Remarks on the treaty of 20 March 1289 between the Brandenburg Margraves of the Johannine line and Prince Vitslav II of Rügen, and the place of this agreement in the plans to seize Gdańsk Pomerania after the death of Mestwin II

Keywords: Pomerania, Brandenburg, Rügen, Greater Poland, Pomeranian dukes, Mestwin II, Bogislaw IV, Margraves of Brandenburg, John II, Otto IV “with the Arrow”, Conrad, Prince (= Fürst) Vitslav II of Rügen, bishops of Cammin Hermann von Gleichen, Jaromar, Przemysł II, Treaty of Prenzlau (20 March 1289)

On 20 March 1289 in Prenzlau, the Rugian Prince Vitslav II concluded a treaty with the Brandenburg Margraves of the Johannine line: Otto IV “with the Arrow” and Conrad\(^1\). The concluded treaty concerned the division of Eastern Pomerania. It was carried out after the death of the Gdańsk-Pomeranian Duke Mestwin (Mściwoj) II. The ruler of Rügen was to handle the acquisition of his realm. If Mestwin II, during his lifetime, agreed to entrust Vitslav with the Sławno (Schlawer) land, the Rugian Prince promised the Brandenburg Margraves and their heirs a payment of 3,050 Brandenburg silver marks (“tria milia marcarum argenti Brandenburgensis et L\(^{1469}\) marcas”). 2000 marks were to be paid by St. Martin’s day (November 11) of the year Vitslav obtained the Sławno land. Another sum of 1,050 marks was to be paid by Vitslav to the the Margraves by the next St. Martin’s day, i.e. November 11.

If Vitslav obtained the entire Sławno land, he was to satisfy the claims of the Brandenburg Margraves. In exchange for half of this territory, which, in accordance with the treaty, was to become property of the Margraves after the death of Mestwin II, the ruler of Rügen would give Otto IV, Conrad and their heirs appropriate compensation in the form of another land. After receiving this compensation, the Margraves promised to return half of the sum already paid by Vitslav. This was to take place on the agreed date. The treaty was sworn by the knights of Prince of Rügen and the knights of the Brandenburg Margraves. For Vitslav: Johannes von Ceryn, Detlev von Zlizen. For the Brandenburg Ascanians: the Wedel brothers Hasso and Zulis as well as Frederick von Eickstedt. In the event of the death of one of the guarantors of the treaty, he was to be replaced by another.

The Sławno land (as well as the entire Eastern Pomerania) owned by Mestwin II (called in this part of the document Vitslav II’s uncle) was to be divided among the signatories of the treaty after the death of the East Pomeranian ruler. It was assumed that after the death of Mestwin II, Vitslav II would not be able to seize East Pomerania by way of peaceful agreements, and thus it was stated that the ruler of Rügen would need to do it by force. For this reason, the Margraves guaranteed him military and financial assistance in the planned undertaking.

The treaty of 20 March 1289 has been mentioned several times in the literature on the subject\(^2\). However, it has never been the subject of a separate study. While the

---

REMARKS ON THE TREATY OF 20 MARCH 1289 BETWEEN THE BRANDENBURG MARGRAVES… 55

The purpose of concluding the treaty seems clear and resulting from its contents, the circumstances of the conclusion of the agreement allow the proposal of several hypotheses. The lack of a broader discussion of the treaty between the ruler of Rügen with the Margraves causes historical errors, especially in the more recent historiography. This finding seems quite surprising. It results, however, from the research directions in which attempts were made to analyse parts of the diploma written during the conclusion of the treaty of Prenzlau. Historians from the 19th and 20th centuries, who referred to the treaty of 1289, tried to cover in their works all items of the aforementioned document. As a result, they avoided the problems of researchers who only explored certain parts of the Prenzlau document. For this reason, they sometimes spread ahistorical statements.

