najpewniej jako skutek sukcesu jaki król Anglii i Danii odniósł w Norwegii w 1028 roku.

Citation

Morawiec, Jakub. "A skald in royal service – the case Þórarinn loftunga. Part 2: Poetics and ideology of *Tøgdrápa*". *Studia Maritima* XXXIV (2021): 33–59. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2021.34-02.



Krystyna Szelągowska

Faculty of History and International Relations

University of Białystok

k.szelagowska@uwb.edu.pl

ORCID: 0000-0002-5195-044X

Casting a glance across Balticum – Poland and her past in Arild Huitfeldt’s Chronicle¹

Keywords: Arild Huitfeldt, Renaissance historiography, Baltic region

Introduction

To study the way how other nations perceived our own country has always been an interesting and significant topic for historians. Depending on the period, this may be a question of opinions among intellectual and political elites or wider masses of the population. An obvious motive for this interest is simple curiosity, produced by the desire “not to be forgotten”. More serious could be the need to obtain information which could help explain some aspects of the past, such as political decisions. They can be clarified, their rationale can be shown if we realise what the decision-makers knew about the country, with which they were dealing. It was important to learn, what facts were known, what cliches were circulating among the educated, what experiences of previous contact were preserved and remembered.

Another purpose can be pointed out in the situation when a foreign description delivers a picture in some ways different to the one, common in the national memory,

¹ This work was supported by a grant from National Science Centre, Poland, no. 2018/29/B/HS3/01023. A brief outline of this paper was presented on the conference in October 2019, in Gdańsk, organised by Polsko-Skandynawisk Forskningsinstitut and the University of Gdańsk and is published in: *Polsko-skandynawskie stosunki kulturalne, naukowe i polityczne od XVI do XX wieku*, eds. Arnold Klńczyński, Gabriela Majewska (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2021), 29–45.

presenting it from another perspective. The confrontation of those two can expose weaknesses or bias in both².

If we focus on historical works, we can see what information was seen as important and worth commemorating – included in the sources, both primary and secondary. Writing his own vision of history, the scholar, willingly or not, consciously or not, had to select pieces of information, using those he found important and/or interesting. If we study the sources used, we can follow the flow of the information.

There were several Polish students of the Early Modern era, interested in the topic, among whom we can name Stanisław Kot, Zofia Libiszowska, Andrzej F. Grabski, Henryk Zins, we can also list collections of works of more detailed character³. In most cases it was the public opinion in such countries like England, France, the German Reich or Hapsburg domains which were under scrutiny in these works. The Scandinavian countries were the object of study usually in context of bilateral relations, obviously it meant focusing on Swedish writing.

An old, but still useful and valuable, work on Polish-Scandinavian cultural relations by Kazimierz Ślaski provides us with a multitude of, although scattered, notes and remarks about Poland in Scandinavian (and vice versa) works: both scholar and literary⁴. Works on the history of Pomerania very often use and refer to Danish sources.

When studying any foreigner's opinion on one's country, as was mentioned above, an ambitious program could be drawn, and its fulfilment could fruitfully be exploited to enlarge the picture of this country's past. Unfortunately, this can not always be done. In Early Modern times' historical books, based in most cases on repetition, compilation and imitation, attempting to realise the programme of utilitarian historiography and, finally, usually following the principle of authority, i.e., the paradigm of non-critical history, the information was included in most cases by pure coincidence. Simply because it was found somewhere and the historian automatically repeated it⁵.

2 Andrzej Garlicki, "Przedmowa", in: *Sąsiedzi i inni*, ed. A. Garlicki (Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1978), 5.

3 Zofia Libiszowska, "Zainteresowanie Polską w historiografii francuskiej XVI i XVII wieku", *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne*, 1 (1959), 12: 63–82; Stanisław Kot, *Rzeczpospolita Polska w literaturze politycznej Zachodu* (Kraków: Krakowska Spółka Wydawnicza, 1919); Andrzej F. Grabski, *Polska w opiniach obcych X–XIII wiek* (Warszawa: PWN, 1964); idem *Polska w opiniach Europy Zachodniej XIV–XV wiek* (Warszawa: PWN, 1968); Henryk Zins, *Polska w oczach Anglików* (Warszawa: PIW, 1974); the collection *Sąsiedzi i inni* has been mentioned above, a recent one would be Mirosława Hanusiewicz-Lavallee, ed. *Wśród krajów Północy. Kultura Pierwszej Rzeczypospolitej wobec narodów germańskich, słowiańskich i naddunajskich: mapa spotkań, przestrzenie dialogu* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2015).

4 Kazimierz Ślaski, *Tysiąclecie polsko-skandynawskich stosunków kulturalnych* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1977), 61, 70, 141–142.

5 Peter Burke, *Renesans*, transl. Ewa Elżbieta Nowakowska (Kraków: Wydawnictwa UJ, 2009), 6; Dariusz Śnieżko, "Jak Marcin Bielski przerabiał z dobrego na lepsze", in: *Tożsamość i rozdwojenie. Renesans*, ed. L. Wiśniewska (Bydgoszcz: Akademia Bydgoska im. Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2002), 213; Karl A.E. Ehenkel, Konrad A. Ottenheim, "The Quest for an Appropriate Past: The Creation of National

Sometimes he made a conscious decision, but in most cases, it is now difficult to understand why the historian resolved to mention one battle, or peace treaty, or seizure of a throne, or a royal marriage, whilst ignoring others. Only sometimes can we recreate the way of reasoning and comprehend the purpose of using the information. And such is the case of Arild Huitfeldt's work.

The well-known Renaissance tendency to provide the national culture with a new national history⁶, which would be modern and compatible with the demands of the day, was implemented in two ways. One was the attempt to present it in classical Latin, in accordance with the humanist and rhetoric model of history. Such work was supposed to be promoted outside home, as it was addressed mainly to foreigners – they had to be illuminated about the land's glorious past, the noble origins of the nation and its rulers, and its cultural achievements. The national history thus provided arguments in the political discourse and strengthened the nation's honour. In Denmark long-lasting endeavours in that field, unsuccessful in the 16th century, were finally crowned with two Latin works published in the 17th century, written by Johannes Pontanus and Johannes Meursius⁷.

The historian's labour could also have another purpose. Equally political and utilitarian, the picture of the national past could be, written in vernacular, directed at a domestic audience. Its role was to stir up national emotions, strengthen the feelings of loyalty to the ruling dynasty – at the same time offer all necessary evidence to its legitimisation – and support the programme of integrating the country. The educational purpose was also important – by presenting the proper politics, describing errors and

Identities in Early Modern Literature, Scholarship, Architecture and Art”, in: *The Quest for an Appropriate Past in Literature, Art and Architecture*, ed. idem (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2019), 3; Thomas Haye, “The Construction of National Past in Bella Britannica by Humbert of Montmoret (d. ca. 1525)”, in: *The Quest*, 157–65; Andrzej F. Grabski, “Czy historiografię można uwolnić od mitu?”, *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 40 (1996), 1: 6, 11; Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, *Polska myśl historyczna a humanistyczna historia narodowa (1500–1700)*, transl. Zbigniew Owczarek (Kraków: Universitas, 2011), 45, 54; Anthony Grafton, *What was history? The art of history in early modern Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 31; Daniel R. Woolf, *The Idea of History in Early Stuart England, Erudition, Ideology and ‘The Light of Truth’ from the Accession of James I to the Civil War* (University of Toronto Press, 1990), 12; Burke, *Renesans*, 17, 23; Knud Fabricius, “Cornelius Hamsfort og den danske Bonde”, *Historisk Tidsskrift*, series 10, 26 (1932–1934): 543, accessed 10.06.2021, <https://tidsskrift.dk/historisktidsskrift/article/view/49791>; Konrad Bielecki, “Etnocentryzm: czy tylko jeden? Krytyczna analiza teorii ‘renesansów’ Jacka Goody’ego”, *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 76 (2019), 3: 443.

6 The idea of Early Modern nationalism is supported by a large number of scholars, like, among recent ones, Caspar Hirschi (*The Origins of Nationalism. An alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany*, Cambridge University Press, 2012) or Azar Gat (with Alexander Yakobson, *Nations. The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism*, Cambridge University Press 2013).

7 A thorough analysis of both works was presented by Karen Skovgaard Petersen, *Historiography at the Court of Christian IV* (København: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2002).

criticising the past wrongdoings, the historian was teaching the king and the readership how to pursue good policy and care for the homeland's wellbeing.

When in the 1530s the major achievement in medieval Danish historiography, the chronicle of Saxo Grammaticus *Gesta Danorum*⁸, was finally printed, the educated elites in Denmark realised that there is a painful lacuna in the country's history: between the end of the 12th century and the present times there was no equally valuable description of the past. Arild Huitfeldt was one who managed, though for domestic readers only, to fill the gap⁹.

Arild Huitfeldt, his work and his contacts with Poland

The historian descended both from the distaff and agnate side, from noble families making a rapid career in Dano-Norwegian monarchy. When he was born (1546), the Huitfeldts and Trolle – his mother's kin – belonged to Danish magnates. As other young men of the nobility, Huitfeldt undertook the *Grand Tour* around Europe, visiting some German and French universities and acquiring perfect knowledge of Latin. Afterwards, in 1571 he entered the royal service, becoming a secretary in the Danish Chancery – at that moment, as historians suspect, he could have started to collect historical documents, of which he made good use later¹⁰. Soon afterwards he was promoted to the rank of First Secretary – one of the leading figures in Danish administration. After a three-year interruption, when he worked as the headmaster of Herlufsholm School, he was appointed (1586) by King Frederick II Chancellor of the Realm, and thus became a member of the Privy Council, a body which shared the magistracy in Oldenburg monarchy with the king. After the king's death, Huitfeldt was a member of the Regency Council – a close-knit circle of aristocrats ruling the country under minor Christian IV. The new king kept him by his side, entrusting him with diplomatic missions. The historian died in 1609.

8 *Danorum regum heroumque historie stilo eleganti a Saxone Grammatico natione Sialandico necnon Roskildensis ecclesie preposito abhinc supra trecentos annos conscripte et nunc primum literaria serie illustrate tersissimeque impresse.* ed. Christiern Pedersen ([Paris], 1514).

9 The historian and his work were an object of study of several Danish and Scandinavian scholars like already-mentioned Karen Skovgaard Petersen, Harald Ilsoe (a.o.: *En redegørelse for Arild Huitfeldts alment litterære læsning og åndshistorisk baggrund således som det kan læses ud af hans fortællinger til Danmarks Riges krønike og hans kommenterende bemærkninger i selve dennes tekst* (København, 1955); "Arild Huitfeldts Krønike, konfronteret med Anders Sørensen Vedel og eftertiden", *Fund og Forskning*, 14, 1967) and representing 19th century historiography: Holger F. Rørdam (*Historieskriveren Arild Huitfeldt, Danmarks Riges Kansler og Raad, Skoleherre for Herlufsholm*, Kjøbenhavn: V. Thaning & Appel, 1896).

10 Rørdam, *Historieskriveren*, 48.

It is astonishing how, being devoted to so many political and administrative duties, Huitfeldt managed to write his immense history of Denmark. Its eight volumes *quarto* were printed from 1595 to 1603, covering the period from the legendary beginnings to the death of King Christian III (1559). In the mid-17th century, the second edition was printed, this time in two volumes *folio* fifteen hundred pages long under the title *The Chronicle of the Kingdom of Denmark*¹¹.

The book enjoyed a widespread popularity. Written in vernacular it soon became a favourite among the reading nobility and almost the official version of Denmark's history at least until the introduction of absolutism (1660), which to some extent annulled its verdict on the previous political system in Denmark. For much longer it was able to influence historical debates and the consciousness of wide circles of the society, whose literacy in the meantime was growing. It was finally replaced by Ludvig Holberg's history of Denmark, published in the 18th century¹². Up to the 20th century the Danish historians, although many times pointing out the weaknesses of Huitfeldt's book, emphasised how profoundly he influenced them, and their work. However, the historian's opinions were treated as authoritative also by his contemporaries and the next subsequent generations in non-scholarly aspects, mainly in different spheres of politics¹³.

As the chronicler was dealing with the history of his homeland – Denmark, which several times did, or at least tried, to play the role of the hegemon in Northern and Central Europe – he had to include material – names, events – connected with the history of its neighbours: lands located around the Baltic Sea. Doing so, he followed his own hierarchy of importance and interests. The most common and frequent are notes devoted to the Polabian region, the sphere of long-lasting Danish expansion and rivalry with the German states¹⁴. Then, Huitfeldt was trying to deliver knowledge about the Balticum: Western Pomerania and Gdańsk Pomerania, Livonia and Estonia. Polish history was located only on the third place. These notes on Poland cannot be arranged into a coherent vision: they are fragmented and scattered. To some degree it can be concluded that the native context was one motive for inclusion, a political usefulness another, and sometimes – the exciting character of the “news”. Only one exception (in

11 *Danmarckis Rigis Krønike ved Arrild Huitfeld* (Kiøbenhaffn: Joachim Moltke, 1652, hereinafter referred to as DRK/1); *Den Anden Tomus eller Part aff Danmarckis Rigis Krønike* (Kiøbenhaffn: Joachim Moltke, 1652, hereinafter referred to as DRK/2). The digitalised version can be found on: <https://archive.org>. For more details describing the work see: Krystyna Szelągowska, “Arilda Huitfeldta szlachecka wizja dziejów narodowych Danii”, *Roczniki Historyczne* 86 (2020): 224–225.

12 Ludvig Holberg, *Dannemarks Riges Historie*, vol. 1–3 (Kjøbenhavn 1732, 1733, 1735).

13 For more details see: Szelągowska, “Arilda”, 223.

14 Recently, Huitfeldt's approach to the Polabian region was described by Paweł Migdałski, *Słowiańszczyzna północno-zachodnia w historiografii polskiej, niemieckiej i duńskiej* (Wodzisław Śląski: Wydawnictwo Templum, 2019), 95–97.

fact within the frames of contemporary reality, rather than the past) can be found: the historian has an expert knowledge and clear vision of the political system in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Having this narrow scope and visible limits in mind, this study presents this material also because Arild Huitfeldt, the most prominent Danish historian of that period is hardly known in Polish historiography.

The main sources on Polish history for Huitfeldt were the works of Marcin Kromer and Jan Herburt – he mentioned both. He also could find something in Adam of Bremen and more recent works of Albert Krantzius. It is hard to speculate to what degree Polish-Danish relations in Huitfeldt's times had any impact on his interests. It is possible that these made him remember about Poland, but equally important was the contemporary scholarly practice and methods: simply to repeat the sources. Huitfeldt's work has generally an annalistic character, he organises his material along temporal axes, from time to time including separate notes about Poland. Studying Huitfeldt's notes on Polish and Slavonic history (his focus on Pomerania was mentioned above) provides a good opportunity to recognise his scholarly methods. For instance, the historian mentioned the duke Boleslaus Wrymouth several times, and every time he wrote down this name in a different way: Bolslaus, Burislavus and the transcription of the Polish form: Boleslao Crivousto (Bolesław Krzywousty). The same happens with the name of the duke of Posen Przemysł (also king of Poland), who can be called Premislaus or Premislaff. Obviously, it was not easy for a Scandinavian writer to spell the Slavic names correctly, but on the other hand this diversity could be explained also by the simple fact that the historian used varied sources and was writing down the form used. Such a thing is common mainly in the part, which was the paraphrase of *Gesta Danorum*, which can also be evidence that large parts of this volume, a simple annal, could have been written by the Chancellor's collaborators: secretaries and scribes.

We do not know much about the direct contacts of the Chancellor with Poland. One known interaction occurred when Huitfeldt was in a diplomatic mission in England in 1597. On the way, his ship passed by a Polish vessel on its way back, with Polish ambassador, Paweł Działyński on board¹⁵. In a diary, written by Huitfeldt's secretary it is noted that the Danish ship saluted the Polish one with gunfire and a trumpet blast¹⁶. This event was also recorded by a pamphlet, *Merkuriusz sarmacki* emphasising the elegant and friendly character of the meeting. The text presented the negative outcome of Działyński's mission as a result of Queen Elizabeth's hostility, and not his own doing¹⁷.

15 *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. 2, ed. Zbigniew Wójcik (Warszawa: PWN, 1982), 36–37.

16 [Ludvig Heithman], "Dagbog over de danske Gesandters Rejse til England og Holland in Tillæg til Arild Huitfeldts Levned", ed. Holger Fr. Rørdam, in: H.F. Rørdam, *Historieskriveren* (in the same volume, but with separate paging), 135.

17 *Merkuriusz sarmacki z Niderlandów i Anglii, czyli zwięzła relacja z dwóch poselstw do Niderlandów i Anglii, które z woli Najjaśniejszego i Najpotężniejszego króla Polski i Szwecji etc., i za zgodą Jego dostojników, senatorów i Sejmu gorliwie i chwalebnie sprawował i uczynił sławnymi oświecony*

In Huitfeldt's work we come across a small note, showing that, on the margin of great political affairs, the members of a diplomatic mission could make friendly gestures towards each other. When the historian was describing the negotiations concerning Estonia in the 14th century, between the King of Denmark and the Livonian Brothers of the Sword, he mentioned a letter from 1345 where the proposition of selling the country was expressed and informed that the Polish ambassador on the peace congress in Stettin in 1570 donated a copy of this letter to the Danish delegation¹⁸.

Diverse short notes

Most of the diverse, scattered and short information, deprived of any comment and usually not connected with the previous or the next one is concerned with alliances, peace treaties, royal marriages or wars and battles, such as Emperor Conrad's victory over the Polish King (sic!) Mieszko and Czechs¹⁹ or wars between the March of Brandenburg and Poland²⁰. One "Polish archbishop" was mentioned as the one who ordained fraudulently the one-eyed bishop Osmund (a story taken from Adam of Bremen) to archbishop, allowing him to continue his activity in Sweden²¹. Duke Boleslaus Wrymouth was mentioned as the one whom holy Otto von Bamberg gave support in Christianising the Pomeranian people²².

In the 14th and 15th centuries the relations and contacts between Poland and Denmark became more frequent and intense, due to the increasing conflicts in the region between various political forces: the Polish-Lithuanian union, the Brandenburg March, the Teutonic Order, the Holy Roman Empire, not to mention Gdańsk. This is reflected in Huitfeldt's chronicle, when the historian recorded the growing political and diplomatic activity in the region both of Denmark and the Kingdom of Poland.

i wspaniały Paweł Działyński Roku Pańskiego 1597, transl. Irena Horbowy, ed. Ryszard Marciniak (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1978), 48.

- 18 Aff dette Breff tilkom os først en Copie, aff det Polske Sendebud til Stettin, paa den Fredsfordrag som giordis imellem Danmarck oc Sverige Aar 1570. DRK/1, 494; One contact described by Huitfeldt's biographer Holger F. Rørdam ([entry: Arild Huitfeldt] in: *Dansk biografisk Lexicon*, ed. Carl Frederick Bricka, vol. 8 (Kjøbenhavn: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag (F. Hegel & Søn), 1894, 147) about negotiations with the Polish delegation, which came to Denmark in 1604 asking for support is probably based on a mistake.
- 19 Aar 1027 ofvervant Keyser Conradus de Poler oc deris Konge Mesnigum, med stor ære: hand ofvervant oc de Behmer deris Medhielpere oc tvang de Sclaver under Skat. DRK/1, 69.
- 20 Aar 1327 gjorde de Poler oc Littover stor skade i Lante Marcken. DRK/1, 440.
- 21 (-) ordinerit i Polen aff en Erckebysp (-). DRK/1, 82.
- 22 Aar 1118 vaar Bisp Ottho udi stor Flor, som vaar en synderlig hellig Mand, huilcken tilbød oc tilhialp Bolslaum den Polske Hertug at skulle paatage sig Pilgrims gang til det slavoniske Folck, som man kalder Pomerske, oc predike for det groufe Folck Guds Ord; Han omvend dem, ganske aldelis med deris Første Wartislav til Gud. DRK/1, 95.

Now, the information became more detailed; the author decided also to include documents *in extenso*, in most cases the treaties signed. This was the alliance signed in 1315 between Eric Menved and Władysław Łokietek, which is explained as being caused by the war with margraves²³. Two agreements signed by Kings Waldemar Atterdag and Kazimierz Wielki (1350, 1363) were also noted and their texts included²⁴. However, there is no information about a possible Waldemar's visit in Poland, which confirms a more recent state of knowledge in that matter. There was a long-lasting belief that the Danish king took part in the famous "feast at Wierzynek's" during the international meeting in Cracow in 1364, which is now questioned²⁵. A closer cooperation took place in the 15th century, when King Eric of Pomerania signed a peace treaty with Władysław Jagiełło in 1419. Huitfeldt informed the reader about the sole act, the visit of Eric in Poland in 1424 including some details: the occasion was the marriage of the Polish king, the Emperor Sigismund of Luxemburg was present and that negotiations about a marriage of Jagiełło's daughter Hedwig took place with the involvement of the papal delegate. What he did not mention was: the reasons of the treaty, its contexts (the problems with the Teutonic Order) and the fact that the plan of the marriage eventually failed²⁶.

Those events were analysed in Polish historiography, thus we know that Huitfeldt committed several minor errors²⁷, but more importantly that we are dealing with an annalistic form, so there is no real narrative here – neither interpretations nor reasoning can be found. The notes about diplomatic negotiations on treaties and marriages at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries have a similar character: in 1507 King Hans was, according to a letter quoted, reconsidering a marriage of his son, Christian, with

23 DRK/1, 381 cont.

24 Aar 1350 giorde Kong Woldemar oc Kong Casimir aff Polen, dem it fast Broderlig Venskaff imellem [-], Datum min Lovitz in octavo Domino 1350. Denne confederation bleff atter fornyet Aar 1363 til Cracow, hour Kong Casimir da tilbant sig, at hielppe hannem oc hans Undersaatter imod huer Mand som en Broder den anden aff all Mact. DRK/1, 503.

25 In theory, there were three possible occasions: Łowicz (1350), Kraków 1363 and therein in 1364, when the feast took place. The information about Waldemar's presence was announced by Jerzy Wyrozumski (*Kazimierz Wielki*, Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1982, 138–141), writing about the Polish-Danish relations in the context of Kazimierz Wielki's foreign policy. However, in his more recent outline (*Dzieje Polski Piastowskiej (VIII wiek – 1370)*, *Wielka Historia Polski*, 2, Kraków 1999, 372) this was not repeated. Kazimierz Ślaski (*Tysiąclecie*, 69) mentioned the meeting of both monarchs in 1363, Janusz Małek ("Stosunki kulturalne Polski i Litwy z państwami skandynawskimi w późnym średniowieczu i w czasach nowożytnych (1385/97–1795)", in: *Wśród*, 67) – specified the years 1350 and 1363.

26 DRK/1, 676, 712.

27 The festivities in 1424 were on the occasion of the coronation of Sophie, Jagiełło's wife. See: Zenon Nowak, "Przymierze Polski i Litwy z państwami unii kalmarskiej", *Zapiski Historyczne* 34 (1969), 1: 67–78; Idem, "Sprawa przyłączenia Pomorza Słupskiego do Polski w latach 1419–1425", *Zapiski Historyczne* 39 (1974), 3: 99–124.

a “Polish maiden”²⁸, an “eternal peace treaty” was mentioned under 1509 – the chronicler noted that this treaty was at the Polish request, and that Denmark was granted “a prime place” – whatever it meant²⁹. A few years later, adding no comment at all, the historian mentioned an alliance signed by Hans’s successor, King Christian II with Russian Duke Wasilij... against Poland³⁰.

Although, as we see, there are no comments from the historian’s side, the events in Poland had to be important to some degree, since he decided to mention, under the year 1386 Jagiełło, Duke of Lithuania’s, marriage with Polish King Ludwik Węgierski’s daughter, Jadwiga. It can be explained in two ways: with the fact that the marriage was followed by the duke’s Christianisation and adopting the Christian name, which is carefully noted. The other motif could, demonstrating a more modern approach, result from the noting the connection with future events: his son’s – Władysław – death in battle (1444) and the marriage of his grand-daughter Anna, who married the duke of Pomerania; here again the importance of Pomeranian history can be seen³¹.

Huitfeldt observed the famous war between Poland and the Teutonic Order from this point of view. When mentioning under the year 1410 the battle at Grunwald (Tannenberg), obviously a sensation in Europe at that time, typically for him, he focused attention on the Pomeranian aspect, describing the actions of the duke of Pomerania and the duke of Szczecin³². He also found it worth informing that in the course of the war forty thousand Teutonic Knights died³³.

Huitfeldt’s interests in Western Pomerania, Dantzic and the politics in the eastern area of the Baltic Sea led to a more detailed account. This is worth a separate study, but in most cases, Poland was not mentioned, since Pomerania had, for a long time, its own independent position and politics. So, only those few notes, when Poland or Polish rulers are directly and clearly named, will be presented. Huitfeldt mentioned the Danish expeditions on Preussen and Sambia and the establishment of Dantzic combined with Christianising the people and the local ruler – Mściwój, who denounced

28 DRK/2, 1067.

29 Ibidem, 1074.

30 Ibidem, 1109–1111.

31 Fick Jagello Hertug udi Lythow, Kong Lodvigs Daatter i Polen, Hewdvig, til Hustru, oc med hende Polen, siden hand haffde ladet sig døbe oc bleff hand kaldet udi Daaben Vladislauus. Denne vaar Konning Vladislai Fader i Ungarn, som bleff slagen udi Bugern hos Varnem, Aar 1444. Oc Casimir Kongis tii Polen huis Datter Annam, Hertug Bugislaff aff Pommern den X fick til Ecte., DRK/1, 571.

32 Udi den Marck Tannebierge bleff den Tydske Ordens Mestere slagen aff Jagellone Polono. Hertug Bugislaff i Pommern dragger til Kongen aff Polen i tieniste oc Svantiboer aff Stettin til Ordensfolcket. Hand sender dennem sin Søn Casimir med 600 Heste, huilcken bleff fangen udi Nederlaget oc formedelst Hertug Bugislai Underhandling maatte løse sig for store Penninge. Kongen fordreff Hertug Bugislaff for hans hielp oc Tieniste, nogen Stæder oc Slot. DRK/1, 635.

33 DRK/1, 636

his loyalty to the Polish king and made tribute to the Danish Waldemar³⁴, The person worth mentioning was the duke Conrad of Mazovia and his alliance with the Poles against Świętopełk³⁵. To add drama to his narrative, Huitfeldt recalls the story of the duke Przemysław of Posen, who ordered the strangulation of his wife, Ludgard, with a string³⁶.

Huitfeldt did not inform when and how the Teutonic Order settled in Poland, but he did not ignore when it began to affect the political situation in the region. He described the struggle in Hither Pomerania (*Vorpommern*) over the legacy of local rulers, which engaged all neighbours, including the Order and Poland³⁷. He writes how Pommerellen came under Polish rule³⁸, about the conflicts between Poland and Pomeranian rulers and their alliance against the March of Brandenburg at the end of the 13th century, summing up that several expeditions by Poles, Brandenburgians and dukes of Western Pomerania tried to win Gdańsk Pomerania³⁹.

Although the description of the Pomeranian's fate lacks a coherent form and the threads are not linked, Huitfeldt managed to detect and mention one major turning point – the moment when Dantzig was captured by the Teutonic Order. He described the events in a neutral tone, informing about all issues: the politics of the local voivode, the Brandenburgian's expansion, the Polish king's breach of the agreement with the

34 Aar 1210 skeede it Thog udi Lante Preussen oc Samblant at omvende de Lande til christelige Tro, da blef Mistovi en Polske Første tiltvungen at sverge Konning Woldemar Liudelse. Anno 1164 tilforne haffde hans Herre Fader Konning Woldemar den I. bygt it Slot til Dantzig som Wyssele udløber oc kallet den Haffn Dantzig. Men siden Kong Woldemar vaar bortseyglet tog Sobislaus der Stæd ind igien oc er imellem disse Thog 46 Aar. DRK/1, 178.

35 DRK/1, 203.

36 Samme Aar [1283] lod Premislaus første af Possen hans Hustru Ludgierd quelle med en strick, men de Poler holdt hende for hellig. DRK/1, 287.

37 Ordens Herrerne lade Mestowin quit for hans Faders Gaffue: Mestowin Klaget sig for Paffuen hand sende den Bisp aff Firmian; efter hans Forhandling gaff Mestowin aff sin god Vilie Ordens Herrer det Slot Nowe med 15 Byer der med fick Ordens Folcket først Fod udi Prytzen. Oc effterdi Mestowin saa sig ingen Liffs Arffinge at haffue oc mange effter hands Død skulde ville anmette dennem Rettighed til hans Lande; som var Polen, Pommern, Første aff Ryen oc Greff Adolf aff Holsten. Huilcke begge Herrer haffde hans Døttre oc dernæst ordensherrerne da haffde hand heldst hiulpet hans Frender der til med de Slaver vilde icke der udi bevilge huilcket gaffue tilkiende at deris Forfædre vaare forstøtte aff Forpommern oc derfor hyldiget de Hertug Premislaff der med bleff de rette Arffinge forstøtte, hour offuer stor Blods udgydelse kom offuer Landet. DRK/1, 287–288.

38 Formedelst Mestowi dødelige Afgang uddøde den hinder Pomerske Linie oc Landene kom under Polen. DRK/I, 308.

39 Effter at Hertug Bugislaus icke vilde affstaa sin arffuelig Rettighed til hinder Pomern drog hand til Belgard oc gandske Landskabet fulde hannem til Ryvolde oc da kom hannem de Poler imod hos den Bukowiske Strand huilcket han nederlagde udi it Slag indtog Ryvolde oc plyndrede det. Paa det sidste forligte sig Wartislaff aff Pommern med Hertug Bugislaff oc effterlod hannem de forøffrede Lande paa det hand skulde bistaa hannem imod Marggreuffen. Der offuer er han med Wladislao dragen udi den Ny Marck oc hafuer Arensvold oc Bergensted forvøstet oc forherget oc skede det Thog om Thog for Pommerens skyld imellem Polen, Marck oc Pommern. DRK/1, 310.

Knights, and the Order's brutal revenge. He informed (another example of a modern approach to an historical narrative) that the Order possessed the town and the region for one hundred and fifty years⁴⁰.

The complicated problems of Pomerania and its relations with Poland were also present in the 14th century, so again battles, wars and peace treaties were mentioned: so, in the year 1377 Duke Kazimir, in the service of the Polish king, taking part in a siege, was killed by a stone. But the rationale behind this information was sound: the duke's death and the problems with his legacy were important: his duchy was inherited by his brother, who married Marie, who was the daughter of Lady Ingeborg from Mecklenburg, and this couple's son was Duke Eric, who would later become king of Denmark⁴¹. That is why it was vital to inform the readers about the descent of King Eric of Pomerania: Lady Ingeborg was the daughter of King Waldemar Atterdag and Queen Margaret's sister.

In general, the genealogical connections were always seen as important, and the Early Modern historians usually devoted a lot of space to invoke them and clarify as much as possible. So did Huitfeldt, mentioning some marriages between Slavic, Polish and Pomeranian members of royal families and their Scandinavian, mainly Danish, counterparts. So, the Swedish Prince Magnus married Świątosława, the daughter of Duke Boleslaus Wrymouth⁴²; here a mistake was made, since the duke's daughter's name was Ryksa. Another marriage was between the Swedish princess, daughter of King Magnus I Birgersson, called Ladulås and Polish Duke Przemysław⁴³.

40 Kongen aff Polen haffde indgiffuet Pomerellen en Weywaade, Peter Swendſe Erff kantzler: den same gaff sig under Marggreffuerne med de Slot oc Stræder Stolpe, Schlave, Polno, Karrickel oc Nyenborg: hour ofuer Marggreffueren holt sig gantske Hinderpommeren: huorefore Kongen indtog same Slot, fangede Weywaaden, huilcken dog siden kom løs: Marggreffuerne droge paa Dantzic, erøffrede det, men Slottet beholt en Polisk Høffvitzmand Bogusse, til saa lenge Kong Wladislaff fordret Hoffmesteren aff Prytzen til Hielp oc igien indtog Staden. Nu bleff Hoffmesteren for hans Tieniste oc Krigs omkostning skyld, icke saa snart betalt: der offuer forjagede hand Høffvitzmanden Bogusse fra Slottet. Byen kunde hand icke faa, for hand vaar før vel besat. Siden samlede Hoffmesteren meget Krigsfolck aff Ryssland oc gjorde Anslag paa Byen oc paa it almindelig Marcket i Dominick neffued, som mange Kremere oc Kiøbmand vaare tilsaammen da haffue hand erøffret Byen eer videre fort dragen, haffuer indtaget Dinhow, Bottno, Lowenborg, Schlato, Canitz, Taathal oc den gandske Land til Stolpen oc haffuer Ordensfolcket same Lande som med Gewalt bleff indtagen, beholt halffandet hundred Aar. Dette er skeed 1302, 12304, 1305 oc nogen Aar effter at dette Larm hafuer været. DRK/1, 323.

41 Aar 1377 bleff Casimir den fierde som udi mange Aar haffde ladet sig bruge udi Kongens aff Polen Tieniste, huorfaare hand oc bleff forlænt med de Lande, Dolbrin oc Braborrig oc haffde der med forøgt sin Titel. Som hand det store Slot Spator i Polen, Kongen til beste haffde belagt, bleff han udi en Storm med en Steen ihjelslagen. Effter hans Død vende de Poler, huis Lande hand haffde fortient, under dem. DRK/1, 564.

42 Udi dette Aar 1128 tog Hertug Magnus Suentoslavam, Kong Burislavi aff Polen Datter til Hustru, Bryllupet stod i Ribe. DRK/1, 96.

43 Udi dette Aar gifted Kong Magnus i Sverige Rigitz, konning Waldemars datter; hende fick en Polnisk Herre heed Prebislaus: den II hans Broderdatter fik en Herre aff Depholt heed Boloff oc hun Marine.

In the very detailed account of King Christian III's reign – close to his own experiences and memory, and based on written sources, but also on eyewitnesses' reports, a royal marriage was connected with a diplomatic scandal. This happened in 1555, when the Danish princess Anna, the niece of King Christian, held her marriage in Wismar (1555). Huitfeldt reported that the Danish delegation was offended, because the Polish one was – wrongly, as the Danes claimed – given precedence, i.e. the better position in the hierarchy of guests, so they decided to leave the feast⁴⁴. This story must have been well known in Europe at that time and it was also present in Polish historical books, namely the Chronicle of Poland from 1597, formally by Marcin Bielski, but in the part written by his son, Joachim. In his loose style and with a bit of humour the author describes the event with the final conclusion: the Danes had to “go to the tavern to have supper”⁴⁵. Also, Holberg wrote about this incident, but his purpose was different: he discovered that Huitfeldt confused the characters of the story (he confused Albrecht of Mecklemburg with Albrecht of Preussen) and did not miss the opportunity to correct the old master⁴⁶.

The last short note concerned with Poland was connected to the Northern Seven Years' War and, as the chronicler admits, it was waged during the reign of the next Danish king, Frederik II. The note describes only the origins of the war – i.e. the comet which in the year 1556 foreshadowed dramatic events to come. In Huitfeldt's eyes the disaster was caused by a conflict in Livonia which was stirred up by the irresponsible and selfish politics of the Polish king, Sigismund Augustus. This was contrary to Christian III, who tried to calm down the tensions and avoid hostilities⁴⁷. The

44 (-) menendis deris Herre at være skeet en Spaat der udi, thi Hans Majest. vaar icke aleeniste Brudens Moderbroder, men ocksaa Danmarkis Rige it ældre Kongerige end Polen, efterdi her udi Danm. Rige udi utænckelige Aar hafuer været Konger udi den stæd at for stackit Tid Polen haffuer været en Førstedom. DRK/2, 1548.

45 *Kronika Polska, Marcina Bielskiego. Nowo przez Iachima Bielskiego syna iego wydana* (Kraków, 1597) (reprint, Warszawa: Graf_ika, 2019).

46 Ludvig Holberg, *Dannemarks Riges Historie*, vol. 2 (Kjøbenhavn, 1733), 390, accessed on 15.11.2020, <http://holbergsskrifter.dk/holberg-public/view?docId=DH%2FDHTom2.page&toc.depth=1&brand=&chunk.id=bd2chap1>.

47 Samme aar vaar en stor Comeet paa Himmelen om Vinteren med it forfærdeligt Rijs oc Straaler som udi Tuiffel betyde den store Plage offuer Liffland aff Muscoviteren som er at læse udi den lifflendiske Krønike. Samme Krig oc Ulycke begyntis først aff indbyrdis Trætte som vaar imellem Hermeisteren oc Erkebispem til Riga. Efterdi at Kong Christian som en forstandig Herre saa at det vilde komme paa det sidste Landit til stor Skade oc Affbreck understod hans Majest. sig u daff Fredkierhed at vilde forlige Herremesteren oc Erkebispem huilcken aff Herremesteren vaar fangen oc forsende derfor udi dette Aar sine statlige Sendebud did at forhandle at Bispem icke alleniste maatte komme paa frij Fod igien, men ocksaa den gandske Sag bliffuer forenit før end større Ulycke (som indbyrdis Trette oc Oprør almindelig pleyer effter sig at drage oc nu for de fremmede Giæster skyld huilcke der offuer vaare bleffne indførde i Landit) vaar paa ferde maatte effterfølge. Disse Sendebud handlede saa vit, at altingist vaar saa got som besluttit, at megen Skade haffde kunde bleffuen affveriet, der som de haffde haft sin fremgang. Men effter Kongen aff Polen icke vilde samtycke samme conditions, gick Ilden

description was a logical conclusion of the official Danish standpoint which accused the Polish expansionist policy in that region of causing the war.

The Renaissance historical books, partly in a medieval manner, were concentrated on politics and its history – the same we see in the case of Huitfeldt's chronicle. In more recent times, however, the confessional problems became vital as well. So also in this aspect a piece of information with a Polish thread can be found. During the reign of Christian III the relations between various protestant creeds became hostile and for the Danish Church and the king himself the defence of pure Lutheran doctrine was seen as *raison d'état*. This is probably why Huitfeldt decided to include the information about a short visit in Denmark of Jan Łaski, also because in this way he managed to explain the origins of one decree, issued (1559) by Christian III – a decree forbidding the supporters of the anabaptist movement to enter the monarchy. Around two hundred refugees from England, whose escape was caused by the persecution of the catholic Queen Mary Tudor, came to Denmark. Huitfeldt does not specify the moment of their arrival, connecting it directly with the above-mentioned decree, but in fact they came six years earlier, in 1553. Among them, one "Johannes aff Lask", a Polish nobleman. The king organised a theological debate between newcomers and the leaders of the Danish Church but he did not accept the point of view of the former and ordered them to leave the country immediately. Huitfeldt, using an account of one of the refugees, whom he called "Carolus Utenhoff" (in fact it was Johannes van Utenhove, 1516–1566, a Flemish humanist and religious reformer), reports that all this happened during a severe winter⁴⁸. Contrary to the historian's description, which is not exact, the debate was waged not in person, but only in the form of exchange of letters between the Danish bishop Peder Palladius⁴⁹ and other members of the group, and Łaski did not participate in it⁵⁰.

The story about Petrus Duvinus

In most cases, the notes and information about Poland had limited character, although coming closer to his contemporary time, the chronicler made them more extensive.

i brand, oc ødelagde paa se sidste icke alleniste den Ganske Orden oc Landit men strackte sig ocksaa til andre Naboer. DRK/2, 1552.

48 Ibidem, 1548–1549.

49 Peder Palladius, 1503–1560, lutheran cleric, bishop (superintendent) of Zealand from 1537; a prominent promoter of the Lutheran church in Denmark.

50 Kai E. Jordt Jørgensen, "Jan Laskis Besøg i Danmark, Vinteren 1553". *Teologisk Tidsskrift for den danske Folkekirke*, series 5, 6 (1935), 92, 94.

Nevertheless, in some circumstances, the stories are slightly longer. There are three such examples, all strictly connected with Danish history.

The first deals with the well-known story about Piotr Włostowic, a Silesian magnate in the 12th century, an important figure in Polish politics of that day.

Under the year 1149 Huitfeldt noted the death of “Petrus Duvinus”, a Dane, who, despite his good position in his homeland, came with his father, a wealthy man, to Poland and joined the service of King (sic!) Bolesław III (the Wrymouth). He won respect and sympathy of the king, but (after his death) lost the favours of his son, duke Władysław, because he dared to mock his wife. The duchess accused him of treason, and he was blinded and muted in 1144 and finally died in 1149. Huitfeldt mentioned that he founded a monastery in Breslau where he was buried and quoted the epitaph on his tomb⁵¹. Huitfeldt described the whole story, following the book of the Silesian chronicler Joachim Curäus (1532–1573): *Gentis Silesiae annales complectente...* (Wittenberg 1571).

Another moment when the historian came across the same, or a similar, story happened when he was describing the tragical reign of the Danish King Eric Plovpenning (1216–1250). He referenced “Polish chroniclers” („Polnische Krønicleskriffuer”), i.e. Marcin Kromer⁵² and Jan Herbut – both copied the story from a medieval, 13th century text, Wielkopolska Chronickle. In this version, Peter (“Petrus Avinus til Breslow”), the son of a certain William, the knight of King Eric, made a career in the court of the Polish King Bolesław. When the Danish king was killed (1250) William asked his son to convince Bolesław to organise an expedition to Denmark to avenge the murder of King Eric and punish his killers, mainly his brother Abel. At the same time another motive was to rescue and take away the Danish treasure, in order not to let them fall into the assassin’s hands. Following Kromer and Herbut, Huitfeldt gave an account of the expedition and its consequences: the Danish Royal Council offered Bolesław the Danish crown, which he refused to take⁵³.

51 Aaret derefter [1149] døde udi Slesien Petrus Duvinus, en Dansk, som hafuer bygt oc funderit S. Vincentij closter til Breslaw, som er aff Præmonstratenser orden: Hans Epithaphium eller Graffskriffit liuder saaledis: Hic situs est Petrus, Maria conjuge fretus / Marmore spledente, patre Vilhelmo peragente / Han vaar høyt anset udi hans Fæderne Land dog drog hand derudi uvist aff hvad Aarsage til Kong Boleslaum den 3. udi Polen, som da oc haffde Slesien, med sin Fader som vaar en rig Mand. Hos hannem bleff han æret oc anset: Han fick en begrædelig Affgang, for hand skiemtet noget for rundeligen med Christina Wladislai Hustru, Keyser Henrich den 5. Datter thi begge Øyene bleff hanem udstunge oc hans Tunge affskaaren, huilcket skeed Aar 1144. Hand Leffde endda 5 Aar efter, døde Aar 1149. DRK/1, 103.

52 The story was described by Marcin Kromer twice: *Kronika Polska Marcina Kromera biskupa warmińskiego* (Sanok, 1857), 258–259, 285–288.

53 Men effterdi disse Sager som nu ere repeterit, blifue tillagt Boleslao Crivousto, huilcken Aar 1139 er Død, oc derfor mange Aar for denne tid, nemlig 1250 Aar, saa lader jeg saadant hafue sin Besked oc Maade. De Danske Annaler melde intet der om, at saadant paa denne eller nogen tid tilforne skulle haffue været skeed. men udi den Slesiske Historie finder jeg, at Aar 1149, skal en Dansk været Død,

Huitfeldt immediately realised the weaknesses of this story and critically commented that Peter had lived in the previous century, as it was described under the year 1149 (once again he told the whole story). He also pointed out that the Danish annals do not mention such events and concludes – which shows his modern abilities as an historian – that the story was much better adjusted to the historical realities of the 12th century, not the 13th⁵⁴.

The story of the Polish conquest of Denmark was also repeated by a Danish 17th century historian Claus C. Lyschander in his work *Danske kongers slectebog*. Here the author made a reference to Polish historians⁵⁵, but certainly he also knew that it was present in Huitfeldt's authoritative book. Lyschander did not critically comment on the story, just repeated it, but, being an expert in chronology and following Huitfeldt's remark, he associated it with the assassination of the Danish King Eric Emune in 1137⁵⁶.

Also, Holberg decided to accept the story in part; this time in the context of the dramatic murder of Duke Kanut Lavard (1131). Referencing Kromer, he only mentioned that this event initiated the period of civil wars in Denmark and because of that, many magnates left the country, among them "Lord William, father of Peder Dumes [sic], who went to Poland (-)"⁵⁷. Certainly, Holberg did not write anything about the Polish conquest of Denmark. In this way, the Polish legend was absorbed, for a while, into Danish historiography, although purified of most incredible elements.