One of the first historians who tried to comprehensively look at the treaty of 1289 was Friedrich Wilhelm Barthold. He recalled the earlier agreements of the Duke of East Pomerania Mestwin II with the Margraves of Brandenburg in 1269 and 1273. In the first case, Mestwin II relinquished all his lands to the Margraves, in order to regain them as a fief obtained from the Ascanians. The exception was the Białogard (Belgard) land, which was to become the direct property of the Margraves. Under the second agreement, Mestwin II was to resign in favour of the Margraves from Słupsk (Stolp) and Sławno lands in order to take them into a fief for himself and his children. The

---

3 An example of such claims is the purchase price of the Sławno land of 3,000 marks. It is also wrongly assumed that the land of Sławno was to be bought from Mestwin II for these 3,000 marks. The bases for these theories were the statements contained in the works of Zielińska-Melkowska, “Zjednoczenie Pomorza Gdańskiego”, 95; Spors, Dzieje polityczne, 152 and Osiegłowski, Polityka zewnętrzna Księstwa Rugii, 92.

4 It seems that especially 20th-century Polish historians did not appreciate the possible help in the correct interpretation of the document that could be found in the renditions of this diploma prepared by Heinrich Friedrich Paul von Wedel, hrsg v., Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte des Schloßgesessenen Geschlechter der Grafen und Herren von Wedel, (Leipzig: Bernhard Hermann 1888), 25; Herman Krabben in: Regesten, 1469.

5 Barthold, Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen, Teil 3, 46–47.

6 PU, 238, 253; the last authors to refer to these agreements are Blażej Śliwiński, Mściwoj II (1224–1294), 177 et seq., 190 et seq., 200 et seq. (who negates the possibility of an actual conclusion of this treaty), and Edward Rymar who questions these claims in “Mściwoj II jako lennik margrabiów brandenburskich (w latach 1269–1273)”, Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza 23 (2019), 216–244.

7 PU, 238.

8 Ibidem, 253
text of the documents shows that a part of the land was separated out from the object of the transaction and intended for the brother-in-law of the Duke of Gdańsk, Heinrich Kichrberg\(^9\).

Later in his argument, Barthold drew attention to the political and family ties linking the Brandenburg Margraves with Vitslav II of Rügen. So he rightly recalled the treaty on the division of Gdańsk Pomerania after the death of Mestwin II in 1289\(^{10}\). The agreement included a plan to take over the Sławno land by the ruler of Rügen. Barthold also drew attention to the person of the bishop-elect Jaromar of Rügen. The support of the Cammin (Kamień) church for the Brandenburg-Rügen plans was a factor uniting both parties signing the treaty on the future division of Gdańsk Pomerania. Barthold completed this fragment with a reflection on the rapprochement between Mestwin II and Przemysł II, Duke of Greater Poland, and the anti-Brandenburg basis of the alliance of both dukes. Thus, the treaty of 1289 was for the aforementioned researcher a testimony to the struggle for political domination of the Margraves on the shores of the Baltic Sea: from Rügen to Gdańsk Pomerania. The Prenzlau Agreement was presented by the quoted historian as a reaction to the Pomeranian-Greater Poland rapprochement and the resulting danger for the political position of the Brandenburg Margraves\(^{11}\).

Describing the fief relationship of Mestwin II and the Brandenburg Margraves, Stanisław Kujot devoted a fragment of his analysis to the claims of Vitslav II to the Sławno land. They resulted from the kinship of the rulers of Rügen and Eastern Pomerania. The mother of Vitslav II of Rügen was Euphemia, daughter of Świętopełk of Gdańsk-Pomerania. Thus Mestwin II was Vitslav II’s uncle\(^{12}\). Regarding the earlier relations of the signatories of the treaty of 1289, i.e. the Brandenburg Margraves with Mestwin II, Kujot (like Barthold) first mentioned the issue of tributes paid to the Ascanians by the Pomeranian prince in 1269 and 1273. Later, the quoted historian dealt with the problem of the participation of the Margraves in the civil war between the sons of Świętopełk of Gdańsk (between 1269 and 1271). At the beginning of the dispute over the Gdańsk throne, the Margraves were allies of Mestwin II. Rivalling his brother Wartislaw II, Mestwin II recognized the suzerainty of the Brandenburg Ascanians.


\(^{10}\) PU, 285; see Barthold, Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen, Teil 3, 46–47; idem, Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen, zweiter Teil: Von der Bekehrung Pommerns zum Christentum bis zum Tode Barnims I. i. J. 1278. Nebst einer Höhen und Fluß-Karte von Pommern, (Hamburg: Friedrich Perches 1840), 553 et seq.; and the last author: Śliwiński, Mściwoj II (1224–1294), 213 et seq. (in this work, there is a reference to older literature on the subject).

\(^{11}\) Barthold, Geschichte von Pommern und Rügen, Teil 3, 44 et seq.

\(^{12}\) Kujot, Margrabiowie brandenburscy, 54.
Kujot claimed that it was not known exactly what the Margraves had promised Mestwin II in return for recognizing their suzerainty. The difficulty in correctly assessing the relationship of both sides of the treaty stemmed from the fact that the Brandenburg Margraves, without consulting the Pomeranian ruler, started to act independently. They themselves sought power in the Duchy of Gdańsk-Pomerania. However, these plans were hindered by the Pomeranian-Greater Poland alliance from the early 1270s. The Margraves, however, never gave up their attempts to seize the above-mentioned territory. An expression of this policy was the agreement concluded in 1277 for the repurchase for 3,600 Brandenburg marks of the Sławno and Darłowo (Rügenwalde) lands by John II, Otto IV and Conrad from Vitslav II of Rügen – Mestwin II’s nephew. Kujot analyzed only those fragments of the treaty that directly pertained to the relationship between: Pomerania – Rügen – Brandenburg. He omitted the terms of repayment and coverage of the buyout sum, considering them as extraordinary matters not directly related to Pomerania. However, Kujot’s attention was drawn to the clause of the document, which suggested that Vitslav II could advocate the recognition of the authority of the Margraves in the Sławno land to Mestwin II.

One of the reasons for the conclusion of the treaty of 20 March 1289 in Prenzlau was, according to Kujot, the growth of cooperation between Mestwin II and the Dukes Przemysł II of Greater Poland and Bogislaw IV of West Pomerania. Its important item was the question of ownership of the Sławno land, which suggests that the alliance of these rulers was directed against the Margraves of Brandenburg and Rügen. Another reason for the congress in Prenzlau was the need to clearly define the rights to Pomerania, which Vitslaw II and the Brandenburg Margraves intended to obtain after the death of Mestwin II. The congress in Prenzlau was therefore to decide on the equal division of the Pomeranian land. If Mestwin II were to give Vitslaw II the Sławno land during his lifetime, the Rugian Prince promised to pay the Margraves 3,050 marks. Vitslaw II was to give them some other territory for this half, which would formally belong to the Margraves in the future. If this land went into the hands of the Margraves, they were to return 1,500 marks to Vitslaw II.

Kujot recognized the Treaty of Prenzlau as one of the most important documents that set out the plan of the Brandenburg Margraves with regard to Pomerania. The alliance concluded by the Ascanians with Vitslaw II was dictated by the forces that Otto IV and Conrad had in the expected clash with Przemysł II of Greater Poland, which

---

13 Ibidem, 61.
14 PU, 285.
15 Kujot, Margrabiowie brandenburscy, 62.
16 Ibidem, 63.
17 PU, 448; Kujot, Margrabiowie brandenburscy, 64.
Marek Smoliński turned out to be too small. Being aware of this, the Margraves came to an agreement both with Vitslav II and soon with his son, Jaromar, bishop-elect of Cammin\(^{18}\).

Paul von Nießen was another researcher to record the agreement between Vitslav II and the Brandenburg Margraves in 1289\(^{19}\). The aforementioned researcher tried to explain the reason for the Brandenburg-Rügen treaty by means of an argument concerning the dynastic policy of Mestwin II\(^{20}\). To realize his policy, the Duke of East Pomerania concluded inheritance agreements not only with the Margraves, but also earlier with Barnim I of West Pomerania. Nießen also allowed for the possibility of an inheritance agreement in Eastern Pomerania between Mestwin II and Vitslav II of Rügen\(^{21}\). Probably knowing the texts of the agreements concluded by the Brandenburg Margraves with the Pomeranian Duke in 1269 and 1273, Nießen focused his attention on one of their aspects. In documents from 1269 and 1273, Mestwin II mentioned his children\(^{22}\). So he did not specifically refer to his widely known daughter Katarzyna\(^{23}\). Hence the assumption that Mestwin II could finally have a daughter, but also a son(s)\(^{24}\).