Thirteen Years' War

The second larger story related to the Thirteen Years' War (1454–1466) and Huitfeldt's description is focused only on Danish and Swedish participation. Danish engagement was a direct consequence of the Swedish one, since at that time the primary object of Danish politics was to preserve the Kalmar union, and counter back all Swedish

hed Petrus Duvinus udi S. Vincentij Kloster som vaar af Praemonstratensis Orden, hos Breslow, som hand før haffde stifttit, huilcken haffuer en saadan Graffskift (-). DRK/1, 228.

54 Den Historie som Curäus reciter, kommer bedre ofuer ens for Tidens, Naffnens oc Omstendens Skyld til forrige Tide end her. DRK/1, 228.

55 The author informed that he used the collection *Poloniarum rerum latini veteres et recentiores scriptores quotquot exstant*, Basel 1582 by Johannes Pistorius.

56 Claus Christopher Lyschander, *Synopsis historiarum Danicarum ... den Danske historia ... forfattet vdi de Danske kongers slectebog* (Kjøbenhaffn, 1622), 428–429, accessed on 18.09.2020, https://books.google.pl/books?id=NLtBAAAACAAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=pl&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.

57 (-) Herr Wilhelm Peder Dumes Fader, hvilken gick til Polen (-), Ludvig Holberg, *Dannemarks Riges Historie*, vol.1 (Kjøbenhavn, 1732), 210, accessed on 15.10.2020, <http://holbergsskrifter.dk/holberg-public/view?docId=DH%2FDHTom2.page&toc.depth=1&brand=&chunk.id=bd2chap1>.

attempts to win independence. The major actors were, thus, King Christian I and the Swede Karl Knutsson Bonde (Charles VIII).

Being aware of the real character of Danish politics during the war – Huitfeldt understood without any doubts that the most important part was the Swedish issue – the historian, though not always coherently, describes other aspects as well. He correctly associates the war with the rebellion of the Prussian towns against the Teutonic Order, placing its start in 1457. Danish engagement is presented as a result of pleas from the Orders side – the Knights asked the western rulers (including the Emperor) to put sanctions (i.e. to forbid the trade) on the Prussian towns⁵⁸.

So, the history goes on: King Christian sent a letter to Kazimierz Jagiellończyk, pointing out with deep sorrow, how the Order made a name for itself in defending Christianity not only in Syria, but also in Eastern Europe, how dangerous the Polish king's action could be, encouraging other pagan nations in the region to fight against it. He reminded Kazimierz that he pledged to protect the Christian religion and preserve good relations with the Order. Finally, he included a threat: if Kazimierz does not abandon the politics of supporting the rebellious towns, he, Christian, would have to act against him, and also against those towns, especially Gdańsk, Elbląg and Toruń. Incidentally, this letter revealed how much the Danish king was influenced by the Teutonic Order's narrative about its activity in the Middle East and Eastern Europe – repeating the phrases about “pagan people” who were supposed to still live in the region.

But soon, other information, in fact, presented a much more realistic picture of the motives of his engagement. When Christian issued the orders forbidding any trade with Gdańsk, he explained that the major reason related to the fact that the city's ships violated the law, since they were sailing from the Baltic Sea to the Northern Sea, not through the Sund, where they would have to pay the customs, but took another route – the Danish straits. Another reason was the fact that Gdańsk supported the enemy of Denmark, Karl Knutsson. And finally, the third reason was described. This was connected with an incident which happened a few years before – Huitfeldt (twice) pictures a humiliating situation for the Danish king, when he, sailing along Norwegian shores during the storm, wanted to seek shelter in one port, and this was prevented by some Gdańsk vessels, which began to shoot cannons against the Danish ships, so the king had to stay at sea the whole night. The Gdańsk merchants are also portrayed as real pirates, who attack Danish ships, capturing the crews and the goods⁵⁹.

58 Aar 1457 begyntis en stor Krig oc Oprør udi Lante Prytzen, imellem Undersaatterne oc Ordens Herer, en Part de Prydske Stæder gaffue sig under Kong Casimiro aff Polen, en Part tog hand med Krigsmact ind, huilcket fortrød Keyseren, Churførster oc andre Herrer, saa at de saa vel i Ordens Herrer besøgte Kong Christiern, at forbiude all Tilføring paa same frafaldne Prydske Stæder, oc ellers Handel oc Vandel udi hans Riger at bruge. DRK/2, 869.

59 Vaar Kongen for nogle Aar siden i Norge oc for Storm skyld vilde været ud I en Haffn, da skiød de imod hannem, saa hand ikke maatte komme udi sin egen Haffn dog der vaar Platz til flere Skibe, saa

The incident in the first description was commented on as a “joke”, for which “they soon would pay dearly” (*...en Spaat ...huilcket hand dennem siden dyrt nock betalde*)⁶⁰.

The description of the war is focused on the activity of the Swedish part, particularly Karl Knutsson, combined with the politics of Gdańsk. The negative attitude towards this city did not prevent Huitfeldt to portray its mayor, Reinhold Niderhof, as brave and determined in fighting against the Order for freedom – this was during the armistice negotiations in Stockholm, when he dared to oppose the Danish king, presenting the Teutonic Order as a traitorous, aggressive and tyrannic organisation which would never be accepted by the people of Gdańsk, loyal to the Polish king⁶¹.

Typical for the period lack of coherence, the historian does not inform how the war ended (losing his interest at the moment when Denmark abandoned the case) – in the year 1466 (when the peace treaty in Toruń was signed) he mentioned only the plans of a royal marriage between the Danish Crown Prince Hans and Sophie, the 2-year-old daughter of Kazimierz Jagiellończyk, which did not come to fruition⁶².

King Christian II and Melchior

Finally, the third story in which Poland played some role, though rather passive, was connected with the whole narrative about King Christian II's reign, and specifically the judgement of the king, in which Huitfeldt in fact presented the official position of the contemporaneous Danish government.

Under the year 1520, noting (slightly incorrectly) the beginning of the war between Poland and Ducal Prussia (the secularized Teutonic Order state), he precisely informed that the war was caused by the fact that Prince Albrecht Hohenzollern did not want to

hand den hele Nat hafuer maat holdet Søen til med, da falder de undertiden udi Land oc bortfører hand Undersaatter oc deris Gods. DRK/2, 869–870.

60 Ibidem, 860.

61 Omsier bleff en Dag Anstillet til Stockholm om en anstand. Did bleff paa Kongen aff Polens oc de Dantzigers vegne forsendt Her Reinhold Niderhof Borgemester oc Her Bernt Bapst Raadmand huilcke bleffue afferdiget med Siu Skibe til Stockholm under Kong Christierns Leyde der vaar oc Hertugens aff Slesvig oc de Lybske Sendebud hos oc første gang bleff intet skaffet thi Kongen vilde at Ordens Herren med skulde indragis i Handelen oc da Niderhof haffde sagt at Kongen aff Polen oc hans Undersaatter at vaaret vaare anfalden oc fiendligen antastet huilcker saadan en Potentat icke burde, da kom det til saadan en Forbittring, at Kongen foer ud oc sagde ere i icke tilforn undsagde nock [wyzwani “na pojedynek] saa undsiger jeg eder endnu paa mine Tre Rigers vegne, Kongen aff Polen oc alle hand Lande, Særdelis Prytzen oc Dantzic. Herr Niderhoff undsagde hannem igien paa Kongen aff Polens oc Dantzigers Byes vegne, sigendis der hos Kongen skulde aldrig leffue den Dag at de igien skulde tage de Tyrraner de Krytze Herrer. Der bleff samme Møde split at oc de Dantzigers seylet igien hiem oc komme til Dantzic S. Hans Afften. DRK/2, 873.

62 Ibidem, 909

pay homage to the Polish king, Sigismund [I the Old]⁶³. Again, Denmark was involved in the events, because, as Huitfeldt informed, Christian sent a military unit to support Prussia. According to Huitfeldt, it was the same unit which was previously sent from Poland to Denmark to help in the war with Sweden. The Polish king then sent an envoy, named Melchior, with a letter in which he asked the Danish king about his plan and reasons and criticised the Danish decision. Huitfeldt reported that, at the first moment, the king of Denmark, in an apology, explained he knew nothing about sending the unit to Prussia, and such a response was taken by the ambassador back home. But soon Christian changed his mind and ordered some vessels to chase the Polish ship and murder Melchior under a disguise of a pirate attack⁶⁴.

Several times in his book, when expressing the opinion about King Christian II and his rule, Huitfeldt mentioned that incident, stressing that this was an extremely barbaric act: “Even the Turks do not kill any envoy sent to them [in a diplomatic mission]!”⁶⁵. Some evidence is also provided: the next Danish king, Frederick I, writing in his letter – an accusation of Christian to legitimise his dethroning, mentioned three golden rings he saw in Christian’s hands, recognising them as being the ambassador’s possessions.

This story was well known in Denmark then, and was also included into the s.c. Skibby Chronicle (*Skibbykrønike*) of Poul Helgesen. This book was unknown until the 17th century, so Huitfeldt must have used another source⁶⁶. Nevertheless, the story is mysterious, since it cannot be confirmed by another source. Even Marcin Kromer in his book about the fate of Katharina Jagiellonka did not mention it, though he included a description of Christian II as godless, malicious and cruel⁶⁷. It is impossible to assume that if he had known anything about the murder of the Polish ambassador, he would have omitted it. Holberg in his Danish history quoted two official documents: the letter-statement of Frederick I and the official announcement of the Royal Coun-

63 Samme tid [1520] vaar der en Krig begynt imellem Kong Sigismundum aff Polen oc Hertug Albrit aff Pryssen, aff den Aarsage, Hertugen aff Pryssen icke vilde giøre de Poler nogen Læns Eed oc Forplict, men holt sig aldels saa vel for den Tydske Aardenn Skyld, som ellers i andre maade at ligge under den Romerske Rige aff saadan Tvist gjorde de Poler stor skade udi pryssen, de andre igien paa de Polske Undersaatter. DRK/2, 1152.

64 Ibidem, 1161–1162.

65 Kongens Sendedbud aff Polen lod hand omkomme udi den Østre Strand, som er uhørlig iblant Christen Folck. Ja end ey iblant Tyrcker et Sendedbud som til hannem selff sendis skulde belegedis oc skadis., DRK/2, unnumbered dedication to Christian IV, also 1162.

66 Ślaski, *Tysiąclecie*, 141 [Poul Helgesen], “Den skibyske Krønike”, in: *Monumenta Historiae Danicae*, ed. H. F. Rørdam, vol. 1 (Kjøbenhavn: G.E.C. GAD, 1873), 52; Poul Helgesen (ca.1485–after 1534) was a Catholic, his latin chronicle mainly focus on the reformation in Denmark, of which he was a fierce enemy; the manuscript of his work, ending in 1534, was hidden in a wall of the church in Skibby and was discovered in 1650.

67 Marcin Kromer, *Historyja prawdziwa o przygodzie żalosznej księżęcia finlandzkiego Jana i królowny polskiej Katarzyny*, ed. Janusz Małek (Olsztyn: Pojezierze, 1983), 14–15.

cil. Both explain the reason why the Danish people and the Royal Council decided to perform such an extreme action as overthrowing their own king. The assassination of Melchior was not mentioned in either of them⁶⁸.

So, most probably this history is false, being a part of the black legend of Christian II, being carefully constructed over a long time, and gradually enriched by most extreme details, showing the king as a felon and a man willing to violate any law. Huitfeldt probably used one of many pamphlets, written and published during the internal struggle in Denmark.

Huitfeldt's opinion about the Commonwealth's political system

Finally, one more aspect of Huitfeldt's interests in Poland should be analysed.

As a statesman and politician, Huitfeldt had good knowledge about the political system in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the democracy based on the nobility's predominance and its government. Such references were often put mainly in the author's prefaces, by which he provided the young king (Christian IV) with political expertise. The teaching was partly of a moral character – the historian wanted to show the king examples of a proper ruler, his policy and behaviour. He also wanted to present the Danish political system as not only the best one, but also as something more natural, being a product of historical evolution and strongly connected with tradition. The basic elements of the system were the election of the king, and the leading position of the Privy Council in the government. He saw the political system in the Commonwealth as good evidence confirming that diagnosis. Several times he emphasised that Denmark is a “free elective monarchy”, and the Polish example was proof that it could not be seen as an aberrancy. It was vital to point to the elective character of the monarchy in the context of the changes in the early 16th century and the dethronement of Christian II.

So, the old chancellor admonished the king:

(-) at the beginning the Estates of this kingdom simultaneously made an oath and elected Your Majesty, to lay the legal government [in your hands], just as Your ancestors had [been given]. It was because this kingdom is not a hereditary monarchy, but a free elective one. At the beginnings there were no hereditary kingdoms or other magistrates, such as we see today, but the people were choosing the one who was most clever, diligent

68 Ludvig Holberg, *Dannemarks Riges Historie*, vol. 2, 141–158. Similarly, Polish historiography does not mention it at all, see: Andrzej Wyczański, “Polska służba dyplomatyczna 1506–1530”, in: *Polska służba dyplomatyczna XVI-XVIII wieku*, ed. Zbigniew Wójcik (Warszawa: PWN, 1966), 11–79 (and a list of individuals active in the Polish contemporaneous diplomacy included, 69–70).

and fit. And some states, i.e. this kingdom [Denmark] and Poland still preserve the ancient habit⁶⁹.

The elective monarch was, thus, according to Huitfeldt, the most natural and traditional form of government, which has been created for the common good, and its structures, i.e. offices – including the royal one – have to serve the people.

In particular he provided information about Henry de Valois, who, as he wrote, did not want to live in Poland, but in France, so the Poles decided to choose another ruler⁷⁰.

The historian notes the similarity of governing principles: the democratic idea that the state does not belong to the king, or dynasty, but the people. He remarked that supreme officials make an oath of allegiance not only to the ruling king, but they swear to take care of the whole country (*men oc Riget at skulde vide diss Beste*). In Denmark, he continued, we have a chancellor, a hofmeister, a marshal and other members of the Privy Council. In Poland: a voivode and a castellan⁷¹. Poland is also listed as a country which adopted (together with England, Scotland, the Italians and the French) a good military system. It rejected the mercenary army, replacing it with “one’s own one”, an army consisting of conscripted locals. Huitfeldt presented this idea as a piece of advice to the king, convincing that – as history shows – the mercenaries are always troublesome⁷².

The information about the Polish system provided by Huitfeldt belong to those, which in the book have a consistent and coherent character: they were repeated in the same form several times, so it is clear that the historian had analysed the topic and came to the conclusion. Probably this relates to the utilitarian character of Huitfeldt’s book: he wanted to air the conviction that the Danish system: the elective monarchy with a strong position of the Privy Council, representing the people, is a natural product of historical development and certainly can be placed within the European tradition. This was confirmed by the Polish example: as the political system did not hinder making it a strong state, so similarly Denmark with its form of government can preserve its role as the hegemon in Northern Europe.

69 (-) haffuer disse Rigers Stender samptlig hyldit, sorit oc udvald Eders Maj. oc derhen seet, oc til det lofflige Regiment, som Eders fremfarne Forældre haffue ført, huilcke Kongedomme icke er nogle Arfferige men fri Valriger. Aff første da vaare ingen Kongeriger eller Herschaff Arfflige, som nu en Part ere, men da tilstickede oc udvalde Folckit den, som dydeligste, Forstandigst oc Beqvemmeligst vaar. Ved same Skick er dette Rige, Polen oc nogle fleere udi Christendommen aff langsommelig Brug oc Indskickelse bleffne., DRK/2, in unnumbered dedication to Christian IV.

70 de Poler at være træd til it ny Vall, der Kong Henrich den anden icke vilde bo hos dennem udi Polen, men udi Franckrige. DRK/2, 1210.

71 DRK/2, 1211.

72 DRK/2, in unnumbered dedication to Christian IV.

Conclusion

All the notes and information about Poland included in Arild Huitfeldt's chronicle do not compose a full and coherent picture. The historian focused his attention of his own national history and usually referenced Poland, when some connections were visible: the royal marriages, treaties or alliances: those had to be scrupulously, in an annalistic manner, registered. He also presented information which involved Denmark directly – like the story about Peter the Dane. Some events, though, were so well known, like the battle at Grunwald, that even though they had nothing to do with the history of Denmark, they could not be omitted.

When delivering the political and ideological lessons Huitfeldt used the Polish example in a consistent way – here it was logical to mention the political system of the Commonwealth as similar to the Danish one, as proof that the Danish elective monarchy was not an anomaly, but proper and stable and other European countries had the same kind of monarchy. He stressed that everywhere it was a product of historical development and a system growing out of the tradition. The story about Melchior became also useful to accuse King Christian II, presented here as a brutal, cruel tyrant, violating the law.

Still, this analysis does not clearly show, whether there is much or little information about Poland. This question can be answered by some comparisons with notes concerning other Eastern or Central European countries, such as, for instance, the Czech Republic (Bohemia in contemporaneous practice) or Hungary, incidentally being a country with, to some degree, a similar social and political system to the Polish one. This question probably could be an object of scrupulous analysis, but for the purpose of this paper, only a quick glance would suffice.

In the huge, more than three hundred *folio* pages (not paginated) large register of names and terms, at the end of the second volume of Huitfeldt's work, the term "Poland" is included in five entries (certainly, other notes are listed in other contexts, like ruler's names). In the case of both the Czech Republic and Hungary, there is none. Some notes, however, can be found. Both countries' names are usually evoked in connection with the information about the Holy Emperor's activities, since, for some time, they possessed the Crowns of those. Separately, Hungary is mentioned in the history of Eric of Pomeranian's journey south to meet the emperor (1424), when the Danish king was travelling across this country⁷³. Some other annalistic remarks inform that Bohemians became Christians in 893, about the Hungarian King Bela's marriage, that Hungarians were defeated by the Turks (1304) or that the Bohemian King Wenceslaus was killed by his brother Boleslaus (974). There are also a few sentences – long note

73 Ibidem, 697, 726.

about the burning at the stake of Jan Hus from Prague (“Johannes Huss, Pragensis”). The short note is concluded with a moral sentence: that is how heretics end⁷⁴. Obviously Huitfeldt did not realise, that Hus was in fact a predecessor of Protestantism, and repeated conclusions from his source, which was the common opinion of Europeans at that time. This could also result from his Lutheran standpoint, which at the end of the 16th century excluded any variation of the non-Catholic creeds, except the strict Lutheran one.

It seems that Huitfeldt had a much better awareness and interest in Poland and her history than other Eastern and Central European countries. First and foremost, because of the real connections between the two countries and geographical location – in his eyes, Poland was probably a part of Northern Europe, involved in affairs and politics of the Baltic region.

Bibliography

- Bielecki, Konrad. “Etnocentryzm: czy tylko jeden? Krytyczna analiza teorii ‘renesansów’ Jacka Goody’ego”. *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 76 (2019), 3: 425–452.
- Bielski, Marcin. *Kronika Polska, Marcina Bielskiego. Nowo przez Ioachima Bielskiego syna iego wydana* (-). Kraków 1597 (reprint), Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Graf_ika, 2019.
- Biskup, Marian. *Trzynastoletnia wojna z Zakonem Krzyżackim 1454–1466*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo MON, 1967.
- Bömelburg Hans-Jürgen. *Polska myśl historyczna a humanistyczna historia narodowa (1500–1700)*. Transl. Zbigniew Owczarek, Kraków: Universitas, 2011.
- Burke, Peter. *Renesans*. Transl. Ewa Elżbieta Nowakowska, Kraków: Wydawnictwa UJ, 2009.
- Czapliński, Władysław. *Polska a Dania XVI–XX w.* Warszawa: PWN, 1976.
- Długopolski, Edmund. *Władysław Łokietek na tle swoich czasów*. Kraków: Universitas, 2009.
- Enenkel, Karl A.E., Ottenheim, Konrad A. “The Quest for an Appropriate Past: The Creation of National Identities in Early Modern Literature, Scholarship, Architecture and Art”. In: *The Quest for an Appropriate Past in Literature, Art and Architecture* ed. Idem, 1–12. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2019.
- Fabricius, Knud. “Cornelius Hamsfort og den danske Bonde”, *Historisk Tidsskrift*, series 10, 26 (1932–1934), 543. Accessed 10.06.2021. <https://tidsskrift.dk/historisktidsskrift/article/view/49791>.

74 DRK/1, 662.

- Garlicki, Andrzej. "Przedmowa". In: *Sąsiedzi i inni*, ed. Andrzej Garlicki, 5–6. Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1978.
- Gat, Azar. (With Alexander Yakobson). *Nations. The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013.
- Grabski, Andrzej Feliks. "Czy historiografię można uwolnić od mitu?". *Przegląd Humanistyczny* 40 (1996), 1: 1–17.
- Grabski, Andrzej F. *Polska w opiniach Europy Zachodniej XIV–XV wiek*. Warszawa: PWN, 1968.
- Grabski, Andrzej F. *Polska w opiniach obcych X–XII wiek*. Warszawa: PWN, 1964.
- Grafton, Anthony. *What was history? The art of history in early modern Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Hanusiewicz-Lavallee, Mirosława, ed. *Wśród krajów Północy. Kultura Pierwszej Rzeczypospolitej wobec narodów germańskich, słowiańskich i naddunajskich: mapa spotkań, przestrzeń dialogu*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2015.
- Haye, Thomas. "The Construction of National Past in Bella Britannica by Humbert of Montmoret (d. ca. 1525)". In: *The Quest for an Appropriate Past in Literature, Art and Architecture*, ed. Karl A.E. Enenkel, Konrad A. Ottenheim, 153–166. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004378216_008.
- [Heithman, Ludvig]. "Dagbog over de danske Gesandters Rejse til England og Holland in Tillæg til Arild Huitfeldts Levned", ed. Holger Fr. Rørdam. In: H.F. Rørdam, *Historieskriveren Arild Huitfeldt, Danmarks Riges Kansler og Raad, Skoleherre for Herlufsholm*. Kjøbenhavn: V. Thaning & Appel, 1896.
- [Helgesen, Poul]. "Den skibyske Krønike". In: *Monumenta Historiae Danicae*, ed. H.F. Rørdam, vol.1, Kjøbenhavn: G.E.C. GAD, 1873.
- Hirschi, Caspar. *The Origins of Nationalism. An alternative History from Ancient Rome to Early Modern Germany*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Holberg, Ludvig. *Dannemarks Riges Historie*. Vol. 1, Kjøbenhavn, 1732. Accessed on 15.10.2020. <http://holbergsskrifter.dk/holberg-public/view?docId=DH%2FDHTom2.page&toc.depth=1&brand=&chunk.id=bd2chap1>; Vol. 2, Kjøbenhavn, 1733. Accessed on 06.10.2019. <http://holbergsskrifter.dk/holberg-public/view?docId=DH%2FDHTom2.page&toc.depth=1&brand=&chunk.id=bd2chap1>.
- [Huitfeldt, Arild]. *Danmarckis Rigis Krønike...* (-). vol. 1–2, Kjøbenhaffn: Joachim Moltke, 1652.
- Ilsøe, Harald. "Arild Huitfeldts Krønike konfronteret med Anders Sørensen Vedel og eftertiden". *Fund og Forskning* 14 (1967): 23–58.
- Jørgensen, Kai E. Jordt. "Jan Laskis Besøg i Danmark, Vinteren 1553". *Teologisk Tidsskrift for den danske Folkekirke*, series 5 (1935), 6: 81–116.
- Kot, Stanisław. *Rzeczpospolita Polska w literaturze politycznej Zachodu*. Kraków 1919.

- Kromer, Marcin. *Historyja prawdziwa o przygodzie żalósnej księżęcia finlandzkiego Jana i królowny polskiej Katarzyny*, ed. Janusz Mańlek, Olsztyn: Pojezierze, 1983.
- Kromer, Marcin. *Kronika Polska Marcina Kromera biskupa warmińskiego ksiąg XXX (-)*. Sanok 1857.
- Libiszowska, Zofia. "Zainteresowanie Polską w historiografii francuskiej XVI i XVII wieku". *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne*, series 1, 12 (1959): 63–82.
- Lyschander, Claus Christoffer. *Synopsis historiarum Danicarum ... den Danske historia... forfatted vdi de Danske kongers slectebog*. Kiøbenhaffn: Henrich Waldkirch, 1622. Accessed on 18.09.2020. https://books.google.pl/books?id=NLtBAAAACAAJ&printsec=frontcover&hl=pl&source=gb_s_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false.
- Mańlek, Janusz. "Stosunki kulturalne Polski i Litwy z państwami skandynawskimi w późnym średniowieczu i w czasach nowożytnych (1385/97–1795)". In: *Wśród krajów Północy. Kultura Pierwszej Rzeczypospolitej wobec narodów germańskich, słowiańskich i naddunajskich: mapa spotkań, przestrzenie dialogu*, ed. Mirosława Hanusiewicz-Lavallee, 58–102. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2015.
- Merkuriusz sarmacki z Niderlandów i Anglii, czyli zwięzła relacja z dwóch poselstw do Niderlandów i Anglii, które z woli Najjaśniejszego i Najpotężniejszego króla Polski i Szwecji etc., i za zgodą Jego dostojników, senatorów i Sejmu gorliwie i chwalebnie sprawował i uczynił sławnymi oświecony i wspaniały Paweł Działyński Roku Pańskiego 1597. Transl. Irena Horbowy, ed. Ryszard Marciniak, Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich 1978.
- Migdalski, Paweł. *Słowiańszczyzna północno-zachodnia w historiografii polskiej, niemieckiej i duńskiej*. Wodzisław Śląski: Wydawnictwo Templum, 2019.
- Nowak, Zenon. "Przymierze Polski i Litwy z państwami unii kalmarskiej". *Zapiski Historyczne*, 34 (1969), 3: 45–78.
- Nowak, Zenon. "Sprawa przyłączenia Pomorza Słupskiego do Polski w latach 1419–1425". *Zapiski Historyczne*, 39 (1974), 3: 100–124.
- Rørdam, Holger Frederik. *Historieskriveren Arild Huitfeldt, Danmarks Riges Kansler og Raad, Skoleherre for Herlufsholm*. Kjøbenhavn: V. Thaning & Appel, 1896.
- Rørdam, Holger F. [entry: Arild Huitfeldt]. In: *Dansk biografisk Lexicon*, ed. Carl Frederick Bricka, vol. 8. Kjøbenhavn: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag (F. Hegel & Søn), 1894.
- Szelaągowska, Krystyna. "Arilda Huitfeldta szlachecka wizja dziejów narodowych Danii". *Roczniki Historyczne* 86 (2020): 217–248.
- Ślaski, Kazimierz. *Tysiąclecie polsko-skandynawskich stosunków kulturalnych*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1977.

- Śnieżko, Dariusz. "Jak Marcin Bielski przerabiał z dobrego na lepsze". In: *Tożsamość i rozdzielenie. Renesans. Materiały z V sesji naukowej z cyklu "Świat jeden, ale nie jednolity"*, ed. L. Wiśniewska, 211–220. Bydgoszcz: Akademia Bydgoska im. Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2002.
- Wolf, Daniel R. *The Idea of History in Early Stuart England, Erudition, Ideology and 'The Light of Truth' from the Accession of James I to the Civil War*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.
- Wójcik, Zbigniew, ed. *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*. Vol. 2, Warszawa: PWN, 1982.
- Wyczański, Andrzej. "Polska służba dyplomatyczna 1506–1530". In: *Polska służba dyplomatyczna XVI–XVIII wieku*, ed. Zbigniew Wójcik, Warszawa: PWN, 1966.
- Wyrozumski, Jerzy. *Kazimierz Wielki*. Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1982.
- Wyrozumski, Jerzy. *Dzieje Polski Piastowskiej (VIII wiek – 1370)*, *Wielka Historia Polski*. Vol. 2. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Pinnex, 1999.
- Zins, Henryk. *Polska w oczach Anglików*. Warszawa: PIW, 1974.

English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The enormous 16th century book *Chronicle of the Kingdom of Denmark*, written in vernacular, is a testament to several features typical of that period's historiography. As a utilitarian history it was supposed to deliver moral and political lessons and arguments. It has a traditional form, in many parts annalistic. Despite several weaknesses, the work became very popular reading for generations of Danish nobility, influencing the development of historical consciousness. The *Chronicle* is also evidence of broadening the horizons of Danish elites, a group to which the author, the Chancellor of the Realm and the magnate, belonged. The paper presents information concerning Poland, included in the book. The fact that it was so could be simply a result of historical methods applied in this period (among others, copying and repeating sources), but it could be caused also by growing interests in Poland, seen as a partner in regional politics with the Baltic Sea as the centre. Some closer connections between Poland and Denmark, mainly in the 15th and the 16th centuries, could be connected with the network of conflicts and alliances among such political entities as: the Teutonic Order, the Holy Empire, Brandenburg, the Hanseatic League, Gdańsk and the whole of Pomerania. Most of the notes are scattered, rather short and do not create a comprehensive whole. In the case of more recent history, the narrative has a much more well-developed character (like for instance the case of the Thirteen Years' War). Some Polish context (probably fictitious) became useful when the author had to criticise King Christian II. Huitfeldt was also well-informed about the political system of the Commonwealth and included the information when writing about the Danish system, presenting both as similar.

Spojrzenie przez Bałtyk – Polska i jej dzieje w Kronice Królestwa Duńskiego Arilda Huitfeldta

Słowa kluczowe: Arild Huitfeldt, historiografia renesansowa, region bałtycki

STRESZCZENIE

XVI –wieczna *Kronika Królestwa duńskiego*, autorstwa Arilda Huitfeldta powstała na marginesie starań państwa o stworzenie nowoczesnej syntezy dziejów narodowych, mającej do spełnienia różnorakie polityczne cele, w odniesieniu do zagranicznego i krajowego odbiorcy. 9-tomowe dzieło omawia dzieje Danii od legendarnego króla Dana do roku 1559 (śmierć Chrystiana III). Napisane w języku narodowym, ma dość tradycyjną formę, bliską rocznikowi i kronice. Pozostaje historią pragmatyczną, realizującą polityczne, dydaktyczne i moralizatorskie cele. Mimo wielu słabości, historia ta przyniosła wizję dziejów Danii, kształtującą mentalność wielu pokoleń duńskich elit w epoce nowożytnej. *Kronika* jest świadectwem poszerzania się horyzontów elit duńskich tego czasu, które reprezentuje autor dzieła, magnat i kanclerz Korony, Arild Huitfeldt. Większe zainteresowanie Polską w tym kręgu mogło być skutkiem polsko-duńskich zbliżeń na tle skomplikowanego układu politycznego północnej Europy, splotu interesów i konfliktów (Polska – Dania – Szwecja – Zakon Krzyżacki – Gdańsk – Hanza – Marchia Brandenburska – Cesarstwo). Celem artykułu jest ukazanie, jakie informacje o Polsce i jej dziejach znane były wykształconym elitom duńskim tego okresu. Tradycyjny kształt dzieła rzutuje na dobór przekazów, który cechuje przemieszanie informacji ważnych z błahymi. Informacje o Polsce w większości mają charakter rozproszonych wzmianek, dotyczących takich zdarzeń jak dynastyczne mariaże, dwustronne traktaty, wojny i bitwy oraz pojedyncze, czasem „sensacyjne” fakty. Narracja bardziej rozbudowana pojawia się w odniesieniu do nowszych dziejów, w przypadku m. in. wojny trzynastoletniej. Pewne *polonicum*, choć akurat nie związane z rzeczywistymi faktami, zostało użyte w krytyce króla Chrystiana II. Znający realia systemu politycznego Rzeczypospolitej kanclerz używał polskiego przykładu w opisie ustroju Danii, który uważał za podobny.

Citation

Szelągowska, Krystyna. "Casting a glance across Balticum – Poland and her past in Arild Huitfeldt's Chronicle". *Studia Maritima* XXXIV (2021): 61–86. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2021.34-03.



Jarosław Drozd

Institute of History
University of Gdańsk
jaroslaw.drozd@ug.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0001-5577-5696

Register Files of The State Enterprise and the Joint Stock Company “Żegluga Polska” in Gdynia as a Source in Research on the Polish Merchant Navy under the Second Polish Republic

Keywords: Gdynia, shipping, Polish merchant navy, Second Polish Republic, interwar period, state archives

The Companies Register files found in the fonds of the Municipal Court in Gdynia constitute an exceptionally valuable source for research on the history of the Polish Merchant Navy and the economic history of the Second Polish Republic¹. In 2003, they were edited and prepared for release (by the author of this article), but, despite the passage of years, they are still used in research only by a narrow group of historians. All the greater the pity that the fonds contains register files of Polish shipping companies, which should be used as source material for research on issues related to the history of maritime economy in the Second Polish Republic. In this article, the records of the Companies Register were used to describe the circumstances of the establishment, the organisation, the activity, the fleet, and the operational and financial results of Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe “Żegluga Polska” [lit. State-owned Enterprise

1 The Companies Register was established in the Second Polish Republic under the decree of the Chief of State of 7 February 1919 and the regulation of the Minister of Justice of 22 April 1919 on the Companies Register. It was divided into three sections. General partnerships and limited partnerships were entered in RHA [Companies Register A], data on limited liability companies and joint-stock companies were entered in RHB [Companies Register B], and information on companies with foreign investment capital was entered in RHC [Companies Register C]. The Register was kept in the form of books annexed with register files. The register files of the Municipal Court in Gdynia were handed over to the State Archives in Gdańsk on 14 September 1982. The fonds was given the reference code APG 1845 and was deposited in the repository of the Department in Gdynia. After the Gdynia Department had been transformed into a Branch Division, the fonds received a new reference code (APG OG 149), and once it had been edited and prepared for release (in 2003), it was officially put into “scientific circulation”.

“Polish Shipping”], Poland’s oldest and largest shipping company, which transformed from a pioneering state-owned business into an efficient joint-stock company. Register files of Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe “Żegluga Polska” (one volume from the years 1926–1932), in comparison with the register records of “Żegluga Polska” SA (two volumes from the years 1932–1939), contain relatively sparse source materials. However, they are of exceptional value, if only because they regard the pioneering period in the development of the Polish Merchant Navy. On the other hand, the documents of “Żegluga Polska” SA (mainly reports on the company’s activities from the years 1932–1938) constitute a unique and extremely detailed historical source, rich in operational and financial data, which can be used to supplement information found in the issues of *Rocznik Rady Interesantów Portu Gdynińskiego* [Yearbook of the Port of Gdynia Stakeholder Council], *Rocznik Statystyczny Gdyni* [Gdynia Statistical Yearbook], or *Rocznik Morski i Kolonialny* [Maritime and Colonial Yearbook].

Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe “Żegluga Polska” was established in 1926 under the State-owned Enterprises Act. The impetus for this undertaking was provided by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which, in the autumn of 1927, bought five “Wilno” – type collier ships in France. They arrived in Gdynia in the first days of January 1928 and were soon loaded in Gdańsk with wood destined for the ports of Western Europe (with time, of course, they also started carrying coal). At the beginning of 1928, the fleet of “Żegluga Polska” consisted of nine ships, including two passenger ships. In the same year, another two cargo ships and two smaller passenger ships were ordered in England. It was a time when Polish society was becoming more and more interested in maritime affairs. An important role in popularising the Polish Merchant Navy was played by the company’s inconspicuous coastal passenger ships, whose decks were filled with more and more tourists every season. “Work on land, rest at sea” – this simple advertising catchphrase, probably coined by the managing director of “Żegluga Polska”, Engineer Julian Rummel, won thousands of supporters and enthusiasts in the country. Since the condition of the ports in Hel and Jastarnia left much to be desired, two new ships, SS “Jadwiga” and SS “Wanda”, were launched to provide liner services on the routes to these destinations. Solemn blessing of the ships took place in June 1928 in the presence of Marshal Józef Piłsudski, who visited Gdynia for the first time, accompanied by his two daughters (the godmothers of the two vessels). At the same time, a small paddle steamer SS “Hanka” was launched on this route (her godmother was Engineer Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski’s daughter). The company’s development program, adopted by the Administrative Council of “Żegluga Polska” in 1929, provided for the establishment of liner services, without neglecting tramp services. The company’s first liner services were to Riga, Tallinn and Helsinki. After ten years of operation, “Żegluga Polska” SA already served eleven routes with constant cargo flows, connecting Gdynia and Gdańsk with Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg, ports of Italy, Sweden, Finland,

Latvia, Estonia, and the Middle East. Before the outbreak of World War II, "Żegluga Polska" SA had the largest fleet out of all the Polish shipping companies, with 16 ships (not counting coastal shipping and tugs) with a total Gross Register Tonnage (GRT) of 25,073 and was a showpiece of the Polish Merchant Navy.

At the request of the managing director, Engineer J. Rummel, on 8 January 1927, Państwowe Przedsiębiorstwo "Żegluga Polska" was entered in the Companies Register of the Municipal Court in Gdynia (under reference number RHB 23)². The scope of business activities specified in the company's statute included "the transport of goods and travellers by sea and all related activities". This entry was supplemented on 30 May 1928 with the following: "the performance of sea transport services with particular emphasis on the needs of the State and domestic industry and trade, transport of people and cargo and performance of related financial and commercial operations such as selling ship tickets, taking goods into storage, granting loans, etc."³. Engineer J. Rummel, an excellent organiser, without whom the development of "Żegluga Polska" would have been impossible, had remained in the position of managing director until the firm was transformed into a joint-stock company. The only change in managerial personnel took place on 14 May 1930 when, pursuant to a resolution of the Administrative Council, the then Minister of Industry and Trade, Engineer E. Kwiatkowski dismissed Kazimierz Rothert (head of the Freight Department) from the position of deputy managing director and appointed Hugo Teofil Pistel in his place⁴.

The circumstances of transforming Państwowe Przedsiębiorstwo "Żegluga Polska" in Gdynia into a joint-stock company are well documented in the register files. The transformation was initiated by the Minister of Industry and Trade, Dr. Ferdynand Zarzycki. On the basis of the resolution of the Council of Ministers of 27 January 1932, he submitted an appropriate bill to the Sejm (Parliament) of the Republic of Poland. In the recitals to the proposal, the minister wrote that the reason for this decision was to create conditions in which private capital could be invested in the state-owned enterprise. The reasons for choosing the new organisational form for the company were

-
- 2 State Archives in Gdańsk, Gdynia Branch (Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku Oddział w Gdyni, hereinafter: APG OG), the Municipal Court in Gdynia (Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni, hereinafter: SGG), 149/416, *Postanowienie o wpisie do rejestru handlowego z 2 marca 1927 r.*, 1, 5 [*Decision on entry in the Companies Register of 2 March 1927*, 1, 5]. Engineer J. Rummel referred to the nomination issued on 10 November 1926, by the Minister of Industry and Trade, Engineer E. Kwiatkowski and a letter of authorisation of 29 December 1926, issued by the Chair of the Administrative Council, Dr. Cyryl Ratajski.
 - 3 Ibidem, 149/416, *Wniosek Państwowego Przedsiębiorstwa "Żegluga Polska" do SGG z 30 maja 1928 r. o uzupełnienie wpisu do rejestru handlowego*, 11. [*Application of Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe "Żegluga Polska" to SGG of 30 May 30 1928 for supplementing the entry in the Companies Register*, 11].
 - 4 Ibidem, *Uzupełnienie wniosku do rejestru handlowego Sądu Grodzkiego w Gdyni z 21 sierpnia 1930 r.*, 18 [*Supplement to the application to the Companies Register of the Municipal Court in Gdynia of 21 August 1930*, 18]. See also: Ibidem, *Postanowienie o wpisie do rejestru handlowego z 8 października 1930 r.*, 27 [*Decision of 8 October 1930 on Entry in the Companies Register*, 27].

based on the conviction of the then Government that the pioneering period in the company's activity had come to an end and that appropriate conditions had been created for the company to be run in cooperation with local government or private capital. In July 1932, the Ministry of Industry and Trade announced the end of the liquidation of the enterprise operating under the old rules and its "expiry"⁵. The enterprise was removed from the Company Register on 31 August 1932⁶. Of great importance here is the notarial deed of 18 July 1932, preserved in the first volume of the company's register records. Citing the Act of 17 March 1932, on the transformation of a state-owned enterprise into a joint-stock company (Official Journal of the Republic of Poland No. 32, item 339) and the Order of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of 9 July 1932, with the approval of the Ministry of Treasury, the director of the Maritime Department at the Ministry of Industry and Trade, Dr. Feliks Hilchen, issued a consent to establish a joint-stock company by the name "Żegluga Polska" with a capital of PLN 8 million⁷. The managing director of the company was Feliks Kollat, director of the "Polish-British Ship Society" in Gdynia, who was also a member of the management board of that latter institution, which "was not considered a competitive enterprise"⁸. Feliks Kollat remained in his position until the outbreak of World War II, also serving as president of the Polish Shipowners' Union and honorary consul of Japan. Upon his motion of

-
- 5 Ibidem, *Wniosek ministra przemysłu i handlu z 15 lipca 1932 r. o przekształcenie przedsiębiorstwa państwowego Żegluga Polska na spółkę akcyjną*, 37 [Motion of the Minister of Industry and Trade of 15 July 1932 to transform Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe "Żegluga Polska" into a joint-stock company, 37]. The files include the opening balance sheet of "Żegluga Polska" SA as of 1 April 1932, the balance sheet of Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe "Żegluga Polska" for the year 1931/32 and the liquidation balance sheet of Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe "Żegluga Polska" as of 31 March 1932.
 - 6 Ibidem, *Postanowienie o wykreśleniu z rejestru handlowego z 31 sierpnia 1932 r.*, 39. [Decision of 31 August 1932 on removal from the Companies Register, 39].
 - 7 APG OG, SGG, 149/604, *Akt notarialny z 18 lipca 1932 r. (rep. 961/32) zawarty przed Atanazym Zalewskim, zastępcą notariusza H. Ewerta-Krzemieniewskiego w Gdyni*, 21nn. [Notarial deed of 18 July 1932 (ref. no. 961/32) concluded before Atanazy Zalewski, deputy of notary public H. Ewert-Krzemieniewski in Gdynia), 21 ff.] See also: Ibidem, *Postanowienie MPiH z 18 czerwca 1934 r. w sprawie zezwolenia "Żegludze Polskiej" S.A. w Gdyni na podwyższenie kapitału zakładowego*, 112. [Decision of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of June 18, 1934 authorising "Żegluga Polska" SA in Gdynia to increase its share capital, 112]. Ibidem, *Potwierdzenie wpisu do rejestru handlowego z 31 października 1934 r.*, 122 [Confirmation of entry in the company register of 31 October 1934, 122]. The non-cash contribution to the company's capital were the tugboats: "Ursus", "Tur", "Bizon" and "Żubr". The State Treasury owned 40,000 registered IPO shares and 1,500 FPO shares. The company's share capital was increased to PLN 8,300,000 upon the motion of its authorities of 3 August 1934, with funds raised in a follow-up public offering of 1,500 registered shares with a nominal value of PLN 200 each (APG OG, SGG, 149/605, *Postanowienie MPiH w sprawie zatwierdzenia zmiany statutu S.A. pod nazwą "Żegluga Polska" z 29 lipca 1939 r.*, 219–222 [Decision of the Ministry of Industry and Trade of 29 July 1939 on the approval of the change of the statute of the joint-stock company by the name "Żegluga Polska", 219–222]. At the general meeting of shareholders held on 7 July 1939, in Gdynia, the share capital was increased to PLN 15,000,000.
 - 8 APG OG, SGG, 149/604, *Protokół z posiedzenia Rady Nadzorczej "Żegluga Polska" S.A. z 18 lipca 1932 r.*, 25n [Minutes from the meeting of the Supervisory Board of "Żegluga Polska" SA of 18 July 1932, 25f].

26 June 1936, the Supervisory Board handed over the functions of the deputy managing director to the then procurator, Dr. Stanisław Darski, who also remained in his position until the end of the Second Polish Republic⁹.

"Żegluga Polska" SA was entered into the Companies Register of the Municipal Court in Gdynia (under ref. no. RHB 206) on 3 November 1932¹⁰. Its statute, preserved in its entirety in the first volume of the register files, was approved under the Decision of the Ministry of Industry and Trade on 13 July 1932¹¹. From then on, the company's most important tasks included: "transporting people and goods by sea, on its own ships and leased vessels, and by land; carrying out all financial and commercial operations related to this purpose and running the company's own industrial enterprises or purchasing and selling syndicated shares in other enterprises. In particular, the scope of the company's activities includes: sale of ship, train and other tickets; taking goods into storage; granting loans for goods accepted for storage and transport; insurance of freight accepted for storage and transport; arranging all kinds of forwarding, brokerage and other activities related to the transport and storage of goods; building and maintaining the company's own marinas and warehouses; transportation of passengers, luggage and goods in mixed and land-sea transport based on direct shipping documents¹².