His / their alleged death in the period of infancy was to induce the East Pomeranian ruler to change his succession policy. It was also influenced by the resistance of the Pomeranian nobility. They were against the possibility of Mestwin II’s domain being inherited by someone from the German circle\(^{25}\). That is why Mestwin II associated himself with his relative Przemysł II, the ruler of Greater Poland. In 1282, he recognized


\(^{19}\) Phyl, „Wizlaw II.”, 622 only mentioned the treaty but did not analyse its details. Similarly, Śliwiński, *Fragmenty dziejów politycznych*, 7; Rymar, *Stosunki Przemysła II z margrabiami brandenburskimi*, 135; idem, “Wielkie Pomorze obszarem lennym margrabiów brandenburskich z dynastii askańskiej (trybutarnym Rzeszy Nienieckiej)”, *Roczniki Historyczne* 62 (1996), 38; idem, *Wojny na Pomorzu Zachodnim*, 150; Wybranowski, *Polityka biskupów kamieńskich*, 16.


\(^{21}\) Nießen did not clearly indicate any specific legal acts or source information on this matter. While in the case of the treaty with Barnim I, it could have been the Cammin Agreement of 1264 (PU, 206; see Jan Powierski, “Układ kamiński na tle stosunków między książętami Pomorza, Krzyżakami i Prusami w latach sześćdziesiątych XII wieku”, *Rocznik Olsztyński* 8 (1968), 11–33; Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II (1224–1294)*, 82 et seq.), then in the case of the Rugian Princes being heirs to Mestwin II the source could have been the chronicle by Johannes Bugenhagen, see Otto Heinemann, hrsg. v., *Johannes Bugenhagens, Pomerania*, (Stettin: Verlag Leon Sarniers Buchhandlung 1900), III, XIV, 123.

\(^{22}\) PU, 239, 256.

\(^{23}\) Born of his marriage to Judith Wettin of Brehna; see Marek Smoliński, *Polityka zachodnia księcia gdańsko-pomorskiego Świętopełka* (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Officina Ferberiana 2000), 155 et seq.

\(^{24}\) Historians have been interested in this matter for some time. One of the proposals for solving the problem of the sons of Mestwin II was the assumption of errors in the readings of the diplomas from 1269 and 1273. Instead of the word „pueri”, some historians have proposed the word „patrui”, indicating not the children but the uncles of the East Pomeranian prince. However, this hypothesis was not further developed in the literature on the subject; see Kujot, *Magrabiowie brandenburscy*, 55.

\(^{25}\) About the election of a new ruler by Pomeranians in the event of Mestwin II’s death, see Johannes Bugenhagens, *Pomerania*, III, XIV, 123; Jasiński, *Tragedia rogozińska*, 84.
him as his heir\textsuperscript{26}. In this situation, the Margraves, who wanted to take over, after the expected death of Mestwin II, if not all, then at least part of his duchy, decided to cooperate with their recent rival, Vitslav II of Rügen. His advantage in this case were the rights to Eastern Pomerania, which he retained as the son of Jaromar II and Euphemia, daughter of Świętopełk II, Duke of Pomerania. Both sides started to cooperate already at the moment of the vacancy in the bishopric of Cammin (Kamień), after the death of Bishop Hermann von Gleichen in 1288. Jaromar was elected in his place before March 5, 1289. He was the son of Vitslav II. His additional advantage was the kinship linking the bishop-elect with the Margraves\textsuperscript{27}. Ultimately, however, both sides did not proceed to implement the agreement of 1289. According to Nießen, after the resignation or death of Jaromar, the Bishop of Kamień, in 1294\textsuperscript{28}, the political paths of both sides of the Treaty of Prenzlau clearly diverged.

Christian Reuter, who was also interested in the agreement concluded in 1289 between Vitslav II of Rügen and the Margraves Otto IV and Conrad, considered it in the context of a specific political plan implemented by the Ascanians. This plan was aimed at subordinating to the Margraves the areas stretching from the mouth of the Trave and the mouth of the Oder rivers to the mouth of the Vistula\textsuperscript{29}. Trying to implement their bold intentions, the Margraves of the Johannine line had to repeatedly thwart the resistance of the coalitions and alliances cyclically forming against them. Reuter pointed out that in the early seventies the Ascanians lost the rivalry for Gdańsk. In 1272/1273, they faced the coalition formed against them by the Archbishop of Magdeburg Conrad, the Princes Vitslav II of Rügen, Henry of Mecklenburg, Nicholas of Werle, Waldemar of Rostock and Count Gunzelin of Schwerin\textsuperscript{30}.

\textsuperscript{26} Janusz Bieniak, “Postanowienia układu kępińskiego (15 lutego 1282)”, \textit{Przegląd Historyczny} 82 (1992) 2, 209–232; recently on this, see Śliwiński, \textit{Mściwoj II (1224–1294)}, 257–271. This work features a review of positions on the essence of the agreement between Mestvin II and Przemysł II.


\textsuperscript{29} Reuter, \textit{Die Askanier und die Ostsee}, 302 et seq.

\textsuperscript{30} Georg Christian Friedrich Lisch et al., hsg. v., \textit{Mecklenburgische Urkundenbuch}, (hereinafter: MUB), Bd. II (1251–1280), (Schwerin: in Commission der Stiller’schen Hofbuchhandlung 1864), 1250; Regesten, 1021, 1022; Reuter, \textit{Die Askanier und die Ostsee}, p. 302 was not interested in the fact that the coalition was also joined by Barnim I as well as Bolesław the Pious together with Mestvin II. See also Nießen, \textit{Geschichte der Neumark}, 229 et seq.; Rymar, “Walka o Pomorze Gdańskie w latach 1269–1272”, \textit{Rocznik Gdański} 44 (1987) 1: 26; Smoliński, “Sytuacja na pograniczu askańsko-meklamburskim w II połowie XIII w. i na przełomie XIII/XIV w. i najazd Brandenburgii na Pomorze Ślůwien- skie w 1306 r.”, \textit{Gdańskie Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza}, no. 7: Mazowsze, Pomorze, Prusy, (2000): 188–189; Śliwiński, \textit{Mściwoj II (1224–1294)}, 190 et seq. (herein also the remaining literature on the subject).
In 1277, the matter of seizing the Sławno land (and according to Reuter also the Słupsk land\(^\text{31}\)) was included by the Margraves in their plans to intervene in Scandinavia on the part of the exiled Swedish king Waldemar. At the described moment, Waldemar was an exile expelled from the country by his brother Magnus. Striving to regain power, Waldemar began building a political party that would facilitate this enterprise. It was largely based on kinship ties. Waldemar was married to the Danish princess Sophia, which favoured his alliance with the Danish King, Erik Glipping. Erik, however, was the brother-in-law of the Johannine Margraves because his Queen Consort was Agnes, the daughter of Margrave John I. Duke Barnim I of West Pomerania and Lord Waldemar of Rostock also had a part in this political game. They became guarantors of the repayment of the debt that Erik Glipping incurred with the Ascanians. The ruler of Riigen, who participated in the described events, sold the Sławno land to the Margraves with its fortified towns and the city of Darłowo\(^\text{32}\). This transaction was therefore only one of the elements of the political situation that the Margraves tried to exploit.

In his article, Reuter showed that the fact of obtaining the Sławno land in 1277 was for the Margraves one of the steps in their march towards the eastern part of Pomerania. However, in order to take this step, and at the same time to retain their fresh acquisition, the Ascanians had to become actively engaged in Scandinavian politics and, what is equally important, maintain their dominance over Western Pomerania.

Complementing Reuter’s arguments, one should also remember that 1277 brought about several political events that could possibly determine the political position of the Margraves. Waldemar of Sweden and his wife Sophia made them a generous offer. In exchange for help in regaining their part of the Swedish kingdom, they offered Otto IV and Conrad the island of Gotland as well as a yearly payment of 1000 marks, to be paid for four years. If Gotland did not come under the rule of Waldemar, the Ascanians were to receive compensation in the form of other lands that they themselves would accept\(^\text{33}\). Moreover, the agreement provided for further land concessions in favour of the Margraves.

---

\(^{31}\) It is known, however, that Mestvin II was able to regain it most likely in 1274. Therefore, it is difficult to assume that the Ascanians wanted to acquire it also from Vitslav II; see Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II (1224–1294)*, 207 et seq.