In the first operational year (from 1 April 1932 to 31 December 1933), "Żegluga Polska" SA offered liner services operated by three ships. Two of them (SS "Cieszyn" and SS "Śląsk") sailed every fortnight from Gdynia/Gdańsk to Tallinn and Helsinki (occasionally calling at the port of Kotka) as well as to Rotterdam and Antwerp. The third steamer (SS "Tczew") first ran on a biweekly schedule (from 1 April 1932 to 1 September 1933) to Rotterdam, but was then transferred to the route to Antwerp, and was replaced on the route to Rotterdam by SS "Chorzów"¹³. In 1934, "Żegluga Polska" SA already operated six liner services with its own ships ("Śląsk", "Cieszyn", "Chorzów" and "Tczew") and with chartered vessels. Two journeys were also made by the tramp ships SS "Wilno" and SS "Katowice". New liner services were launched connecting Gdynia/Gdańsk with Hamburg (service operating from 15 February 1934,

9 APG OG, SGG, 149/605, *Wniosek z 12 września 1936 r. o wpisanie do rejestru handlowego dr S. Darskiego, 28n*. [Motion of 12 September 1936 to enter Dr. S. Darski into the Companies Register, 28f.].

10 APG OG, SGG, 149/604, *Postanowienie o wpisie do rejestru handlowego z 19 lipca 1932 r.*, 36n, 41 [Decision of 19 July 1932 on entry in the Companies Register, 36n, 41].

11 Ibidem, *Odpis postanowienia ministra przemysłu i handlu z 13 lipca 1932 r.*, 3 [Copy of the Decision of the Minister of Industry and Trade of 13 July 1932, 3]. See also: Ibidem, *Wniosek o wpis do rejestru handlowego z 18 lipca 1932 r.*, 1 [Application of 18 July 1932 for entry in the Companies Register, 1].

12 Ibidem, *Statut Spółki Akcyjnej "Żegluga Polska" w Gdyni*, 4–12 [Statute of the Joint Stock Company "Żegluga Polska" in Gdynia, 4–12]. The company took over from the liquidated state-owned enterprise, a fleet consisting of ten freight vessels with a tonnage of 20,459.19 GRT, two freight-and-passenger ships (2804.24 GRT), and five passenger ships (1,763.89 GRT), 25,027.32 GRT in total.

13 APG OG, SGG 149/604, *Sprawozdanie zarządu S.A. "Żegluga Polska" za rok operacyjny 1932/33*, 81 [Report of the Board of "Żegluga Polska" S.A. for the operating year 1932/33, 81].

with SS “Tczew” running every 16–17 days) and the ports of eastern Sweden – Stockholm and Norrköping (service operated every three weeks, from 7 December 1934, by the chartered vessel SS “Haneström V”). The import traffic of “Żegluga Polska” SA was fully satisfactory, in contrast to its export turnover, which is why the company started to pay more attention to transshipment cargo. Despite the fact that the carrier concluded an agreement with German shipping companies, the turnover on the Hamburg line did not increase. By contrast, transport traffic on the route to Antwerp was becoming better and better, also owing to a large share of transshipment traffic ¹⁴.

Table 1. Operating results of “Żegluga Polska” SA’s liner services in 1934

Destination:	Export	Import	Transshipment	Total
Rotterdam	29,392.	61,220	2,031	92,645
Antwerp	29,548	17,163	3,181	49,892
Finland	16,074	10,008	5,692	31,774
Hamburg	7,289	6,982	–	14,271
Sweden	821	165	–	986
TOTAL	83,124	95,538	10,904	189,568

Source: APG OG, SGG, 149/604, 150; APG OG 149/605, 10ff.

In 1935, in addition to the previous links, liner services to Riga and Klaipeda and the ports of the Levant were launched. They were operated by six of the company’s own ships (“Śląsk”, “Cieszyn”, “Chorzów”, “Tczew”, and two new ships, SS “Puck” and SS “Hel”) and by chartered vessels. The latter were to be gradually replaced with the company’s own tonnage. This mainly concerned the ships sailing along the route to the ports of the Levant, SS “Lewant” and SS “Sarmacja”. During the operation of these ships, it turned out that the first of them, in particular, was fully suited to the needs of this route, so the company started negotiations to purchase this vessel. The new liner service to Riga and Klaipeda (Eastern Baltic) was unprofitable, but it was believed to have a potential for development. In 1935, SS “Wisła” was launched to maintain a regular connection with the ports of South America. Until 1937, the ship made a total of five voyages to ports in Argentina and Brazil, and the route was operated jointly with the shipping company “Gdynia–Ameryka, Linie Żeglugowe” [Gdynia–America, Shipping Lines], which deployed SS “Pułaski” on this route.

14 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu z działalności spółki za rok 1934*, 150n [Report of the Board on the company’s activities for the year 1934, 150f]. In December 1934, SS “Cieszyn”, which operated on the route to Tallinn/Helsinki, as an exception called to Leningrad for a load of apples.

Table 2. Operating results of "Żegluga Polska" SA's liner services in 1935

Destination:	Export	Import	Transshipment	Total
Rotterdam	36,661	38,955	1,031	76,647
Antwerp	36,221	24,220	1,355	61,796
Finland	21,726	7,596	2,366	31,688
Hamburg	6,239	10,384	–	16,623
Sweden	11,334	6,158	–	17,492
Eastern Baltic	947	1,166	–	2,113
Ports of the Levant	10,413	4,868	–	15,281
TOTAL	123,541	93,347	4,752	221,640

Source: APG OG, SGG, 149/605, 10ff.

In 1936, "Żegluga Polska" SA launched its eighth liner service (to Gothenburg and ports in south-western Sweden), and the fleet was supplemented with SS "Lewant", bought from the Swedish shipping company "Svenska Orient Linien"¹⁵. In 1937, another service was launched (to the ports of Turku-Åbo in western Finland). At that time, the company provided liner services along nine routes: to Antwerp ("Hel" and "Śląsk"), Rotterdam ("Chorzów" and "Puck"), Hamburg ("Tczew"), Tallinn-Kotka-Vipuri-Helsinki ("Cieszyn"), Riga-Liepaja-Klaipeda (SS "Anna Greta", on charter), Stockholm-Range (SS "Kjörrefjord", on charter), Malmö-Gothenburg (SS "Blenda", on charter), ports of the Levant ("Lewant" and SS "Lechistan"), and Turku-Åbo (SS "Bro", on charter)¹⁶.

Table 3. Operating results of "Żegluga Polska" SA's liner services in 1936

Destination:	Export	Import	Transshipment	Total
Antwerp	50,603	32,309	61	82,973
Rotterdam	52,706	38,784	64	91,554
Finland	24,353	3,999	2,495	30,847
Hamburg	7,239	10,873	57	18,169
Eastern Sweden	16,315	7,018	48	23,381
Western Sweden	7,755	4,190	259	12,204
Eastern Baltic	1,455	3,193	4,555	9,204
Ports of the Levant	26,772	11,141	7,886	45,749
TOTAL	187,148	111,507	15,426	314,081

Source: APG OG, SGG, 149/605, 58.

The last register file data on the development of "Żegluga Polska" SA's liner services come from 31 December 1938. At that time, the company expanded the scope of its

15 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu za rok 1936*, 57n [Report of the Board for 1936, 57f.].

16 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu spółki za rok 1937*, 112 [Report of the Company Board for 1937, 112].

activity by launching liner services on routes to Genoa, Livorno and ports of Sicily (the Italian line) and to Ghent (via Hamburg). The company now operated a total of eleven routes: to Antwerp (“Cieszyn”, “Poznań”), Rotterdam (“Chorzów” and “Wilno”), Hamburg and Ghent (MS “Oksywie”), Tallinn–Kotka–Viipuri–Helsinki (“Śląsk”), Turku–Åbo–Mantyluoto–Vaasa (“Śląsk”), Riga–Liepaja–Klaipeda (SS “Alfa”, on charter), Stockholm (MS “Rozewie”), Malmö–Gothenburg (“Blenda”, on charter), ports of the Levant (“Lewant” and “Lechistan”), Genoa–Livorno–Napoli–ports of Sicily (“Katowice”, “Puck”, and “Hel”)¹⁷.

Table 4. Comparative analysis of receipts from regular freight transport services in the years 1936–1938

Line	Year	Export	Import	Transshipment	Between ports	Total	Increase/decrease
Antwerp	1938	56,658	43,010	–	–	99,668	–5,8%
	1937	58,852	47,012	–	–	105,864	28%
	1936	50,603	32,309	61	–	82,973	n.d.
Rotterdam	1938	56,853	45,901	–	–	102,754	–12,7 %
	1937	68,490	49,188	5	–	117,672	29%
	1936	52,706	38,784	64	–	91,554	n.d.
Hamburg	1938	7,077	10,245	–	–	17,322	–2,8 %
	1937	6,814	11,005	10	–	17,829	–2%
	1936	7,239	10,873	57	–	18,169	n.d.
Southern Finland and Tallinn	1938	28,820	9,114	2,557	1,151	41,642	–1,8 %
	1937	27,940	12,405	1,243	843	42,431	38%
	1936	24,353	3,999	2,247	248	30,847	n.d.
East Baltic (Riga)	1938	2,144	1,179	5,573	76	8,972	–15,6 %
	1937	1,205	1,769	7,628	33	10,635	16%
	1936	1,455	3,193	4,545	11	9,204	n.d.
Eastern Sweden (Stockholm)	1938	17,990	10,554	346	241	29,131	6,6 %
	1937	15,803	11,478	59	–	27,340	17%
	1936	16,315	7,018	48	–	23,381	n.d.
Western Sweden (Malmö)	1938	9,971	4,597	125	–	14,693	–6,9%
	1937	10,618	5,140	4	23	15,785	30%
	1936	7,755	4,190	259	–	12,204	n.d.
Levant	1938	40,470	22,405	385	20,792	84,053	26,2 %
	1937	32,223	15,412	425	12,756	60,816	33%
	1936	26,722	11,141	919	6,967	45,749	

17 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu za rok 1938*, 57n [Report of the Board for 1936, 57f].

Line	Year	Export	Import	Transshipment	Between ports	Total	Increase/decrease
Western Finland (Turku)	1938	18,293	11,645	343	–	30,281	29,7 %
	1937	16,609	6,482	250	–	23,341	100%
	1936	–	–	–	–	–	–
Ghent	1938	2,362	598	–	84	3,044	100%
	1937	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1936	–	–	–	–	–	–
Genoa	1938	3,709	1,483	77	–	5,269	100 %
	1937	–	–	–	–	–	–
	1936	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total	1938	244,347	160,732	9,406	22,344	436,829	4%
	1937	238,554	159,880	9,624	13,655	421,713	34%
	1936	187,148	111,507	8,200	7,226	314,081	n.d.

Source: APG OG, SGG, 149/605, 112f, 178.

The report on the activity of "Żegluga Polska" SA in Gdynia in the first operating year, which covered the period from 1 April 1932 to 31 December 1933, confirms that tramp shipping services (with no fixed routing or itinerary) were provided in a market characterised by falling freight rates and decreasing coal exports. Despite these difficulties, the company's ships were in operation throughout 1932, except for short periods when no suitable employment could be found for the larger vessels (SS "Wisła", SS "Niemen" and SS "Wart"). Over the period of 7 quarters of a year, the company's fleet transported 346,734 tons of goods (after the tramps were immobilised, in 1933, only 153,734 tons were transported)¹⁸. In 1934, the company began to regularly launch its tramp ships: SS "Wilno" (in March), SS "Poznań" (in April), SS "Toruń" (in June) and SS "Katowice" (in December). They made the following trips: "Wilno" (24 trips to: Antwerp, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Brussels, Dunkirk, Rouen, Oxelösund, Ostend, London, Hull, Cork, Reykjavik, and Burntisland, carrying approx. 50,238 tons of cargo), "Poznań" (on charter as "Arafart") until 19 December 1934, she made 30 voyages in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea, carrying 78,387 tons of goods. At the end of December 1934, she left for West Africa), "Toruń" (made 24 trips to: Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Brussels, Ostend, London, Oxelösund, Gefle, Norrköping, Szczecin, Stockholm,

¹⁸ APG OG, SGG, 149/604, *Sprawozdanie zarządu S.A. "Żegluga Polska" za rok operacyjny 1932/33*, 82 [Report of the Board of "Żegluga Polska" S.A. for the operating year 1932/33, 82]. To compare, the company's liner shipping vessels transported approximately 100,000 tons of general cargo in 1933 alone. The rest of the freight were loads of wood, sugar, grain, scrap, etc.

Gothenburg, Ystad, Hamburg, and Ghent, transporting 61,042 tons of goods) and “Katowice” (made trips to Amsterdam and Antwerp, carrying 2,690 tons of goods)¹⁹.

Table 5. Operational results of tramp shipping services in the years 1934–1936

Cargo transported	1934 (in tons)	1935 (in tons)	1936 (in tons)
In export traffic	117,359	260,947	249,023
In import traffic	38,056	123,108	181,076
Between ports	39,088	8,533	18,291
TOTAL	194,503	392,588	448,390

Source: APG OG, SGG, 149/605, 10ff.

The year 1935 was finally witnessing a gradual improvement in the tramp shipping market, marked by increases in the employment of tramps and the quantity of transported goods. At that time, transport services were initiated on the route to South America, and a liner service was launched to ports of southern Spain (only for the period of fruit import). SS “Wisła” sailed on the South American route, while the Spanish route was served by three old “Wilno” – type ships (bought in France in 1927). Although they were no longer suitable for use in liner shipping, they made perfect tramps, allowing the carrier to explore the market and collect information for future use in transporting Spanish fruit in the winter season. A further improvement in the overall economic situation on the liner shipping market took place in 1937. At that time, both the quantity of freight transport and the total amount of receipts from freight increased, with all vessels put into service. The ships of “Żegluga Polska” SA made 203 voyages during that year (compared to 173 trips in 1936)²⁰. In 1938, tramp shipping again showed a decline in turnover, this time due to a downturn in the general economy and the withdrawal of several ships which were instead deployed in liner services²¹.

Initially, coastal shipping was a loss-making section of the company, but in 1933 there was a clear increase in tourist traffic in Gdynia and on the Hel Peninsula, which resulted in the revival of passenger ship tourism²². In 1932–1933, coastal shipping services were maintained on the routes from Gdynia to Hel and Jastarnia, in 1934–1938 from Gdynia and Orłowo Morskie to Hel and Jastarnia, and in 1935–1937 to Sopot.

19 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu z działalności spółki za rok 1934*, 151n [Report of the Board on the company's activities for the year 1934, 151f]. Unfortunately, the register files do not provide the same amount of detail on ship traffic in the years 1932–1933 and 1935–1938.

20 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu spółki za rok 1937*, 113 [Report of the Company Board for the Year 1937, 113].

21 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu spółki za rok 1938*, 179 [Report of the Company Board for the Year 1937, 179].

22 APG OG, SGG, 149/604, *Sprawozdanie zarządu S.A. “Żegluga Polska” za rok operacyjny 1932/33*, 83 [Report of the Board of “Żegluga Polska” S.A. for the operating year 1932/33, 83].

These routes were served by SS "Gdynia", SS "Gdańsk", SS "Jadwiga" and SS "Wanda". The route to Orłowo Morskie was operated by the tugboats "Żubr" (in 1934) and "Łoś" (in 1935–1936). In 1934, the company organised five trips to Bornholm, but in the following years the idea was abandoned. On 1 October 1934, a new service was launched for the first time to provide a winter link between Gdynia and Hel, with the ship "Jadwiga" sailing twice a day between these ports²³. In the following years, the steamer "Wanda" operated on this route outside the vacation season (in 1935–1938). In 1935, coastal shipping vessels made 32 cruises to Gdańsk, during which tourists visited the port and the city, but this was also only a one-off initiative as the numbers of summer visitors decreased in the following years. In March 1935, "Żegluga Polska" SA took over the shares of "Towarzystwo Turystyki Morskiej" [Maritime Tourism Society], which, in the same year, bought two motorboats in Sweden ("Jaś" and "Małgosia", operated from the summer season of 1936 to 1938)²⁴. In 1938, liner services on the routes from Gdynia and Orłowo Morskie to Hel and Jastarnia were maintained (the service to Sopot was suspended), but only three ships were used: "Gdańsk", "Wanda" and "Jadwiga"²⁵.

As a joint-stock company, "Żegluga Polska" leased four tugboats ("Ursus", "Tur", "Bizon" and "Żubr") from the Maritime Office in Gdynia and operated them from 15 September 1932. From the very start, the company tried to use the boats efficiently to achieve the best possible financial results. In addition to towing ships in the port, they also towed barges between Gdynia and Gdańsk and provided ship rescue services. Additionally, in the summer months, "Żubr" was also employed in transporting tourists visiting the port in Gdynia²⁶. In 1934, the company received leased tugboats from the State Treasury as a contribution in kind for FPO shares, and in the autumn of 1934, an additional, fifth vessel of this type was chartered²⁷. The fifth tugboat ("Atlas") was purchased in July 1935 in Rotterdam, but the increase in turnover in the towing and rescue department prompted the company to order a new vessel of this type from the Gdańsk Shipyard in November 1935. It was equipped with anti-ice reinforcements as

23 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu z działalności spółki za rok 1934*, 152 [Report of the Board on the company's activities for the year 1934, 152]. In 1934, the company used its own funds to build a pier in Orłowo Morskie, which allowed the carrier to provide coastline shipping services with a larger vessel. In the same year, the passenger harbour in Gdynia was moved from a wooden pier to Nabrzeże Wilsonowskie [Wilson Quay].

24 APG OG, SGG, 149/605, *Sprawozdanie zarządu S.A. "Żegluga Polska" w Gdyni z działalności za rok operacyjny 1935*, 13 [Report of the Board of "Żegluga Polska" S.A. for the operating year 1935, 13].

25 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu za rok 1938*, 179n [Report of the Board for the year 1938, 179f].

26 APG OG, SGG, 149/604, *Sprawozdanie zarządu S.A. "Żegluga Polska" za rok operacyjny 1932/33*, 84 [Report of the Board of "Żegluga Polska" S.A. for the operating year 1932/33, 84].

27 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu z działalności spółki za rok 1934*, 153 [Report of the Board on the company's activities for the year 1934, 153].

well as rescue and fire-fighting devices²⁸. Thus, in 1936, the company already operated six tugs (including “Tytan” built in Gdańsk).²⁹ In December 1938, the tugboat “Łoś” was sold to the Maritime Office in Gdynia (the Office leased the boat from “Żegluga Polska” SA in 1937)³⁰.

The first pieces of information on the tonnage of the State Enterprise “Żegluga Polska” in Gdynia, found in the register files, come from April 1930. At that time, the company’s fleet consisted of fourteen ships. They included the freighters: SS “Niemen”, SS “Wisła”, SS “Warta”, SS “Katowice”, SS “Kraków”, SS “Poznań”, SS “Toruń”, SS “Wilno” and SS “Tczew”, and the passenger ships: SS “Gdynia”, SS “Gdańsk”, SS “Jadwiga”, SS “Wanda”, and SS “Hanka”³¹. In the first reporting period, i.e. the operating year 1932/1933 (from 1 April 1932 to 31 December 1933), the company’s fleet lost 5,770.3 GRT due to the sinking of “Niemen” and the sale of “Warta” and “Hanka”³². In 1934, the tonnage increased as four new tugs were acquired. Also, in October of that year, two new ships (SS “Hel” and SS “Puck”) were ordered to be launched on the routes to Rotterdam and Antwerp. Owing to the increased tonnage, “Żegluga Polska” was able to take two ships off charter³³. In 1935, the company’s fleet was expanded to include the steamers “Puck” and “Hel”, launched in March and April 1935³⁴, and in 1936 SS “Lewant” and the sea tug “Tytan”³⁵ were added to the fleet’s tonnage. In August 1937, the company bought SS “Lechistan”, which, together with her sister steamer, “Lewant”, was employed on the Levantine line³⁶. In 1938, the company’s fleet was supplemented by two sister motor ships: MS “Oksywie” and MS “Rozewie”. The former was launched in March 1938 to sail on the route to Hamburg, and the latter, a month later, was put on the route to Stockholm. At the beginning of 1938, the company ordered a cargo steamer with a capacity of approx. 1,250 TDW from Gdynia Shipyard (it was to be completed in 1940), and in December 1938, it sold the tugboat “Łoś” to the Maritime Office in Gdynia³⁷.

28 APG OG, SGG, 149/605, *Sprawozdanie zarządu S.A. “Żegluga Polska” w Gdyni z działalności za rok operacyjny 1935*, 14 [Report of the Board of “Żegluga Polska” S.A. for the operating year 1935, 14].

29 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu za rok 1936*, 60 [Report of the Board for the Year 1936, 60].

30 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu za rok 1938*, 180 [Report of the Board for the Year 1938, 180].

31 APG OG, SGG, 149/416, 17.

32 APG OG, SGG, 149/604, *Sprawozdanie zarządu S.A. “Żegluga Polska” za rok operacyjny 1932/33*, 81 [Report of the Board of “Żegluga Polska” S.A. for the operating year 1932/33, 81].

33 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu z działalności spółki za rok 1934*, 154 [Report of the Board on the company’s activities for the year 1934, 154].

34 APG OG, SGG, 149/605, *Sprawozdanie zarządu S.A. “Żegluga Polska” w Gdyni z działalności za rok operacyjny 1935*, 9 [Report of the Board of “Żegluga Polska” S.A. for the operating year 1935, 9].

35 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu za rok 1936*, 57 [Report of the Board for the year 1936, 57].

36 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu spółki za rok 1937*, 110n [Report of the Company Board for 1937, 110f].

37 Ibidem, *Sprawozdanie zarządu za rok 1938*, 174, 176 [Report of the Board for the year 1938, 174, 176].

Initially, the company operated one transshipment warehouse in the port of Gdynia, in which it stored goods transported in liner services. It was located in hangar no. 1 (Nabrże Pilotowe [the Pilot Quay]), leased from the Maritime Office, and consisted of a so-called "free trade" section and a transshipment section licensed by the Ministry of Treasury. In 1935, this warehouse was already insufficient, so the company additionally leased from the Maritime Office, "Cukroport" warehouse No. 5 on Nabrże Amerykańskie [the American Quay] (in the Free Zone). After another year, both reloading warehouses turned out to be too small, and, therefore, in 1936, the company leased a third warehouse, "Cukroport" No. 3/4 on Nabrże Polskie [the Polish Quay].

"Żegluga Polska" SA in the years 1934–1939 belonged to numerous economic organisations: The Polish Shipowners Association in Gdynia, the Polish Ship Managers' Association in Gdynia, the Association of Port Warehouse Owners and Leaseholders in Gdynia, the Gdynia Tourist Propaganda Association in Gdynia, the Association of Cotton Trade Stakeholders in Gdynia, The Baltic & International Maritime Conference in Copenhagen, and the following Chambers of Commerce (CC): the Polish-Belgian CC in Warsaw, the Polish-Hungarian CC in Warsaw, the Polish-Swedish CC in Stockholm, the Polish-Greek CC in Warsaw, the Polish-Romanian CC in Warsaw, the Polish-Dutch CC in Warsaw, the Polish-Swiss CC in Warsaw, the Polish-Egyptian CC in Warsaw, and the Polish-Palestinian CC in Warsaw.

Before it was transformed into a joint-stock company and became a showcase of the Polish Merchant Navy, Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe "Żegluga Polska" had been the latter's "experimental station". The story began in the first days of January 1927, when five "Wilno"-type tramp boats arrived from France to Gdynia. Over that year alone, they made 117 voyages, carrying around 300,000 tonnes of exports and imports. "Żegluga Polska" immediately launched coastal shipping services, which contributed to the development of the Polish coastal and tourist traffic. As of 1 January 1929, the Polish merchant fleet consisted of 17 sea-going vessels (excluding tugs and lighters), 14 of which belonged to "Żegluga Polska". When the company was still a state-owned enterprise, apart from tramp and coastal shipping services, it started to run liner services. Initially, the ships sailed on short delivery routes to Estonia and Finland, and later to the Netherlands and Belgium. In the following years, "Żegluga Polska" was systematically developing its own liner shipping network, though its tramp vessels also famously made numerous pioneering voyages. What was extremely important for the development of the Polish Merchant Navy, "Żegluga Polska" facilitated the organisation and establishment of two other shipping companies (in 1929 "Polsko-Brytyjskie Towarzystwo Okrętowe" [Polish-British Shipping Company] SA and, in 1930, "Polsko-Transatlantyckie Towarzystwo Okrętowe" [Polish-Transatlantic Shipping Company] SA), encouraging foreign capital to take an interest in our merchant navy. In 1932, "Żegluga Polska" was transformed into a joint-stock company, thus gaining greater

freedom of action in the fight against the economic crisis in the global shipping market, from which it emerged victorious. This is best confirmed by its turnover, which continued to grow until the end of 1938, as evidenced by the data presented in this article. The variety of information about “Żegluga Polska” SA contained in the pages of its register files, should encourage researchers to conduct similar analyses of the documents of other shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding companies. They are waiting for scholars in the laboratory of the Gdynia archives.

Bibliography

Archival materials

Archiwum Państwowe w Gdańsku Oddział w Gdyni [State Archives in Gdańsk, Gdynia Branch].

Sąd Grodzki w Gdyni [Municipal Court in Gdynia] (APG OG 149/416, 604, 605).

English version: Radosław Dolecki, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The files of the Companies Register of the Municipal Court in Gdynia kept in the Gdynia Branch of the State Archives in Gdańsk constitute an extremely valuable historical source for research on the history of the maritime economy in the Second Polish Republic. In this article, information from the files was used to describe the circumstances of the establishment, the organisation, the activity, the fleet, and the operational and financial results of Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe “Żegluga Polska” [State-owned Enterprise “Polish Shipping”] and the joint-stock company of the same name, which in the years 1927–1939 were the showcase of the Polish Merchant Navy. “Żegluga Polska” was established in 1926 under the State-owned Enterprises Act. The company’s development program, adopted by the Administrative Council of “Żegluga Polska” in 1929, provided for the establishment of liner services, without neglecting tramp services. The company’s first liner services were to Riga, Tallinn and Helsinki. A vital role in popularising the Polish Merchant Navy was played by the carrier’s inconspicuous coastal passenger ships. The advertising slogan “Work on land, rest at sea” quickly attracted crowds of enthusiasts in the country. The register files document in detail the circumstances of transforming Przedsiębiorstwo Państwowe “Żegluga Polska” in Gdynia into a joint-stock company. The transformation was initiated by the Minister of Industry and Trade, Dr. Ferdynand Zarzycki. The company was given a new organisational form because the Government believed that appropriate conditions had been created for the company to be run in cooperation with self-government or private capital. “Żegluga Polska” SA was entered into the Companies Register kept by the Municipal Court in Gdynia on 3 November 1932. At the end of 1938, ten years into its operation, the company boasted eleven transport links with constant cargo flows, connecting Gdynia and Gdańsk with Antwerp, Rotterdam, Hamburg, ports of Italy, Sweden, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, and the Middle East.

It had the largest fleet out of all the Polish shipping companies, with 16 ships (not counting coastal shipping vessels and tugs) with a total tonnage of 25,073 GRT and was thus a showcase of the Polish Merchant Navy.

Akta rejestrowe przedsiębiorstwa państwowego i spółki akcyjnej "Żegluga Polska" w Gdyni źródłem do dziejów Polskiej Marynarki Handlowej w okresie II RP

Słowa kluczowe: Gdynia, żegluga, polska marynarka handlowa, okres międzywojenny, archiwum państwowe

STRESZCZENIE

Niezwykle cennymi źródłami historycznymi do prowadzenia badań nad dziejami gospodarki morskiej w okresie II RP są znajdujące się w zasobie gdyńskiego oddziału Archiwum Państwowego w Gdańsku akta rejestru handlowego Sądu Grodzkiego w Gdyni. Niniejszy artykuł na ich podstawie prezentuje okoliczności powstania, organizację, charakterystykę działalności, tonaż oraz wyniki eksploatacyjne i finansowe Przedsiębiorstwa Państwowego "Żegluga Polska" a także spółki akcyjnej, noszącej tę samą nazwę, będących w l. 1927–1939 wizytówką Polskiej Marynarki Handlowej. "Żeglugę Polską" powołano do życia w 1926 r. na podstawie ustawy o przedsiębiorstwach państwowych. W programie rozwoju "Żeglugi", przyjętym przez jej Radę Administracyjną w 1929 r., przewidywano utworzenie linii regularnych, bez zaniedbywania żeglugi nieregularnej. Pierwsze regularne szlaki komunikacyjne przedsiębiorstwa prowadziły do Rygi, Tallinna i Helsinek. Istotną rolę w popularyzacji Polskiej Marynarki Handlowej odegrały niepozorne statki żeglugi przybrzeżnej "Żeglugi Polskiej". Hasło reklamowe "Pracuj na lądzie, odpoczywaj na morzu", szybko zjednało sobie w kraju wielkie rzesze entuzjastów. Akta rejestrowe szczegółowo dokumentują okoliczności przekształcenia Przedsiębiorstwa Państwowego "Żegluga Polska" w Gdyni w spółkę akcyjną. Inicjatorem zmian był minister przemysłu i handlu, dr Ferdynand Zarzycki. Przyczyny wyboru nowej formy organizacyjnej tkwiły w przekonaniu Rządu, że stworzone zostały odpowiednie warunki dla współpracy kapitałów samorządowych lub prywatnych w jego dalszym prowadzeniu. "Żeglugę Polską" SA wpisano do rejestru handlowego Sądu Grodzkiego w Gdyni 3 listopada 1932 r. Pod koniec 1938 r., po 10 latach pracy, spółka mogła się pochwalić stałą komunikacją towarową na 11 liniach, łącząc Gdynię i Gdańsk z: Antwerpią, Rotterdamem, Hamburgiem, portami Włoch, Szwecji, Finlandii, Łotwy i Estonii oraz z Bliskim Wschodem. Miała najliczniejszą flotę z wszystkich polskich towarzystw żeglugowych, dysponując 16 statkami (nie licząc jednostek żeglugi przybrzeżnej i holowników) o łącznym tonażu 25 073 BRT i tym samym była wizytówką Polskiej Marynarki Handlowej.

Citation

Drozd, Jarosław. "Register Files of The State Enterprise and the Joint Stock Company "Żegluga Polska" in Gdynia as a Source in Research on the Polish Merchant Navy under the Second Polish Republic". *Studia Maritima* XXXIV (2021): 87–101.
DOI: 10.18276/sm.2021.34-04.



Maciej Franz

Faculty of History
Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań
franz@amu.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0002-9075-605X

Bulletin of the Maritime and Colonial League of May 1939 (from the collection of the State Archives of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast)

Keywords: Maritime and Colonial League, magazine, 1939, maritime propaganda

Archival materials regarding the history of the Maritime and Colonial League (M&CL) have not been fully preserved for any of the pre-war districts of this organisation. The most conspicuous gap in archival records was left by war damage. When, in the early 1980s, Tadeusz Białas attempted to present the entirety of the M&CL's activities in interwar Poland, he based his investigation on an extensive search of preserved archival materials, which, for obvious reasons, he had to limit to Polish national archives¹.

At that time, access to archives located on the territory of the then USSR was severely restricted, and obtaining permission to access archival materials related to the history of the second largest social organisation with a strong paramilitary character in the Second Polish Republic verged on the impossible. The situation changed after the collapse of the communist camp and, ultimately, the USSR itself. It was then that Lithuania, Belarus and the Ukraine, all opened their archives to Polish historians.

As an effect of work undertaken in 2016 in the State Archives of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast (Державний Архів Івано-Франківської Облaсті) in Ivano-Frankivsk (pre-war Stanisławów), unique archival material related to the activities of the M&CL in the former Stanisławów Voivodeship was obtained. Fonds 414 contained the organisation's² statute, reports on the League's collections for the Maritime Defence Fund

1 Tadeusz Białas, *Liga Morska i Kolonialna 1930–1939* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1983).

2 Державний Архів Івано-Франківської Облaсті (hereinafter DAIFO), fonds 414, description 1, case 1, 1–24v.

(MDF) from September–October 1935³, circulars of the M&CL concerning the Festival of the Sea from 5 April–6 August, 1936⁴, and 9 August–21 September of the same year⁵, instructions for the participants of an M&CL camp organised in Eforie on the Black Sea, in Romania⁶, temporary regulations for the Maritime Defence Section of the M&CL from 1936⁷, M&CL bulletins from 1936⁸, reports of the M&CL on fundraising for the MDF for the period between January and April 1936⁹, minutes of a meeting of the Board of the M&CL Association in Halicz in May 1936¹⁰, circulars of the M&CL from 1938¹¹, speeches by guests of the M&CL on military and maritime issues¹², and a press bulletin of the M&CL from May 1939¹³.

As the list above shows, war damage did not spare the archive and its resources. The preserved funds is not particularly large and it only allows a fragmentary analysis of the activities of the M&CL¹⁴. However, it contains two very valuable documents. One of them is a collection of lectures by guests invited to M&CL meetings: Lieutenant Commander Rafał Czczott, Engineer Stanisław W. Kochanowski, Naval Captain Engineer Witold Hupert, Lieutenant Commander Artur L. Reyman, and Engineer Jerzy Sawiczewski. This material has been edited and published to make it available to the broadest possible audience¹⁵. The other is the press bulletin from May 1939, which shows the state of tension that prevailed in Poland at that time and that reflected on the increasingly aggressive maritime propaganda of the M&CL; at the same time, it

3 Ibidem, fonds 414, description 1, case 2, 1–13v.

4 Ibidem, case 3, 1–16.

5 Ibidem, case 4, 1–15.

6 Ibidem, case 5, 1–4.

7 Ibidem, case 6, 1–2v.

8 Ibidem, case 7, 1–36.

9 Ibidem, case 8, 1–28v.

10 Ibidem, case 9, 1–2.

11 Ibidem, case 10, 1–4v.

12 Ibidem, case 11, 1–31.

13 Ibidem, case 12, 1–7.

14 A larger M&CL funds has been preserved in The Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Lviv (Центральный Державний Історической Архів України у Львові, CDIAU), fonds 444, description 2, cases 1–162, and fonds 444, description 3, cases 1–75. In addition to a huge amount of financial information regarding fundraising for the MDF and the construction of the Maritime Basilica in Gdynia, one can also find in it single issues of the *Bulletin* of the M&CL, but no copy of issue 50/39 has been preserved in this collection. An archival search conducted in the State Archives of Ternopil Oblast (Державній Архів Тернопільської Облaсті) in Ternopil did not lead to the acquisition of new M&CL materials. There is no separate M&CL fonds in the collections found in these archives. It is possible that individual documents can be found in provincial (voivodeship) fonds. As of today, however, they have not been tracked down.

15 Maciej Franz, Mariusz Kardas, *I wojna światowa na morzu w opiniach polskich teoretyków i praktyków* (Oświęcim: Wydawnictwo Napoleon V, 2018).

presents the actual state of knowledge about some aspects of the potential future war and discusses the tasks that the Polish Navy and merchant navy would have to face. When juxtaposed with the knowledge about the maritime aspects of the Polish campaign of 1939, this text points to an interesting conclusion that even before the war broke out, people who dealt with maritime affairs in the Second Polish Republic had already known how it would end for the Polish Navy and the Polish presence at sea.

When researchers embarked on analysing the content of the *Bulletin* itself, which is not a widely used source, and supposedly has not survived to modern times in too many copies, a decision was made to prepare the entire bulletin for publication, so that everyone could have access to this rather unique document from the times of the end of the Second Polish Republic. It is worth recalling here that Tadeusz Białas, in his discussion of the fate of the M&CL in the interwar period, devoted only a single paragraph to its *Bulletin*, without making any attempt at analysing the content of at least several issues of this periodical or outlining its subject matter¹⁶. No such studies have been undertaken by other historians dealing with the activities of the M&CL in the years 1930–1939. In this situation, it can be argued that the content of this magazine is practically unknown to researchers of the history of maritime Poland.

The *Bulletin* of the M&CL No. 50/39 is divided into four thematic parts. The first part is entitled “The Navy in Peace and War”. It outlines the role and significance of navies in history, and its main task was to use propaganda to influence readers and, at the same time, to forge appropriate opinions on the development of the Polish navy in the daily press in Poland. It pointed to the necessity of possessing a strong navy and associated it with the idea that only a state which has one can be sure of peace, because no one would attack a country that is strong at sea. Without entering into a dispute with the author of that text, one should note that in 1939 the Polish Navy was significantly smaller than the navy of the Third Reich, the USSR, Sweden, Denmark or Finland. With one minelayer, four destroyers, five submarines and six minesweepers, and a few smaller auxiliary ships, it could not engage in combat with any of the above-mentioned fleets. Its potential advantage over the naval forces of the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was no consolation.

The naval forces possessed by the Polish state in 1939 could in no way whatsoever carry out some of the tasks mentioned in the *Bulletin*, which, according to the author of the article, modern navies were supposed to accomplish. It was incapable of protecting its own fishing vessels, either on coastal waters, or even less so on waters away from the Baltic Sea. In this respect, the Polish naval fleet’s combat potential and the plans to use it, both in peace and at war, gave no hope of protecting our country’s own economic zones. Though the Polish Navy was capable of performing other tasks mentioned

16 Białas, *Liga Morska i Kolonialna 1930–1939*, 242.

in the article, such as hydrographic works¹⁷ or the development of meteorological and rescue services, there still remained the issue of ensuring safety in the Polish naval force's own zone of maritime influence.

Similarly, the potential of the Polish Navy should be assessed with regard to its ability to ensure free transport of strategic goods, especially natural resources or armaments to Polish ports during war. As the author of the text in the *Bulletin* wrote, any navy's duty is to "...bring safely to the country every transport ship heading towards it". This was an infeasible task, because Poland did not have a safe port on its own coast, and this was well known to a wide range of people interested in maritime affairs. It was not without reason that transports of military equipment purchased in France were directed to the Black Sea port of Constanța, so that they could then reach Poland from the south via railroads. The last military transport to the Polish city of Gdynia arrived in July 1939. The ship "Wilia" brought a shipment of French Renault R35 tanks which were intended for the 21st Light Tank Battalion¹⁸. Unfortunately, further shipments did not reach Gdynia since the route through the Baltic Sea was completely closed after the outbreak of the war¹⁹. What best illustrates how much Poland needed a safe port in September 1939, not only for ships, but also for the navy, is the history of the damaged Polish submarine ORP "Rys" entering the port of Hel during the war. Seriously battered, the ship entered the port on the night of 4/5 September against the recommendations of the Fleet Command. The camouflaged and partially submerged vessel was temporarily repaired, and the crew were allowed to disembark for a short while. On 6 September, the ship left the port, but did not have a chance to return to it in the course of that war²⁰. It was the only such case among Polish submarines. The remaining vessels, once they went to sea on the first day of the war, never managed to enter a Polish port again. And yet, as the author of the text in the *Bulletin* rightly

17 The Polish hydrographic service, established in 1923, was intensively developed in the following years. As a result, not only were hydrographic charts of Polish territorial waters prepared, but also hydrographic surveys were conducted to enable safe navigation on the waters for which the Polish state held responsibility. This was an outcome of intensive work conducted by the Hydrographic and Measurement Division of the Polish Navy, headed by Artur L. Reyman from 1927, who quickly climbed the steps of his military career. This excellent officer of the Polish fleet was also a good researcher, as evidenced by his study devoted to the old charts of the Polish coast, see Artur L. Reyman, *Dawne mapy morskie wybrzeża polskiego* (Warszawa: Służba Geograficzna, 1937).

18 It was intended to be one of the eight light tank battalions envisaged in the modernisation plan for the Polish Army approved by the Armaments and Equipment Committee, Jędrzej Korbał, "Komitet ds. Uzbrojenia i Sprzętu. Think tank Wojska Polskiego", *Historia Wojsko i Technika* 3 (2021): 93.

19 The body responsible for this was the Transport Committee at the Polish Ministry of Industry and Trade, established in April 1939

20 *Sprawozdanie z kampanii wrześnieowej 1939 r.*, ppor. mar. Jerzego Hedingera, oficera nawigacyjnego na ORP "Rys", author's own collection, published in: Maciej Franz, Krzysztof Kuska, *Z Polski do Kanady – wojennym szlakiem. Archiwum domowe porucznika Jerzego Hedinger* (Oświęcim: Wydawnictwo Napoleon V, 2013), 46–7.

claimed: “There is no country today that could wage war without assistance from the outside. Today, there are no states that are self-sufficient ...”. It is difficult to argue with such an opinion. However, one may wonder how the Polish authorities responsible for the preparation of Poland for the war, which seemed extremely probable already in May–June 1939, wanted to solve this problem. It is difficult to take seriously the idea of transporting all supplies through Romanian ports, then by railway towards the Polish borders, and finally, via Stanisławów and Lviv, towards the front²¹.

Equally interesting seems to be the opinion of the author of the sketch in the *Bulletin* that a navy’s task is not only to defend its own transports, but also to operate offensively against enemy transports, to deprive the adversary of supplies, and thus cut them off from the materials they need and weaken their land army. This task could have been assigned to the Polish submarine fleet in 1939. Unfortunately, Operation “Worek” (*Sack*), the operational plan prepared for that fleet, was dramatically conservative and bound Polish vessels to their own coast, restraining their movement to strictly defined areas of operation. Adoption of this most defensive of plans for the use of the Polish submarine fleet was not only a mistake²², but also a departure from everything that had been said for years, also by the M&CL, which called on citizens to raise funds for the construction of the submarine “Orzeł”. The fact that previously prepared, more offensive plans to use Polish submarines had been rejected may be surprising. The more so that even the authors of the articles prepared for the M&CL were well aware that it was crucial for any navy to move offensively towards the enemy’s ports or their shipping routes at sea. Built for a lot of money and with great effort of the whole society, submarines were perfect for such operations. Instead, a decision was made to “tie” them to the coast, which exposed the submarines to intense action of enemy anti-submarine forces, in this way marginalising this most offensive component of the Polish Navy²³. This is indeed astonishing.

21 As a matter of fact, no preparations to bring this idea to life were ever made. Stanisławów, a city which played a strategic role in this concept due its key position in the Polish railway network, was stripped of the army on the first day of the war. It did not receive any military transports, and its railway station and railway network were bombed by the German Air Force from the beginning of the war. Clearly, no air cover was provided, Maciej Franz, “Garnizon stanisławowski we wrześniu 1939 roku”, in: *Wojna zmieniła wszystko. Stanisławów i Ziemia Stanisławowska w dobie wojny, okupacji i “wyzwolenia” (1939–1945)*, vol. 1, *Polityka – Wojskowość*, edited by Adam A. Ostanek & Mariusz Kardas (Warszawa – Iwano-Frankivsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wojskowej Akademii Technicznej w Warszawie, 2019), 157–170.

22 Andrzej Makowski, “Dywizjon okrętów podwodnych Polskiej Marynarki Wojennej w kampanii wrześniowej. Ocena operacyjno-taktycznego użycia”, *Studia z Dziejów Polskiej Historiografii Wojskowej* 13 (2012): 74.

23 As early as 2 September 1939, the newest Polish submarine ORP “Sęp” suffered damage which practically excluded this vessel from further military operations. The damage sustained as an effect of explosions of depth charges dropped nearby by German ships included an increased leak in the silencer pipe (the first damage in this area appeared on September 1), leak in the drainage pipeline

And finally, as the same author of the sketch for the *Bulletin* writes, a navy must "... defend its own coast and ports". However, the Polish Navy was not prepared for this task either. And there is no more dramatic argument for this claim than the fate of the destroyer ORP "Wicher" and the minelayer ORP "Gryf", which, after a successful skirmish with German destroyers on the morning of 3 September, were sunk by bombers in a German air raid in the port of Hel²⁴. The Polish Navy was neither capable of defending its coasts and ports, nor could it feel safe in any of these ports.

The second sketch found in the *Bulletin* of the M&CL No. 50/39 is devoted to naval bases in the Baltic Sea, and so, like the first text, to which it is related thematically, was of considerable propagandist importance for this organisation.

Departing, historically, from the success of the English Queen Elizabeth I's fleet in the battle against Admiral Medina Sidonia's invincible Spanish Armada in the 16th century, the author of the sketch analysed the strengths and weaknesses of each Baltic state with regard to how many naval bases they possessed or controlled. The main part of the analysis relates to the events of the First World War, which can be considered typical of that time, because it was this conflict that, being the most recent one, captured a lot of attention from the then authors²⁵.

The sketch, nevertheless, provides a starting point for an analysis of Baltic states and the condition of their naval bases in 1939. The author concluded that the USSR was practically locked up in the depths of the Gulf of Finland, and therefore, he looked for a way out of this confinement through the White Sea Canal and the ports in the Far North. At the same time, he concluded that this was only a partial solution, since the canal could only be navigated by smaller vessels²⁶. He also discussed Finnish bases,

and water leakage into the ship, deformation of manholes, and release of a watertight stern bulkhead which resulted in water leaking into the ship, Naval Museum in Gdynia – Fonds (NMG-F), *Dziennik zdarzeń ORP "Sęp" od dnia 13 lipca 1939 r.*, ref. no. 998 A, 54.

- 24 This is what Witold Hubert, one of the crew of the destroyer ORP "Wicher", noted in February 1970 in his account written in Darłowo: "Joy, restored faith in the alliance, faith in victory, and then around 2 p.m. a raid of enemy squadrons sent to sink "Wicher" and "Gryf" by the Nazi command enraged by the defeat of their destroyers. (...) bombs on "Wicher", bombs on "Gryf". "Gryf" is on fire, "Wicher" is sinking by the wharf, it falls overboard. On the yard, suspended is the body of a colleague, AB Edward Kwiatkowski, who has been blown onto the yard by an exploding bomb which hit the part of the bridge on which he was staying". NMG-F, ref. no. 231 R, Witold Hupert, *Wspomnienia z ORP "Wicher" – wrzesień 1939. Obrona Helu*, 7.
- 25 One example of a very in-depth analysis, prepared for the Publishing House of the Maritime and Colonial League, was the work of Lieutenant Commander Rafał Czczott, which was considered to be the most valuable of its kind until the times of Edmund Kosiarski and his studies from the 1970s, see Rafał Czczott, *Wojna morska na Bałtyku 1914–1918* (Warszawa: Liga Morska i Kolonialna, 1935).
- 26 The very idea of building a canal linking the Baltic Sea with the White Sea was not a bad solution, the more so that, owing to the enormous efforts of forced labourers and prisoners, it was constructed in less than two years and was formally navigable from the summer of 1933. Unfortunately, the fact that it was located on a tectonic plate and built using archaic construction methods placed limitations on its use, among others due to its "shallowness". The military significance of the canal was therefore

especially the significance of the Åland Islands for the maritime defence systems of Finland as well as Sweden and the Baltic states.

A separate paragraph was devoted to German bases, with particular emphasis on the areas of Szczecin-Świnoujście, on the one hand, and Piława and Królewiec on the other. The author of the sketch pointed out that these regions were well adapted for use as posts from which to operate navy units. However, he did not venture to describe the Polish defence system and the military potential of the ports of Gdynia and Hel, which was in fact, nil, since Gdynia was naturally threatened by the proximity of Gdańsk (Free City of Danzig), which in mid-1939 was under complete control by fascist forces and was “free” in name only²⁷. At the same time, Hel, together with the extended Fortified Region, which was considered to be a safer port for the Polish fleet, did not in fact provide it with any security, given the supremacy of the German air forces²⁸. In not saying anything about Polish naval ports and their potential, the author said more than necessary.

The third sketch is pure propaganda, as it refers to the participation of the Polish rural population in the coming “Days of the Sea”, spreading of maritime propaganda in the countryside, and the role and significance of the participation of the rural population in military service, including the navy. This is a classic text when it comes to M&CL’s propaganda activity.

The fourth sketch reports facts and figures related to M&CL’s fundraising for the Maritime Defence Fund (MDF), including the amount expended towards the construction of the submarine ORP “Orzeł”, but also the amount set aside for the first two Polish torpedo chasers ordered in British shipyards²⁹.

The final element of the *Bulletin* of the M&CL No. 50/39 is a “List of the Naval Fleets of Great Maritime and Baltic Powers”, printed as the last, additional page of the

minimal from the very beginning, Wojciech Tomasiak. “Cień Jasińskiego. Przyczynek bibliograficzny”, *Pamiętnik Literacki*, CIX (2018): 3, 190.

- 27 An excellent discussion of the role of the port of Gdynia and its actual use during World War II can be found in a sketch by Kamil Hoppe, who pointed out that after the bombardment by the German air forces on 1 September, the port of Gdynia did not see Polish ships any more in the course of this campaign, Kamil, Hoppe. “Obraz i losy Gdyni w latach 1939–1945”, *Zeszyty Gdyniackie* 4 (2009): 214–215.
- 28 The construction of the port and its facilities began in 1931 but had not been completed by the outbreak of the war. Despite this fact, the port of Gdańsk was already at that time considered to be as important as Gdynia and, at the same time, safer than the latter, because it was located well away from the activities of German spies, Anna, Marek, Łukasz Marszałek, “Obiekty militarne jako element krajobrazu kulturowego Półwyspu Helskiego”, *Studia z Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej* 7 (2018): 235.
- 29 Funds for the torpedo chasers were raised all over the country during special “Chaser” campaigns organised within the framework of the MDF to further reinforce the concrete dimension of the activity of both urban and rural communities, Filip, Gończyński-Jussis. “Zbiórka na Fundusz Obrony Morskiej na terenie województwa lubelskiego (1933–1939)”, *Radzyński Rocznik Humanistyczny* 14 (2006): 206.

volume. Unfortunately, this list does not feature the Polish naval fleet, despite the fact that the author, more or less precisely, described all the other Baltic navies. The condition of the Polish Navy in 1939 was not a secret to anyone, either in Poland or abroad. Both the Third Reich and the USSR knew much more about the Polish Navy than they should have. It is also certain that neither one nor the other was particularly afraid of the Polish fleet. Anyway, The Polish Navy is missing from this list.

In mid-1939, the outbreak of World War II was not yet certain. A lot could have happened, but as we know, nobody and nothing could stop Adolf Hitler on his path towards war. The Polish campaign of 1939 ended in a crushing defeat of the Polish Navy. It is difficult to evaluate it otherwise given the loss of the destroyer "Wicher", the minelayer "Gryf", the gunboats "Komendant Piłsudski" and "General Haller", the training torpedo ship "Mazur", and the minesweepers "Jaskółka" and "Czapla", the internment of the submarines "Sęp", "Rys" and "Żbik", and the "escape" from the Baltic Sea of the destroyers "Grom", "Błyskawica", "Burza" and the submarines "Orzeł" and "Wilk". The Polish Navy did not manage to sink any of the German warships or merchant ships, and the sinking of the German minesweeper "M-85" by a mine laid by ORP "Żbik" as early as October 1939, was quite an accidental success.

The state of the Polish fleet was not spoken of loudly. Propaganda produced by the M&CL built the image of a large and strong Polish fleet, capable of stopping any enemy. At the same time, the *Bulletin* pointed to all the actual faults and deficiencies of the Polish Navy. This is not so much interesting, as symptomatic. All those who knew what fate they were preparing for the Polish ships by beating the propaganda drum, were well aware what the real situation looked like. Anyone who was able to analyse the situation calmly and rationally in isolation from the propaganda noise, could have no doubts. This notwithstanding, the propaganda raged until the outbreak of the war, and that is why the reality of the September events hurt so much.

Nowadays, the propaganda of Poland's strength and power at sea is not so unequivocal. Formally, no one conceals the problems of the Polish fleet, which is slowly vanishing from the Polish coast. At the same time, for years now, successive governments, regardless of their political affiliation, have been talking about reconstructing and building a strong Polish naval fleet. Apart from talking, however, they have not done anything to improve the situation. The contemporary Polish state repeats all the mistakes made in the interwar period with regard to maritime policy, the Polish presence on the Baltic Sea, and the expansion of the navy. Unfortunately, despite the passage of nearly 100 years, maritime propaganda is still the most important part of the Polish presence on the Baltic Sea. It cannot, however, replace a genuine maritime policy, and an analysis of source materials, especially those from the 1930s, best indicates how ineffective it is. It did not manage to prepare either the state or the society for the horror of the war that was to come.

Bibliography

Archival sources

Державний Архів Івано-Франківської області (DAIFO)

fonds 414, description 1, case 1

fonds 414, description 1, case 2

fonds 414, description 1, case 3

fonds 414, description 1, case 4

fonds 414, description 1, case 5

fonds 414, description 1, case 6

fonds 414, description 1, case 7

fonds 414, description 1, case 8

fonds 414, description 1, case 9

fonds 414, description 1, case 10

fonds 414, description 1, case 11

fonds 414, description 1, case 12

Центральный Государственный Исторический Архив Украины в Львові (CDIAU)

fonds 444, description 2, cases 1–162

fonds 444, description 3, cases 1–75

The Naval Museum in Gdynia – Archival Fonds

ref. no. 231 R

ref. no. 998 A

Printed sources

Franz, Maciej, Mariusz Kardas. *I wojna światowa na morzu w opiniach polskich teoretyków i praktyków*. Oświęcim: Wydawnictwo Napoleon V, 2018.

Franz, Maciej, Krzysztof Kuska. *Z Polski do Kanady – wojennym szlakiem. Archiwum domowe porucznika Jerzego Hedingera*. Oświęcim: Wydawnictwo Napoleon V, 2013.

References

Białas, Tadeusz. *Liga Morska i Kolonialna 1930–1939*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Morskie, 1983.

Czczott, Rafał. *Wojna morska na Bałtyku 1914–1918*. Warszawa: Liga Morska i Kolonialna, 1935.

- Franz, Maciej. "Garnizon stanisławowski we wrześniu 1939 roku". In: *Wojna zmieniła wszystko. Stanisławów i Ziemia Stanisławowska w dobie wojny, okupacji i „wyzwolenia” (1939–1945)*. vol. 1, *Polityka – Wojskowość*, eds. Adam A. Ostanek, Mariusz Kardas, 157–170. Warszawa – Ivano-Frankivsk: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wojskowej Akademii Technicznej w Warszawie, 2019.
- Gończyński-Jussis, Filip. "Zbiórka na Fundusz Obrony Morskiej na terenie województwa lubelskiego (1933–1939)". *Radzyński Rocznik Humanistyczny* 14 (2006): 197–211.
- Hoppe, Kamil. "Obraz i losy Gdyni w latach 1939–1945". *Zeszyty Gdynskie* 4 (2009): 213–223.
- Korbal, Jędrzej. "Komitet ds. Uzbrojenia i Sprzętu. Think tank Wojska Polskiego". *Historia Wojsko i Technika* 3 (2021): 84–98.
- Makowski, Andrzej. "Dywizjon okrętów podwodnych Polskiej Marynarki Wojennej w kampanii wrześniowej. Ocena operacyjno-taktycznego użycia". *Studia z Dziejów Polskiej Historiografii Wojskowej* 13 (2012): 55–83.
- Marek, Anna, Łukasz Marszałek, "Obiekty militarne jako element krajobrazu kulturowego Półwyspu Helskiego". *Studia z Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej* 7 (2018): 233–249.
- Reyman, Artur L. *Dawne mapy morskie wybrzeża polskiego*. Warszawa: Służba Geograficzna, 1937.
- Tomasik, Wojciech. "Cień Jasińskiego. Przyczynek bibliograficzny". *Pamiętnik Literacki*, CIX (2018): 3, 189–204.

English version: Radosław Dolecki, Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

The Maritime and Colonial League published several magazines. One of them was the "Bulletin", the object of which was to spread maritime propaganda. It is one of the forgotten magazines of the interwar period. The issue of the "Bulletin" presented in this article is a relic found in the State Archives in Ivano-Frankivsk (Ukraine), and it is completely unknown to the Polish reader. The content and opinions contained therein constitute an interesting starting point for the analysis of maritime Poland just before the outbreak of World War II.

Biuletyn Ligi Morskiej i Kolonialnej z maja 1939 roku (ze zbiorów Derżawnego Archiwa Iwano-Frankiowskiej Obłasti)

Keywords: Liga Morska i Kolonialna, czasopismo, 1939, propaganda morska

STRESZCZENIE

Liga Morska i Kolonialna wydawała kilka czasopism. Jednym z nich był "Biuletyn", który miał odpowiadać za szerzenie propagandy morskiej. Jest to jedno z zapomnianych

czasopism dwudziestolecia międzywojennego. Prezentowany numer "Biuletynu" jest zabytkiem odnalezionym w archiwum w Iwano-Frankiwsku i kompletnie nieznanym polskiemu czytelnikowi. Zawarte w nim treści i opinie, stanowią ciekawy punkt wyjścia do analizy Polski morskiej tuż przed wybuchem drugiej wojny światowej.

SOURCE

1. (Press Bulletin of the M&CL) Biuletyn prasowy LMiK nr 50/39, Warszawa 23 June 1939, allocation Державній Архів Івано-Франківської Облaсті (DAIFO), fonds 414, description 1, case 12, 1-7.

Warszawa, ul. Widok 10

Telephone: 5.22-04

Warszawa, on 23rd June 1939

PRESS BULLETIN OF THE M&CL

No. 50/39

Free reprint

Articles and press releases can
be used freely by the press.

THE NAVY IN PEACE AND WAR

From time immemorial, the sea has always played a major role in the lives of nations allowing them to achieve power and prosperity. Those who ruled the sea constantly followed the path of development while those who neglected maritime affairs – collapsed, for the sea was the factor that created strong, enterprising nations, instilled a desire for continuous progress, enriched countries and turned them into powers.

Nothing has changed since then. Everything has remained as before, only the conditions have changed, the coexistence of nations has entered a new path, but the sea has remained what it was – a source of state power and national prosperity.

That being so, today there is no country that does not seek to have a sea coast, and having it, has neglected maritime affairs. All nations, then, trade by sea, create larger and larger merchant fleets, expand their ports, and, above all, do not forget that maintaining access to the sea is today a matter of a nation's economic and political life, and, therefore, that these maritime possessions must be defended at all costs. This is why we are witnessing this manic naval arms race, since every nation wants to defend its rights at sea – and this can only be done with a strong, well-organised and well-trained Navy.

We must also remember that a strong Navy is not only about defending a state's maritime interests and its coastal possessions. It has been like this for centuries, and

today it has become especially perspicuous that it is only the strong who is reckoned with, and the strong is the one who, next to an excellent land army, has a suitable navy, because it is the latter that others most often see, and from its condition, appearance and efficiency create an image of the whole nation. Thus, the navy is a visible proof of a country's military strength and, thus, a powerful political factor. For, today, it is only those who have mighty maws of warship cannons behind them that are listened to willingly.

Thus, a strong navy is nowadays a source of good neighbourly relations, favourable alliances and successful political moves. This is the tacit influence it exerts by virtue of its very existence; and there are still many other, peacekeeping tasks for this part of a state's armed forces.

By relying on its naval force, a state can develop its trade without hindrance using the merchant navy. And the development of the merchant navy depends on the naval fleet, since the emerging shipping companies must have a guarantee that their interests will be secured: otherwise no one will risk investing capital in merchant shipping.

The navy also acts as a powerful factor against the denationalisation of overseas emigrants. Warships, by constantly visiting foreign countries to which citizens of a given state emigrate, strongly reinforce the spiritual connection between the expatriates and their Motherland. In these cases, they constitute, in a manner of speaking, a part of their country, and thus evoke a national spirit in the emigrants and provide a stimulus for patriotic action.

In addition to political and commercial influences, the navy performs a number of activities related to peacekeeping on its own waters. It protects and secures the peaceful work of its country's coastal and deep-sea fishermen and guards territorial waters against foreign invasion, by which it greatly contributes to the development of the fishing industry. It carries out all kinds of hydrographic works: it conducts measurements, produces nautical charts, prepares and issues maritime pilots, establishes and maintains rescue, meteorological, warning and other types of stations. It inspects and maintains navigation instruments and, most importantly, swiftly comes to the rescue of ships calling for help from the sea, or people in various dangerous land situations (flood, fire, earthquake, etc.), and while performing all these duties, it simultaneously trains and prepares for warfare.

During wartime, the navy must guarantee the delivery of war materials and food to the country, so it should, first of all, maintain sea communication lines, that is, defend and bring safely to the country every transport ship heading towards it. This requires constant surveillance of the movement of ships and keeping enemy warships at bay. Failure to complete this task will lead to unpleasant consequences for military actions on land. For there is no country today that could wage war without assistance from the outside. Today, there are no states that are self-sufficient in all branches of the arms

and food industries. One country lacks raw materials, another lacks fuels, and still another lacks food, etc. These shortages have to be replenished throughout the war, the goods have to be brought to the country and unloaded. The transport needs to be secured by the navy, which must, at the same time, operate on the enemy's communication lines to prevent the necessary materials from being delivered to the opposing belligerent's posts, and thus to weaken the enemy's land forces.

From this main task of the navy derive all its further goals and aspirations. In defending the state at sea, the navy should use all possible means to fight the enemy's navy, whether in the open sea or in its own bases, and cooperate with its own land army, if necessary, in coastal operations, and finally to defend its own coast and ports.

Summarising the navy's tasks during wartime, we see that it does not only defend the coastline, as it is often said in our country, but it fights the enemy on a par with the military – so just as the army, it defends the entire state, only it does so at sea.

O.Ž.

MARINE BASES IN THE BALTIC SEA

The sheer number of naval operational bases in the Baltic Sea demonstrates the political and strategic importance of this sea. Although geographically internal, it has always been open to those who have had a strong navy on it. Already at the dawn of history, Slavic timber ships called "komięga" accompanied Danish vessels in their raids on the Britons, fought against the Vikings, or allied with them to defend themselves against foreign invaders.

In the times of Queen Elizabeth I, the English, under the cover of their warships and using Narva as their Baltic base, conducted a lively economic exchange with Russia, which Poland could not interfere with since it had no fleet. Contrary to what is often thought, the German Empire and Prussia did not have their own fleets either, as evidenced by the fact that King Sigismund III Vasa came to the aid of the Emperor, sending him a small contingent of vessels, which later rotted away uselessly in Wismar.

Thus, Denmark and Sweden, and then – since the time of Peter the Great – also Russia – had been the only maritime powers in the Baltic Sea until the end of the 19th century. It was only later, when the German Navy League (*Der Deutscher Flottenverein*) helped to realise Tirpitz's idea, that Germany also acquired a high seas fleet. After the war with Japan, as a result of heavy losses suffered in the battles of Port Arthur and Tsushima, Russia ceased to be a great maritime power. The role of Sweden and Denmark also slowly declined as they turned into small neutral states. So, in fact, already in the first years of this century, Germany enjoyed almost complete supremacy in the Baltic Sea.

They reigned supreme, however, not because of their numerical superiority, as their fleet had a variety of long-range strategic tasks which mostly consisted in defending the North Sea on the other side of Jutland. If, nevertheless, during the last war, the

Germans, with the help of a dozen light ships /cruisers and destroyers/ managed to put the Russian Baltic fleet in check, it was only because the latter – due to some negligence, and also because its commander-in-chief had to answer to the general who commanded the army dedicated to the defence of the cities of St. Petersburg and Revel – behaved completely passively and, despite its advantage, did not undertake any major offensive operations.

The Russians excused themselves arguing that the Germans could at any time have transferred their heavy forces – modern battleships and armoured cruisers – from the North Sea to the Baltic via the Kiel Canal – but operations like that would only have been occasional and short-lasting, because the *Hochseeflotte* could not, after all, strip the North Sea of its force. Besides, the transition of the heavy battleship squadron from Wilhelmshaven to Rügen would have taken at least four days. During that time, more than one successful operation could have been mounted against the German coast.

But, as we have said, the Russian fleet was passive, and even before the war it had been unable to prepare appropriate operational bases in Liepāja and Riga. The former was not ready and was evacuated by the army at the beginning of the war. The latter was not prepared at all to defend itself from sea assaults and serve as a base for larger ships. As a result, the Russian fleet had bases in the depths of the Gulf of Finland /Helsingfors, Revel and Kronstadt/, which normally freezes for 4–5 months of the year, thus making the fleet's operations even more difficult. Despite those difficult conditions, English submarines did manage to make their way to the Baltic Sea through the Danish Straits and, based in Riga, Revel and Hangö, inflicted heavy losses on the German navy and merchant fleet.

Nowadays, the political situation in the Baltic Sea has changed fundamentally. Instead of four countries – Germany, Russia, Sweden and Denmark – there are now ten – with Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland added to the count. Russia has lost most of its coast and must restrict itself to the depths of the Gulf of Finland /about 200 km of coastline/, with Kronstadt as its main, and almost only, base. It is true that the White Sea Canal connects this base today with Arkhangelsk and the Arctic Ocean (the base of Poliarnoye), but the canal can only be crossed by light vessels – destroyers and submarines /and that only in the summer/.

Finland has its bases in Helsinki and Turku /Åbo/, but the demilitarisation of the Åland Islands has deprived it of access to this intricate and impenetrable maze of several thousand islands, islets and rocks. At the moment, when the issue of the re-militarisation of these islands has been settled between Finland and Sweden, the Åland Islands are regaining their former strategic importance, just as during the last war, when the Russians hurriedly set up heavy batteries there and created ports, harbours and sea airports. That is why they are protesting today against the re-militarisation, for fear that, in foreign hands, the islands would become a dangerous post, flanking the exit from the Gulf of Finland.

Swedish bases are located in Stockholm, Karlskrona and Gothenburg, and there are also several fortified posts in Northern Sweden /Gulf of Bothnia/ and on the islands of Gotland and Öland as well as at the outlet of the Sound. Estonia has one base in Tallinn, and Latvia two – in Riga and Liepāja (although its fleet is minuscule). These bases are remnants of the Russian navy; Lithuania does not have a single one. Denmark bases its fleet mainly in Copenhagen and Køge Bay, where a network of forts scattered over straits govern navigation.

And then there is Germany. Their main Baltic base is today both the main operational base and the entire fleet's arsenal. It is located in Kiel, at the eastern end of the Kiel Canal, and includes a wide system of coastal fortifications, stretching as far as Fehmarn and Rügen. This system is connected here with another one with the centre in Świnoujście, that is Szczecin, covered by the guns located on the islands of Uznam (Usedom) and Wolin. Then there is a gap stretching up to Piława, which, together with Królewiec, provides a comfortable base in the Vistula Lagoon. Recently, Klaipėda in the Curonian Lagoon has become another base, and the Germans are expanding Stolp /Słupsk/ between Kołobrzeg and the Polish border, at the mouth of the River Piaśnica. This last port will, of course, be adapted only to light forces – torpedo boats and speeders as well as naval aviation.

J. Grt.

APPEAL FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN THE "DAYS OF THE SEA"

The Polish countryside makes the largest contribution to the ranks of our heroic army. It feeds the whole nation and wants to take a fuller part in the life of the state, which it is entitled to do if only because of its large population and vitality. It is maturing politically, socially, economically and culturally, which is why it must be engaged in fruitful work in every area of national life. History has shown that the Polish peasant has marked the borders of the Republic of Poland not only with a plough, but also with a rifle, defending Poland's interests both on land and at sea.

Poland's access to the sea is the economic foundation of agriculture. The countryside should know about it. The export of agricultural products strengthens rural livelihoods and leads the countryside to prosperity.

The sea is the source of Poland's power. The peasant knows about it, and he must learn more and more. The Polish nation, aware that its existence and development are contingent on strong adherence to the sea and the development of economic possessions in the Baltic Sea, is strong enough not to allow any force to diminish our maritime heritage.

The countryside knows that Gdańsk used to be Polish and that Poland will not hand it over to the Germans at any cost. The countryside knows that the people and the state must arm themselves at sea in order to have effective means of defence and attack there.

The rural youth, who are to join the ranks of our navy and merchant navy in largest numbers, must learn the truth, which should sink deep into their hearts, that, strong at sea, connected with the world by our own shipping lines, possessing our own sources of colonial raw materials, and having our own trading apparatus, we will create, for future generations, a Poland that is even stronger politically and economically.

We will not be pushed away from the Baltic Sea!

Gdynia and Gdańsk are the path to the wide world!

Farmers, millions of whom will take part in the Festival of the Sea, in the days of the whole nation's great demonstration, should be provided with accurate and comprehensive information about the Polish Baltic Sea, about the Polish navy and merchant fleet, and encouraged to donate to the Maritime Defence Fund, so that their contributions, which are the most valuable because they come from the people, should be used to build numerous new Polish warships to guard the borders of the Polish sea and glorify the name of the Republic of Poland in the world's oceans.

The countryside will take a large part in the "Days of the Sea", as a class of dedicated citizens of the state, as soldiers who have more than once shed their blood for the Motherland and are ready to face the enemy today as well.

The Polish countryside, which grew out of a peasant's patch of land, will, if need be, go, on the orders of the Supreme Commander, to defend the borders of the Baltic Sea and will not allow Poland to be pushed away from the sea.

The people of the countryside will go where the national and state duty calls them. They will feed the army and the nation, they will cultivate the land, they will pull up weeds, and with a rifle in hand, they will curb the enemy's aspirations, because Poland is and will be the ruler of its own sea.

This year's "Days of the Sea", solemnly celebrated by the whole nation, will bind it into an unbreakable bond of unity and strength; the nation, based on a strong and heroic army, will not allow the enemy to violate the laws of the Republic of Poland on the Baltic Sea.

MARITIME DEFENCE FUND

Collection status for the Maritime Defence Fund

On 21 June, 1939, the amount collected for the MDF was PLN 9,854,232.82.

Together with the amount collected separately among the Army and Navy's Officers and NCOs' Corps, the capital was PLN 12,498,799.36.

After deducting the costs of construction of the submarine "Orzeł", there remains PLN 4,298,799.36 for the construction of torpedo chasers. Two torpedo chasers have already been ordered on account of this amount.

Contributions of the Districts of the Maritime and Colonial League to the Maritime Defence Fund

The following Districts of the Maritime and Colonial League took the leading places in the collection for the Maritime Defence Fund in the first ten days /1st-10th/ of June 1939:

- The Capital City District in Warsaw paid in PLN 13,000.
- The Łódź District in Łódź paid in PLN 12,000.
- The Radom-Kielce District in Radom paid in PLN 5,000
- The Silesian District in Katowice paid in PLN 5,000

Total contributions in the first ten days /1st-10th/ of June of this year to the Maritime Defence Fund amount to 56,000.

THE END

Publisher: Maritime and Colonial League

Editor: Fryderyk Kuleschitz

LIST OF THE NAVAL FLEETS OF GREAT MARITIME
AND BALTIC POWERS

ENGLAND

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Ships of the line	15	473,700	9	325,000
Heavy cruisers	15	145,530	---	---
Light cruisers	46	284,965	22	152,100
Destroyers	175	229,814	24	40,560
Torpedo boats	---	----	---	---
Larger submarines	32	44,774	13	14,600
Smaller submarines	24	13,230	---	---
Aircraft carriers	7	137,950	5	115,000
Chasers	20	490	13	???
TOTAL		1,330,443		647,260

UNITED STATES

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Ships of the line	15	464,300	6	214,000
Heavy cruisers	17	161,200	1	10,000
Light cruisers	17	140,500	6	52,000
Destroyers	213	261,655	40	58,600
Torpedo boats	---	---	---	---
Larger submarines	63	70,775	16	23,200
Smaller submarines	27	13,910	---	---
Aircraft carriers	5	120,300	2	29,400
Chasers	13	975	4	???
TOTAL		1,233,615		387,200

JAPAN

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Ships of the line	9	272,070	2	???
Heavy cruisers	12	107,800	---	???
Heavy cruisers, old vessels deployed for coastal defence	5	43,090	---	---
Light cruisers	24	132,755	2	17,000
Destroyers	112	141,628	2	3,000
Torpedo boats	12	6,868	---	---
Larger submarines	37	58,657	8	???
Smaller submarines	24	20,734	---	???
Aircraft carriers	6	88,470	1	10,050
Chasers	---	???	---	???
TOTAL		870,072		30,050

FRANCE

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Ships of the line	7	163,945	4	140,000
Heavy cruisers	7	70,000	---	---
Light cruisers	11	79,729	3	24,000
Destroyers	60	114,683	11	19,492
Torpedo boats	12	7,320	7	7,140
Larger submarines	40	53,026	5	5,710

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Smaller submarines	30	17,048	15	10,500
Aircraft carriers	1	22,146	2	36,000
Chasers	8	105	4	92
TOTAL		528,002		242,934

ITALY

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Ships of the line	4	95,244	4	140,000
Heavy cruisers	8	79,232	---	???
Light cruisers	16	85,992	---	???
Destroyers	74	97,443	12	42,000
Torpedo boats	59	38,185	---	---
Larger submarines	8	10,809	16	???
Smaller submarines	82	55,929	5	5,130
Aircraft carriers	---	---	---	---
Chasers	44	870	---	???
TOTAL		463,704		187,130

GERMANY

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Ships of the line	5	82,000	3	105,000
Heavy cruisers	---	---	3	30,000
Light cruisers	6	35,400	6	58,000
Destroyers	17	28,183	13	23,540
Torpedo boats	12	9,600	30	18,000
Submarines, smaller and larger	43	16,445	28	15,577
Aircraft carriers	---	---	2	38,500
Chasers	???	???	17	???
TOTAL		164,628		288,617

USSR

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Ships of the line	3	69,878	3	110,000
Heavy cruisers	2	16,030	6	48,000
Light cruisers	4	25,494	---	---
Destroyers	20	30,647	8	22,400
Torpedo boats	15	10,500	---	---
Submarines	160	81,000	---	???
Aircraft carriers	1	9,000	2	24,000
Chasers	240	---	---	---
TOTAL		242,549		204,400

On all seas

DENMARK

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Coastal defence ships	1	3,500	---	---
Heavy cruisers	---	---	---	---
Light cruisers	---	---	---	---
Destroyers	---	---	---	---
Torpedo boats	17	3,009	2	???
Submarines	10	2,641	2	640
Aircraft carriers	---	---	---	---
Chasers	---	---	---	---
TOTAL		9,150		640

SWEDEN

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Coastal defence ships	8	38,830	---	---
Cruisers	2	8,940	---	---
Destroyers	14	8,958	2	2,048
Torpedo boats	2	1,480	---	---
Submarines	16	8,325	2	700
Chasers	2	82	4	???
TOTAL		66,615		2,748

FINLAND

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Coastal defence ships	2	7,800	---	---
Cruisers	---	---	---	---
Destroyers	---	---	---	---
Torpedo boats	---	---	---	---
Submarines	5	1,828	---	---
Chasers	7	85	---	---
TOTAL		9,713		---

ESTONIA

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Coastal defence ships	---	---	---	---
Cruisers	---	---	---	---
Destroyers	---	---	---	---
Torpedo boats	1	228	---	---
Submarines	2	1,240	---	---
Chasers	---	---	3	???
TOTAL		1,468		---

LATVIA

Type	Current status Number	Current status Total tonnage	In construction Number	In construction Total tonnage
Coastal defence ships	---	---	---	---
Cruisers	---	---	---	---
Destroyers	---	---	---	---
Torpedo boats	---	---	---	---
Submarines	2	790	---	---
Chasers	---	---	---	---
TOTAL		790		---

O.Ž.

Citation

Franz, Maciej. "Bulletin of the Maritime and Colonial League of May 1939 (from the collection of the State Archives of Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast)". *Studia Maritima* XXXIV (2021): 103–123. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2021.34-05.



Emilia Denkwicz-Szczepaniak

Institute of Scandinavian and Finnish Studies

University of Gdańsk

e.denkwicz@interia.pl

ORCID: 0000-0001-6808-6603

Polish civilian forced labourers and prisoners of war in the Organization Todt – Einsatzgruppe Wiking, 1941–1945

Keywords: Organization Todt, Norway, Finland, Polish workforce, World War II

Introduction

The Organization Todt (OT) was a paramilitary construction company in the Third Reich, named after founder, engineer Fritz Todt, Ph.D. The organisation's genesis started with two large construction projects by Todt, supervised by him, namely: building of a network of modern motorways in the Third Reich in the years 1933–1938 and a system of fortifications on the French border in the years 1938–1940, called the Siegfried Line. With Hitler's permission, OT was independent from government administration from the beginning, being relatively free to carry out various construction projects. After the outbreak of the war, OT started to participate in works undertaken by the Wehrmacht, successfully competing with army engineers. With Hitler's expansion all over Europe, OT followed the Wehrmacht to occupied territories carrying out many tasks related not only to holding the front (construction of various defences, field railways etc.) but also connected with the operations of troops in occupied territories, especially maintaining efficient road and railway communication (repairing damaged roads and bridges, modernising the railway network or constructing new lines etc.).

OT was sent to Denmark and Norway in April 1940, and to Finland in Autumn 1941. Its building activity was different in each country. In Denmark OT built only fortifications, at first on a small scale and later, from mid-1942, on a larger scale. In Finland, OT's activities were more diversified, although a majority of works were of

an emergency character since they were performed for the needs of the 20 Mountain Army in its war with the Soviets. Apart from fortifications, OT undertook various road works, including maintaining road accessibility in winter. The OT received the greatest number of construction tasks, including permanent fortifications, in Norway. At the beginning, OT built the base of German submarines in Trondheim, but one year later was employed alongside the engineering troops of the Wehrmacht, as well as the building troops of the Marine and Luftwaffe, in constructing cannon posts for Coastal artillery.

After the announcement of the “Viking” programme in May 1942 and after the restructuring of management of the OT in mid-1942 by Albert Speer, the successor of Todt, after the latter’s tragic death in February 1942, the status of OT increased in Scandinavia and in other countries under Nazi occupation. In each country, so-called operation groups were created (*Einsatzgruppe*) which obtained many administrative rights, especially concerning the economic policy of the occupant. Denmark, Norway and Western Finland had fallen into the sphere of activity of the so-called “Viking” operation group (*Einsatzgruppe Wiking*, EG Wiking), with its seat in Oslo. Willy Henne, a close associate of Todt at the time, was chief of the Technical Department of the Third Reich in Norway. Strategic decisions on the economic policy-making in this country rested in his hands¹.

The operations of OT in Norway and Finland were initially based on labour power from Norway, Denmark, Finland and Germany. However, a scarcity of local labour power and skilled German workers lead the organisation to increase its usage of forcibly imported workers and prisoners of war (POW), primarily Russians, Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs and other nationalities. Polish nationals soon became the largest group of foreign workers (despite Norwegians and Germans) affiliated to the EG Wiking.

How many Poles were hired in the EG Wiking and in which methods were used to recruit them? This article presents the main results from my archival studies in Norwegian archives (Riksarkivet in Oslo, Statsarkivet and NGU-arkivet in Trondheim) and German archives (Bundesarchiv in Aachen and Koblenz, and Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv in Freiburg). I have been able to determine the number of Polish civilian labourers and POWs that were affiliated to the EG Wiking and deployed in Norway and Finland by analysing OT-*Arbeitseinsatzkartei*, transportation lists and registration cards (repatriation register) not issued to aliens following the end of the war. Furthermore, I have investigated how civilian Poles were recruited and why the methods varied from region to region. Lastly, I have investigated how many Poles were hired to construct fortifications, *Nordlandsbanen* and roads, and which type of work assignments Polish labourers most often conducted.

1 For more information please see: Franz Wilhelm Seidler, *Die Organisation Todt. Bauen für Staat und Wehrmacht 1938–1945* (Koblenz: Bernard&Graefe Verlag, 1987).

The OTs' recruitment system in the Polish areas incorporated into the Third Reich, October 1941–July 1944

The Polish areas occupied by Germany were divided between the areas wholly incorporated into the Third Reich and the areas that constituted a Polish rump state under the German name *Das Generalgouvernement für die besetzten polnischen Gebiete*, often abbreviated to *Generalgouvernement* (GG). The Germans created two new regions (*Gau*) in the areas incorporated into the Third Reich: *Reichsgau Danzig–Westpreussen* in the north and *Reichsgau Wartheland* in the west. Moreover, the western part of the district of Kraków, the district of Katowice and the Tatra mountains in the south, were incorporated into the province of *Oberschlesien*. The northern parts of the Polish province of *Mazowien*, the dubbed *Regierungsbezirk Zichenau*, were later absorbed into the German region of *Ostpreussen*. The GG constituted the central and eastern territories of Poland, with Warsaw, Radom, Kraków and Lwów as its main cities (Lwów and its surrounding areas were incorporated into the GG following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941). The twofold division of Poland would become important for the OT's recruitment of labour power.

The Polish areas incorporated into the Third Reich constituted an important stockpile of labour power for Hitler's Germany. Recruitment from this area was in general governed by the same rules as in the Third Reich.

The OT had three main methods for recruiting labour power. The first method was operational mainly between 1941 and 1942. It was a simple recruitment procedure which involved German construction companies that had contracts with the OT, entailing that the company hired its own workers. The companies that signed construction contracts with the OT were automatically considered a weapons manufacturing company. Company employees (*Firmenangehörige*) were given a service obligation document (*Dienstverpflichtungsschein*) issued by the local employment office. The document entailed that the employee was prohibited to seek employment with other companies. These employees were called permanent workers (*Stammarbeiter*)² and were required to follow their company. The companies received labourers from all territories occupied by the Third Reich. Companies that previously had undertaken work for the OT could be assigned labourers that had been recruited by other companies' recruitment offices in Germany, offices established in the incorporated areas of Poland, or by local employment offices. This was the most common path to employment in the OT – indirect and without concern for the preferences of the worker.

2 Riksarkivet (OT), Eske 42, Handbook of the Organisation Todt, London, March 1945, MIRS/MR – OT/5/45 (hereinafter: HOT), 168.

Map 1. Original German map from 1 March 1940



1. Oryginalna mapa niemiecka przedstawiająca podział administracyjny okupowanych ziem polskich z naniesionymi przez autora pasami niemieckiego osadnictwa planowanego na ziemiach wcielonych do Rzeszy

Source: Czesław Madajczyk, *Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce*, vol. 1 (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970), 64–65.

This recruitment method was terminated during the autumn of 1942. The OT-central gave new branches of employment offices (the so-called *Nebenstelle*) the task of undertaking a general registration of all labourers from the areas incorporated into the Third Reich and the GG, and to control documents issued to newly recruited personnel in the OT. This constituted the second recruitment method used by the OT, a method based on forced service obligation (*Dienstverpflichtung*). Each labourer was given a written order stating that he was required to visit the employment office. The OT established recruitment agencies (*OT-Werbstellen*) in larger employment offices to handle labour recruitment. These agencies were given authorisation to ship selected individuals to specific companies in all occupied areas. The agencies were furthermore authorised to ship employees to co-operate with the Wehrmacht for recruitment of soldiers³. The recruitment process was as such wholly integrated within the OT structure.

The OT-employment card contained essential personal information, such as the candidate's first name and surname, date of birth, residence, citizenship, and information on family matters (marital status and age of wife, number of children, their names and age). Moreover, the card contained information on the labourer's profession and employment position. Moreover, the candidate was medically examined to determine his ability to work. Each OT-recruit was given a service booklet (*Dienstbuch*) with a number corresponding to the number found on his employment card. Moreover, all newly registered candidates were given an identification number (*Erkennungsmarke Nr.*), which was registered on the employment card. This number was important as it remained the same throughout the duration of the labourer's service, whereas the number on the employee's service booklet changed when the labourer was moved from Finland to Norway, or vice versa. The last part of the registration entailed supplying the recruits with workwear or OT-uniforms and to distribute salaries based on OT-tariff.

It has been possible to estimate the total number of Polish nationals that were deployed for work in Norway and Finland by arranging all identification numbers in numerical order. The shipments to Norway amount to a total of 45 transportation lists. The lists mostly concern transportation from the GG, but also transportation from *Wartheland* and *Danzig-Westpreussen*. The OT-workers were required to carry their identification number around their necks in the same way as Wehrmacht soldiers⁴.

The German construction companies' role in recruitment of labour power was, thus, reduced to the bare minimum during the spring of 1942. This further entailed that it was only larger companies, which conducted important tasks for the war economy,

3 RA, E. 42, HOT, 168–169.

4 Seidler, *Die Organisation Todt*. 186 and 171–182; see also: RA, E. 42, HOT, 169. Clothing varied. Poles having proclaimed German nationality (*Volksdeutsche*) were given uniforms, whereas the rest, and particularly the lowest ranking (*Hilfsarbeiter*), were given civilian clothing with a brown armlet inscribed with "Org. Todt". These labourers also received the lowest salaries. Labourers of higher rank (*OT-Vorarbeiter* and *OT-Meister*) were usually uniformed.

that were allocated essential professional labour power. This development came as a result of the establishment of the OT-central in Berlin, the EG Wiking in Oslo, and by development of new organisational guidelines introduced under the new OT-management, headed by Albert Speer. The areas covered by EG Wiking required an increasing replenishment of labour power. This was an important reason as to why the OT forcibly recruited employees without regard to their age or professional qualifications.

The third recruitment method used by the OT in the Polish areas incorporated in the Third Reich was based on voluntary conscription to employment offices. The documents of the individuals recruited in this manner stated that the labourer was “voluntarily obliged for service” (*Freie-dienstverpflichtet*). However, there was only a total of 52 people that volunteered for service in the OT in this manner. It is plausible that the majority of them had signed the third or fourth *Deutsche Volksliste* (DVL) (more information below) and were included in the OT transportation lists of German nationals. The nationality of the volunteering labourers was revealed following the end of the war and the majority proclaimed Polish citizenship⁵.

It is reasonable that the first and third recruitment method entailed preferable working conditions and more “freedom” in comparison to the second method, which was arguably characterised by coercion and poor work conditions. Nonetheless, all labourers and companies affiliated to the OT were subject to coercion and compulsory labour⁶.

The first Poles from the Polish areas of the Third Reich arrived in Finland during the autumn of 1941. It was 17 workmen from *Oberschlesien* (Upper Silesia) who arrived alongside German companies and were stationed in Petsamo and Kuusamo (see table 1). Thirty Poles from *Riegerungsbezirk Zichenau* (Zichenau District), together with the German company, “Matthaus Hauck” from Würzburg, were stationed in Kuusamo in July 1942 (see table 2). All 30 workers were professional carpenters, locksmiths and machinists, and were permanent employees of the company from 1940 until 1941. The group was deployed as a *Vorkommando* to undertake essential preparations. The harsh climatic conditions in Finland meant that it was difficult to recruit skilled German labourers and the number of workers was, thus, insufficient. Instead, the Germans relied on the labour power of POWs. The analysis of the OTs *Arbeitseinsatzkartei* has revealed that several of the Poles deployed in Finland were tasked with supervising prisoners. All OT labourers, including Polish nationals, were transferred from Finland to Norway during the autumn of 1944 after the armistice between Soviet Union and Finland.

5 RA, OT-Abteilung Arbeitseinsatz (OT-Abt.Arb.), E. 19, Transportlisten no. 79, 81, 82. List no. 79, dated 26 March 1943, include 98 Reichsdeutsche labourers, and among them, 14 from Gdansk Pomerania (6 of which proclaimed Polish heritage). List no. 81, dated 30 March 1943, includes 288 Germans, of which 24 resided in the Polish areas incorporated in the Third Reich. Seven of these individuals were listed as travelling to Poland. List no. 82 includes 184 Germans, of which 14 people resided in the Polish areas of the Third Reich. Six of them returned to Poland.

6 Seidler, *Die Organisation Todt*, 133.

The onset of the EG Wiking-program in the latter part of April 1942 entailed a steadily increasing deployment of labourers in Norway. OT-labourers were transported by boat from Aalborg and Aarhus (Denmark), or from Szczecin (Poland) to Oslo as often as two to three times a month. Between April and December 1942, the OT deployed 6036 labourers in Norway⁷. These individuals were primarily of German, French, Belgian, Italian and Dutch nationality and arrived as employees of German and Austrian construction companies that had been hired by the OT to build fortifications⁸. The companies' employees included Poles from the Polish areas of the Third Reich. It is necessary to underline that German archival documents, inter alia the transportation lists, exclude the individual labourer's nationality meaning that they were all bulked together as German nationals. As such, the OT could easily ensure that the management of each company was German. Polish nationals from the incorporated areas could, if they spoke German and had a professional German education, be appointed to administrative positions in the construction companies. The analysis of the OTs' *Arbeitseinsatzkartei*, documents from the repatriation register and statements of nationality made by labourers, makes it possible to estimate the number of Poles from the areas incorporated into the Third Reich that were hired by German companies to undertake work in Norway and Finland. The documents show that 505 Poles were deployed in Norway between May and December 1942 (see table 1–3). They make up one-tenth of all OT employees.

Workers recruited from the Polish areas of the Third Reich were shipped to Norway and Finland alongside three types of German companies. The first type was German construction companies that, besides hiring Germans, primarily hired Poles from the incorporated areas. Companies of this type are: "Bernhard Frericks" from Berlin; "Curt Kallenbach" from Saarbrücken; "Sager und Woerner" from Berlin (all of which originally operated in Finland and subsequently in Norway); "Willy Jaeschke" from Duisburg (which mainly hired Poles from Oberschlesien); "Weidmann und Greatsch" from Emmerich/Duisburg (mainly Poles from Oberschlesien); "Willy Krenz" from Berlin; and "Karl Brant" from Brema. Three of these companies, "Karl Brandt", "Sager und Woerner", and "Curt Kallenbach" were also hired by the EG West⁹. It is not possible to determine how the Polish labourers were hired by these companies, but most of them were undoubtedly recruited by German employment offices. It is likely that

7 Bundesarchiv–Militarisches Archiv, Freiburg (BA–MA), Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Norwegen, RW: 39/88, Monatsbericht: April, May, June 1942; ibidem, RW 39/89, Monatsbericht: July, August, September 1942; ibidem, RW: 90, Monatsbericht: October, November, December 1942.