In the context of their Baltic policy, Reuter considered a return to the old plans of the Margraves, whose immediate goal was to subjugate Lübeck. It should be remembered that in 1280, the King of the Romans Rudolf of Habsburg handed over to his nephew, Duke Albert of Saxony and the Margraves John II, Otto IV and Conrad the right to administer the property and rights pertaining to the Reich in Saxony and Thuringia. The Margraves thus received the rights that had previously been held by the deceased Albert, Duke of Brunswick, and the aforementioned Saxon duke. The city almost immediately protested against the rights of the Margraves and tried to remove them from the influence on their politics and income through legal and then military means. Lübeck soon became one of the most important members of the alliance established, among others, against the Ascanians of the Johannine line. The alliance united people directly or indirectly mentioned in the agreement of 1277, in which, inter alia, the Śląsko land was traded. Among the signatories of the alliance established on 13 June, 1283, were Vitslav II of Rügen and Bogislav IV – the son of the late Barnim I of West Pomerania. In addition to them, the alliance against the Margraves of Brandenburg was joined by: John I, Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, Princes Henry I and John I of Werle, John II, John III and Henry II of Mecklenburg, John, Nicholas and Borwin of Rostock, as well as counts Helmond and Nicholas of Schwerin, and Bernhard of Dannenberg. They were supported by the cities: Lübeck, Wismar, Rostock, Stralsund, Schwerin, Demmin and Anklam. As is known, Szczecin (Stettin), Stargard and Pyrzyce (Pyritz) also participated in the war. The fights on the Pomeranian front ended on 13 August 1284 with the peace treaty in Vierraden concluded between Margraves Otto IV and Conrad, and Bogislav IV and Vitslav II of Rügen. This treaty also included at least some of the allies of both sides. Western Pomerania suffered heavy losses after this peace. The Ascanians, in turn, failed to subdue Lübeck and the Polabian lands. Among the allies of the Margraves who swore the final provisions of

---

34 Johann Friedrich Böhmer, Friedrich Techen, bearb. v., *Urkundenbuch der Stadt Lübeck*, (hereinafter: UB Lübeck) Theil 1, (Lübeck: Friedr. Aschenfeldt 1843), 403; Regesten, 1224.

35 See Regesten, 1296, 1304, 1309, 1310, 1312, 1317, 1318.

36 PommUB II, 1265; Regesten, 1334; Wehrmann, "Vom Kriege Brandenburgs und Pommerns in den Jahren 1283–1284", *Monatsblätter der Gesellschaft für Pommersche Geschichte und Altertumskunde* 17 (1903): 129–135; Nießen, "Zum brandenburgisch-pommerschen Kriege von 1283–1284", ibidem, 145–148; Stanisław Kujot, "Dzieje Prus Królewskich", *Toczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu* 22 (1915): 1074–1075; Smoliński, Sytuacja na pograniczu, 193; Rymar, *Wojny na Pomorzu Zachodnim*, 149; idem, "Udział Pomorza w wojnie koalicjnej 1283–1285", in *Kręgu idei, polityki i wojska*. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Januszowi Farysiowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin, ed. Tomasz Sikorski, Henryk Walczak, Adam Wątor, (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego 2009), 471–487. See also Krzysztof Guzikowski, "Rywalizacja i współpraca. Polityka Barnima I (1233–1278) i Bogusława IV wobec Piastów (1278–1309)", *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski* 32 (2017) 2: 190, note 39, where recent literature on the subject has been given. This alliance was directed not only against the Margraves. Its signatories also took into account their relations with Norway.

37 PommUB II, 1312; Regesten, 1366.
the treaty were mentioned not only the Danish King Erik Glimping, but also the Prince of Greater Poland Przemysł II\(^{38}\). This cooperation probably continued for some time, because one of its aspects was the marriage of Przemysł II with Richeza, the daughter of the aforementioned Swedish King Waldemar. It was concluded in the fall of 1285, but was certainly planned earlier\(^{39}\).

A surprising event in the above-mentioned war of 1283–1284 was the regaining of the Sławno land by Mestvin II. The ruler of East Pomerania was associated with the Duke of Greater Poland, Przemysł II, then an ally of Brandenburg\(^{40}\). Thus, Mestwin II’s move was perilous. It threatened to upset his relations with the Ascanians. Mestwin II then had to have political support, which would possibly hinder the counteraction of the Margraves. The move by the East Pomeranian ruler was probably agreed with Przemysł II. The literature, perhaps wrongly, emphasizes the errors in Przemysł II’s policy of that time. These errors include, among others, his alliance with Brandenburg. The Duke of Greater Poland supposedly did not benefit from it\(^{41}\). However, this claim does not seem to be correct. Since Przemysł II was to inherit from Mestwin II, the seizure of the Sławno land by the Gdańsk-Pomeranian Duke certainly extended the area that was to fall to the Duke of Greater Poland in the future.