8 RA, E. 41, case 91a, OT–Einsatzgruppe West, Baustandsbericht v. 15.04.1942, Firmeneinsatz.

9 Ibidem, in April 1942 the Kallenbach corporation employed 627 labourers in EG West. 589 of these (93.9%) were foreign civilian labourers. The Brandt corporation employed 394 foreign labourers, amounting to 96.3% of its total work force of 409 individuals. "Sager und Woerner" employed 331 foreign labourers, which amounts to 95.3% of its work force of 347 persons.

the labourers were assigned to one of the above mentioned companies following their arrival in the OT camp, located in Wannsee near Berlin, in which they prepared for transportation to the EG Wiking.

The second group of German construction companies are companies that were established within the Polish areas incorporated into the Third Reich, particularly from two new *Reichsgau*: *Danzig–Westpreussen* and *Wartheland*, and the area of *Stettin Pomerania*. Four companies from *Danzig–Westpreussen* operated in Norway with Polish labour power: “Arge Pommern” from Bad Polzin (Połczyn); “Max Maertins” from Gdańsk; “Wilhelm Meister” from Elbing (Elbląg); and “Richard Menzel” from Köslin (Koszalin). All four companies employed Polish and German nationals from their respective local areas. The first company, “Arbeitsgemeinschaft Pommern”, was created following the merger of minor Pomeranian companies, inter alia “Wilhelm Sabban” and “Benicke” from Stettin, “Kobs” from Człuchów and “Arge Stargard” from Stargard. The merged company operated in Norway with 24 Polish and 12 German labourers (see table 1 and 2). Three of these companies were established in northern Norway to construct docks¹⁰, brought along 40 Polish labourers (see table 2 and 3).

The “Hans Krull” and “Franz Bodmann”, two independent German companies from the area of *Reichsgau Wartheland* (Kraj Warty), solely employed Polish labourers from the city of Łódź and its suburbs. “Hans Krull” arrived in the town of Alta with 57 Polish labourers in July 1942, and “Franz Bodmann” followed in the latter part of June 1942 until June 1943 with a total of 161 Polish workers (see table 4). Four smaller companies from *Reichsgau Wartheland* arrived in Norway during 1943. They were: “Kurt Bender” from Łódź and “Fritz Schneider” from Gniezno (these companies established one new entity, named “Arge Bender–Schneider” upon arrival in Norway), plus “Kurt Baum” from Łęczycza and “Adolf Frieztsche” from Jarocin, which merged under the name “Arge Baum” (see table 4).

The third group of German construction companies consists of corporations that established branches in the Polish areas incorporated into the Third Reich. The majority of these branch–companies were established in *Wartheland*. They differed from similar companies operating in the General Government (GG) by being responsible for covering their own costs. They operated their own employment positions within the EG Wiking. The “Franz Bodmann” company from Łódź (a branch of the same company from Getynga), and the “Herbert Sackmann” from Poznań (a branch of the same company from Jena) were two of the most active branch companies. The “Franz Bodmann” hired, as mentioned above, 161 Polish workers and “Herbert Sackmann” 18 people (see table 3 and 4).

10 RA, OT–Abt.Arb., E. 8/1140, Ref. Hafenbau, 097/V/Le, Vermerk v. 30.06.1942, Vermerk v. 5.08.1942, betr. Entwicklung des Firmeneinsatzes für Kaibauten.

Although the German companies hired their own labour power, they could be allocated employees by applying to an employment office (*Landsarbeitsamt*, LAA) or its local branches (*Nebenstellen*). These employment offices forcibly registered people and provided an important stockpile of labourers, regardless of educational background and age, that could be collected and shipped to a pre-defined construction site. The majority of mass transportations of labourers went to the northern parts of Norway and Finland. A total of 1320 Poles, of which 1000 came from *Reichsgau Wartheland* and 320 from *Reichsgau Danzig–Westpreussen*, were hired by the EG Wiking in this manner. All of them were transported to northern Finland in a total of three shipments. The first and largest shipment was undertaken on 31 October 1942 (see table 4) and involved between 800 and 1000 men that had been handled and registered by local employment offices in the eastern parts of *Wartheland* and shipped from the *Landsarbeitskontor* in Poznań to the northern part of Finland to construct an army railroad between Hyrynsalmi and Kuusamo¹¹. The labourers were divided between two large companies: “Matthaus Hauck” from Würzburg, and “Sager and Woerner” from Berlin. The two succeeding shipments in May and June 1943 contained an estimated 320 Poles originating from *Danzig–Westpreussen*. The majority of these labourers were employed by “Matthaus Hauck”.

The total number of Polish labourers from the incorporated Polish areas in the Third Reich thus amount to an estimated 2650 individuals. 1595 (59.8%) workers originated from *Reichsgau Wartheland*; 393 (15.3%) came from *Oberschlesien*; an estimated 572 (21.5%) from *Danzig–Westpreussen*; and approximately 90 (3.4%) from *Regierungsbezirk Zichenau*. The uneven dispersion of the labourer’s regional origin is peculiar but can be explained by the geographical variations in the Germanisation policies under the auspices of German district managers (*Gauleiter*). This is especially relevant in the areas of *Oberschlesien* and *Danzig–Westpreussen*, headed by Josef Wagner and Albert Forster, respectively. Both district managers Germanised their subordinated populations by forcing them to sign the *Deutsche Volksliste* (DVL), which was divided into four categories from number I to IV. The population could choose to either sign one of the four categories or to be shipped to concentration camps – meaning that many signed the list. The overbearing reason as to why the district managers conducted a forced Germanisation policy was an insufficient recruitment to the Wehrmacht. By enlisting Poles in the DVL, the Germans shipped an estimated 15,000 Poles to Norway as part

11 A report from 31 October 1942, in which Dr. Post, the person in charge of EG Wiking at the OT central in Berlin, describes the transport from Wartheland in the following manner: “LAA Wartheland has deployed 1000 Polish workers for operations in Kuusamo in Finland, which from November will undertake work for Baurat Gross from Poznan”, see RA, Abt. Arbeitseinsatz, E. 6/1100 Gesamteinsatz, Einsatz-Bericht der EG Wiking und Finnland für die Zeit von 20.09. – 31.10.1942. The Arbeitseinsatzkartei obtained from the Norwegian Riksarkivet shows that the Polish shipment was reduced by 200 individuals. It is, however, possible that there are 200 missing Arbeitseinsatzkartei, or that these individuals were deployed in a different “einsatz” group.

of the Wehrmacht (vast documentation of this practice is found in the Rustkammer-archive in Trondheim). I found, during my research, several examples of “Wehrmacht Poles” that chose to (when given the opportunity to do so) become employees of the OT instead of joining the German army. The Germanisation policy undertaken by Arthur Greiser, the district manager in the region of *Wartheland*, is a contrast in comparison to two of the aforementioned regions. *Wartheland* was Germanised by relocating Poles to the GG and replacing them with German nationals. By January 1944, there was only a total of 90,000 Poles, 2% of all Polish nationals in the region, that had signed lists III and IV of the DVL. The corresponding number in *Danzig-Westpreussen* was 44.3% and 38% in *Oberschlesien*.

Table 1. Transport of Poles from Oberschlesien, Oct. 1941– July 1944

Name of German company or employment office	Company transport and date	Destination	Number of workers
Bernard Frericks (Berlin)	16 October 1941	Petsamo	5
	10 October 1942	Petsamo	3
	10 August 1943	Petsamo	4
	4 December 1943	Kirkenes	3
Jens Kluge (Alt Gleiwitz)	22 October 1941	Kuusamo	12
Willy Jaeschke (Duisburg)	20 May 1942	Trondheim/Åndalsnes	27
Arbeitsamt Sosnowiec	14 July 1942	Trondheim	10
Carl Brandt (Brema)	9 June 1942	Bergen	4
Beton Monierbau	11 June 1942	Narvik I	5
Weidmann u. Greatsch	3 July 1942	Åndalsnes	27
Emmerich (Duisburg)	8 July 1942	Åndalsnes	41
Arge Erbe	18 September 1942	Itto (Finland)	4
	26 September 1942	Itto (Finland)	2
Heinrich Butzer (Hamburg)	24 September 1942	Fauske	4
Zech und Voigt (Berlin)	8 April 1943, in transport with 77 German nationals	Alta	6
Unknown German company	5 April 1943, in transport with 134 German nationals	Narvik	6
Unknown companies	Unknown date, arrived in Norway with Wehrmacht	Kristiansand	3
		Miscellaneous	24
Unknown companies	Unknown date (insufficient source material)	Miscellaneous	203
Total			393

Source: RA, OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei, E. 30–35 (Poles); *Ibidem*, OT–Abt. Arbeitseinsatz, E. 15, 17, 19–22, Transportation lists; *Ibidem*, AEF DP Registration Card, i.e. Repatriation register.

However, the disproportional recruitment to the OT can also be explained by the Germanisation policy’s differentiation between labour duty and compulsory labour. Poles enlisted in the DVL were only subject to labour duty (*Arbeitspflicht*), not compulsory labour (*Arbeitszwang*), as people of other nationalities. This difference corresponds to the regional variation in Germanisation policies, and as such constitutes the

main reason as to why the majority of labourers in the OT originated from *Reichsgau Wartheland* and not from the other incorporated areas.

Table 2. Transport of Poles from Regierungsbezirk Zichenau, July 1942–July 1944

Name of German company or employment office	Company transport and dates	Destination (OT, OBL, BL)	Number of workers
Matthaus Hauck (Würzburg)	7 July 1942	Kuusamo	3
	28 July 1942	Kuusamo	2
	29 July 1942	Kuusamo	16
	30 July 1942	Kuusamo	7
	1 August 1942	Kuusamo	2
Arge I Sachsen (Chemnitz)	7 October 1942	Alta	3
	30 March 1943	Narvik	4
Heinrich Schäfer (Saarbrücken)			
Sager und Woerner (Berlin)	5 April 1943, in transport with German nationals	Narvik I	6
		Trondheim	3
Janso Feret, and other companies	July 1943	Janiskoski	4
	Wolfer und Goebel (Esslingen)	31 December 1943	Kirkenes
Mo i Rana			2
Fauske			1
Breidt and Daub (Berlin)	July 1944	Trondheim	5
Legion Speer and other companies	1943/44	Unknown destinations in Norway and Finland	Est. 30
Total			Est. 90

Source: RA, OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei, E. 30–35 (Polish nationals); *Ibidem*, OT–Abt. Arbeitseinsatz, E. 15, 17, 19–22, Transportation lists; *Ibidem*, AEF DP Registration Card, i.e. Repatriation register.

Table 3. Transport of Poles from Reichsgau Danzig–Westpreussen, April 1942–July 1944

Name of German company or employment office	Company transport and dates	Destination (OBL, BL)	Number of workers
Arge Pommern (Poczyzn)	April 1942	Trondheim	9
Richard Menzel (Koszalin)	July 1942	Kirkenes	11
Max Maertins (Gdańsk)	September 1942	Kirkenes	17
H. Sackmann (Poznań)	September 1942	Kirkenes	12
Sager and Woerner (Berlin)	19 September 1942	Unknown location in Finland	2
Arge I Sachsen (Chemnitz)	7 October 1942	Alta	22
Arge III Sachsen (Chemnitz)	31 December 1942	Kirkenes	12
Arge Bauvens–Siewers (Köln)	9 October 1942	Skiippagurra	14
M. Hauck (Günzburg)	31 October 1942	Unknown location in Finland	20
Bafag AG (Regensburg)	31 December 1942	Fauske	4
Simer and Müller (Brema)	15 March 1943	Kirkenes	3
Unknown company	26 March 1943, in transport with 84 German nationals	Kirkenes	14
		Kristiansand	
H. Schäfer (Saarbrücken)	30 March 1943	Tønsberg	
		Narvik I	7
		Fauske	2
Collective transport	27 May 1943	Bergen	1
		Kuusamo	Est. 220
		Mo i Rana	2
J. Kunz (Freiburg)	9 June 1943		
Collective transport	June 1943	Unknown location in Finland	Est. 100

Name of German company or employment office	Company transport and dates	Destination (OBL, BL)	Number of workers
Transport from the Ruhr district with: – Angerer (Dirschau) – Matrowitz (Berlin)	8 June 1944	Fauske Mo i Rana	8 10
Single people in transport from General Government)	Until July 1944	Miscellaneous	Est. 50
Deployed as part of Wehrmacht	1942–1944	Miscellaneous	32
Total			Est. 570

Source: RA, OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei, E. 30–35 (Polish nationals); *Ibidem*, OT–Abt. Arbeitseinsatz, E. 15, 17, 19–22, Transportation lists; *Ibidem*, AEF DP Registration Card, i.e. Repatriation Register.

Table 4. Transport of Poles from Wartheland, April 1942 until July 1944

Name of German company or employment office	Company transport and dates	Destination (OT, OBL, BL)	Number of workers
Curt Kallenbach (Saarbrücken)	4 April 1942	Kirkenes	18
Arge Pommern (Pocznyn)	April 1942	Trondheim	15
Willy Krenz (Berlin)	May 1942	Mo i Rana	22
Arge Nordmark (Hamburg)	May 1942	Mo i Rana	4
Herbert Sackmann (Poznań)	June 1942	Mo i Rana	6
Hans Krull (Łódź)	21 June 1942	Alta	57
Franz Bodmann (Łódź)	29 June 1942	Alta	55
	13 July 1942	Alta	73
	17 August 1942	Alta	30
	15 June 1943	Alta	3
Bernard Frericks (Berlin)	15 September 1942	Kirkenes	3
Max Maertins (Gdańsk)	15 September 1942	Kirkenes	2
Landesarbeitsamt Wartheland (Poznań)	31 October 1942	Kuusamo	800–1000
Bafag AG (Regensburg)	15 February 1943	Trondheim	3
Wilhelm Meister (Elbląg)	29 March 1943	Narvik	10
Zech und Voigt (Berlin)	8 April 1943	Alta	31
	8 May 1943	Alta	2
J. Kunz (Freiburg)	9 June 1943	Mo i Rana	12
Franz Bodmann (Łódź)	15 June 1943	Alta	3
Kurt Baum (Łęczycza)	20 August 1943	Mo i Rana	35
	19 September 1943	Mo i Rana	5
Selbach (Koblenz)	20 August 1943	Mo i Rana	1
Adolf Frieztsche (Jarocin)	19 September 1943	Mo i Rana	41
	27 September 1943	Mo i Rana	1
Kurt Bender (Łódź)	19 September 1943	Narvik II	30
Fritz Schneider (Gniezno)	19 September 1943	Narvik II	36
Miscellaneous companies and NSKK	Until July 1944	Miscellaneous	est. 100
Total			Est 1595

Source: RA, OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei, E. 30–35 (Polish nationals); *Ibidem*, OT–Abt. Arbeitseinsatz, E. 15, 17, 19–22, Transportation lists; *Ibidem*, AEF DP Registration Card, i.e. Repatriation register.

The OTs' recruitment system in the General Government

The General Government (GG) was the Polish rest state created and occupied by the Germans. The GG was used as a source for labour power and constituted the main recruitment area of civilian Polish nationals that served in various German "einsatz" groups. In the initial phase of the occupation, the GG was an important area for Hitler's preparatory work for the invasion of the Soviet Union. It was, therefore, imperative to continuously improve the standard of the GG's infrastructure, and to construct passageways (*durchgangstrasser*) in areas occupied by the Germans. The OT, alongside the regions of EG Jacob, was given an array of construction tasks, primarily focused on maintenance or construction of new infrastructure needed by the Wehrmacht. It was imperative to create an operational recruitment system to obtain both professionally trained and regular workers to fulfil their construction assignments. The established system differed from and was more comprehensive than the above-mentioned system used in the incorporated areas.

The system used in the GG was also useful to fulfil the needs of EG Wiking. Recruitment of Polish nationals started as early as May 1941 and was planned by the German employment offices and companies hired by either the OT or the Wehrmacht. Polish language newspapers issued by the Germans, often dubbed "reptile-newspapers" by Poles, were filled with advertisements from German and Polish companies and from different recruitment and information offices¹². Information offices were established in all major GG cities after October 1941. Warsaw had three offices, whilst Kraków, Radom, Tarnów, Rzeszów, Lwów and Przemyśl had one office each. The office in Kraków established subbranches in the surrounding towns of Bochnia, Miechów, Wolbrom and Jarosław. Moreover, several German companies hired well-paid recruitment officers to trawl districts and villages to secure employment of labour power. The Polish resistance movement started a campaign to warn Polish nationals about the false and propagandist content of the "reptile newspapers" through their own underground press. It was warned that the advertisement entailed recruitment to the OT, shipment to the Third Reich and heavy manual labour under supervision of the German military¹³.

12 There were four "reptile newspapers": "Nowy Kurier Warszawski"; "Goniec Krakowski"; "Gazeta Lwowska"; and "Dziennik Radomski". For more information, please see: Władysława Wójcik, *Prasa gadzinowa Generalnego Gubernatorstwa (1939–1945)* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe WSP, 1988); Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Gazeta Lwowska 1941–1944* (Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, 1996); Krzysztof Woźniakowski, *Polskojęzyczna prasa gadzinowa czasów okupacji niemieckiej 1939–1945* (Opole: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scriptorum 2014).

13 For more information on recruitment to the OT, please see: Emilia Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, *Polska siła robocza w Organizacji Todta w Norwegii i Finlandii w latach 1941–1945* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2018), 73–77.

Recruitment of Poles from the GG to the EG Wiking was fully operation from the spring of 1943. This time-period saw the first large shipment of Polish labourers from the GG. The shipment included an estimated 700 forest workers recruited by different employment offices during January and February 1943 following a recommendation from the GG government. The labourers were told that they were to be stationed for work in Germany, and were gathered in 2–3 camps in Stettin Pomerania. Two of the camps are often seen in archival materials: the OT Lager Piepstock (present day Podlipce, near Stargard Szczeciński) and the OT Lager Wachlin (today known as Warchlin, near Stettin). The labourers were, upon arrival in the camps, formally inscribed into the OT and hired for construction work in the surrounding areas. Following two months of labour, the Poles were shipped by train to the OT-*Transportstelle* in Stettin where they learned that they were going to travel to Norway. They were transported by ship to Oslo alongside Wehrmacht soldiers on the 24th of April. However, the shipment only included 644 Polish labourers upon arrival in Oslo, and the remaining 32 might have managed to escape during the transportation. The Poles were hired by different OBLs in Norway (see table 5). It is necessary to point out that only 58 of the 644 labourers were over the age of 30 and that the remaining individuals were young boys between the ages of 16 and 20. Although some individuals had professional training as shoemakers, bakers, carpenters, tailors and bricklayers, the vast majority of them were forest workers without education – recruited from poor villages in the southern part of the GG¹⁴.

The second large-scale transportation from the GG was shipped during May 1943 to *Einsatz Finland* (Operation Finland). This shipment was part of a major enlistment scheme that had been arranged during the spring and summer of 1943, which had intended to collect 10,000 Polish workers for distribution amongst different *Einsatz* groups. The enlistment scheme was arranged by high-ranking authorities within the OT in co-operation with the OT-central and the GG government. All employment offices were, during March 1943, given two direct orders from the GG government. Firstly, they were informed about the order's purpose, i.e. to recruit 10,000 Polish labourers. Secondly, all offices were obliged to only co-operate with companies that the OT-central's Eastern Transition Office (OT-*Zentrale, Durchgangsstelle Ost*), located in the town of Tomaszow Mazowiecki, had specifically given the task of recruiting labourers (*Anwerbeauftrag*). The practical result of this scheme meant that only a few and well-performing companies were given the task of recruiting labourers. Sixteen German construction companies with company branches or recruitment offices in

14 Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, *Polska siła robocza*, 79–82; Seidler, *Die Organisation Todt*, 133. The education background of the labourers are confirmed by information from each OT-EG Wiking worker's *Arbeitseinsatzkartei* found in the OT register (card file). This register is situated in Riksarkivet in Oslo; for further information, please see RA, *Arbeitseinsatzkartei – Poles*, box: 30–35.

Warszawa, Lwów, Radom and Kraków were selected for this enlistment scheme. One of these construction companies, "Feret" from Berlin, operated in the territories of Hungary, Austria and the GG through its Hungarian branch, "Janso Feret". Examples of other companies that partook in the scheme and operated through branches or recruitment offices are: "Sanitas"; "Gottlieb Gunther"; "Gerhard Hunger"; "Gnom-Zygmunt Knabe"; "Heinrich Stickel"; "Johannes Kellner". Three of the 16 companies operated through information agencies as they did not have any company branches in the GG. Each company was given a specific number of labourers they were expected to recruit. The above mentioned "Janso Feret" was given the task of recruiting 3414 labourers – amounting to 1/3 of the total recruitment target. The labourers obtained by "Janso Feret" were distributed in the following manner: 1114 were shipped to Finland, 1300 to the Soviet Union, 750 to the Balkans, and 250 to the EG West¹⁵.

The autumn of 1943 saw a sharp increase in demand for labour power, and the OT consequently started to independently recruit labourers from the GG by issuing advertisements under their full organisational name and by establishing their own recruitment offices (*OT-Werbestelle*). This method had not been used in other areas controlled by Germany. The OT established three recruitment offices in the city centre of Warsaw and published advertisements two times a week in the "reptile newspaper", "Nowy Kurier Warszawski". The advertisement stated that the OT organisation was in need of an array of skilled workers for their associated construction companies and proclaimed that workers would receive a free and nutritious diet, a free work uniform, free accommodation, paid holiday, and a good salary. The city of Radom had a recruitment office as early as May 1943, and the city of Lwów had two offices from August 1943. The cities in which the OT did not establish recruitment offices were covered by information offices, which gained the role as the OTs local representative, responsible for hiring employees.

The third recruitment method was based on direct recruitment of labourers by companies that had contracts with the OT and mirrored the above mentioned method that was used in the Polish areas incorporated into the Third Reich. These companies had their own independent methods and standards for labour recruitment but chose to open recruitment offices in the GG following the increased demand for labour power during the spring of 1944. Examples of these companies are: "Breidt und Daub" (Berlin) with a branch in Warsaw (additional branches in Darmstad and Trondheim); "Arkitekt Johannes Kellner" from Warsaw which operated in Tømmernes (construction of the polar railroad); and "Erich Pixberg" from Lwów which operated in the northern parts of Finland.

15 For more information on procedures on employee registration, please see: Denkwicz-Szczepaniak, *Polska siła robocza*, 79–81.

There were two companies operating in the GG that solely focused on labour recruitment. The companies received a pre-defined payment per recruited labourer. The two companies were: “Gnom – Zygmunt Knabe” and “Richard Plihal”. Both entities had Warsaw as its main base and depended on assistance from recruitment agencies in other cities. An estimated 1000 Poles were recruited by the “Gnom” company. The labourers had been deployed in Norway and Finland by March 1944, ca. 500 in each country. The second company, “R. Plihal”, recruited a total of 315 people – all deployed to Norway (see table 5).

The OT was in constant need of labour power. This gave a basis for recruitment agencies operating from private apartments, often without any official names. There was an estimated 30 of these small-scale recruitment agencies in Warsaw. This system was at the height of its operation during the spring and summer of 1944, a period which saw an ever-increasing demand for labour power combined with limited possibilities to attain people. This resulted in the OT-EG Wiking radically changing its employment practices. The leader of the EG Wiking and the General Plenipotentiary for construction (*Generalbevollmächtigte für die Bauwirtschaft*) in the Norwegian *Reichskommissar*, Willi Henne, issued on 20 May 1944 a decree which gave OT-officials authorisation to regulate the dispersion of OT labourers within the EG Wiking¹⁶. This meant that companies were required to transfer parts of their employees to other companies in need of labour power. The companies were, therefore, no longer operating as fully independent entities. The practice was clearly characterised by coercion for both the companies and their employees, which lost their company affiliation and, as such, became subject to involuntary relocation.

Table 5. Transportation of Poles from GG, April 1943–August 1944

Recruitment period	Recruiting company/ OT	Destination in Norway (OBL)	No. of workers	Destination in Finland (OBL)	No. of workers	Name of hiring company
First period: April–June 1943	Transport no. 86, organised by German Arbeitsamt in southern GG	Alta	90			Arge I Sachsen Wolfer und Goebel Arge Stallmann Willy Jaeschke Sager und Woerner Hitzbleck
		Kirkenes	91			
		Mo i Rana	108			
		Åndalsnes	110			
		Trondheim	53			
		Kristiansand	92			
		Narvik I	50			
	Fauske	50				
	J. Feret, special recruitment operation			Janiskoski	1114	Feret (Berlin) and other companies
		Total	644		1114	

¹⁶ RA, OT-Abteilung Generalbevollmächtigter für die Bauwirtschaft (OT – Abt.G.B.Bau), E. 47–51, 53, Merkblatt v. 20.05.1944, Tgb. Nr L1c/8747/44, Verfügungsrecht über betriebsgebundene und Zuge-wiesene Arbeitskräfte deutsche Baufirmen in Norwegen; For more information on recruitment system in the GG, please see: Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, *Polska siła robocza*, 73–96.

Recruitment period	Recruiting company/ OT	Destination in Norway (OBL)	No. of workers	Destination in Finland (OBL)	No. of workers	Name of hiring company
Second period: September 1943 – March 31 1944	Gnom-Z. Knabe, Warszawa	Mo i Rana Fauske Trondheim	Est. 500	Petsamo	Est. 500	Arge Preusse Bauvens-Sivers Pollensky und Zollner Conrad, Sackmann, Funke, Breidt und Daub
	E. Pixberg (Lwow) Hofmeister (Brema) Legion Speer K. Hitz (Klagenfurt) Breidt und Daub	Kristiansand	8	Lapland	Est. 500	E. Pixberg, Hofmeister
	OTs recruitment	Oslo, Mo i Rana, Trondheim	12 295	Rovaniemi	Est. 50	K. Hitz, Breidt und Daub, Sager und Woerner Miscellaneous companies
		Miscellaneous OBL	21 women			
Total			Est. 840		Est. 1050	
Third period: April–August 1944	Breidt und Daub (Berlin/Warszawa) Gnom-Z. Knabe (Warszawa) Richard Plihal (Warszawa)	Trondheim	124			Breidt und Daub, and other companies NSKK, Funke, Sackmann
		Oslo	40			
	Fauske, Trondheim	112	Johannes Kellner NSKK Fr. Preusse			
	Oslo	164				Fr. Preusse
	Fauske	7	Miscellaneous Companies			
	Tømmernes	32				Miscellaneous Companies
	Mo i Rana	54	Miscellaneous Companies NSKK – Høvik			
	Tømmernes	34				
J. Kellner (Warszawa) Fr. Preusse (Braunschweig) OTs recruitment	Miscellaneous OBL	12 women				
Information offices recruitment	Oslo	144				
	Varous OBL	Est. 30				
Total			Est. 753			
Total Norway			Est. 2237	Total Finland	Est. 2164	

Source: RA, OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei, E. 30–35 (Polish nationals); *Ibidem*, OT–Abt. Arbeitseinsatz, E. 15, 17, 19–22, Transportation lists; *Ibidem*, AEF DP Registration Card, i.e. Repatriation register.

Polish prisoners of war in the EG Wiking

A total of 1711 Polish POWs were deployed in Norway¹⁷. They were organised in three construction battalions, no. 28, 30 and 41, and shipped from Hamburg to Norway between April and May 1942¹⁸. The manager of fortification construction in Norway

17 BA–MA, RW 6 Bestand an Kriegsgefangenen 01.09.1941–31.12.1944, 450–453.

18 *Ibidem*, RW 38/88, Monatsbericht (hereinafter: MB), April 1942, 3; *ibidem*, MB, May 1942, 111.

distributed the battalions to Elsfjord near Mo i Rana, Åndalsnes and Egersund¹⁹. Some of the deployment locations within the EG–Wiking are unknown, but they were, in general, distributed as small groups all over Norway. I have managed to pinpoint the following locations: Lødingen near the city of Bodø, Ylvingen, Drevja, Hemnesberget, Sandnessjøen, the Gossen airfield and Lista. The Polish POW Kazimierz Srokowski, estimates that there were a total of 100 POWs stationed in the village of Lødingen to construct bunkers for the Luftwaffe. Fifteen of them were transferred to Ylvingen near the town of Mosjøen during the autumn of 1942 for tunnel construction and railroad transport of rocks and gravel for construction of an artillery battery.

Three hundred Polish prisoners worked in the nearby town of Sandnessjøen from July 1943 until November 1944, where they constructed tunnels. These workers were moved to the town of Rognan during November 1944 for railroad construction²⁰. In 1943, a total of 120 Polish prisoners were deployed to construct an airfield in Lista for the German construction company, “F. Diehl” (Essen)²¹. Two hundred prisoners had been deployed to Lista during May 1942 and accommodated in the POW camps in Skeime and Vanse. All of the prisoners were officers and were, therefore, not tasked with manual labour. They were transported to Denmark during October 1944²².

Troublesome recruitment of labour power to the construction of the *Nordlandsbanen* (railroad) during the summer of 1943 resulted in the OBL *Nordlandsbanen* in Mo i Rana receiving a shipment of 1041 Polish POWs. The prisoners were divided into two groups. Five hundred and fifty individuals were made available to construction section no. 13 (NSB–13. Avdeling) and settled in Rotelva camp, while the remaining 491 were allocated to construction section no. 15 and settled in Saltnes camp²³ (table 7). The same number of Polish POWs were registered in both construction sections in June 1944 (table 8)²⁴. OBL Fauske was constantly short of labour power, and, therefore, received a shipment of 240 Polish POWs, all hired by “Rose–Exner” (table 10). In August 1944, a total of 1281 Polish POWs were affiliated to the construction of the *Nordlandsbanen*, and an estimated 320 were constructing fortifications.

19 Ibidem, RW 39–163 TB O. Qu 2–Qu 2, August 1942, 93.

20 Ingvar Andersen, “Krigsfangenskap”, *Årbok for Helgeland* vol. XXI (1990): 88–89.

21 RA, OT–Abt. Arb., E. 7–1110, Written report from OT–Wiking, OBL Süd v. 8.03.1943 to OT–EG Wiking in Oslo.

22 For more information on Polish POWs in Skeime, please see: Torbjørn Larsson–Fedde, *Russiske og polske krigsfanger i Farsund–området 1940–45* (Vanse: Lista Museums Venner, 2013), 77–78, 82–89, 94–103.

23 RA, OT–Abt. Bahnbau, E. 9, OBL Nordlandbahn, Streckenbesetzung v. 03.12.1943.

24 RA, Mjr Leiv Kreyberg–archive, Office for former prisoners of war in Bodø, Box 2, Lists of Polish prisoners of war in Nordland country.

The Poles' role in realisation of OTs' construction tasks in the EG Wiking

a) Fortifications

The vast majority were hired for construction of fortifications along the Norwegian coastline. They were registered at 49 different locations – often islands in Norwegian fjords. Examples include the islands of Storfosna, Tarva, Hitra and Frøya – all located in the Trondheim fjord, the airfield in Ørlandet, and Orkanger and Melland. The town of Narvik was an important location for workers that constructed artillery batteries on the nearby islands of Trondenes and Engeløy. Islands in proximity to the area of Mo i Rana, for instance Sjona, Nesna, Donnes, Hemnes, Ylvingen and Vikan, were also important locations for labourers. The Poles were further deployed far north in Norway in the town of Kirkenes and the nearby town of Vadsø and villages of Elvenes, Skiipagurra, Smalfjord, and Ekkerøy²⁵. An estimated total of 3200 forced civilian labourers (see table 6) and 320 POWs from Poland were hired for construction of fortifications in Norway from 1942 until 1945. The work locations for prisoners of war are in comparison to the locations of the forced labourers, difficult to determine.

Table 6. Polish civilian labourers in the construction of fortifications in Norway, 1942–1945

Destination (OBL)	Name of German company	Period of employment	Number of Polish workers from:		
			Polish areas incorporated in the Third Reich	General Government	Total
Kirkenes	M. Maertins (Danzig) R. Menzel (Köslin) G. Hallinger (Gelsenkirchen) Arge III Sachsen (Chemnitz) C. Kallenbach (Saarbrücken) W. Scheumann (Magdeburg) B. Frericks (Berlin) Wolfer&Goebel (Esslingen)	from September 1942 to May 1943	104	97	201
Moen	Badische Baugesellschaft (Freiburg)	1943/1944	5	–	5
Narvik	W. Meister (Elbing) Arge Preusse (Braunschweig) Beton und Monierbau (Kassel) H. Schäfer (<i>Saarbrücken</i>)	May 1942–1944	29	87	116
Mo i Rana	Arge Stallmann (Gelsenkirchen) Siemer und Müller (Brema) Arge Nordmark (Hamburg) Arge Krenz (Berlin) Breidt und Daub (Warszawa)	May 1942–1944	23	152	175

²⁵ For more information on Polish nationals hired to construct fortifications in Norway, please see Denkwicz-Szczepaniak, *Polska siła robocza*, 113–131.

Destination (OBL)	Name of German company	Period of employment	Number of Polish workers from:		
			Polish areas incorporated in the Third Reich	General Government	Total
Drontheim	Arge Pommern (Połczyn) Muller–Altwatter (Stuttgard) Sager und Woerner (Berlin) Breidt und Daub (Warszawa)	May 1942 July 1942 1943–1944 1944	33	595	628
Åndalsnes	Weidmann und Greatsch (Emmerich) W. Jaeschke (Duisburg) Chr. Unmack (Berlin) E. Zimmerman (Köln)	from May 1942 to May 1943	95	49	144
Bergen	A. Stapf (Berlin) C. Brandt (Brema)	1942–1944	11	3	14
Kristiansand	Hitzbleck (Duisburg) Massenberg (Essen) Hofmeister, A. Diehl (Essen)	from April 1943	1	95	96
Tønsberg	Siemens–Bau (Berlin) Richard Plihal and other companies from Warszawa	from December 1942 to March 1945	2	151	153
Oslo	K. Hitz (Klagenfurt) and other companies	from April 1943 to 1945	–	72	72
Total			303	1301	1604

Source: RA, OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei (Polish nationals), E. 30–35; OT–Abt. Arbeitseinsatz E. 15, 19, 20, 21 Transportlister.

b) Nordlandsbanen

Nordlandsbanen was the largest and most expensive construction project undertaken by the Third Reich in Norway and constituted the second largest work location for Polish OT employees in Norway. Hitler was convinced that a railroad between Trondheim, Narvik and Kirkenes would secure transportation of supplies to the North Front and the Third Reich's access to ore from the Swedish town of Kiruna²⁶. However, the scale of the project was reduced, mainly due to scarcity of labour power. Hitler, thus, agreed that the town of Drag, near Tysfjord, should become the railroad's end station. The period between the outbreak of the war and 15 March 1942 saw the opening of the line between Mosjøen and Mo i Rana. The second stretch between Mo and Drag was open from 15 March 1942. The line was divided into two construction sections: the first section from Mo to Fauske (177 km), and the second from Fauske to Drag (147 km).

26 For more information on Third Reich plans for Nordlandsbanen please see: Emilia Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, "Bygging av polarjernbanen sør for Mo i Rana", *Årbok for Rana* vol. XXXII (1999): 33–37.

The first section was directed by OT *Oberbauleitung* (OBL) Nordlandsbanen, located in Mo i Rana. It was divided into six construction sections (*bauolos*) with numbers between 11–16. The manager of each section was a Norwegian engineer, and the labourers were divided between the OT and the Norwegian State Railway (NSB). A total of 9654 people were employed by December 1943, of which 5232 were prisoners of war (1041 from Poland and 4191 from Russia), 2831 Norwegians, 550 foreigners, 206 legionaries from the National Socialist Motor Corps (*Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrerkorps*, NSKK), and 885 Germans. Polish labourers amounted to 56% of the foreign civilian labourers (280 Poles and 220 others). The 550 Polish prisoners of war from Rotelva camp were hired by NSB in construction section 13, and the remaining 491, from Saltnes camp, by “Looft und Wibb” in construction section 15 (table 7). 14,666 workers were affiliated to the first construction section during June 1944, and the number of Polish civilian labourers increased from 280 to 414 (56.2% of all civilian foreigners, with the exception of Norwegians and Germans). The number of Polish POWs remained the same – 1041. 134 Polish labourers were shipped from the GG between January and August 1944 and distributed among five of the above mentioned companies: “Bauvens”, “Funke”, “Haase”, “Conrad” and “Breidt u. Daub” (table 8). The labourers had primarily been recruited by the German recruitment company “Gnom”. Moreover, the construction company “Breidt und Daub” had its own independent recruitment office in Warsaw, which also shipped labourers to assist the company’s construction projects in Norway. Lastly, there were 8668 Russian POWs and 265 legionaries from the NSKK, of which 67 were Polish nationals that had been enlisted by German recruitment companies (table 8).

Table 7. Poles in the construction of Nordlandsbanen, OBL Mo i Rana, 3 December 1943

NSB sections number	Name of German company or OBL/BL and Norwegian companies, too NSB-sections	Number of workers and OT-personnel				Prisoners of war		NSKK legionary		Total
		Germans	Norwegians	Poles	Other nationalities	Poles	Russian	Poles	other	
Mo i Rana-stab	Hauptkolonne	20	72	–	–	–	–	–	10	102
	Kabza	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10
	OBL Mo i Rana	125	17	3	14	–	558	–	–	717
	NSB sentralen	–	510	–	–	–	–	–	–	510
11	Siemer u. Müller	16	–	1	–	–	–	–	–	17
	BL Nævernes	14	2	–	–	–	285	–	–	301
	NSKK – 15., 23. kompani	45	–	–	–	–	252	–	116	413
	NSB – 11. section	–	702	–	–	–	–	–	–	702
	Arge Bauvens–Sievers	123	–	4	6	–	1465	–	–	1598

NSB sections number	Name of German company or OBL/BL and Norwegian companies, too NSB-sections	Number of workers and OT-personnel				Prisoners of war		NSKK legionary		Total
		Germans	Norwegians	Poles	Other nationalities	Poles	Russian	Poles	other	
12	Funke	90	–	12	81	–	243	–	–	426
	NSB – 12. section	–	146	–	–	–	–	–	–	146
	Selmer (Norwegian)	–	56	–	–	–	–	–	–	56
	Haase	24	–	–	13	–	437	–	–	474
	Lenhard	135	–	–	40	–	571	–	–	746
13	Selbach	38	–	1	42	–	380	–	–	461
	NSKK – 6. kompani	43	–	–	–	–	–	–	30	73
	Kunz	20	–	15	5	–	–	–	–	40
	Conrad	15	–	15	–	–	–	–	–	30
	NSB-13. section	–	180	–	–	550	–	–	–	730
	Winterdienst	20	50	–	–	–	–	–	–	70
14	Sackmann	18	–	8	3	–	–	–	–	29
	Breidt u. Daub	2	–	133	–	–	–	–	–	135
	NSB – 14. section	–	340	–	–	–	–	–	–	340
15	Gehlen	10	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	10
	NSKK – 13. kompani	18	–	–	–	–	–	–	50	68
	Looft u. Wibb	10	–	–	–	491	–	–	–	501
	Arge Baum (Jarocin)	1	–	83	–	–	–	–	–	84
	NSB – 15. section	–	237	–	–	–	–	–	–	237
	BL Rognan	18	4	–	–	–	–	–	–	22
Röllinger	50	–	–	13	–	–	–	–	63	
16	Wolfer u. Goebel	40	–	5	3	–	–	–	–	48
	Strand (Norwegian)	–	53	–	–	–	–	–	–	53
	Henriksen (Norwegian)	–	308	–	–	–	–	–	–	308
	NSB – 16. section	–	207	–	–	–	–	–	–	207
Total	905	2884	280	220	1041	4191	–	206	9727	

Source: RA, OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei Polish nationals), E. 30–35, OT–Abt. Bahnbau, E. 9, OBL Nordlandbahnen, Streckenbesetzung, state of 3 December 1943.

Table 8. Poles in the constructions of Nordlandsbanen, OBL Mo i Rana, June 1944

NSB – sections number	Name of company or OBL/BL and Norwegian institution, too NSB-sections	Number of workers and OT-personnel I				Prisoners of war		NSKK legionary		total
		Germans	Norwegians	Poles	Other nationalities	Poles	Other nationalities	Poles	Other	
OBL Mo i Rana	OBLs stab	151	–	–	63	–	–	–	–	214
	District office in Mo	–	43	15	–	–	–	–	–	58
	Siemer u. Müller	13	–	–	–	70	–	–	–	83
	NSB – 10b.section	–	25	–	–	–	–	–	–	25
	NSB – railroad station Mo	–	114	–	–	–	–	–	–	114

NSB – sections number	Name of company or OBL/BL and Norwegian institution, too NSB–sections	Number of workers and OT–personnel I				Prisoners of war		NSKK legionary		total
		Germans	Norwegians	Poles	Other nationalities	Poles	Other nationalities	Poles	Other	
OBL Mo i Rana	Dunderlandsbahn	–	165	–	–	–	–	–	–	165
	Transportabteilung	–	198	–	–	–	–	45	–	243
	Entreprenør Mo (Norwegian)	–	66	–	–	–	–	–	–	66
	Zygmunt Kabza	11	–	–	7	–	–	–	–	18
	Rheinkies	21	–	–	3	–	70	22	–	116
	Ranabygningen(Norwegian)	–	70	–	–	–	–	–	–	70
	Strassenbau	–	141	–	–	–	–	–	–	141
	Rognan Winterdienst Wegwesen (Norwegian)	15 –	75 36	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –	– –
11	Hasse	44	–	28	–	–	250	–	–	322
	Bauvens	177	–	48	–	–	1242	–	–	1467
	NSB – 11. section	–	704	–	–	–	–	–	–	704
12	Funke	132	–	61	53	–	1200	–	–	1446
	Lehnard	185	–	–	17	–	1501	–	–	1703
	Selbach	76	–	1	37	–	1000	–	–	1114
	Selmer (Norwegian)	–	85	–	–	–	–	–	–	85
	NSB – 12. section	–	111	–	–	–	–	–	–	111
13	Siemer u. Müller	51	–	3	–	–	498	–	–	552
	Lenz	109	–	–	4	–	500	–	–	613
	Conrad	80	–	49	–	–	435	–	–	564
	Kunz	29	–	16	23	–	30	–	–	98
	NSB – 13. section	–	122	–	–	–	–	–	–	122
	Bauleitung Nævernes	22	–	–	10	550	291	–	–	873
14	Sackmann	27	–	8	14	–	393	–	–	442
	Gehlen	29	–	–	3	–	687	–	–	719
	NSB – 14. section	–	281	–	–	–	–	–	–	281
15	Röllinger	26	–	–	11	–	36	–	–	73
	Wolfer u. Goebel	80	–	10	25	491	–	–	–	606
	NSB – 15. section	–	125	–	–	–	–	–	–	125
16	Strand (Norwegian)	–	71	–	–	–	–	–	–	71
	NSB – 16. section	–	95	–	–	–	–	–	–	95
	Henriksen (Norwegian)	–	305	–	–	–	–	–	–	305
	Looft u. Wibb	10	–	–	5	–	15	–	–	30
	Breidt u. Daub	3	–	96	–	–	–	–	–	99
	Arge Baum	1	–	79	–	–	–	–	–	80
	Impregnerbygging (Norwegian)	–	–	–	30	–	–	–	–	30
	BL Rognan	30	–	–	17	–	450	–	–	497
Total:		1322	2634	414	322	1041	8668	67	198	14666

Source: RA, OT–Abt. Bahnbau, E. 9, Tabell "June 1944/H"; OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei (Polish nationals), E. 30–35.

The second construction section, from Fauske to Drag, was managed by German and Austrian companies. The section was divided into two OBLs: Fauske and Tømmernes. Tables 9, 10 and 11 illustrate the rate of employment in both OBLs.

Six construction companies were affiliated to OBL Fauske in October 1943, and seven more in the succeeding year (tables 9 and 10). Some companies operated simultaneously in two or more construction sites, but were hindered by scarcity of labour power. The companies, therefore, often applied to be granted permission to relocate labourers from closed down projects in the Eastern Front during the spring of 1944²⁷. 4437 labourers, of which 3580 were POWs, were hired in October 1943. Only 44 Poles were among the OTs foreign labourers (table 9). But this number had increased four-fold in 1944. The number of Polish labourers had increased to 171 in June 1944 (table 10), and to 202 in the succeeding month, meaning that the Poles amounted to 57.5% of the foreign workers in August 1944 (with the exception of Norwegians and Germans). The labourers were mainly recruited from Warsaw and the surrounding areas, and had been enlisted by Plihal and Gnom. OBL Fauske had, in addition to 5000 Russian and Serbian POWs, 240 Polish POWs²⁸.