Returning, however, to Reuter’s discussion, one should focus on his statements strictly concerning the agreement of 1289\(^{42}\). According to him, the factors that induced the Brandenburg Margraves to return to their policy of expansion east of the Oder were the failures they suffered in their expansion towards the river Trave\(^{43}\), as well as their policy towards cities and the awareness of the near end of Mestwin II’s life. The latter reason significantly determined the actions of the Margraves aimed at seizing East Pomerania and Gdańsk. For this reason, on 20 March 1289, Otto IV “with the Arrow” together with his brother Conrad concluded the Treaty of Prenzlau with Vitslav II. Reuter did not deal with the text of the concluded pact itself, adopting the findings of earlier researchers.

Wehrmann drew attention to other circumstances of the alliance of the Rugian ruler and the Brandenburg Margraves. In his research, he emphasized the importance of the election of Jaromar, son of Vitslav II of Rügen, to the office of Bishop of Cammin.

\(^{38}\) Rymar, *Stosunki Przemysła II z margrabiami brandenburskimi*, 107.

\(^{39}\) See Jasiński, *Tragedia rogozińska*, 79, where there is more information on the mediation of the Margraves regarding the conclusion of this marriage.

\(^{40}\) The last author to discuss these events was Śliwiński, *Mściwoj II (1224–1294)*, 288 et seq. The idea for such a solution to the problem of the seizure of the Sławno land was proposed by Spors, *Dzieje polityczne*, 142.

\(^{41}\) See e.g. Nowacki, *Przemysł II*, 107.

\(^{42}\) Reuter, *Die Askanier und die Ostsee*, 305.

\(^{43}\) It is also worth remembering the defeat of the Margraves’ army in the spring of 1284 suffered during their attack on Mecklenburg. See Regesten, 1353.
This idea has already appeared in the literature on the subject, although earlier researchers did not pay this much attention to it\textsuperscript{44}. Wehrmann began his argument by stating that the peace in Vierraden in 1284 resolved the principal moot points between the Ascanians, Bogislaw IV and his younger half-brothers (Barnim II and Otto I)\textsuperscript{45}. They were the sons of Barnim I and Matilda, daughter of Otto III\textsuperscript{46}. Hence, in disputes arising in the ducal house, they appealed to the support of the Brandenburg Ascanians. An important factor in stabilizing the situation was the attitude towards the situation of the Bishopric of Cammin. Due to the age of the Bishop of Cammin Hermann von Gleichen, both in Pomerania and in Brandenburg the necessity of the future election of his successor was slowly taken into account. The account of the 16\textsuperscript{th}-century Pomeranian chronicler Thomas Kantzow that Bogislaw IV asked the Pope to appoint Jaromar, son of Vitslav II as an auxiliary bishop to Hermann, raises mixed opinions in the literature of the subject\textsuperscript{47}. Certainly, however, even if the West Pomeranian dukes did not in fact support Jaromar’s election, then after Hermann’s death in 1288 they at least did not strongly oppose his cause. The already possible marriage of Bogislaw IV with Margaret, the daughter of Vitslav II of Rügen, must have played a role as well\textsuperscript{48}.

Jaromar was elected in 1289 after the members of the Cammin chapter who represented the influences of individual rulers had reached an agreement\textsuperscript{49}. It was a compromise between the Brandenburg Margraves, Vitslav II and Bogislaw IV. From this cooperation, a political block, primarily centred around the Ascanians and rulers of Rügen, emerged. Bogislaw IV quickly resigned from participating in this alliance. A few years later he found himself in a political block hostile to the Ascanian family, centred around the Duke of Greater Poland, Przemysł II, and the East Pomeranian Mestwin II\textsuperscript{50}. The West Pomeranian Duke certainly felt connected with the current opponents of the Brandenburg Ascanians as early as 1287. The Margraves certainly did not disregard the attitude of Bogislaw IV. In 1288, they met with him, the Bishop of