The work progressed slower in the Tømmernes OBL. Albeit the workforce composed 2694 men during February 1944, half of the construction sites were unmanned. Four companies were responsible for railroad construction: three from Vienna (“Mayreder-Kraus”, “Universale” and “Staug”) and one from Hamburg (“Ph. Holtzmann”)²⁹. The companies were occupied with preparatory work during the spring of 1944, inter alia geological investigations, drainage and construction of barracks. The OT searched for new companies to staff the unmanned construction sites. Two companies which solely employed Polish labourers were hired during late spring. The first company, “Arge Bender-Schneider” was a merged entity of two German companies from *Wartheland* (“Knut Bender” from Łódź and “Fritz Schneider” from Gniezno), which signed a contract with the OT on 31 May 1944. It mostly constructed barracks³⁰. The second company, “Arch-Johannes Kellner”, started working in the nearby area of Tømmernes during late spring of 1944, and recruited its labourers from Warsaw and its suburbs from between May and July. It mostly conducted tasks affiliated with installation and electricity. The company’s manager, engineer Tschernischoff, wanted to take over

27 RA, OT–Abt. Arb., E. 35–2000, correspondence between the following companies: Rose, Hochtief, Pollensky und Zöllner; Ibidem, Aufstellung über die Umsetzung von Firmensplitterern u. Anzahl der bisher in Oslo durchgeschesteten Gfm, stand 28.01.1944 und 11.04.1944.

28 Statsarkivet Trondheim (SAT), Norske Statsbaner (NSB), E. 1, 1.001–1.004. OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei, Einsatz OBL Fauske, stand 25.08.1944.

29 RA, OT–Abt. Bahnbau, E. 8, folder B1/A–1 Umlaufe, Arbeitskräfte im Bahnbau 25.02.1944, Ibidem, E. 49, folder 4 Gesamt. Streckenbereisung im Bereich der OBL Tømmernes v. 22–24.03.1944; Linienführung

30 RA, OT–Abt. Bahnbau, E. 12, Contracts 1943–45, Contract no. 119.

control of the labourers affiliated to the “Plihal” company and, therefore, suggested a merger. The operations of “Plihal” in OBL Fauske was from July 1944, managed by the German engineer L. Scheitzow. However, his company did not have a designated work location and the employees were, thus, spread across different locations, affiliated to OBL Fauske and made available to other companies. The two engineers, therefore, worked to merge their entities. An agreement stipulating the merger and establishment of “Arge Plihal–Kellner” was signed on 25 August 1944. The agreement stated that the companies would pool their labour resources to construct 10 minor power stations for the OBL Tømmernes³¹. The merger was never accomplished due to redistribution of Polish labourers affiliated to Warsaw companies. The OTs’ headquarter in Berlin had, in co-operation with the largest German company in Berlin, “Breidt und Daub”, and the OTs management in Oslo, decided to allocate the Polish labourers recruited by “Plihal” and “Gnom” to “Breidt und Daub”³². The real reason was that Richard Plihal, the manager of “Plihal”, had embezzled 30,000 RM from the OT in Berlin and left for Vienna. The company was dissolved and the employees were hired by “Breidt und Daub”. This company lent its employees to other construction sites in the areas surrounding Trondheim and to construction of railroads³³ (compare table 10). The staffing in the construction sites of OBL Tømmernes increased during late 1944 following the evacuation of all German companies (38) from Finland and northern Norway. Seven companies took up work in OBL Tømmernes³⁴. Two of these companies, “C.Kallenbach” and “B.Frericks” employed Polish labourers³⁵ (table 11).

31 RA, OT-pakke Plihal, I-40, Schriftwechsel des Baubüros Fauske der Fa. Plihal (Handakte Scheitzow), Arbeitsgemeinschaftsvertrag zwischen den Firmen Plihal und Kellner v. 25.08.1944 and Scheitzow letter to attorney E. Wäsch, dated 17 September 1944.

32 RA, OT-pakke Plihal, 1-7 Firma Plihal Abrechnung, letter from Reichminister für Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion, Amt Bau, OT, Abt.Arbeitseinsatz A 17 PO-RRKr-He, dated 19 August 1944, to EG Wiking Oslo, furthermore, a letter from OT EG-Wiking, dated 28 August 1944 no. VA (2)-1093-44 an sämtliche Einsätze und OBL der OT EG Wiking.

33 Ibidem, Scheitzow letter to Eugen, manager of OBL-Fauske, dated 19 October 1944.

34 RA, OT-Abt. Bahnbau., E. 48, mappe 1 Ebk, Vermerk v. 04.12.1944 betr.: Weiterverwendung der aus dem Einsatz Finnland und bei der OBL Alta freiwerdenden Firmen.

35 The Poles recruited by C. Kallenbach were shipped from the employment offices in Galicja and Podbeskdzie to Norway on 17 May 1943. They were originally employed by “Wolfer und Goebel” in OBL Kirkenes. They constructed the road in Skogsanvære from Lakselv to Kirkenes (between May 1943 and August 1943) and were most likely hired for similar work in OBL Moen. This information is based on the labourers’ employment cards.

Table 9. Poles affiliated to the construction of Nordlandsbanen, OBL Fauske, 1 October 1943

Name of German company or OBL/BL and Norwegian institution, too NSB-sections	Number of workers and OT-personnel			Prisoners of war			Total
	Germans	Norwegians	Poles	Other nationalities	Poles	Russian, Serbian	
OBL Fauske stab	150	–		–	–	–	150
Hospital OBL Fauske	20	–		–	–	–	20
M. Fanghängel	20	–	–	–		–	20
C. Rose	50	–	1	–		500	551
Grün u. Bilfinger	108	47	10	–		730	895
Pollensky u. Zöllner	64	–	3	–		600	667
H. Butzer	53	52	–	–		700	805
Hochtief	65	144	30	–		1050	1289
NSKK	40						40
Total:	570	243	44			3580	4437

Source: RA, OT–Abt. Bahnbau, E. 46, mappe 2 OBL Fauske, tab. Arbeitseinsatz Fauske stand 1.10.1943, RA, OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei (Polish nationals), E. 30–35.

Table 10. Poles affiliated to the construction of Nordlandsbanen OBL Fauske, 25 July–25 August 1944

Name of German company	Number of workers and OT-personnel				Prisoners of war		Total
	Germans	Norwegians	Poles	Other nationalities	Poles – state of 25 Aug. 1944	Russian, Serbian	
OTs own recruitment	197	32	–	57	–	78	364
Lohnbetreute	49	–	–	56	–	154	259
M. Fanghängel	7	–	2	–	–	66	75
Arge C. Rose–Exner	14	9	25	31	–	195	274
Grün und Bilfinger	82	36	43	–	–	959	1120
Pollensky und Zöllner	87	48	15	27	–	782	959
H. Butzer	94	16	35	31	–	711	887
Funke und Co	42	1	15	–	240	491	789
Hochtief	105	106	27	–	–	1608	1846
H. Grubba	19	–	–	8	–	–	27
Th. Goodson	20	–	–	1	–	–	21
K. Stein	7	–	5	–	–	–	12
Niedergessäs	2	4	4	–	–	–	10
Menk	5	–	–	–	–	–	5
E. Zublin	39	11	–	–	–	120	170
little companies	19	–	–	–	–	–	19
Transportflotte Sperr	2	–		4			6
NSKK	32	70					102
Total:	822	333	171	215	240	5155	6936

Source: RA, OT–Abt. Bahnbau, E. 46, mappe 2 OBL Fauske, tabell: Arbeitseinsatz–stand am 25.7.1944, RA, OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei (Polish nationals), E. 30–35; SAT–avd Dora, NSB, E.1. 1.001–1.004, 1.001 OT–Arbeitseinsatz, OBL Fauske, state of 25 August 1944.

Table 11. Poles affiliated to the construction of Nordlandsbanen, OBL Tømmernes, 10 December 1944–1 March 1945

Name of German company	Number of workers and OT–personnel			Prisoners of war Russian, Serbian	Total
	Germans	Poles	Other nationalities		
Arge Bender–Schneider (Łódź)	–	66	–	total: 9453	9519
J. Kellner (Warszawa)	–	54	–		54
C. Kallenbach (Saarbrücken)	176	90	76		342
Mayreder–Kraus (Wien)	104	–	18		122
Masch. Fabr., Ruckon	1	–	–		1
Ph. Holzmann (Hamburg)	50	1	11		62
Universale (Wien)	93	–	36		129
Staug (Wien)	35	–	100		135
B. Frericks (Berlin)	47	21	–		68
G. Günther (Warszawa)	–	4	–		4
Total:	506	236	241		9453

Source: RA, OT–Abt. Bahnbau, E. 49, mappe 3 Allgemein, Firmeneinsatz, stand v. 10.12.1944; Ibidem, OT–Arbeitseinsatzkartei (Polish nationals), E. 30–35.

The tables above indicate that civilian Polish nationals worked on both construction sections. The employment level peaked during the summer of 1944 and the Poles amounted to an estimated 50–57% of all civilian foreign labourers (with the exception of Norwegians and Germans). They undertook work assignments that are normal in the opening phase of a construction site, for example building of barracks, quays and power plants to secure electricity supplies. Poles hired by “Breidt und Daub” and “Arge Baum–Fritzche” were primarily tasked with constructing barracks in the Rognan–region. Some of the Poles affiliated to “Plihal” undertook similar work. The same work assignments were carried out in OBL Tømmernes. A total of six bridges were under construction or planning. The most pressing project was construction of transshipment quays on different sections of the railroad line (construction section). Polish workers participated in the constructions of the quays in Torkilseng, Gyltvik, Aspfjord, Medgård and Engan³⁶ Tunnel construction was also an important task, and it was needed to build a total of 81 tunnels on the railroad line between Mo i Rana and Drag (36 from Mo i Rana to Fauske, and 45 between Fauske and Drag). Some of these tunnels, inter alia the one in Apsfjord, were constructed with participation from Polish labourers. This is at the present time a road tunnel on the European Route E6. The result of the efforts taken to construct the Nordlandsbanen railroad was disappointing when considering the initial targets, and the construction had halted near Dunderland at the end of the war. NSB took up construction after the war, and the stretch to Fauske was finished in 1958, whereas the stretch to Bodø, four years later. Although 50 km of railroad was finished north of Fauske, nearing the end of 1944, this stretch was never opened. All construction sites north of Torkilseng were abandoned during October

36 RA, Pakke OT–Wiking, concern specially Plihal company, I–40, 1–7.

1944, following the capitulation of Finland, and only one-third of the work on the line from Fauske to Drag was completed³⁷. Polish labourers were the largest group of foreign workers on the aforementioned stretch. An imperative reason for this is that many of the Polish labourers attempted to flee to Sweden upon arrival to their work locations – regardless of the distance to the Swedish border. Many Poles succeeded in entering Sweden and were often assisted or accompanied by Norwegians. The Germans, therefore, started to ship Polish labourers to the northernmost construction section, where the potential for a successful escape was limited by the local nature. This also constitutes the most plausible explanation as to why it was mostly Polish nationals, although not that many in number, that were deployed north of Fauske, inter alia to Tømmernes, Drag, Engan and other locations.

c) Construction, modernisation and maintenance of roads

Riksvei 50 (present day E6) was the most important road system for the Wehrmacht. It was the most prioritised link for shipment of military supplies from Germany to the *Armee-Oberkommando Norwegen* (AOK Norwegen) and the Lapland army, which was stationed in Finland, and the Murmansk front in the Soviet Union. Utilisation of the road was difficult during the winter months, particularly in the north where heavy snow and strong winds were normal. This was especially challenging in the areas between Kvænangen, Alta and the Porsanger fjord, where strong winds can result in snowdrifts as high as 15 metres. This made it difficult to keep the road open for traffic. The Germans intended to hinder the Allies by cutting off Riksvei 50 near Laksefjorden, Repparfjorden, Revsbotn or Kvænangen³⁸. It was, therefore, important that the Wehrmacht kept Riksvei 50 open, especially the stretch to Alta, and the continuing road to Lakselv and Karasjok. The three following stretches were of particular importance:

- I. Kvænangen – and Badderer mountain pass;
- II. Repparfjord – Kistrand – Karasjok, further divided into two sections: Repparfjord–Skaidi–Kistrand and Kistrand–Karasjok;
- III. Alta – Repparfjord.

The three stretches incorporated in total an estimated 250 km³⁹. The Germans planned to construct wooden snow sheds and wooden snow fences to help keep the road open during wintertime. Construction on stretch I (Kvænangen – Badderer mountain pass) was allocated to two German and four Norwegian companies. The largest of the German companies, “Franz Bodmann” from the Polish city of Łódź (*Litzmannstadt*), was hired to construct snow sheds and snow fences on the Kvænangen

37 Seidler, *Die Organisation Todt*, 58–59.

38 Thorbein Gamst, *Finnmark under Hakenkorset: Festung Finnmark* (Arendal: Agdin Forlag, 1984), 115.

39 RA, OT–Abt. Strassenbau, E. 4, B. Strassenbauten I Allgemeines 1942–43, Vermerk v. 11.05.1942 betr. Besprechung beim Wehrmachtbefehlshaber am 09.05.1942.

mountain, and, additionally, to modernise the bypass road which stretched around the Kvænangen fjord. Preparatory work was undertaken from 10 July until 31 October 1942. The company constructed a 5.4 km long snow shed extended with 17 meeting points, every 900 metres. The shed was 3.8-metres-tall and 3.8-metres-wide. The shed's entrance was secured with two 8-metre-tall snow fences, both with solid foundations. A total of 7.4 km of snow fences was constructed on parts of the road less exposed to tall snowdrifts. The construction included 50–60 Poles from the town and suburbs of Łódź, all of which had been recruited by “Franz Bodmann” and forcibly stationed with OBL Alta. Moreover, the company employed an estimated 70 Poles for modernisation of the 9 km bypass road around the Kvænangen fjord. A total of 120–130 Poles worked for “Bodmann”⁴⁰. The second German company was “Arge Sachsen” from Chemnitz. The company worked during the summer on the Baddern mountain pass, and undertook the same assignments as mentioned above, albeit on a smaller scale. The labourers amounted to a group of 23 Polish nationals that had been shipped from Danzig–Westpreussen to Norway. They worked alongside 160 political prisoners from Norway. The work resulted in the construction of an 806m snow shed, 3.5 km of snow fences and the maintenance of 2 km of existing fences⁴¹.

The German company “Hans Krull” from Łódź was hired to work on stretch II from Lakselv to Karasjok. The company mainly undertook winter security measures on the 83 km road. The company had 50 Polish nationals among their employees – all from the Łódź region. The work was conducted between July and November 1942, but its outcome is unknown due to missing documents. The two companies from Łódź, “Franz Bodmann” and “Hans Krull”, were transferred to the area surrounding the Porsanger fjord during the 1943 work season for road construction. The former company was presumably given the road section between Kistrand and Lakselv, whilst the latter company was allocated the section between Skaidi and Kistrand. The latter section involved construction of snow fences⁴².

Stretch III, from Alta to Repparfjord, had a total length of 110 km and was an important part of Riksvei 50 for the Wehrmacht. Six German and four Norwegian construction companies had contracts on this part of the road. Three of the German companies had hired a total of 78 Polish labourers. They were dispersed in the following manner: “Hans Krull” from Łódź (35 individuals); “B. Frericks” from Berlin (10 individuals); and “Zech und Voigt” (33 individuals). The Polish labourers were few in comparison to the 789 men from other nationalities and amounted to only 10% of

40 RA, OT–Abt. Strassenbau, E. 79, D. Winterdienst, D.II Sondereinsätze des Winterdienstes. Planungsgruppe für den wintersicheren Ausbau an Strassen im Nord–Norwegen. Bericht nr 10, 1–2, 4–5.

41 Ibidem, 3.

42 RA, OT–Abt. Strassenbau, E.1 Allgemeine Angelegenheiten, Vermerk v. 11.11.1942 betr. Neueinteilung der OBL–ungen im Bereich nordlich Narvik, 4.

the total work force. The labourers were monitored by only 128 Germans⁴³. The work mostly involved the same construction tasks that were undertaken on the mountain passes of Kvænangen and Badderen – but were comparatively more comprehensive. Two snow sheds with a total length of 13.596 m were constructed. The snow tunnel on the Reppar mountain was 8235 m and was constructed by the Norwegian company “Larsen”. The Hattern tunnel was built by “Frericks” and “Krull”, 5300 m and 60 m respectively. Moreover, some of the companies constructed German bases and workshops throughout the stretch.

A total of 327 forced labourers from Poland were hired for road construction in northern Norway. The majority of them (221) were recruited from Łódź and its surrounding region, and the rest from the Polish areas incorporated in the Third Reich. The Poles amounted to 23.9% of the foreign workers (with the exception of Germans and POWs)⁴⁴.

Brief outline of work conditions, salaries, housing and diets

Polish labourers working for the OT up until January 1943 received salaries from their respective employing construction company. This mostly concerned Poles originating from the incorporated areas. The OT, thus, had no official tariff prior to 1943 and salaries were organised by the construction companies, with varying practices. This system was changed on 1 February 1943 when Dr. Fritz Schmelter, who was responsible for recruitment of labour power in the OT–central in Berlin, created the so–called Poland–foreign–construction–tariff (*Polen–Ausland–Bautariff*), dated 11 January 1943. It concerned all Polish workers hired by German companies in all occupied Polish territories, with the exception of the GG and the Third Reich. This tariff was the only one of its kind and exclusively applied for Polish nationals. Three other tariffs were issued in January 1943 and applied to all foreigners with the exception of Poles in three different regions. They were Bautariff–Nord (Scandinavia), West (France, Belgium and the Netherlands), and East (Soviet).

The main reasons as to why the Polish tariff differed from other tariffs was the so–called *Sozialausgleichabgabe* (SAA) – a 15% social equalisation tax. Moreover, the tariff differed depending on from which area of Poland the labourer originated. Poles from the incorporated areas that had signed the DVL were exempt from the SAA, and Poles that had not signed the DVL – with the exception of those originating from the

43 RA, OT–Abt. Strassenbau, E. 82, D. III Winterdienstbauten, a.3. Repparfjell, Leistungübersicht der Bauleistungen Mai–Oktober 1943, OBL Alta, Abschnitt – Repparfjord v. 11.11.1943, 1.

44 For more information, please see: Emilia Denkiewicz–Szczepaniak, “Polske tvangsarbeidere på veibygging i Nord–Norge under den andre verdenskrig”, *Årbok for Rana* vol. XXXVII (2004): 59–65.

GG, had to pay the tax. Qualified labourers that had signed the DVL earned 0.80RM per hour, whilst labourers with the same qualifications that had not signed the DVL and the workers from the GG, earned 0.68RM per hour. Assistant workers were paid 0.65R, and 0.56RM per hour. Furthermore, they were (with the exception of Poles having signed the DVL) deprived of all secondary payments and the *Einsatzgeld* (a soldier salary – the equivalent of 1RM per day – given to all married Polish nationals). This entails that their salaries were 30% less of that received by other foreign workers and workers that had signed the DVL.

The Polish tariff, thus, represents a clear categorisation of Poles, meaning that the OT could exploit them to the fullest. The situation for Poles in the GG worsened following the Warsaw uprising when the Soviet army entered the GG. This made it impossible to easily transfer the labourers' money to the GG. The largest German recruitment company in Warsaw, "Breidt und Daub", established an office in the OTs headquarters in Oslo in Kirkegata 15. This company was ordered by the EG Wiking and the OT-central to coordinate the Poles' salaries and to wire them to the Deutsche Bank in Berlin. This meant that every Polish labourer had to travel to Berlin to withdraw their salaries. This was impossible for many Poles, and it is likely that many of them did not receive their salaries during the last months of the war⁴⁵.

The Polish POWs in Norway received salaries based on the OT-tariffs – the equivalent of 0.50RM per day. They received up to 0.90RM per day and 15–27 RM per month. It was possible to wire the salary to family members. The POWs could, due to the 1929 Geneva convention, signed by the Polish government, receive food parcels from the International Red Cross. Their social conditions were, thus, good⁴⁶.

OTs' Polish labourers and POWs were housed as other foreigners, and the Polish tariff states that the labourers received free accommodation. There were two types of wooden barracks: a sturdier option for civilian labourers and temporary solutions for prisoners. The barracks were of varying sizes depending on the surrounding landscape. The smallest barracks, the so-called forest cabins, were 6.5 x 4.8 metres and accommodated 8 workers. A road-barrack was a medium-sized housing option encompassing 8.7 x 3.8 metres, intended to accommodate 12 men. The most used option was a barracks of 33.14 x 8.71 metres, which housed 22 individuals⁴⁷. Cast iron ovens were used for heating. The most important inventory of the barracks was the beds, often wooden bunkbeds, but mostly simple benches. The POWs were housed in tents

45 More information on work conditions, please see: Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, *Polska siła robocza*, 174–187.

46 Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (PIASM), London, A XII 47–74, Prints from reports issued by delegates of the International Red Cross visiting camps for Polish POWs, London, 2–5 December 1944.

47 RA, OT-Abt.Bahn, E. 46, Baracken.

(so-called Swedish and Finnish tents) made from plywood and heated using the same method as in the barracks⁴⁸.

OT-documents provide insight in the diet provided to the workers, which varied depending on the labourer's nationality and year of the war. The diet of a German labourer varied between 3600–3800 calories a day, whilst foreign workers received between 3000–3300 calories daily⁴⁹. The amount of calories was, on average, 500–800 calories more than what was received by labourers who did not do physically demanding labour.

Conclusions

The largest group of civilian Poles affiliated to the OT-EG Wiking were civilians, amounting to an estimated 7100 labourers. Polish POWs amounted to 1711 and constituted a small fraction in comparison to the number of Russian prisoners affiliated to the EG-Wiking.

The analysis of the OT-archive provides a detailed illustration of how Polish nationals were recruited to the EG-Wiking and why this process was complicated. Labourers were recruited from the incorporated areas until 1942 in a systematic and well-organised manner by German construction companies contractually obliged to the OT. The initial recruitment method in which construction companies bore the main responsibility was altered during the spring of 1942, and all labourers originating from the incorporated areas were registered to retain control over eligible employees of the OT. This registration was undertaken by state employment offices (*Landesarbeitsamt*) and the local sub-offices (*Nebenstellen*), which summoned Polish nationals. All employment offices had a special division named OT-*Werbstellen*, which registered labourers and distributed them on construction companies in need of labour power.

The recruitment method used in the GG was more comprehensive as the region was considered occupied territory functioning as a stockpile for cheap labour power. Polish industry had been destroyed by the Germans, Polish corporations had been forced out of the GG, and equipment and machinery were shipped to the Third Reich. The Polish industry was replaced by German companies producing goods needed by the military. The major consequence of this upheaval was increasing rates of unemployment, inter alia in the cities of Warsaw, Łódź, Kraków, Radom and Rzeszów.

Unemployment, poverty and deprivation led many Polish nationals to accept any employment position they were offered. The spring of 1943 saw a large-scale transportation of Poles arranged by the OT-central in co-operation with the government of the

48 For more information please see: Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, *Polska siła robocza*, 190–200.

49 See table no. 41 in: Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, *Polska siła robocza*, 205–206.

GG and local employment offices. The recruited Poles had been convinced that they were to undertake work in Germany and were not aware that they were employed by the OT. Recruitment was also outsourced to larger companies with good results from former recruitment assignments. When the methods could no longer fulfil the labour power needs of the OT, the organisation launched a propaganda campaign in the GG by utilising the *Werbstellen* and issuing advertisements in Polish-language newspapers. The spring of 1944 saw the establishment of OT recruitment offices and information agencies in the GG. Many Poles volunteered to the OT to avoid apprehension for resistance work in the Polish Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*, AK). They intended to escape to Sweden and from there travel to the Polish Army, stationed in England.

The EG-Wiking's increasing demand for labour power led the OT to forcibly recruit labourers without concern for age and qualifications. The coercion became especially visible in May 1944, when Willi Henne issued a decree giving the OT administration full authority over the labourers. This provides an explanation as to why many Poles often were transferred between work locations, for instance between Finland and Norway, or vice versa. All Poles deployed in Finland were transferred to assist the construction of the *Nordlansbanen* during the autumn of 1944. *Nordlansbanen* was the main workplace for Poles, and an estimated 870 civilian labourers and 1281 POWs were affiliated to this project during the summer of 1944. The Poles amounted to the largest nationality, an estimated 50–57% of all foreign workers (with the exception of Norwegians and Germans). Frequent rotations and transferrals of labour power meant that individuals from all Polish territories participated in the construction of the *Nordlansbanen*. The Polish labourers' speciality was wood construction, for example construction of barracks, snowsheds and fences, and wooden constructions for railway viaducts, bridges, etc.

Bibliography

Archival Sources

- Bundesarchiv–Militärarchiv, Freiburg (BA–MA)
- Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Norwegen (RW: 6, 39)
- Armeoberkommando 20 (RH 20–20)

Poland Institute and Sikorski Museum (PIASM), London

- Norwegia – Prints from reports issued by delegates of the International Red Cross in Geneva, visiting camps for Polish POWs, London (A XII 47–74)

Riksarkivet i Oslo (RA)

Organisation Todt–Einsatzgruppe Wiking:

- Abteilung Arbeitseinsatz,
- Abteilung Bahnbau,
- Abteilung Strassenbau,
- Bauleitung der Luftwaffe,
- Arbeitseinsatzkartei (Polakker)
- OT in Norway. Set up and main activities. IFO II 401/44
- Handbook of the Organisation Todt MIRS/MR OT/5/45 London, March 1945, Eske 42
- Mjr Leiv Kreyberg arkiv. Kontoret for eks–krigsfanger, Bodø, E.1–5
- Pakker til firmaer Breidt u.Daub og R.Plihal: IV 110, IV 38, IV 71, IV 110, IV 96, I 24, I 40, I 7 og II 42

Statsarkivet i Trondheim

- NSB, Nordlandsbanens krigshistorie, Ellingsves samling, E. 1–5

Studies

- Andersen, Ingvar. “Krigsfangenskap”. *Årbok for Helgeland XXI* (1990): 85–100.
- Denkiewicz–Szczepaniak, Emilia. *Polska siła robocza w Organizacji Todta w Norwegii i Finlandii w latach 1941–1945*. Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo UG, 2018.
- Denkiewicz–Szczepaniak, Emilia. “Polske tvangsarbeidere på veibygging i Nord–Norge under den andre verdenskrig”. *Årbok for Rana XXXVII* (2004): 59–65.
- Denkiewicz–Szczepaniak, Emilia. “Bygging av polarjernbanen sør for Mo i Rana”. *Årbok for Rana XXXII* (1999): 33–37.
- Gamst, Thorbein. *Finnmark under Hakenkorset: Festung Finnmark*. Arendal: Agdin Forlag, 1984.
- Hryciuk, Grzegorz. *Gazeta Lwowska 1941–1944*. Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, 1996.
- Larsson–Fedde, Torbjørn. *Russiske og polske krigsfanger i Farsund–området 1940–45*. Vanse: Lista museum, 2013.
- Madajczyk, Czesław. *Polityka III Rzeszy w okupowanej Polsce*. T.1. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1970.
- Seidler, Franz Wilhelm. *Die Organisation Todt. Bauen für Staat und Wehrmacht 1938–1945*. Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1987.
- Woźniakowski, Krzysztof. *Polskojęzyczna prasa gazdinowa czasów okupacji hitlerowskiej 1939–1945*. Opole: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scriptorium, 2014.
- Wójcik, Władysława. *Prasa gazdinowa Generalnego Gubernatorstwa (1939–1945)*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Naukowe WSP, 1988.

English version: Mark Atkinson

SUMMARY

Over 8800 Poles (ca. 7100 civilian forced workers and 1711 prisoners of war) were sent to Norway and Finnish Lapland to work for the Organisation Todt – *Einsatzgruppe Wiking* (EW). The first and second sections present the recruitment of the civilian forced labour within Poland and the sites to which they were transferred in Norway and north Finland. Until the spring of 1943, the majority were recruited from the Polish areas included in the *Reich*. The recruitment operated through construction firms with help of German recruitment offices. From spring 1943, recruitment increasingly originated from the *General Gouvernement*, the east part of Poland occupied by Germany. This change coincided with targeted actions to recruit for the EW, and in the autumn the OT started its own recruitment campaigns. The third section presents the number of Polish prisoners of war (POW) which were sent to Norway from Hamburg in April–May 1942. They were divided into three working battalions and spread on various building sites around the country, until 1041 of them were gathered in December 1943 to work on the expansion of the railway line in northern Norway. The fourth section elaborates the kind of building labour, mainly building of fortifications, roads and the north railway in Norway. The final section presents the living and working conditions of the Poles who were discriminated against both in terms of pay and liberties. Discrimination was also applied to the Poles working for EW. In January 1943, the OT adopted a specific *Polen–Ausland–Bautarif*, which sustained discrimination for Polish civilian workers. For Polish POWs norms of social conditions were higher than for Soviet and Yugoslavian POWs.

Polscy cywilni robotnicy przymusowi i jeńcy wojenni w Organizacji Todta – Einsatzgruppe Wiking, 1941–1945

Słowa kluczowe: Organizacja Todta – Norwegia – Finlandia – polska siła robocza – II wojna światowa


STRESZCZENIE

Ponad 8800 Polaków (ca. 7100 cywilnych robotników przymusowych i 1711 jeńców wojennych) zostało wysłanych do Norwegii i północnej Finlandii do robót budowlanych prowadzonych przez Organizację Todta – Grupę Operacyjną Wiking (*Einsatzgruppe Wiking*, EW). W pierwszej i drugiej części przedstawiono system rekrutacji polskich robotników i miejsca, do których byli transportowani na terenie Norwegii i północnej Finlandii. Do wiosny 1943 r. większość rekrutowanych pochodziła z ziem polskich włączonych do III Rzeszy. Rekrutacja prowadzona była przez firmy budowlane z pomocą niemieckich urzędów pracy. Od wiosny 1943 r. rekrutacja coraz częściej odbywała się w Generalnym Gubernatorstwie (*General Gouvernement*), wschodniej części Polski, okupowanej przez Niemcy. Ta zmiana zbiegła się z zaawansowaną akcją rekrutacji na potrzeby EW, stąd jesienią 1943 r. OT wystartowała z własną kampanią rekrutacyjną. Trzecia część prezentuje problemy polskich jeńców wojennych (POW), którzy zostali wysłani z Hamburga do Norwegii w kwietniu–maju 1942 r. Zostali tam podzieleni na trzy bataliony robocze i rozesłani na różne place budowlane na

terenie całej Norwegii, po czym 1041 z nich zostało skierowanych w grudniu 1943 r. do prac w rozbudowie północnej części linii kolejowej w Norwegii. W czwartej części przedstawiono rodzaje prac budowlanych, głównie budowę fortyfikacji, dróg oraz linii kolejowej na północy Norwegii. W ostatniej części opisano warunki życia i pracy Polaków, którzy byli dyskryminowani zarówno pod względem płac, jak i swobód obywatelskich. Dyskryminacja ta była stosowana także wobec Polaków zatrudnionych przez EW. W styczniu 1943 r. OT przyjęła specjalną taryfę budowlaną (*Polen-Ausland-Bautarif*), która podtrzymywała dyskryminację polskich robotników cywilnych. Dla polskich jeńców wojennych stosowano normy warunków socjalnych na wyższym poziomie niż dla sowieckich i jugosłowiańskich.

Citation

Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, Emilia. "Polish civilian forced labourers and prisoners of war in the Organisation Todt – Einsatzgruppe Wiking, 1941–1945". *Studia Maritima* XXXIV (2021): 125–160. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2021.34-06.



Grzegorz Strauchold

Historical Institute
University of Wrocław
grzegorz.strauchold@uwr.edu.pl
ORCID: 0000-0003-2000-8619

The Maritime League. A study of the dissolution of a social institution

Keywords: Maritime League, Polish Western Union, maritime policy; indigenous people (native inhabitants); liquidation of independent social institutions.

Communists, who, owing to the military support of Moscow, took the reins of power in Poland in the summer of 1944, were gradually extending the scope of their authority over the next few years until they took control over nearly all areas of social life in the late 1940s by administrative, military and terrorist means and by rigging parliamentary elections (1947). At the same time, in implementing their policy of integrating the German territories incorporated by Poland in 1945, they were forced to rely on the great ideological achievements and organisational potential of social institutions that were completely alien to their doctrine. The most important of them was the Polish Western Union (*Polski Związek Zachodni*, PZZ). This organisation had been established before 1939 and it had set itself the task of optimally integrating with the Polish state the German territories which had been incorporated into Poland as part of the Treaty of Versailles imposed on Germany as the losing side in World War I. PZZ was closely associated with the right-wing political party, the National Democrats. In their love of their homeland, the National Democrats (or the “Endeks”, as they were called) did not hide their nationalist sentiments, especially their hostile attitude towards the Germans, but also their hatred of Bolshevism and the Soviet Union. After World War II, some members of the National Democratic Party decided to establish cooperation with the communists from the Polish Workers’ Party (*Polska Partia Robotnicza*, PPR) to promote – as they believed – the Polish *raison d’état* beyond ideologies, which was to integrate the Polish state with the German lands granted to Warsaw at the conference of the victorious powers in Potsdam in the summer of

1945. The then leader of PPR, Władysław Gomułka made a decision to use the help of the Endeks, which he considered to be absolutely indispensable¹.

Another social organisation which also dated back to pre-war times was the Maritime League (*Liga Morska*, LM; before 1939, the Maritime and Colonial League). From 1945, the League worked in an ideologically incoherent cooperation with communists towards the goal of familiarising Polish citizens as fully as possible with maritime problems and “re-Polonising” the sea coast – an objective it shared with PZZ. The activities of LM were intertwined with the initiatives of PZZ, as both these organisations cooperated extensively on the Polish sea coast, which for the most part (except for a small belt in the region of the Gulf of Gdańsk) had been incorporated into Poland at the expense of Germany in 1945. As it later turned out, their fates were to be entwined even more strongly at the end of the 1940s when the communists broke up the cooperation and began to administratively liquidate social organisations which they found to be ideologically alien to them. The liquidation was carried out in several stages. First, the organisations were forced to change their ideological character and to accept new leaders, who were submissive to PPR. At the same time, members whose ideological position was inconsistent with that of the party were removed from these institutions. In the next stage, the already defenceless organisations were fused with others. In this way, PPR reduced the number of entities which assembled large social groups not directly associated with the party. As part of these activities, the political authorities came up with the idea of merging PZZ with LM. Because the scenario of incapacitating and then liquidating independent social structures had been planned out for years to come before and was in fact similar for all such organisations, I gave this study a title indicating that the post-war fate of the Maritime League was just one of the several “cases of the dissolution of social institutions”².

In the first instance, the communist party (PPR, and from December 1948 PZPR) decided to put a lid on the Polish Western Union. The authorities pressured and threatened the leaders of PZZ to abandon their national (national-democratic) ideology. The pre-war organisation was absurdly and falsely accused (in an internal document of PZZ from the end of the 1940s) of not having instigated the public before the war to “re-gain” the western lands which Poland had lost to Germany in the long historical process that had spanned several centuries. PZZ, incapacitated in the years 1947–1948, radically changed its goals and methods of work from the beginning of 1949. As the Union

1 See more on this topic in older literature: Grzegorz Strauchold, *Mysł zachodnia i jej realizacja w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1945–1957* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2003). The fate of post-war social initiatives in the 1950s and 1960s was discussed very recently by a Szczecin (Stettin) historian, Adam Makowski. Adam Makowski, *Między iluzją a realiami. Towarzystwo Rozwoju Ziemi Zachodnich w latach 1957–1970* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2019).

2 G. Strauchold, *Mysł*.

evolved in the direction desired by the communists, its programme was becoming more and more a simple reflection of the theses of the then communist propaganda³.

The author of the valuable and still valid monograph on the history of post-war PZZ, Michał Musielak, pointed to another factor which had deepened the crisis of this organisation and had been associated with radical internal changes within the communist party. At that time (1948–1949) the party was increasingly transforming into (replacing?) the state. At the end of 1948 and the beginning of 1949, Władysław Gomułka was removed from power. His successor, Bolesław Bierut, initiated an accelerated transformation of the communist party and the entire state along the lines imposed by Moscow. In the process, PZZ was thoroughly purged. Repressive measures were taken against some of its leaders⁴.

The process of internal pacification in line with the communists' expectations also affected LM, which had so far been independent of the state authorities, had a reserved attitude towards the communists – to say the least – but was still useful to them.

The situation was to be moulded according to the party's plan during the Convention of LM, which had been postponed several times and was finally held on 23–24 February 1947 in the presence of the League's "party guardian" Zenon Kliszko (PPR). The election of the chairpersons of the convention evokes associations with the convents of PZZ: Zenon Kliszko and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm Wacław Barcikowski (prominent members of PZZ) were elected deputies to the Chairman of the Convention, Minister of Labour and Social Welfare Kazimierz Rusinek from the Polish Socialist Party (*Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*, PPS). The opening address was delivered by the then President of the General Board of LM, Lt. Col. Stanisław Kiryłuk (PPR), and one of the speeches was given by an honorary member of LM Eng. Eugeniusz Kwiatkowski, who was then the Government's Delegate for Coastal Affairs (later, the organisers were reproached for having invited Kwiatkowski to the meeting). His speech revolved around the thesis that the possession and skilful use of a sea coast leads to increasing the importance and prosperity of a state and the standard of living of its citizens.

The convention was stormy; the delegates clashed over the General Board's report (which mentioned some financial "deficiencies and flaws") and over statements regarding the freedom of speech in the discussion (or a lack thereof). Despite the

3 A classic example of this is the letter of 12 September 1949 by the secretary of the Wrocław district of PZZ, Mirosław Filipowicz, addressed to the General Board of PZZ. In discussing "[t]he tasks of PZZ at the new stage of its development", the author mentioned "mobilising society to fight for peace and against Anglo-Saxon imperialism; highlighting the role of the Soviet Union in regaining the Western Territories; the campaign to raise awareness of the transformations in West and East Germany; the execution of the economic plan as a response to imperialists; [and] the issue of national defence." Cf.: Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. [State Archives in Poznań, Polish Western Union, ref. no.], 617, 1.

4 Cf.: Musielak Michał, *Polski Związek Zachodni 1944–1950* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1986), 164–167.

disagreements, the General Board was given a vote of approval. The organisation's new statute was also approved, and new leaders of the League were appointed. The executive committee of the General Council was to be presided over by Rear Admiral Adam Mohuczy. Kazimierz Petruszewicz (from March 1947, Deputy Minister of Shipping) was appointed Vice-President. Among the members of the Council, there were people with firmly established positions in the highest circles of state and party authorities: Waław Barcikowski, Zenon Kliszko, Józef Dubiel, and former President of LM Stanisław Kiryluk.

At the end of the session of the League's first post-war convention, the following resolution was adopted by acclamation:

The First General Convention of the Maritime League in the Reborn, Democratic Homeland (...) declares that the regaining of the ancient Piast lands and the 500-kilometer-long sea coast is a great accomplishment of the Polish Democratic Camp. We believe that the inviolability of our borders on the Oder, the Neisse and the Baltic Sea is a fundamental condition of our independence and sovereignty. We solemnly declare that the Maritime League will work with full enthusiasm and dedication towards educating our nation in the spirit of love of the sea and the understanding that it is only the Democratic Camp that can defend and develop our coast (...).

The League's new Board was elected at the convention. Stanisław Kiryluk had to give up the President's seat. According to a later report of the Office for Mass Organisations at the Mass Organisations Department of the Central Committee of PPR, he felt bitter about it and did not want to participate any more in the initiatives of LM. This led to an organisational crisis in the League, which, to make matters worse, suffered "insurmountable difficulties" resulting from the lack of adequate funds. Of note, the Central Committee's report emphasised that, at that time, a political struggle was going on within this organisation between PPR and PPS. Representatives of the socialist party, who, according to Jerzy Bogusz from the Mass Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of PPR, considered themselves to be "the main hosts of the LEAGUE" were viewed as causing "great difficulties" to the communists. Moreover, the Central Committee of PPR believed that the majority of the delegates to the convention were elements hostile to communists or members who had only recently joined PPS. Despite this, PPR managed to take control of several departments of the League following the meeting.

The convention welcomed with appreciation the decision to establish the Committee for the Construction of the House of the Maritime League. Naturally, the House was to be built in Warsaw, since "The capital, which concentrates centres of state, political, cultural, social and economic administration must also be home to the administrative centre of the League, the pioneer of maritime thought".

The struggle for influence which was taking place during the convention was, seemingly, not reflected in the statute, Article 2 of which provided that "The Maritime League is a social-democratic organisation of higher public interest, whose aim is to encourage the largest possible masses of Polish citizens to work at sea and for the sea". Nonetheless, the transformations which were occurring at that time were signalled in the League's framework programme for the years 1947–1948. It said, among others, that the emphasis had been shifted towards economic matters (the three-year plan), and that "the romantic approach had been replaced with a realistic approach". Thus, there was a departure from the previous main objective (with "imperial overtones"), which was to unite society in the effort to consolidate Polish rule at sea. These provisions were supposed to set out a different course of work for LM and affect its goals.

Despite the communists' success, several years after the so-called unification with PZZ, President of the General Board of the Maritime League General Mieczysław Wągrowski still talked about "elements" who obstructed the process of giving the League an appropriate ideological identity. At the national conference of LM held on 10 May 1953, he remonstrated that during the pre-unification period (before LM was merged with PZZ), there had been people among the League's authorities who were not only "strangers", but also held "thoroughly reactionary views". As evidence, he mentioned the fact of the "Sanation activist" E. Kwiatkowski having been invited to the convention of 1947.

Also, just after the convention, the leaders of PPR still perceived the current situation as undesirable. A newsletter of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee (issued in March 1947) addressed to the secretaries of the provincial committees of PPR stated that there were "small opposition groups" within LM "which hid themselves behind the mask of 'the maritime idea' understood in isolation from reality and the politics of the People's Republic of Poland". Jerzy Bogusz made a list of local leaders who had attended the convention of the Presidents of the District Boards of LM held on 9 March 1947. His list (and the epithets he used to refer to those participants) now looks almost like a line from a comedy sketch (but it did not at that time). The convention was described as a gathering of "populars [members of the Polish People's Party] (Nowak – Katowice, Dębski – Wrocław), Pilsudskite mafia (Szwedowski – Warsaw), Endeks (Otto Uhlik – Kielce), and others who are difficult to classify, but can all be referred to as, more or less, masked enemies". They were purportedly supported at the convention by PPS, which, otherwise, had so far been PPR's closest ally. The situation was even worse – according to the communist analyst – in other social organisations, such as PZZ.

Therefore, a plan was developed to suppress the impact of these institutions on the League. The plan was all the more necessary given that – according to party activists – the report of the General Board of LM, which was received by the Central Committee

of the Polish Workers' Party on 10 April 1947, confirmed that the "ideological and political direction outlined [in 1946] by [its] General Board" had a weak influence on the League's members. It was therefore planned for "a certain number of Party members" to join LM (by individual enrolment). Then, if necessary, the communists were to sign up to the League collectively. In this way, the influence of PPR on LM was to increase along with the growing number of communists in the League's local organisations. The plan was implemented at a truly revolutionary pace. For example, in the Silesia–Dąbrowa Voivodeship "a hundred thousand [?] of the working mass" joined the Maritime League. The communists did not manage to fully bring off the same feat in Bydgoszcz and Szczecin.

Despite all these plans and actions, the General Board of the Maritime League complained in its report for the year 1947 that the local boards had not pulled rank-and-file members "into the orbit of genuine [!] political, economic and maritime work and the problems facing the nation". Also in the work agenda for 1948, the authors complained that in the previous years there had been no "thorough ideological work which would instill in the member masses [!] the ideas of democratic people's Poland"⁵.

The events which followed occurred at an ever faster pace, in keeping with the communists' expectations. The communists achieved the envisioned breakthrough at the meeting of the Supreme Council of the Maritime League held on 9 May 1948. It was during that meeting that the League formulated ideological and political principles that satisfied the communists, cutting itself off from its organisational tradition dating back to pre-war times. In doing so, it followed in the footsteps of PZZ, which had taken a similar step during a convention held on 7–8 December 1947. A new executive committee of the General Board of LM was also established at that meeting. The post of President was given to a member of PPS (and then PZPR) Józef Salcewicz (deputy Minister of Industry and Trade), and the posts of Vice-Presidents were offered to Jan Nowak and Col. (sometimes referred to as a Lieutenant Colonel) Tadeusz Koral. Jerzy Bogusz, a senior PPR official, became Deputy to the Secretary General. It is he who supervised the process of unifying PZZ and LM over the next several months.

At that time, the pre-war activity of LM was evaluated as having been compliant with the ideas of Sanation, whose maritime policy – according to Jerzy Bogusz (one

5 Cf.: Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 2 [Archives of New Records, Maritime League, ref. no. 2], 238–248, – text of the resolution, 247; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 2, 312–313; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Komitet Centralny Polskiej Partii Robotniczej [Archives of New Records, Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party], sygn. 295/X-9, 8–9; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 2, 373; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 66, 1; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Komitet Centralny Polskiej Partii Robotniczej, sygn. 295/VII-59, 114; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Komitet Centralny Polskiej Partii Robotniczej, sygn. 295/X-4, 1–5; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Komitet Centralny Polskiej Partii Robotniczej, sygn. 295/X-16, 48; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Komitet Centralny Polskiej Partii Robotniczej, sygn. 295/X-16, 5; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Komitet Centralny Polskiej Partii Robotniczej, sygn. 295/X-16, 69.

of the leaders of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of PPR) was “false and detrimental to Poland’s development at sea”. In this connection, a plenary session of the General Board of the Maritime League was organised in Wrocław to discuss the issue of increasing vigilance towards “bourgeois elements of all kinds, who were still to be found among [LM’s] authorities or who were exponents of reactionary ideology”. The timing for this task was all the more perfect since it had been concluded at the very same plenum that the League, though not affiliated with any party, was not apolitical after all. Moreover, the basic principle of the League’s activity was to be “revolutionary struggle and work under the leadership of the working class”.

It is therefore not surprising that in the face of the so-called unification of workers’ parties, the League, which welcomed this fact with satisfaction, defined itself in line with Marxist methodology as “an organisation of the broad working masses”. There was no room for unreliable “elements” in it, which is why the newsletter announcing the General Convention of Delegates in 1949, emphasised that new Board members and delegates to the convention should come from among “activists of LM, working people, labourers, smallholders, shock workers, politically and socially aware individuals (...)”. In that period, the League’s vulgarised agenda could, in principle, be applied to any area of activity of the socialist realist state. It was enough to replace the word “maritime” with any other epithet, such as “mountain”, “river”, and so on and so forth. An example of a slogan that was created following this simple formula was “The shock worker realises the maritime programme”. In this case, the six-year maritime plan. The activity of LM was naturally still under close scrutiny. This is evidenced by the fact that party meetings were organised for members of the PZPR representing the provincial authorities of the League.

On 26 May 1949, a general assembly of delegates from the Warsaw and Capital District of the Maritime League was held. This time the meeting was overseen by a board that was more palatable to PZPR. Stefan Ajnenkiel, who had been poorly assessed by the communists, had resigned as President on 20 October 1948. In the resolution adopted at the assembly, the delegates supported the establishment of socialism in Poland⁶.

6 Cf.: Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 3, 20; Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 637, 149; Jerzy Bogusz, “Przedwojenna rola Ligi Morskiej i Kolonialnej”, *Strażnica Zachodnia*, 5–6 (1948): 273; Archiwum miasta Stołecznego Warszawy, Zarząd Okręgowy Warszawski i Stołeczny Ligi Morskiej, sygn. [Archives of the Capital City of Warsaw, Warsaw and Capital District Board of the Maritime League, ref. no.] 6, 42; Archiwum miasta Stołecznego Warszawy, Zarząd Okręgowy Warszawski i Stołeczny Ligi Morskiej, sygn. 2, 36–39a; Archiwum miasta Stołecznego Warszawy, Zarząd Okręgowy Warszawski i Stołeczny Ligi Morskiej, sygn. 2, 36–39a; Archiwum miasta Stołecznego Warszawy, Zarząd Okręgowy Warszawski i Stołeczny Ligi Morskiej, sygn. 2, 36–39a; Archiwum miasta Stołecznego Warszawy, Zarząd Okręgowy Warszawski i Stołeczny Ligi Morskiej, sygn. 2, 10–12a; Archiwum miasta Stołecznego Warszawy, Zarząd Okręgowy

The “sorting out” of affairs in the Polish Western Union and the Maritime League proceeded side by side with the preparation of the members of these organisations to unite in one organisation. *De facto*, the unification meant the liquidation of PZZ and a cessation of its re-Polonisation activities. As pointed out by Michał Musielak in his monograph on PZZ, the idea of the merger arose in mid-1948 in the circles of the Main Committee for the Coordination of Social Organisations, a body which was in charge of controlling and guiding social organisations in accordance with the vision of the centre of the political power in Poland.

Shortly before the unification, at the end of 1947, Czesław Pilichowski, summed up the three years of PZZ’s post-war work, saying that “Contrary to some opinions, PZZ is not a transitional organisation, but quite the opposite – a very much needed and indispensable one”.

On 20 May 1948, a meeting of the executive committee of the Supreme Council and the General Board of PZZ took place, which was attended, among others, by Waclaw Barcikowski, Chairman of the Supreme Council, Józef Dubiel, President of the General Board, and Czesław Pilichowski, Secretary General. The participants in the meeting agreed that the greatest danger was posed by the “restoration of German revisionism by Anglo-Saxon imperialism” the aim of which was to call into question Poland’s rights to the Western and Northern Territories. In order to make society aware of this danger in a more effective way, a resolution was passed which “extended” the cooperation of PZZ with LM. The document adopted at that time stated that “Based on the position expressed by many centres of the Polish Western Union, the Executive Committee of the Supreme Council and the General Board of the Polish Western Union recommend that all organisational units establish close cooperation with the fraternal organisation which is working on deepening people’s knowledge and love of the Polish sea – the Maritime League, and above all, to discuss forms of closer cooperation between the two organisations”. At the same time, the executive committee of the General Board of PZZ was authorised to conduct “detailed talks” about this cooperation.

On 24 October of the same year, seeing that the time was ripe, the authorities entrusted Czesław Pilichowski with preparing a special memorandum raising the issue of binding the two organisations with even closer ties. The draft of the memorandum was approved by the executive committee of the General Board of PZZ on 2 October

Warszawski i Stołeczny Ligi Morskiej, sygn. 2/X-9, 20–21; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 54, 126. A good example of the aforementioned “breakthrough” in the League’s ideology was the letter of 29 November 1948 by the President of the Lower Silesia District of the Maritime League, B. Kupczyński. He wrote, among others, that “The Maritime League, as an organisation which cooperates in the implementation of our maritime plan (...), cannot remain indifferent to the changes that have been taking place in our social life. The Maritime League, in close association with the Soviet Union and the countries of people’s democracy, sees in the socialisation of our country and our economic and social life, a guarantee for the consolidation and proper development of our coast as a hinterland, and our western borders.” Cf. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 52, 26.

1948. Without considering the differences in the goals and activities of the two organisations and their specific character, the committee concluded that both re-Polonisation and maritime affairs were part of the general programme of the democratic camp, and that these tasks should not be executed separately by two different organisations. Work on the merger of the two associations was mentioned explicitly in the report on the activities of the Social and Political Department of PZZ for the period from 1 May to 31 October 1949.

The events took place as planned – at the meeting of the executive committee of the Supreme Council and the plenum of the General Board of PZZ held on 23 August 1949 in Warsaw [!] (while the organisation had been based in Poznań since pre-war times), a resolution was passed unanimously to merge PZZ with LM. The fusion was deemed all the more legitimate as it was based on a “serious and multidimensional convergence” between the two organisations. Moreover, it was emphasised – and indicated as the most important reason for the unification – that “the historical task of populating, developing, and restoring the Polishness of the Western and Coastal Territories along the Baltic Sea coast, the Oder and the Lusatian Neisse” had supposedly been accomplished. The adjective “coastal” was increasingly used side by side with the name “Western Territories”. However, the idea was not new. In the interwar period, the term “western and coastal borderland” had been used by Mikołaj Rudnicki, a western activist, researcher at the University of Poznań. In 1948–1949, the term “Recovered Territories” was more and more often replaced with the name “Western Territories”. Increasingly, the inhabitants of these areas were referred to as Poles, without mentioning their division into regional groups. The phrase “indigenous inhabitant” also fell out of official use. Earlier, in 1947, on the request of the editors of *Przegląd Zachodni* (Western Review), Rudnicki initiated a discussion on finding a different, more appropriate name. He himself opted for the term “native”.

The integration of the Western and Northern Territories with the rest of Poland was considered to have been completed, and further activities in this area were to be organically connected with the activities of the unified and homogeneous state. Since the basic premises for viewing western (and coastal) affairs had been outlined, it was time to state the fact that PZZ and LM had so far shown “serious and multidimensional convergence” in their activities. In view of the above, the General Board of PZZ authorised its executive committee to start talks with the General Board of LM on “merging the two organisations into one social organisation that would mobilise Polish society around matters associated with establishing our border on the Oder, the Lusatian Neisse and along the Baltic Sea coast, and in particular, the issues of comprehensive use and development of the sea and the coast and strengthening the country’s defences at sea through cooperation with the Navy, which is the guardian of the peaceful work of the coast and the state”. The above text could have been (and probably

was) written following a “hint” given to the General Board of PZZ by the leadership of PZPR (an emanation of the “unification” of the workers’ movement in Poland). It clearly reflected the Cold War rhetoric cloaked in the disguise of struggle (and work) for peace. At the same time, a plan was made at the aforementioned meeting of 23 August 1949 to convene an Extraordinary General Assembly of PZZ Delegates on 29 October 1949. Also here – similarly as in the case of the Maritime League – a suggestion was made as to which delegates should be voted for. They had to come from the right social background and show the right type of political engagement. A lecture entitled “The issue of the unification of PZZ and LM” was to be delivered at local assemblies of PZZ convened to elect delegates. The fusion was one of the issues to be addressed in the resolutions of the General Assembly. It was during this meeting that a statement was to be made that PZZ had completed its fundamental tasks and that there were good reasons for it to continue working alongside LM, as part of a unified organisation, “for the good of People’s Poland headed towards socialism, for the good of an economically strong Poland with strong defences on the Oder, the Lusatian Neisse and the Baltic Sea”. Ultimately, however, the idea of organising the General Assembly was abandoned. Instead, a joint unification meeting was to be held for PZZ and LM members⁷.

On 29 August, a few days after the meeting of 23 August, at the plenary session of the Central Commission for the Coordination of Social Organisations, views were presented which corresponded with the unification that was already underway in PZZ and the Maritime League. In general, it was pointed out that social energy, put into an organisational framework, should be fully concentrated around the most important force – the United Workers’ Party. From then on, social organisations were to officially “participate in building the foundations of socialism in Poland”.

This was an announcement of not only the completion of the enforced unification of social organisations, but also the liquidation (unification) of the organisations that deviated from the adopted political direction. A confirmation of this claim can be found

⁷ Cf.: Andrzej Zaćmiński, *Działalność zagraniczna Towarzystwa Rozwoju Ziem Zachodnich w latach 1957–1970* (Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Bydgoszczy, 1995), 22; Musielak, *Polski*, 109–110; Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 593, 87; “Z działalności Rady Naczelnej i Zarządu Głównego P. Z. Z.”, *Strażnica Zachodnia* 5–6 (1948): 263; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych [Archives of New Records, Ministry of Recovered Territories], sygn. 82, 10; “Rezolucja Głównej Komisji Koordynacyjnej Organizacji społecznych uchwalona na Plenum Komisji dn. 29 sierpnia br.”, *Strażnica Zachodnia* 7–9 (1949); an untitled report without a reference number from a council meeting held on 23 August 1949 dated to 24 August, kindly made available to me by Maria Rutowska from the Institute for Western Affairs, 39–40; Ośrodek Badań Naukowych Olsztyn, Zbiory Specjalne, sygn. [Centre for Scientific Research in Olsztyn, Special Collections, ref. no. R–58, 223–224, 226; Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 935, 39; Norbert Kołomejczyk, “Polski Związek Zachodni (Okręg Śląski) w latach 1945–1950”, *Studia i Materiały z Dziejów Śląska* 6 (1964), 353. For information on the nomenclature used by M. Rudnicki see: Bernard Piotrowski, *O Polskę na Odrę i Bałtykiem. Myśl zachodnia i badania niemcoznawcze Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego (1919–1939)* (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1987), 119.

in a report by the communist Mieczysław Wągrowski, preserved in the archives of the Central Committee of PPR. This text, which had also been published in the periodical *Polska Zachodnia* (Western Poland), left no doubt as to the intentions of the central authorities: “Nonpartisanship does not mean apoliticality”. This slogan signified (or portended) the end of any organised activity unyoked to the chariot of goals set by the establishment. The merger (and incapacitation) of the two organisations was justified in a breakneck manner, though one that was consistent with the “logic” of the events, by Jerzy Bogusz, Secretary General of the Central Commission for the Coordination of Social Organisations, who saw it as part of the “unification” of the Polish workers’ movement. Bogusz, by the way, had been – at least in 1947 – a senior official of the mass propaganda division of PPR, and in the autumn of 1949, he became a member of the supreme authorities of both PZZ and LM.

The above events were – as already mentioned – connected with the shaping of the ideology and personnel of PZZ to the communists’ liking. In that period (1948–1949), PZZ was seen in a negative light by the ruling party’s leadership. As pointed out by Andrzej Zaćmiński, what spoke against the Union was not only its national democratic lineage, but also the fact that it assembled in its ranks a large number of members of parties of the former political opposition which were being liquidated (or “democratised”) in that period. Likewise, the establishment of the German Democratic Republic in place of the Soviet occupation zone, which resulted in a re-evaluation of the general perception of the German issue, could not remain without influence on the communists’ views regarding the legitimacy of the further existence of PZZ. Zaćmiński stated that the planned (and established) unified organisation called the Maritime League was a copy of Soviet “Dosflot”⁸.

PZZ and LM were initially to be united at a special convention in Szczecin on 30–31 October 1949. Later, the date was postponed twice: to the first quarter of 1950, and then to 2–3 April 1950. In October 1949, local commissions for the unification of PZZ and LM were established at different tiers of organisational structure⁹.

Many members and activists of the Union were not delighted with the prospect of the merger. The former could protest, though to little avail, at local extraordinary assemblies of PZZ, which, as a side note, followed a very diverse and (from today’s

8 Cf.: “Organizacje społeczne – współuczestnikami budowy podstaw socjalizmu w Polsce”, *Polska Zachodnia* 36 (11 Nov 1949); Archiwum Akt Nowych, Komitet Centralny Polskiej Partii Robotniczej, sygn. 295/X-83 [no pagination]; Mieczysław Wągrowski, “Organizacje społeczne w Polsce Ludowej”, *Polska Zachodnia* 33 (22 Aug 1948); Jerzy Bogusz, “W obliczu zjednoczenia ruchu robotniczego”, *Polska Zachodnia* 48 (5 Dec 1948); Zaćmiński, *Działalność*, 22.

9 Contrary to the information given in *Polska Zachodnia*, Norbert Kołomejczyk wrote that, initially, the unification convention was to take place in the first days of December 1949. Cf.: Norbert Kołomejczyk, “Krajowa Narada Polskiego Związku Zachodniego i Ligi Morskiej”, *Polska Zachodnia* 41 (16 Oct 1949); Kołomejczyk, “Polski Związek”, 353.

perspective) quasi humorous course. For example, at the convention of the Warsaw district, after L. Gluck's introductory lecture on the planned unification of PZZ and LM, the first of the debaters (an employee of the Ministry of Treasury) declared that the lecture had been so exhaustive that no debate was needed. In Olsztyn, on the other hand, the anxious delegates demanded that work be continued and care be provided for the so-called indigenous people. It has to be remembered that the complexity and seriousness of the affairs of the native population was particularly great in that region. It seems that the assurances that the upcoming transformations did not mean that PZZ would be liquidated and its achievements thwarted did not entirely convince the participants of the meeting¹⁰. Naturally, the resolutions adopted at local conventions signified the grass roots' trust in the Union's leadership, which strikingly resembled the workings of communist democratic centralism. Numerous articles justifying the merger were published to "soften" the doubters, in a special section of *Polska Zachodnia* under the heading "Facing the unification of PZZ and LM".

On 11 September 1949, the executive committee of the General Council and the plenum of the General Board of LM authorised the executive committee of the General Board of LM to convene a general assembly of delegates in the autumn, in which a motion was to be put forward for the League to be fused with PZZ "in order to continue their programmed work aimed at mobilising public opinion and social material resources to participate as broadly and actively as possible in the implementation of the maritime economic plans of the People's Republic of Poland, increasing the country's defences and the security of our sea border, and the border on the rivers Oder and Lusatian Neisse, which is inextricably linked with it [the sea border] and is the border of peace"¹¹.

Another element of the pre-unification "campaign" was a special joint meeting of the activists of the two organisations. In preparing this National Meeting of PZZ and LM, a number of preliminary steps were undertaken by both organisations. On 16 September 1949, a conference with the participation of representatives of the organisations' authorities, such as Pilichowski (PZZ) and Szubert (LM), was held to discuss, among others, the draft of the statute of the future unified organisation. Several suggestions for the name of the new structure were made at that conference: the Polish Maritime Union, the Sea and River League, and the Naval League. On 16–18 September 1949, a statutory and regulatory commission, composed of representatives of the two organisations, worked on the draft statute. They prepared a document which said that the seat of the united organisation was to be established in Warsaw. The name of the new association still remained an open question, though. Later the draft was amended,

10 Cf.: Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 118, 118, 121–124; Ośrodek Badań Naukowych Olsztyn, Zbiory Specjalne, sygn. R-57, 152–153.

11 Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 940, 216.

possibly by Stefan Matuszewski (deputy of a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of PZPR at that time), whom the preserved documents mention as the addressee of the revised version of the regulations delivered on 27 September by Pilichowski. Interestingly, at that time, Matuszewski was also President of the General Board of the Soldier's Friends Society (League) (*Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Żołnierza*, TPŻ) (in the years 1945–1953). This was noteworthy since in 1953, in another movement to liquidate social organisations, the post-unification Maritime League became part of TPŻ.

In the surviving draft of the statute – probably a version discussed at the National Meeting – a proposal was made to give the unified organisation the name “Maritime League”, “a democratic, non-party organisation, which (...) mobilises society to work and expend effort towards developing the maritime economy and establishing a close cooperation with the People's Navy, the guardians of the sea border and peace”. No reference, however, was made, in the discussion on the goals and means of action, to the goals and ideology of PZZ, which had major repercussions at the October meeting of PZZ and LM activists¹².

Activists of PZZ and LM met at the National Meeting on 9 October 1949. This assembly merits some attention, not only because it was probably the last such clear demonstration of independence, and also Western ideology, on the part of experts on the subject, but also because it brought significant ideological re-evaluations.

At the presidential table were present: Chairman of the Supreme Council of PZZ and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm Waclaw Barcikowski, President of the General Board of LM Admiral Adam Mohuczy, member of the Supreme Council of PZZ and the General Board of LM Jerzy Bogusz (a universal activist, so to speak), Secretary General of PZZ Czesław Pilichowski, Secretary General of LM Edward Szubert, and member of the General Board of PZZ Karol Przesmycki. The list of guests invited to the conference by PZZ included the name of the guru of pre-war and post-war Western thought, professor Zygmunt Wojciechowski, who, however, did not make it to the meeting. His absence was recorded as excused.

Already in the speech opening the session, W. Barcikowski, in addition to the criticism of the “fairly serious political mistakes” committed in the past by PZZ and LM, indicated the determinants of the international confrontation of ideologies, which provided grounds for the centralisation of social organisations. The unification was viewed as all the more justified as the Western and Northern Territories were considered to have been properly developed and populated and to be integrally engaged – at that stage – in the process of building socialism in Poland. J. Bogusz took the argument

12 Cf.: Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 940, 232–234; Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 940, 235–237, 259–260; Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 940, 218–219.

even further without beating about the diplomatic bush. He recalled that the resolutions of both General Boards on the unification had already been passed. Thus, the current conference was simply a working convention, preparing the execution of what had already been decided. An emblematic example of the hypocrisy and cynicism of the political decision-makers of that time was Bogusz's view of the legitimacy of liquidating the Ministry of Recovered Territories. He argued that "The resolution on the liquidation of the Ministry of Recovered Territories is a clear and telling proof that our entire state has recognised that there are no (...) Recovered Territories, there is one Poland". He added that the problem of indigenous people that still existed there "will find an appropriate solution". The communists used this "occasion" to make a clear announcement that other organisations would take over from PZZ all the matters associated with German affairs to eliminate the Union's monopoly, which was harmful at that stage. This was an evident negation of the legitimacy of the existence of the Polish Western Union. The Maritime League was also seriously criticised for various things: for invoking its pre-war traditions and achievements, and for "making the sea the focal issue" while ignoring the importance of the fact that power in Poland had been "taken over by the people". This last fact was presented as the most important cause of Polish post-war achievements on the coast.

So explicitly expressed, the communists' *credo* regarding the further pursuit of the Western policy provoked verbal resistance, which was probably most fully articulated by Rev. Col. Weryński, a representative of Cracow PZZ. He bluntly pointed out that what was in the pipeline was not a unification but a liquidation of PZZ. This followed clearly from the draft statute of the new, united organisation, a draft that belied the official pre-unification propaganda which had promised to maintain the role of social factors in the work in and on the Western and Northern Territories. The successive speakers coming from PZZ circles, voiced their doubt as to naming the new organisation Maritime League. A similar view was also expressed by L. Gluck, who stated that such an old-new name could only deepen the fears of liquidation in PZZ circles. Franciszek Rataj from Mrągowo spoke in even more dramatic words. In what he said, he aired the views of a large group of Western activists who recognised the danger of effective re-Polonisation work among the so-called indigenous people being brought to a standstill. He said point-blank: "the name Maritime League is not appropriate for where we are based, in Masuria. We don't mind the merger, but we want to come together" [and not get liquidated]. He added: "this new statute, which I received at the last minute in the room [!], does not say a word about our native population". There were more critical responses. They form a long sequence of comments in the preserved archival records. The apprehension about the name Maritime League was even supported by a representative of the "old" League, Col. Stanisław Kiryłuk, who pointed

to the bad response the proposed name (imposed by the draft statute) provoked from members of PZZ.

In the course of the discussion, it was becoming more and more clear that the doubts did not focus on the issue of unification which had already been sealed, but on the name of the new organisation and the problems of the native population. Doubts about the reunification itself in the then situation could only be voiced as verbal protest. The delegates were clearly given to understand they had no say in this regard by a member of the Supreme Council of the Maritime League, Stanisław Herok (PZPR) from Katowice. He said that the new organisation should be shaped in such a way as “the supreme authorities want us to”. As he himself was the supreme authority in the Maritime League, he probably had in mind the party leaders of the state¹³.

Referring to the issues of the native population, Secretary General of the Maritime League E. Szubert defined the place of this group of Polish residents in society. They were not only supposed to be beneficiaries of rights and privileges (which was a peculiar description of the re-Polonisation activities), but also Poles, integrated with the rest of the country’s inhabitants, who had to take a conscious and active part in building socialism. This sort of *fait accompli* strategy (verging on cretinism) was complemented by J. Bogusz’s summary of the discussion. He did not see the need for only one social organisation to take care of the indigenous people. Not even the one established as a result of the unification. The matter of native inhabitants was to be treated normally and taken care of by various offices and organisations, just as in the case of the remaining citizens of the state. All the more so that, as stated by Lt. Tadeusz Koral, a member of the supreme authorities of LM, after five post-war years “the special issue of providing care to indigenous people” no longer existed. Opinions of this sort only confirmed the suspicions of old Western activists as to the intentions of the party-and-state authorities with regard to the tradition and activities of PZZ¹⁴.

The name of the future organisation stirred up strong emotions during the meeting. The subject of the discussion – as mentioned above – was the name “Maritime League”. Some alternative names, such as the Polish Maritime League and the Polish Maritime Union were proposed. Let me add that, ultimately, none of these proposals – which were to be considered at a later time – was adopted, and the organisation established in 1950 adopted the name “Maritime League”.

In fact, the wording of the name referred to something far more important: to what extent the future organisation would focus on maritime issues, and to what extent it would continue the work previously done by PZZ. These concerns could be felt in a speech made by Secretary General of PZZ Czesław Pilichowski. He pointed out that

13 Cf.: Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 940, 26–28; Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 940, 29, 41–43, 46, 53; 61; 74–75; 87; 56.

14 Cf.: Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 940, 95, 127, 110.

the Poznań headquarters of the Union had been receiving letters from the locals alerting the organisation to the risk of the issue of re-Polonisation of the native population being forgotten in the unified organisation. In a meandering speech, in which he tried to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds, Pilichowski in fact slipped in a word which expressed a deep fear that what Poland had achieved so far among the so-called indigenous people would go to waste¹⁵.

Symptomatic for the direction in which PZZ was heading is the list of topics drawn up in the Wrocław district of PZZ to be discussed at the October National Meeting. This document reflects the realities of the time so faithfully that I am going to quote it almost in its entirety. It enumerates "(...) topics that should be discussed at the meeting: I. Critical evaluation of the activity of PZZ in the years 1944–1949: (a) nationalist tendencies in PZZ, (b) petty-bourgeois influences in PZZ (composition of the Boards at lower organisational levels, defence of interests of private merchants), (c) unclear attitude to the cooperation with Political Parties at lower organisational levels, (d) the burden of pre-war ideology, troubles with the crystallisation of the new PZZ ideology, (e) weak ties with the working class and peasants. II. Achievements of PZZ in the period 1944–1949: (a) settlement and development of the Western Territories, (b) campaign for re-emigration from Germany, (c) PZZ as a social factor during verification, (d) provision of assistance and legal care to the native population, (e) re-Polonisation campaign: removal of traces of Germanness, retrieval of traces of Polishness in Recovered Territories, (f) educational campaign: re-Polonisation courses, social homes, etc. III. Tasks of PZZ at the new stage of development: (a) to change the internal situation: to end the verification action, to end the settlement action, (b) to promote a unified educational action by handing it over to the Trade Unions. Accordingly, no task to accomplish in this area of activity, (c) the issue of the native population as a nationwide issue, and not just a matter of one social organisation, (d) to shift the focus to the defence of the western border, (e) to mobilise society to fight for peace and against Anglo-Saxon imperialism, (f) to emphasise the role of the Soviet Union in regaining the Western Territories, (g) to campaign for raising awareness of the changes in West and East Germany, (h) to implement the economic plan as a response to imperialists, (i) the issue of the country's defences"¹⁶.

The National Meeting ended with the adoption of a resolution read out by Pilichowski. The text sounded like a summary of a sentence of an impromptu court against both organisations in their current form and against the initiatives they had been involved in. A hatchet job was done on the pre-war pursuits of PZZ and LM. They were criticised for continuing to make old mistakes in the renewed post-war structures.

15 Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 940, 115–120.

16 Cf.: Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 617, 1.

In statements reminiscent of the ritual self-criticism practised in PZPR, it was pointed out that PZZ had wrongly isolated the native population from the realities of Polish political life. This trend was finally broken at the convention of this organisation held in December 1947. The Maritime League, on the other hand, was reproved for its “romantic attitude towards the sea” and “cloudy phraseology [used to talk about] the maritime idea”. They were seen as tendencies detached from the country’s realities. This wrong, in turn, was exposed and stopped at the meeting of the General Council held on 9 May 1948. In the text of the resolution, there materialised the darkest fears of the “misguided” Western activists. This was evidenced by the words that “PZZ has performed the basic tasks that justified its reactivation after the war. The lands on the Oder, along the Baltic coast and on the Lusatian Neisse have been populated and developed. The Polish population native to these lands is working, on an equal footing with the rest of society, having joined the collective effort of building the foundations of socialism”. At the same time, the goals of the unified organisation were outlined. They included social campaigning for the execution of economic plans “in the maritime sector”, close cooperation with the navy, combating colonialism, and popularisation of maritime affairs in order to increase the number of personnel working at sea and in the maritime sector. There was no shortage of criticism of “imperialist warmongers” and warm words towards the “new, democratic Germany”¹⁷.

Contrary to earlier plans, seeing that the state of preparations was insufficient, the boards of the two organisations decided to postpone the unification convention to 4 and 5 December 1949. They did not stay on schedule this time either. The next proposed dates were February or the beginning of March 1950. Ultimately, a decision was taken in March that the convention would be held in April. The National Convention for the Unification of PZZ and LM was held on 2–3 April 1950 in Szczecin. Convened in order to implement the decisions already made, and not to discuss them, the meeting had served its purpose. This is hardly surprising since the vast majority of the Maritime League’s delegates to the convention were members of PZPR and/or the Union of Polish Youth (*Związek Młodzieży Polskiej*, ZMP). Out of thirty three delegates from the Warsaw and Capital District, one was a member of the Democratic Party (*Stronnictwo Demokratyczne*, SD), which was a puppet of the ruling party (PZPR), and eight were described as non-party delegates.

On 2 April, two separate conventions (PZZ and LM) took place, during which decisions about unification were made. General Mieczysław Wągrowski became President of the General Board of the new structure called the Maritime League. Czesław Pilichowski was elected Secretary General. Out of nine members of the plenum of the General Board of LM, only three came from PZZ. Similarly, 18 out of the remaining 56

17 Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 940, 131–138.

members of the General Board came from PZZ. It should be noted, however, that this statistic is misleading if one wants to treat it as a criterion for having specific political views and a specific attitude to the Polish reality of that time. In other words, previous membership in PZZ did not guarantee that a given member of the General Board of the Maritime League was a staunch supporter of the Western idea in its traditional, classical form, and not a declared Marxist.

In the unification documents, there resurfaced the issue of the native population, but, this time, only as a confirmation of the fact of its “inclusion in the mainstream of the political, economic and cultural life of the People’s Republic of Poland”. While lambasting Anglo-Saxon imperialism and West German revisionism, the delegates warmly welcomed the German Democratic Republic, recognising its establishment as a “historical breakthrough” in Polish-German relations. The unification resolution summarised the programme of the new organisation in the following words: “increasing the potential of the maritime economy” and “popularisation of the heroic traditions of the Polish People’s Army and cooperation with it, especially with the Navy in order to strengthen the country’s defences and mobilise social forces to fight for peace”.

The decisions of the convention *de facto* meant a liquidation of the Union and its incorporation in the Maritime League. Actually, even *de jure*, the unification was an absorption. On 18 January 1951, the executive committee of the Provincial National Council in Poznań sent a letter to the General Board of LM, informing it that (as of 13 January 1951) PZZ had been removed from the register of associations. The decision was based on the fact that, in accordance with the resolutions of the Szczecin convention, PZZ “merged with the Maritime League and became part of it [!] along with its assets and liabilities”. It is hard to find a clearer legal commentary on what has been done.

A commentary on the so-called “unification” published in *Przegląd Zachodni* said that PZZ “as an organisation of a social nature whose work programme is mainly related to anti-German political activity, does not in today’s conditions have an analogous rationale for its work”. Thus, “the merger is a logical consequence of the development of international political relations and of the development of social relations in the country”.

The decision to liquidate PZZ was made by high-ranking party officials. As Andrzej Zaćmiński wrote, the Central Committee of PZPR for Social Organisations indicated the following reasons for this move: “– an incorrect principle of reactivating PZZ as an equivalent of the organisation which existed before 1939, – the tasks performed [by PZZ] do not correspond with the needs and socio-political plan that exists in the democratic system”¹⁸.

18 Cf.: Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 7, 25; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 7 [no pagination]; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 3, 1–43, 52–55; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 3, [no pagination]; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 4, 1–52, 60–104;

Two internal documents of the Maritime League, drawn up after the Szczecin convention, demonstrate how this organisation's old mode of operation and goals were confronted with the practices imposed on it by the communist party. More specifically, after the convention, a decision was made to convene district councils of "the League's activists". The aim of these meetings was to critically evaluate previous activities of PZZ and LM and to plan projects aimed at popularising water sports and implementing the tasks of "defending the country, especially at sea". At the other pole, there were rapidly growing problems (never fully resolved before) in the areas inhabited by the native population. This was especially conspicuous in the former East Prussia. Local members of PZZ who were indigenous to that territory did not want to accept new forms of work, demanding that the existing policy be maintained¹⁹.

As part of the unification policy, which was becoming more and more widespread, in 1950, the authorities liquidated the Baltic Institute, which was one of the last two research and development institutions existing in the 1940s that were not part of the general education system. The liquidation was – as Tomczak put it – a consequence of accepting the thesis that the existing scientific societies were unable to undertake new challenges. It was justified by the reorganisation of science and the establishment of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Some departments of the Baltic Institute were transferred to the Maritime Institute of Technology. And the latter was eventually transformed into the Maritime Institute. The department of Pomeranian studies was to be taken over by the Institute for Western Affairs. However, this plan was only minimally implemented²⁰.

While still on the topic of maritime affairs, I would like to add that in 1953 the complex process of transformation (liquidation) of the institution whose roots reached back to Polish Western Union and the Maritime League, both of which had been reactivated at the end of the war, came to an end. Let me recall that the former was absorbed by the latter on 2 April 1950 during the so-called Unification Convention. After the convention, the leadership of LM focused on removing from the organisation all "alien and hostile elements" that had penetrated into it "under the guise of professionalism". This

Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni, sygn. 940, 208; Roman Łyczywek, "Zjazd połączeniowy LM i PZZ. Pięćlecie odzyskania Szczecina", *Przegląd Zachodni* 5–6 (1950), 507; Andrzej Zaćmiński, "Stanowisko Towarzystwa Rozwoju Ziem Zachodnich wobec problemu niemieckiego w latach 1957–1970." PhD diss. (Poznań: UAM, 1992), 38–39.

19 Cf.: Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 153, 5–6; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 153; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 153, 84.

20 Cf.: Maria Tomczak, "Polska myśl zachodnia", in: *Polacy wobec Niemców. Z dziejów kultury politycznej Polski 1945–1989*, ed. Anna Wolff-Powęska (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1993), 177; Andrzej Bukowski, "Instytut Bałtycki. Jego przeszłość i obecne zadania," *Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego* XII (1964): 2; Andrzej Bukowski, "Instytut Bałtycki", *Rocznik Ziem Zachodnich i Północnych* z 1965 (1965): 244; Edmund Męclewski, *Powrót Polski nad Odrę, Nysę Łużycką, Bałtyk. Szkice* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1971), 564.

meant a hunt for remnants of independent thought, or members of the former LM and PZZ “burdened” with the problems of the past. The real and ideologically desirable nature of LM was reflected in the instructions for the organisation of “Days of the Sea” to be held in 1951. The newsletter announcing the event emphasised several times that it was absolutely necessary to saturate it with political content and that the organisers were obliged to ensure that the ceremony was “politically correct”.

The “unified” LM did not survive long. A meeting of the members of the General Boards of the Maritime League, the Aviation League (*Liga Lotnicza*, LL) and the Soldier’s Friends Society (League) was called for 19 April 1953. Among the guests invited to the assembly were representatives of the Polish Army, state authorities and mass organisations. The goal was to unite these three institutions into one organisation “in accordance with the will of the vast majority of members of LPŻ, LL and LM”. It was probably a coincidence that this convention was held in the Central Club of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society (*Towarzystwo Przyjaźni Polsko-Radzieckiej*) in Warsaw. The preserved documentation does not even have a semblance of representative internal democracy. The documents say explicitly that the members of local boards of the fused organisation were to be appointed after consultation with the local authorities of PZPR²¹. The new, unified organisation operated under the name Soldier’s Friends League. By the way, it is worth paying attention to an interesting trend that had been growing since the late 1940s – the “industrialisation” (the demands of the 6-year plan) and then militarisation (the increasing danger of a “hot” war between the East and the West) of forms of organisational activity of Polish society.

Bibliography

Sources

- Archiwum Akt Nowych Warszawa, Komitet Centralny Polskiej Partii Robotniczej [Archives of New Records in Warsaw, Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party].
- Archiwum Akt Nowych Warszawa, Liga Morska [Archives of New Records in Warsaw, Maritime League].
- Archiwum Akt Nowych Warszawa, Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych [Archives of New Records in Warsaw, Ministry of Recovered Territories].

21 Cf.: Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 65, 21–24; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 66, 1–5; Archiwum Akt Nowych, Liga Morska, sygn. 52, 100.

Archiwum miasta Stołecznego Warszawy, Zarząd Okręgowy Warszawski i Stołeczny Ligi Morskiej [Archives of the Capital City of Warsaw, Warsaw and Capital District Board of the Maritime League].

Archiwum Państwowe Poznań, Polski Związek Zachodni [State Archives in Poznań, Polish Western Union].

Ośrodek Badań Naukowych Olsztyn [Centre for Scientific Research in Olsztyn].

Periodicals

Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego

Polska Zachodnia

Przegląd Zachodni

Rocznik Ziem Zachodnich i Północnych z 1965

Strażnica Zachodnia

References

Bogusz, Jerzy. “Przedwojenna rola Ligi Morskiej i Kolonialnej”. *Strażnica Zachodnia* 5–6 (1948).

Bogusz, Jerzy. “W obliczu zjednoczenia ruchu robotniczego”. *Polska Zachodnia* 48 (5 Dec 1948).

Bukowski, Andrzej. “Instytut Bałtycki. Jego przeszłość i obecne zadania”. *Komunikaty Instytutu Bałtyckiego* XII (1964).

Bukowski, Andrzej. “Instytut Bałtycki”, *Rocznik Ziem Zachodnich i Północnych* (1965).

Kołomejczyk, Norbert. “Krajowa Narada Polskiego Związku Zachodniego i Ligi Morskiej”. *Polska Zachodnia* 41 (16 Oct 1949).

Kołomejczyk, Norbert. “Polski Związek Zachodni (Okręg Śląski) w latach 1945–1950”. *Studia i Materiały z Dziejów Śląska* 6 (1964).

Łaborewicz, Ivo. “Działalność Ligi Morskiej w Jeleniej Górze w latach 1945–1950”. In: *Między Legnicą a Jelenią Górą. Prace dedykowane Stanisławowi Firsztowi w 40-lecie pracy w muzealnictwie i 65. urodziny*, ed. Ivo Łaborewicz, Marek Szajda, 261–279. Jelenia Góra: Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Jeleniej Góry, Archiwum Państwowe we Wrocławiu Oddział w Jeleniej Górze [State Archives in Wrocław, Branch in Jelenia Góra], 2020.

Łyczywek, Roman. “Zjazd połączeniowy LM i PZZ. Pięciolecie odzyskania Szczecina”. *Przegląd Zachodni* 5–6 (1950).

Makowski, Adam. *Między iluzją a realiami. Towarzystwo Rozwoju Ziem Zachodnich w latach 1957–1970*. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2019.

- Męclewski, Edmund. *Powrót Polski nad Odrę, Nysę Łużycką, Bałtyk. Szkice*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1971.
- Musielak, Michał, *Polski Związek Zachodni 1944–1950*. Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1986.
- “Organizacje społeczne – współuczestnikiem budowy podstaw socjalizmu w Polsce”. *Polska Zachodnia* 36 (11 Nov 1949).
- Piotrowski, Bernard. *O Polskę na Odrę i Bałtykiem. Myśl zachodnia i badania niemcoznawcze Uniwersytetu Poznańskiego (1919–1939)*. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1987.
- “Rezolucja Głównej Komisji Koordynacyjnej Organizacji społecznych uchwalona na Plenum Komisji dn. 29 sierpnia br.”. *Strażnica Zachodnia* 7–9 (1949).
- Tomczak, Maria. “Polska myśl zachodnia”. In: *Polacy wobec Niemców. Z dziejów kultury politycznej Polski 1945–1989*, ed. Anna Wolff-Powęska. Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1993.
- Strauchold, Grzegorz. *Myśl zachodnia i jej realizacja w Polsce Ludowej w latach 1945–1957*. Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2003.
- Wągrowski, Mieczysław. “Organizacje społeczne w Polsce Ludowej”. *Polska Zachodnia* 33 (22 Aug 1948).
- Zacmiński, Andrzej. *Działalność zagraniczna Towarzystwa Rozwoju Ziem Zachodnich w latach 1957–1970*. Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uczelniane Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej w Bydgoszczy, 1995.
- Zacmiński, Andrzej. “Stanowisko Towarzystwa Rozwoju Ziem Zachodnich wobec problemu niemieckiego w latach 1957–1970”. PhD Dissertation, Poznań: UAM, 1992).
- “Z działalności Rady Naczelnej i Zarządu Głównego P. Z. Z”. *Strażnica Zachodnia* 5–6 (1948).

SUMMARY:

The article analyses the tactics and the strategy communists from the Polish Workers' Party (and from the end of 1948 – the Polish United Workers' Party) used to incapacitate and then liquidate social organisations dating back to the pre-war period. These structures had different formal and ideological positions in the political reality of the Second Polish Republic. An important role in promoting the so-called western borderlands, which at that time included Greater Poland, the Polish part of Pomerania and the Polish part of Upper Silesia, was played by the Polish Western Union which was close to nationalist national democracy. Another important interwar institution was the Maritime and Colonial League, which was associated with the then establishment. These institutions, which had been gradually revived since 1944, were formally independent, but under the pressure of communists, who wanted to take over power in Poland, they were being peopled by individuals who were ready to serve the communist Polish Workers' Party. After the end of the war, PZZ focused on the so-called Recovered Territories. LM (now without the word “Colonial” in its name), on the other hand,

concentrated on the issues associated with the 500 km stretch of the Polish sea coast and the problems related to the Polish merchant fleet.

The Maritime League, which was reluctant to implement communist ideals and practices, had been, from the moment of its revival, infiltrated from within by representatives of branches of the new political power in Poland. The communists did collaborate with the League (and also with PZZ) in the first post-war years, but the cooperation on their part was short-lived and pragmatic, and so the Maritime League was doomed to dissolution after PZPR took full power over Poland.

Liga Morska. Studium rozbicia instytucji społecznej

Słowa kluczowe: Liga morska, Polski Związek zachodni, polityka morska; autochtoni (ludność rodzima); likwidacja niezależnych instytucji społecznych

STRESZCZENIE

Treść artykułu wypełnia analiza taktyki, a w efekcie strategii, komunistów z Polskiej Partii Robotniczej (od końca 1948 r. Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej) stosowanej dla ubezwłasnowolnienia, a następnie likwidacji organizacji społecznych o przedwojennym rodowodzie. Były to struktury o różnym usadowieniu formalnym i ideowym w realiach politycznych II Rzeczypospolitej. Ważną rolę w propagowaniu problematyki tzw. kresów zachodnich, do których zaliczano wówczas Wielkopolskę, polską część Pomorza i polską część Górnego Śląska odgrywał – bliski nacjonalistycznej narodowej demokracji – Polski Związek Zachodni. W okresie międzywojennym funkcjonowała, powiązana z ówczesnym establishmentem, Liga Morska i Kolonialna. Instytucje te, odradzające się stopniowo od 1944 r., w warunkach parcia komunistów do przejścia władzy w Polsce, z pozoru (formalnie) były niezależne, aczkolwiek już od początku nasycane ludźmi dyspozycyjnymi wobec komunistycznej PPR. PZZ koncentrował się od końca wojny na problematyce Ziemi Odzyskanych. LM (już bez słowa “Kolonialna”) skupiała się na zagadnieniach ponad 500 km wybrzeża morskiego i tematyce polskiej floty handlowej. Liga Morska, daleka od implementacji ideałów i praktyki komunizmu, podlegała zatem od momentu swego odrodzenia praktyce infiltrowania od wewnątrz przez ekspozytury nowej władzy politycznej w Polsce. Aczkolwiek komuniści z nią (także i z PZZ-etem) współpracowali. Współpraca ta z ich strony w pierwszych latach powojennych miała li tylko aktualny, pragmatyczny charakter. Nie mogła zatem Liga Morska ostać się po objęciu przez PZPR pełnej władzy w Polsce.

Citation

Strauchold, Grzegorz. “The Maritime League. A study of the dissolution of a social institution”. *Studia Maritima* XXXIV (2021): 161–183. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2021.34-07.



Krzysztof Kubiak

Jan Kochanowski University of Kielce

k.kubiak@ujk.edu.pl

ORCID: 0000-0002-9623-923X

East Timor 1974–1975. End of Portuguese rule

Keywords: East Timor, Portugal, decolonisation, Indonesia, invasion

A historical outline of Portuguese rule

The Portuguese first set sail on the waters of the Lesser Sunda Islands in the early 16th century. They were searching for a sea route to China and for new areas from which to obtain commercially attractive products, mainly spices, but also sandalwood. In 1522, the last of the ships of Magellan's expedition around the world arrived at the coast of Timor. The Portuguese had for decades contented themselves with occasional trade with the islanders, having neither reasons nor the resources to establish permanent bases there. The situation changed as rivalry grew between Portugal and the Netherlands. Still, the antagonists did not engage directly in Timor, supporting – as they did in the entire region – local allies, or using local mercenary troops. At the regional level, the confrontation ended victoriously for the Dutch, and the eastern part of Timor remained Portugal's only possession in the archipelago area of the so-called East Indies. As a result, the island got divided into two spheres of influence: the Dutch one in the west of the island and the Portuguese one in its eastern part. The border between the Portuguese and the Dutch parts of Timor was initially established in 1859 on the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon, and the disputes regarding the

exact location of the border were settled in 1916 by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague¹. It was then that the Portuguese colony took its final shape².

Timor was located in the far periphery of the Portuguese empire. The metropolis invested very little there, while exploiting the island and its inhabitants in a ruthless and brutal way. At the beginning of the 20th century, a continuous financial crisis prompted Lisbon to try to increase the profits from the colonies. The tax increase in 1911 led to an uprising in Timor called the Munufahi Uprising (from the name of one of Timor's districts, which was home to Dom Bonaventura, the leader of the uprising) or the Great Rebellion. The rebellion was suppressed using locally enlisted troops, an infantry company transferred from Mozambique, and the gunboat "Patria" sent from Macau³.

Table 1. Distances from Dili to the metropolis and other Portuguese overseas territories [nautical miles]

Distance from Dili to:				
Lisbon	around Africa	through the Suez Canal	through the Panama Canal	around Cape Horn
	13,500	9800	14,200	15,300
Macau	2700			
Goa	4200			
Beira	6100			
Luanda	9100			
Bissau	11,700			

Source: data compiled by the author, based on Google Earth Pro and Google Maps.

- 1 Cf. Geoffrey C. Gunn, *Historical Dictionary of East Timor* (Lanham – Toronto – Plymouth: The Scarecrow Press, 2001), xxi–xxiv; Geoffrey C. Gunn, *History of Timor* (Macau: University of Macau, 1999), accessed 13.03.2018, http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/History_of_Timor.pdf.
- 2 Portuguese Timor occupied the eastern part of the island of Timor lying in the archipelago of the Lesser Sunda Islands (the entire island has a surface area of 30,800 km² and is 470 km long and about 80 km wide at its widest part). The island is bordered by the Savu Sea and the Banda Sea in the north and the Timor Sea in the south. The island is the last major landmass between Indonesia and Australia (the south coast of the island lies approximately 700 km away from Darwin). The territory under Portuguese rule covered 15,007 km², of which an area of 814 km² was occupied by the enclave of Oecusse on the northern (Dutch, and later Indonesian) coast (located 60 km from the Portuguese mainland). Portugal also owned the island of Atauro (27 km north of Dili, 105 km²). The highest peak in the east is Foho Ramelau (2,963 m above sea level). The climate is humid subtropical. Precipitation is not high (500–1000 mm per year) as it is controlled by monsoon circulation. The dry period lasts from May to November. The temperatures range between 20–33 °C in the dry season to 29–35 °C in the wet season. The economy used to be based on the export of coffee and precious wood. In 1948, the population was 420,000 (including 1,247 Europeans, mostly Portuguese, 3,592 Chinese, 146 Muslims and 660 people of mixed origin). Muslims and the Chinese, who controlled the wholesale market and also partially the retail market, were resented by the local community. Smaller towns included Liquica, Baucau, Manatuto, Lospalosam Viqueque, Same, Ainara and Sulau.
- 3 Monika Schlicher, *Portugal in Osttimor. Eine kritische Untersuchung zur portugiesischen Kolonialgeschichte in Osttimor 1850 bis 1912* (Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 1996), 114–116; Teresa Bernardino, "Timor e a soberania portuguesa do descobrimento à revolta de 1912", *Revista Nação e Defesa* 9 (1984), 31: 74–85, access: 19.07.2021, <http://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/2793/1/NeD31TeresaBernardino.pdf>.

Portuguese Timor did not play any role in World War I. In the 1930s, the Portuguese territory, together with the Dutch East Indies, became of special interest to Japan, which was looking for new directions of expansion. Ultimately, despite the fact that Portugal remained neutral, the Japanese army invaded and occupied East Timor, which had previously been entered by the Allied Forces⁴. Portuguese institutions were reduced to the role of purely façade organisations. It was only after their military defeat that the Japanese began handing power back to the Portuguese administration on 15 August 1945⁵. The first post-war assessments showed the extent of the losses the “neutral” Portuguese territory suffered during the war. Estimates made by the local administration showed that out of the pre-war population of around 450,000, about 40,000 islanders died as a result of direct action of the occupying forces, devastating forced labour (mainly in road construction), and starvation caused by food requisitioning. One should add to that about 60 Chinese murdered by the invaders and a further 200 dead (before the war, the Chinese community numbered about 2,000 people)⁶. The war ruined the plantation economy, which, prior to 1941, had been developing largely owing to Japanese capital. Due to the fact that in the first post-war years it was practically impossible to collect taxes in cash, successive governors resorted to forced labour to rebuild the most important elements of the infrastructure, such as the main roads. Tribal chiefs “settled accounts” with the state by providing manpower.

From the end of World War II to the Carnation Revolution

After Japan’s capitulation in 1945, Portugal regained control of East Timor. Governed by a governor general (usually an active-duty army officer with the rank of captain-lieutenant colonel) nominated by the Portuguese Prime Minister at the request of the Minister of Colonies (overseas territories). He was assisted by the Governing Council, which *ex officio* included the commander of the armed forces and the chairman of the Legislative Council. The latter body consisted of three nominated members (including the governor) and seven members (four Europeans and three locals) elected in a complicated procedure that was more of a nomination than an election. Timor was divided into 13 administrative areas (counties) and a total of 47 districts (communities).

4 The military issues are discussed in detail in: Michael Leach, *Nation-Building and National Identity in Timor-Leste* (Abington: Routledge, 2017), 43–51; Bernard Callinan, *Independent Company: The Australian Army in Portuguese Timor 1941–43* (London: William Heinemann, 1953). The geopolitical and geostrategic circumstances and the meanders of Portugal’s policy towards Japan are discussed in: David Martelo, *A Imprevidência Estratégica de Salazar – Timor (1941) – Angola (1961)* (Lisboa: Edições Sílabo, 2015). On the other hand, the Portuguese emotional narrative about the occupation of Timor is well represented by Carlos Cal Brandão’s memoirs, *Funo. Guerra em Timor* (Porto: Edicoes “Acu”, 1946).

5 Morito Morishima, *Pearl Harbor Lisboa Tóquio* (Lisboa: Ad Litteram, D.L., 2017), 152–157.

6 Robert Lee, “Crisis in a Backwater. 1941 in Portuguese Timor”, *Lusotopie* 7 (2000): 163–164.

61 administrative offices were maintained (a central one in Dili and 60 in counties and communities). The offices also served as local police stations, which were manned by 10 to 25 local policemen led by a Portuguese non-commissioned officer or officer. The level of education was very low. It was not until 1952 that the first secondary school was opened on the island. Compulsory education was introduced in 1958. Until 1962, the entire educational system (with the exception of Chinese elementary schools) was under the aegis of the Church (57 elementary schools and two minor seminaries offering further education in Macau). In 1974, the illiteracy rate was 90%. During the 1974 census, 229,000 of the island's inhabitants declared themselves Catholic. The health-care system was practically non-existent. In 1950, the island had four physicians and one dentist, who worked chiefly for the European community. Life expectancy was under 40 years, and the infant mortality rate was 40%⁷. Economic development was slow since the economy was based on extensive farming and there was a chronic lack of investment. In 1964, the island's airport was modernised. It was fitted with a concrete runway which could be used by aircraft of the Boeing 707 type. The seaport in Dili was also expanded (the investment was completed in 1966, the quay could accommodate ships up to 100 m in length). Still, the road network was in a deplorable condition, as the Portuguese were unable to maintain it in the difficult Timorese climate. They tried to shift most of the effort on to the locals who did compulsory work. Just as in the pre-war period, the dominant role in the island's economy was played by the Agriculture, Homeland and Work Company (*Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho Lda.*, SAPT⁸).

The military forces in Timor were under the authority of the Independent Territorial Command of Timor (*Comando Territorial Independente de Timor*) in Dili. In 1974, the Command controlled four rifle companies, a communications company, a cavalry squadron (with 10–12 armoured cars), and a field artillery battery reinforced with two platoons of paratroopers. The navy and the air force had liaison groups on the island. In the 1970s, a ship from the metropolis came to Timor once every three months (the route was served by the ships "India" and "Timor" belonging to the state-owned shipping company *Companhia Colonial de Navegação* (CCN⁹), and once a month the

7 Geoffrey Gunn, *History of Timor* (Macau: University of Macau 1999), accessed: 13.03.2018, http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/History_of_Timor.pdf, 136.

8 Forty percent of the company's shares belonged to the state (Japanese shares taken over after the war), 8 percent belonged to Banco Nacional Ultramarino (BNU), and the remaining 52 percent to the da Silva family (the descendants of the company's founder, former governor José Celestino da Silva). *History of Timor*, accessed: 03.08.2020, https://cesa.rc.iseg.ulisboa.pt/History_of_Timor.pdf, 11–12.

9 The company was launched in 1918 through the partial nationalisation of a shipping company established in 1881 as a joint stock company. This move was made to strengthen state control over transport between the metropolis and the Portuguese overseas territories. The company became known during World War II, when it took advantage of the neutrality of the country under whose flag its ships sailed to provide transport services on routes from South America, the Caribbean and the United States to Lisbon. Both vessels were passenger/cargo motor ships built between 1950 and 1951 by

island was visited by a ship from Singapore. In addition, freighters called at the port of Dili to collect coffee and sisal. The Air Transport Service of Timor (*Serviço de Transportes Aéreos de Timor*), which came under the Governor's authority, had two planes: de Havilland Dove and de Havilland Heron. They were scheduled to fly to Darwin, Australia¹⁰.

Despite the fundamental change in the balance of power in the region after World War II, Portugal's sovereignty over East Timor was not threatened. Indonesia, which gained independence after a long war (1945–1949)¹¹ was not interested in escalating the tensions in its relations with Portugal. The efforts of Indonesia's first President, Sukarno, focused on consolidating the country and attempting to seize West Irian (the western part of New Guinea which was still in the hands of the Dutch)¹², Brunei, and areas located in the north of Borneo which were part of Malaysia (Sarawak and Lebuwan, Sabah)¹³.

After World War II, the Portuguese in Timor faced large-scale protests against the colonial administration only once. In May 1958, peasants in the Viqueque area revolted as a result of underground activities initiated by local lower-ranking officials. This was mainly a demonstration against the forced labour system. The rebellion was suppressed by the local garrison and tribal militias mobilised in other parts of Timor.

the British shipyard W. Bertram & Sons Ltd of Sunderland. Gross capacity 7,655, load capacity 4,223 tons, 390 passenger seats. Length 131.6 m, width 17.98 m, draught 7.8, two Richardsons, Westgarth & Co Ltd diesel engines 5,000 hp, speed 15 knots. The vessels had been ordered under the Merchant Navy Reconstruction Plan (*Plano de Renovação da Marinha de Comércio*) adopted in 1945, which aimed at the purchase of 70 new vessels within 10 years.

- 10 Madureira de Carvalho, Luís, *O Dispositivo do Exército Português no Império Ultramarino, durante o período Republicano (1910–1975)* (Lisboa: Academia Militar, 2017), 30.
- 11 The issue of the Indonesian War of Independence is not discussed in the Polish literature of the subject at all. Natalia Laskowska, in a synthetic history of Indonesia published in 2012, mentions these four years of struggle in a single paragraph. Cf. Natalia Laskowska, *Indonezja* (Warszawa: Trio, 2021), 72. In international literature, the most extensive treatment of the war, including descriptions of the course of the military operations, is that by Joseph H. Daves. Unfortunately, his work is burdened with an emotional approach and is lacking in writing and editing. Joseph H. Daves, *The Indonesian Army from Revolusi to Reformasi, vol. 1–3* (n.p.: published by the author: 2013–2014). The general course of the political and military events of that period is described by: Jan Gelman Taylor, *Indonesia: Peoples and History* (Yale: Yale University Press, 2003); John E. Jessup, *A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945–1985* (New York: ABC Clio, 1989); Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- 12 Cf. Arent Lijphart, *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Wies Platje, “Dutch Sigint and the Conflict with Indonesia 1950–62”, *Intelligence and National Security* 1 (2001), 16: 285–312, DOI:10.1080/714002840; Nicholas Tarling, *Britain and the West New Guinea Dispute, 1949–1962* (New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008).
- 13 Cf. Harold James, Denis Sheil-Small, *The Undeclared War: The Story of the Indonesian Confrontation 1962–1966* (Totowa: N.J. Rowman & Littlefield, 1971); Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain, the United States and the Creation of Malaysia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Davis Easter, *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960–1966* (London, Cambridge University Press, 2004).

The volunteers were rewarded by receiving a permission to loot the “wayward” villages. In addition, eighty paratroopers were flown from Lisbon via Beirut, Karachi, Goa, and Colombo in Ceylon to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, which were under Australian administration¹⁴. The soldiers were transported over a route of approximately 16,200 km by two C-54 planes. This took four days. During the rebellion and the pacification operations, the region of Uato-Lari was ravaged. Villages were burned down, herds were slaughtered, crops were destroyed, and people fled into the forest. One hundred and fifty to one hundred and seventy (according to other publications as many as fifteen hundred) rebels and individuals suspected of supporting the rebellion were killed¹⁵. The suppression of the Viqueque rebellion was a special combination of “the old and the new” in the colonial history of Portugal. What was old about the Portuguese strategy was that they took advantage of regional antagonisms and used tribal militia, with relatively little involvement of the colonial forces (though almost half of the garrison stationed on the island was involved in the direct action). The new element was the transfer of paratroopers by airplanes. This operation, although costly, made the Portuguese believe that they were able to respond effectively to threats appearing unexpectedly at various places in the empire. In the following years, the internal situation in Timor was stable. A change, and a fundamental one, was brought about only by the Carnation Revolution.

East Timor after the Carnation Revolution

After the rebellion of 1959, Portugal initiated an education reform in Timor. Its goal was to create a local elite associated with Lisbon. This naturally, though completely contrary to Lisbon’s intentions, stirred some political fervour, with the small class of rather superficially educated Timorese starting to show some activity in politics. They were inspired by the wars which flared up in the Portuguese colonies in Africa. However, the first political party was not formed until 11 May 1974, three weeks after the coup in Lisbon. It was the Timorese Democratic Union (*Uniao Democratica Timorense*, UDT). Led by Francisco Lopes da Cruz and Augusto da Costa Mousinho, Timorese MPs in Lisbon elected in 1972 as representatives of Caetano’s People’s National Action (*Acção Nacional Popular*), the party advocated for Timor to maintain ties with Portugal. The Union was supported by the majority of senior officials, landowners and wealthy Chinese merchants. As a response, the independent-minded employees

14 The archipelago is located almost halfway between Sri Lanka and Australia (2,600 km from Ceylon and 2,200 km from Australia). The nearest landmass is Indonesian Sumatra, 1,100 km). Timor is located 2,900 km from the Cocos Islands.

15 João Luís Gonçalves, *A Revolta de 1959 em Timor Leste* (Lisboa: Letras e Coisas, 2018), 98–102.

of mid-level administration, who believed in the slogans of social revolution, established, on 20 May, the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (*Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente*, FRETILIN¹⁶). Unlike UDT, which established itself mainly in the capital, FRETILIN started building local party structures. Under the leadership of Jose Ramos-Hort, the Front organised the first strike of public workers in Timor's history. The strikers obtained a fifty percent increase in salaries. Later on, the leadership was taken over by Francisco Xavier do Amaral and Nicolau dos Reis Lobato. On 27 May, the Timorese Popular Democratic Association (*Associação Popular Democrática Timorese*, APODETI) was established. In slightly simplified terms, it gathered supporters of integration with Indonesia, including groups of refugees who had escaped from Portuguese Timor after the 1959 rebellion and influential representatives of the Muslim minority. An important part in this movement was played by Guilherme Gonçalves. In the border zone, a prominent role was played by the Association of Timorese Heroes (*Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain*, KOTA), also known as Sons of the Mountain Warriors, which grew out of tribal resentment. It was led by Jose Martins, who had left APODETI. A much less influential political group was the cosy Labour Party (*Partido Trabalhista*), while the Democratic Association for the Integration of East Timor into Australia (*Associação Democrática para a Integração de Timor-Leste na Austrália*, ADITLA), which showed no true interest in the said integration, had marginal political power. Initially, UDT and FRETILIN acted jointly under an agreement concluded on 21 January 1975¹⁷.

The administration was headed by the Governor General, Colonel Fernando Alves Aldeia (an officer of the older generation, born in 1925, who was considered to be a supporter of the overthrown regime). Although the decree of the National Salvation Junta, established after the Carnation Revolution, dismissed all the governors, Timor was far away and there was no one there to enforce the revolutionary decrees flowing in from Lisbon. And so, the colonel acted undisturbed as a “midwife of political life” in Timor, and resigned his office only on the 15 July, after being urged several times by the metropolis. He was succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel Níveo José Ramos Herdade, former head of the military force in Timor, who was not appointed as Governor, but as Acting Governor. Initially, when General António Sebastião Ribeiro de Spínola was President of the Republic, he hoped to maintain some form of ties with part of Portugal's overseas territories, including East Timor. However, when the General was pushed to the sidelines and ultimately resigned his office, Portugal set course for fast decolonisation¹⁸. It was then that the new Governor of Timor, Colonel Mário Lemos Pires was

16 Initially known as the Timorese Social Democratic Union (*Associação Social-Democrata Timorese*).

17 *History of Timor*, accessed: 03.08.2020, https://cesa.rc.iseg.ulisboa.pt/History_of_Timor.pdf.

18 The Portuguese retreated very quickly from Guinea (Bissau), Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Civil wars broke out in Angola and Mozambique even as the evacuation of

appointed. His priority was to accelerate the process of “Portugal’s withdrawal” from Timor.

However, things got complicated quickly. Indonesia, which had previously pursued a restrained policy towards the Portuguese part of the island, decided to join the conflict. The motives that guided General Suharto, who had wielded full power over Indonesia since 1967, were quite complex. In addition to territorial expansionism, he was spurred on by a great fear that the People’s Republic of China would gain a strong position in Timor. It has to be remembered that when he had seized control over the state in 1965–1967, Suharto had dealt bloodily with the Communist Party of Indonesia and the Chinese minority which had been considered the communists’ ally¹⁹. Fears about the increase in Chinese influence²⁰ were also voiced by Australia and the United States. East Timor not only found itself at the centre of the regional conflict, but also became part of the global Cold War rivalry, a fact which local activists probably failed to fully realise. The latter (global) dimension was gaining importance in the context of the withdrawal of the United States from the Republic of Vietnam. In Washington, the supporters of the “domino theory” and other simplified models of geopolitics were once again making themselves known. They insisted that the probable collapse of Vietnam and communists gaining a foothold in East Timor were both elements of a single grand communist plan²¹. Indeed, after President Richard Nixon had resigned in the wake of the Watergate scandal, the Republican administration of his successor Gerald Ford was weak (both politically and intellectually) and did not resist ceding the Timorese case to Indonesia²².

In such circumstances, the Indonesian propaganda machine began to disavow both UDT, which it referred to as “fascist” due to the support the party gave to the solutions forced through by General Spínola, and FRETILIN, which it described as a communist movement. The latter party did indeed refer to the writings of the leftist Guinean guerrilla leader Amílcar Cabral, but what was much more dangerous from Indonesia’s point of view was the fact that it had achieved measurable success in building local

metropolitan troops was taking place.

- 19 These issues are discussed in detail in: Łukasz Bończol, *Zrozumieć Indonezję. Nowy Ład generała Suharto* (Warszawa: Dialog, 2012).
- 20 The complexity of the Australian approach to Timor is perfectly reflected in the collection of published documents: Wendy Way, Damien Browne, Vivianne Johnon, eds. *Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976* (Canberra: The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Melbourne University Press, 2000).
- 21 Brad Simpson, “‘Illegally and Beautifully’: The United States, the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974–76”, *Cold War History* 5 (August 2005), 3: 281–315.
- 22 Moisés Silva Fernandes, “A Preponderância dos Factores Exógenos na Rejeição do Plano Português de Descolonização para Timor-Leste, 1974–1975”, *Negócios Estrangeiros*, 10 (Fevereiro, 2007): 106–109, accessed: 27.06.2021, https://repositorio.ul.pt/bitstream/10451/327/1/21028_ulsd_Moisés_Fernandes.pdf.

party structures and that it had reached out to villagers by initiating, among other things, a general program of fighting against illiteracy²³.

Immediately upon arrival, the new Governor proposed to create a Government Council, which, in a certain time span, was to take over the functions of the provisional government. His initiative was rejected by both APODETI and FRETILIN. In these circumstances, the Portuguese started to organise local elections, striving – in the face of the parties' inability to reach an agreement – to build a political system “from the bottom up”. The elections were held at the beginning of May 1975, and FRETILIN won about 50 percent of the seats in local councils. This undoubtedly was a satisfactory result for the left-leaning officers in power in Lisbon, who were de facto interested in handing power over to one party which they considered to be close ideologically. Such a development of events, however, was not going to be accepted by Indonesia.

The decline of Portuguese power

At that time, anarchy was spreading in metropolitan sub-units. The soldiers had established very friendly relations with radicals, some of whom had previously studied in Lisbon under a government scholarship. Lemos Pires informed Lisbon that this could lead to serious disturbances and asked for the support of soldiers from elite formations, whom he wanted to stay in Timor for at least 6 months. However, Portugal had very limited possibilities of buttressing the forces deployed in Timor. On 15 March 1975, General Costa Gomes decided to airlift (by C-54 planes) a paratrooper company to the island. The preparation of the “mini-airbridge” lasted until 8 April. The first reinforced platoon landed on the island on 14 April, and another one in July. Together with the paratroopers, two Alouette III helicopters were deployed. The sub-units created the Detachment of Timorese Paratroopers (*Destacamento de Paraquedistas de Timor*), which served as a reserve of the Portuguese forces. However, the Governor's request to expand the manoeuvring component to two companies was rejected²⁴.

At that time, Indonesia was conducting a heated propaganda campaign against UDT and FRETILIN. Jakarta's obvious ally was APODETI. Military training for fighters from this organisation and members of KOTA began²⁵. On 27 May, UDT decided to terminate cooperation with FRETILIN. A day later, Indonesian troops, occupied the

23 *History of Timor*, accessed: 03.08.2020, https://cesa.rc.iseg.ulisboa.pt/History_of_Timor.pdf.

24 Mário Lemos Pires, *Descolonização de Timor: missão impossível?* (Lisboa: DoM Quixote: 1994), 152–157.

25 John H. Daves, *The Indonesian Army from Revolusi to Reformasi*, vol. 2, *Soeharto and the New Order* (n.p.: 2013), 391–403; Ken Konboy, *Copassus. Inside Indonesian's Special Forces* (Sheffield: Equinox Publishing, 2003), 186–204.

enclave of Oecusse, using as a pretext the clashes between members of the two organisations²⁶. Portugal limited itself to a diplomatic protest. Governor Mário Lemos Pires was still trying to mediate and offered to organise a summit in Macau on 16–18 June with the participation of the Timorese organisations and representatives of Indonesia and Portugal. However, FRETILIN boycotted the initiative and did not take part in the summit. In this situation, the Portuguese (namely the Supreme Revolutionary Council, *Conselho Superior da Revolução*) unilaterally adopted a “road map” (schedule) for the decolonisation of Timor, which was announced on 17 July. It planned for a general election to the People’s Assembly (*Assembleia Popular*) to be held in October 1976. The final withdrawal from Timor was scheduled for October 1978. Until then, executive power was to be exercised by the government appointed by the Portuguese High Commissioner within 100 days of the publication of the document in question²⁷.

On 25 July, a UDT delegation visited Jakarta. It can be supposed that in view of the leftist attitude demonstrated by the Governor General and most of the officers, the moderate party was looking for another partner. General Ali Murtopo, deputy head of the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara*, BAKIN), informed the Timorese that FRETILIN was preparing for an armed seizure of power. The leadership of UDT decided to take action to forestall the biggest competitor to power. On 11 August, the organisation’s militia began to occupy Dili. They seized the city’s airport, seaport, telephone exchange, civilian radio station, power plant and pump station. The plan had been well prepared and was efficiently carried out. At the same time, public sector employees started an indefinite strike. The attitude of the Portuguese was ambivalent. There are indications that the police commissioner in Dili cooperated with the assassins and even supplied them with some weapons. The army, however, remained in the barracks. FRETILIN not only defended itself, but also quickly started a counterattack. Given the organisation’s program, the enmity of Timor’s neighbouring countries towards it and the geographical remoteness of the island, it can be assumed that the only source of armament for the party’s armed force were Portuguese barracks, especially smaller posts, which were taken over and robbed of their weapons and ammunition. The soldiers, forewarned of the assailants’ plans, usually left the barracks little by little or withdrew before the attackers actually appeared in the barracks. Even so, 23 prisoners of war fell into the hands of FRETILIN. The Portuguese conscripts saw no reason to risk their lives in a conflict that they did

26 An area located on the north coast of the western part of Timor. Under the agreements concluded with the Dutch, it remained in the hands of the Portuguese. Surface area: 814 km² (length along the coast – 46 km, maximum width – 30 km). In 1975, the enclave had a population of about 25 thousand people.

27 Conselho da Revolução, *Diário do Governo* n. ° 163/1975, Série I de 1975-07-17, 985-991, accessed: 03.08.2020, https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/336547/details/maximized?p_auth=2MKghZt3.

not understand and did not really want to understand. Their priority was to return home safely²⁸.

FRETILIN's advantage, which became apparent relatively quickly, was due to two main reasons: an extensive network of local party structures (while UDT remained in fact a "city movement") and organisational efficiency, topped up by a social program that was attractive to the rural population. The fights were fierce; according to one Portuguese newspaper, as many as 2,000 people may have died, but this information has never been, and will probably never be, verified²⁹.

The retreat to Ataúro

The Portuguese behaved passively, having neither the power nor the will to end the violence. As already mentioned, metropolitan sub-units were not only small, but with the exception of the paratroopers, they were eaten from the inside with revolutionary decay, the most evident manifestation of which was the lack of discipline. In the face of this situation, Governor Pires decided to evacuate all military and civilian personnel to the island of Ataúro (25 km north of Dili, length 25 km, width 9 km, surface area 105 km²). In Dili, there were fights for the control of the city centre and the airport. The helicopters based at the airport were evacuated to an ad hoc landing strip in the seaport. Lisbon rejected another request from the Governor for military reinforcement. In fact, with local militants taking control of the airport, it could have been extremely difficult to redeploy the aircraft. The building in which the Governor resided at that time, was, at least twice, attacked by militants of the antagonising groups who wanted to occupy it. A dozen or so Portuguese soldiers went missing. It was later revealed that at least three of them had deserted the army with their weapons to join FRETILIN³⁰.

All available watercrafts were gathered for the evacuation. There were not many of them: the patrol boats "Albufeira" and "Tibar" (Alvor type vessels, 37.5 tons, 25.0 m), two landing craft "Lóios" and "Comoro" (50 tons, 24 m long, built in Macau in 1967–1968), the tugboat "Lifau", the coaster "Musi" (capacity 586 tons, length 67.6 m, ensign of Singapore), and the self-propelled barge "Laleia". The tugboat was purchased

28 Mário Lemos Pires, *Descolonização de Timor*, 152–157.

29 After the Indonesian invasion, and later, after Timor had regained independence, the civil war was marginalised in the official idiom dominated by talk of resistance to the invasion, guerrilla warfare, and the suffering of the civilian population. It is practically impossible to reconstruct the events of the period from August to December 1975.

30 José Leiria Pinto, "Timor 1973/75. Recordações de um Marinheiro", *Rivista da Armada* (Julho 2012): 26–27.

in early May 1974 to replace a lost coaster “Arbid”³¹. It was navigated by sea on a route of 2,300 nautical miles using solely astronavigation, as the vessel was only equipped with a magnetic compass and a log. The barge “Laleia”, built in Macau, was collected in May 1975. The landing craft “Lóios” was soon withdrawn from use due to a malfunction. The pilot motorboat “Laga”, which had recently been imported from Macau, had not yet been launched. Earlier, on 12 August, a Portuguese-chartered coaster “Mac Dili” (“Macdili”, capacity 885 tons, length 65.3 m, ensign of Malaysia) with 272 civilians on board (families of military men, officials with families) left for Darwin³².

On 17 August, paratroopers seized the loading points in the seaport. This was theoretically agreed upon with the combating organisations, which showed the will to cooperate, releasing Portuguese soldiers caught during the fights. At the same time, Portuguese troops began to arrive from the interior of the island. They were demoralised, partially disarmed, and had no intention to do anything except retreat to a safe place. The soldiers started to be slowly transported to the island. The abandoned vehicles ended up in the hands of the Timorese. On 18 August, FRETILIN took control of the Aileu training facility. A helicopter was seized there, which was performing a liaison task (the Portuguese negotiated with UDT the possibility of flying between garrisons). Another craft, sent in search of it, was fired upon, but managed to return to Dili. Next, the Timorese occupied the command headquarters of the Maubisse sector. The platoon of Portuguese riflemen stationed there did not put up any resistance and was disarmed. The skipper of the coaster “Musi”, which was fired upon at night (when coffee was unloaded from it to make room for the soldiers), terminated the charter contract and departed for Singapore. The Portuguese were left only with their own vessels.

At the same time, civilian refugees began to arrive in Dili. Nobody was prepared for this. The Muslims and the Chinese, who were like-minded in this particular situation, demanded to be evacuated to Ataúro. There was an orgy of plunder, arson, rapes, lynching and meting out “people’s justice”. On 22 August, the landing craft “Comoro” was directed to Baucau to evacuate a facility cut off by a FRETILIN blockade from the only coastal road. In the evening, the Norwegian freighter “Lloyd Bakke” (a general cargo ship with passenger seats, capacity 9.745, length 152.4 m) chartered by the Governor’s office in Macau, arrived at the roadstead. She took 1.505, mostly Chinese, refugees to Darwin (they embarked from landing boats in the roadstead). This sparked a rumour that the evacuation trip had been financed by Chinese entrepreneurs from Macau. Interestingly, the costs of the second trip were covered by the Singapore government, which was also mainly interested in the evacuation of the Chinese diaspora.

31 On 23 April 1973, the coaster “Arbid” was lost (built in 1962, load capacity 485 tons). The vessel, manned by 18 seamen led by a Portuguese Navy boatswain sank in the Flores Sea on its way from Bangkok to Dili in a typhoon storm. The entire crew and five passengers died in the catastrophe.

32 José Leiria Pinto, “Timor 1973/75”, 35–26.

About 1,000 people embarked on the ship and departed for Darwin. In this situation, Muslims asked the consul of Indonesia for protection. The next vessel to evacuate the refugees was the already mentioned Malaysian ship “Mac Dili”. The last group of Portuguese military personnel, including the Governor, boarded at dawn on 27 August. Timor remained in the hands of the fighting militias³³.

FRETILIN was successful in the armed confrontation. The UDT militia was forced out of Dili, and its members fled to the west of the island. Indonesia was preparing itself for various scenarios, treating the refugees as a special “political capital”. The military forces on the island were strengthened, which was not surprising given the then circumstances. At the same time, however, during the meeting of the ambassadors of Portugal and Indonesia in Rome on 1 November 1975, the latter assured that his country was not interested in the annexation of East Timor. On the other hand, Portugal was entering the most severe political crisis since the Carnation Revolution, and so a declaration like that, made towards a deeply unstable state, did not have much binding force³⁴.

In mid-September, FRETILIN had full control over the eastern part of Timor. The island was then visited by a delegation of Australian Labour Party MPs led by the Aboriginal Australian senator Neville Bonner. A communication presented later to the media stated that the party was successfully building its administration by pursuing a moderate and balanced policy. This was an overly optimistic picture. The organisation, quite predictably, failed to cope with the deep economic and social collapse. The inhabitants’ newly-awakened ambitions could not be satisfied, and this aroused frustration and fuelled resistance, which was crushed by force. At the same time, guerrilla actions conducted by exiles operating, with Indonesian consent, from the western part of the island, were intensifying. On 10 October, FRETILIN was ousted from its outposts in Batuge and five other border towns. UDT and KOTA, supported by the Indonesian army, sought and liquidated members and supporters of FRETILIN. On 24 November, the leadership of the movement called on the United Nations to intervene, but no action followed.

Departure from Ataúro

The Portuguese staying on the island of Ataúro were almost completely cut off from the world at that time. The civilian radio station and the naval communications centre had been left behind in Dili. The evacuees had taken some of the equipment from the

33 Leiria Pinto, 37.

34 Daves, *The Indonesian Army*, vol. 2, 404–405.

centre but did not manage to put it into operation. In such a situation, they communicated with the world via Macau using two medium-power shortwave radio stations. Communication was often interrupted, and it was impossible to pass on longer messages. The situation on the island was the worse for the lack of a marina. Having nowhere to be moored at, the unit's boats had to remain at anchor, and their survival in the coming monsoon period was uncertain, to say the least. Meanwhile, Lisbon could not do much.

On 3 September, the frigate "Afonso de Cerqueira" (F 488, Baptista de Andrade type) departed from Lisbon to Timor. The operation was burdened with a significant technical risk, as it was a new ship, received from the Spanish shipyard Bazan de Construcciones only in July which had not yet passed full technical tests and whose crew had not completed their training. However, Portugal did not have any other "measures". The main task of the frigate after arriving at Ataúro was to use the ship's radio station to restore stable communication between this cut-off post and Lisbon. Moreover, she was supposed to transport marine subunits. The voyage was improvised in great haste. A hundred and twenty *fuzileiros* (fusiliers) embarked on the ship, making it incredibly crowded. Suffice it to say that some of the canned food was secured and stored on the landing pad (the ship did not have a hangar)³⁵. On 11 September, the vessel passed through the Suez Canal. The lines were dropped at Darwin on 1 October. The commander of the naval forces in Timor, Lieutenant Commander Leira Pinto, who was also to act as a pilot, joined the crew there. The ship arrived on the island on 6 October. On 24 November, "Afonso de Cerqueira" was joined by a twin vessel "João Roby" (F 487) with another 120 marines on board³⁶.

After the arrival of the first frigate, Lieutenant Commander Leira Pinto paid an official visit to the Indonesian Governor to find out, as far as it was possible, what the situation was like. What he saw was most disturbing. There were about a dozen large freighters in the roadstead, which normally would have no reason to be there, especially in such numbers. There were plenty of Indonesian soldiers in the streets, including those from the elite formation Kopassus (*Komando Pasukan*)³⁷. Clouds were evidently gathering over East Timor. However, Portugal could not do anything about it, both due to international circumstances and its internal situation. However, Governor General Mário Lemos Pires was recalled for consultations to Lisbon. He first went to Darwin on board the frigate "Afonso de Cerqueira" on 24 October, and from there by air to

35 *Marinha afunda navio que acompanhou invasão de Timor em 1975*, accessed: 05.08.2020, <https://www.dn.pt/edicao-do-dia/04-set-2018/marinha-afunda-navio-que-acompanhou-invasao-de-timor-em-1975-9794261.html>.

36 José Leiria Pinto, "A história da presença da Marinha em Timor Por ocasião da independência do território", *Rivista da Armada* (Junho 2002): 12–13.

37 Daves, *The Indonesian Army*, vol. 2, 404–40.

Canberra, where he was able to establish stable phonic communication with Lisbon for the first time in weeks. It was there that he found out that he was to return to his home country. His duties were taken over by Lieutenant Colonel José Ângelo Teixeira de Magalhães (Commander of the Military Force), who was appointed Acting Governor. His first task was to initiate the demobilisation and withdrawal of personnel by sea to Darwin, from where the Portuguese departed in small groups to Europe.

Conclusion

In view of what, from the Indonesian point of view, were unfavourable developments in East Timor, the Indonesian authorities made a decision to launch an armed intervention in the part of the island abandoned by the Portuguese. On 12 August, Minister of Defence General Maraden Panggabean issued a decree on the formation of the Joint Operational Force Seroja (*Kogaskag Seroja*). The invasion began on 7 December 1975. Indonesian troops crossed the land border. They used BTR-50 transporters and PT-76 floating tanks. At the same time, the airport in Dili was bombed, and then a helicopter landing party took ground there. A sea landing followed. Indonesian paratroopers landed in several parts of the island. The hastily-created FRETILIN units were unable to resist the Indonesian invaders. A new stage in the history of the eastern part of the island had begun, which ended only in 1999 with the withdrawal of the Indonesians and the proclamation of independence³⁸.

Then, the remaining military personnel embarked on the Portuguese ships in accordance with previously received orders, and the vessels lifted anchors and headed for Darwin. From there “João Roby” set off to her homeland west through the Suez Canal (with evacuees on board), and “Afonso de Cerqueira” sailed east taking a course for the Panama Canal. She returned to Lisbon on 11 March 1976³⁹. It was in such an unspectacular way that the Portuguese presence in the “Seas of the South East” came to its end after almost five hundred years since their first arrival in 1498. Although Lisbon exerted control over Chinese Macau until 1999, it did so only formally.

38 Ibidem, 13.

39 Along with the frigate *Honório Barreto*, the ship took part in the celebrations of the United States Bicentennial. She visited New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Fort Lauderdale, and La Guaira.

Bibliography

- Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor, 1974–1976*. Canberra: D. Brownie, V. Johnson, 2000.
- Bernardino, Teresa. “Timor e a soberania portuguesa do descobrimento à revolta de 1912”. *Revista Nação e Defesa* 9 (1984), 31: 74–85. Access: 19.07.2021. http://comum.rcaap.pt/bitstream/10400.26/2793/1/NeD31_TeresaBernardino.pdf.
- Bończol, Łukasz. *Zrozumieć Indonezję. Nowy Ład generała Suharto*. Warszawa: Dialog, 2012.
- Brandao, Carl C. *Funo. Guerra em Timor*. Porto: Edicoes “Acu”, 1946.
- Callinan, Bernard. *Independent Company: The Australian Army in Portuguese Timor 1941–43*. London: William Heinemann, 1953.
- Conselho da Revolução, Diário do Governo n. ° 163/1975, Série I de 1975-07-17. Accessed: 03.08.2020. https://dre.pt/pesquisa/-/search/336547/details/maximized?p_p_auth=2MKghZt3.
- Daves, John H., *The Indonesian Army from Revolusi to Reformasi, vol. 1–3*. n.p.: published by the author, 2013–2014.
- Easter, Davis. *Britain and the Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960–1966*. London: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Gonçalves, João Luís. *A Revolta de 1959 em Timor Leste*. Lisboa: Letras e Coisas, 2018.
- Gunn, Geoffrey C. *Historical Dictionary of East Timor*. Plymouth: Lanham – Toronto – Plymouth, 2001.
- Gunn, Geoffrey C. *History of Timor*. Macau: University of Macau, 1999. Accessed 13.03.2018. http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~cesa/History_of_Timor.pdf.
- History of Timor*. Accessed: 03.08.2020. https://cesa.rc.iseg.ulisboa.pt/History_of_Timor.pdf.
- James, Harold, Denis Sheil-Small. *The Undeclared War: The Story of the Indonesian Confrontation 1962–1966*. Totowa: N.J. Rowman & Littlefield, 1971.
- Jessup, John E. *A Chronology of Conflict and Resolution, 1945–1985*. New York: ABC Clio, 1989.
- Jones, Matthew. *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965: Britain: The United States and the Creation of Malaysia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- Konboy, Ken. *Copassus. Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces*. Sheffield: Equinox Publishing, 2003.
- Laskowska, Natalia. *Indonezja*, Warszawa: Trio, 2021.
- Leach, Michael. *Nation-Building and National Identity in Timor-Leste*. Abington: Routledge, 2017.

- Lee, Robert. “Crisis in a Backwater. 1941 in Portuguese Timor”. *Lusotopie* 7 (2000): 175–189.
- Léria Pinto, José Luís. “A história da presença da Marinha em Timor Por ocasião da independência do território”. *Rivista da Armada* (Junho 2002).
- Léria Pinto, José Luís. “Timor 1973/75. Recordações de um Marinheiro”. *Rivista da Armada* (Julho 2012).
- Lijphart, Aren. *The Trauma of Decolonization: The Dutch and West New Guinea*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Madureira de Carvalho, Luís. *O Dispositivo do Exército Português no Império Ultramarino, durante o período Republicano (1910–1975)*. Lisboa: Academia Militar, 2017.
- Marinha afunda navio que acompanhou invasão de Timor em 1975*. Accessed: 05.08.2020 <https://www.dn.pt/edicao-do-dia/04-set-2018/marinha-afunda-navio-que-acompanhou-invasao-de-timor-em-1975-9794261.html>.
- Martelo, David. *A Imprevidência Estratégica de Salazar – Timor (1941) – Angola (1961)*. Lisboa: Edições Sílabo, 2015.
- Morishima, Morito. *Pearl Harbor Lisboa Tóquio*. Lisboa: Ad Litteram, D. L., 2017.
- Pires Lemos, Mario. *Descolonização de Timor: missão impossível?* Lisboa: DoM Quixote, 1994.
- Platje, Wies. “Dutch Sigint and the Conflict with Indonesia 1950–62”. *Intelligence and National Security* 1 (2001), 16: 285–312. DOI: 10.1080/714002840.
- Schlicher, Monika. *Portugal in Osttimor. Eine kritische Untersuchung zur portugiesischen Kolonialgeschichte in Osttimor 1850 bis 1912*. Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 1996.
- Silva Fernandes, Moisés. “A Preponderância dos Factores Exógenos na Rejeição do Plano Português de Descolonização para Timor-Leste, 1974–1975”. *Negócios Estrangeiros*, 10 (Fevereiro de, 2007). Accessed: 27.06.2021. https://repositorio.ul.pt/bitstream/10451/327/1/21028_ulsd_Moises_Fernandes.pdfhttps://repositorio.ul.pt/bitstream/10451/327/1/21028_ulsd_Moises_Fernandes.pdf.
- Simpson, Brad. “‘Illegally and Beautifully’”: The United States, the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 1974–76”. *Cold War History* 5 (August 2005), 3: 281–315. DOI: 10.1080/14682740500222028.
- Tarling, Nicholas. *Britain and the West New Guinea Dispute, 1949–1962*. New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2008.
- Taylor, Jan Gelman. *Indonesia: Peoples and History*. Yale: Yale University Press, 2003.
- Vickers Adrian. *A History of Modern Indonesia*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

English version: Radosław Dolecki, Mark Atkinson.

SUMMARY

East Timor (Port. Timor-Leste) was the most peripheral part of the territories under the authority of Lisbon in relation to the metropolis. Due to a series of turbulent historical and political events, the Portuguese had been able to retain first their influence and then power over this area for more than four centuries. The article is a study of a special case in the history of colonialism, namely, the withdrawal of Portugal from East Timor. A historical outline of Lusitanian rule over the eastern part of the island as well as the phenomena and processes that had led to the actual abandonment of this dependent territory by the metropolis are presented. In the more detailed layer, the author highlights the nautical dimensions of the conflict resulting from the location of Timor and its distance from both the metropolis and regional administrative and political centres.

Timor Wschodni 1974–1975. Koniec władzy portugalskiej

Słowa kluczowe: Timor Wschodni, Portugalia, dekolonizacja, Indonezja, inwazja

STRESZCZENIE

Timor Wschodni (port. Timor-Leste) był najbardziej peryferyjną w stosunku do metropolii częścią terytoriów pozostających pod władzą Lizbony. Na skutek szczególnego splotu okoliczności historycznych i politycznych turbulencji, Portugalczycy zdołali zachować najpierw wpływy a potem władzę nad tym obszarem przez ponad cztery stulecia. Artykuł stanowi studium szczególnego przypadku w historii kolonializmu, jakim było wycofanie się Portugalii z Timoru. Przedstawiono rys historyczny luzytańskiego władztwa nad wschodnią częścią wyspy oraz zjawiska i procesy, które doprowadziły do faktycznego porzucenia przez metropolię terytorium zależnego. W warstwie szczegółowej autor eksponuje nautyczny wymiarach konfliktu wynikający z położenia Timoru i jego oddalenia zarówno od metropolii, jak i regionalnych centrów administracyjno-politycznych.

Citation

Kubiak, Krzysztof. "East Timor 1974–1975. End of Portuguese rule". *Studia Maritima* XXXIV (2021): 185–202. DOI: 10.18276/sm.2021.34-08.