\textsuperscript{44} See Nießen, \textit{Geschichte der Neumark}, 316.
\textsuperscript{45} Wehrmann, \textit{Jaromar von Rügen als Elektus von Kammin}, 124.
\textsuperscript{46} Rymar, \textit{Rodowód książąt pomorskich}, 150.
\textsuperscript{48} Rymar, \textit{Rodowód książąt pomorskich}, 161; Smoliński, \textit{Między dwoma organizmami państwowymi}, 40.
Cammin, Hermann, and with Prince Vitslav II of Rügen in Schwedt. They then made concessions to Pomerania regarding the Ueckermünde borderland. At the same time, however, they tried to secure the inheritance rights of the half-brothers of Bogislaw IV and their Ascanian mother. It does not seem that the congress with the Margraves and Vitslav II was a reason for Bogislaw IV to change his political sympathies and move to the Brandenburg-Rügen faction. It cannot be ruled out, however, that the congress weakened the willingness of the West Pomeranian Duke to engage more fully in the anti-Brandenburg coalition linking Greater Poland and Eastern Pomerania.

Further on, Wehrmann drew attention to the various stages of the Brandenburg-Rügen agreement. These included not only the agreement of 1277 under which Vitslav II sold the Sławno land to the Margraves or the treaty of 1289 on the division of Eastern Pomerania after the death of Mestwin II concluded between Vitslav II and the Margraves. Among the particularly important legal acts issued in this matter, the quoted author also included the agreement of 25 October 1290 concluded in Gerswalde between Margraves Otto IV and Conrad on the one hand, and bishop Jaromar and the church of Cammin on the other. The Margraves then agreed that the bishop and the church of Cammin would have full property rights and sovereignty in the town and land of Kolberg (Kolobrzeg), in the town and land of Naugard (Nowogard), and in the town of Jarmen and the surrounding villages, with all the property that the bishop and his church had had until the day the agreement was concluded. For the transfer to the church of Cammin of all the property bound by the precarium law, the bishop and his church gave their fortified town of Kerkow (near Soldin) and its adjoining lands to the Margraves. They emphasized, however, that within a few days and years, the Duke of Szczecin, Bogislaw IV, should join the cause of strengthening the position of the Church and leave the town of Kerkow at the free disposal of the bishopric, as it was before. Additionally, the Margraves declared that they would not build any strongholds and fortifications that would harm the castles and fortifications in the lands of the Cammin bishopric. In addition, Otto IV and Conrad confirmed that the bishop, the chapter of Cammin, vassals and people of the bishopric should have the right to duty-free transport of grain through their lands from Löcknitz to all other places. Another concession of the Ascanians to the bishopric was the declaration of the right to full bishop’s jurisdiction in his lands which also meant not supporting the protesters against the rulings of the church court. The Margraves also assured the church side that the bishop’s income would be paid to him and that the rights of his church would...

51 PommUB III, 1472; Regesten, 1459; Jasiński, *Tragedia rogozińska*, 84; Spors, *Dzieje polityczne*, 145, 152.
be respected. The bishop was also to be the full owner of all parishes, prelatures, archdeaconries and parsonages in his lands. An exception was made in favour of Bernhard, notary to the Margraves. The bishop handed over to him half of the parsonage on the Oder in the New March. Should the Margraves acquire new territories by purchase or some other means, they undertook to pay the bishop one shilling a year for each arable lahn/hube therein. In the event that the bishop fell into a dispute over the borders with neighbouring archbishoprics or bishoprics, they undertook to provide military support to the bishopric of Cammin. The document ended with an assurance that the spiritual and secular property of the Cammin church would be respected by the Brandenburg Margraves. We must therefore agree with Wehrmann that this agreement meant very large concessions from the Brandenburg Margraves to the Cammin bishopric. It can even be considered a milestone on the way to the political independence of the Cammin bishopric. The agreement also clearly indicated that Otto IV and Conrad were anxious to cooperate with Bishop Jaromar.

The reason for the efforts to gain the favour of the Bishop of Cammin is suggested by another agreement, the importance of which for the discussed matter was also indicated by Wehrmann. On 5 November 1292 in Angermünde, the Margraves concluded another agreement with Vitslav II of Rügen and his son, Bishop-elect Jaromar. In it, the bishop promised his uncles, i.e. the Margraves, and his father that he would help and make his lands and fortified towns available and open to the Ascanian and Rugian troops when they began their campaign to occupy East Pomerania after the death of Mestwin II. In return, the bishop was to receive 4,000 silver marks and a promise that the troops would buy food rations in his lands. Both sides agreed that the matter of the border between the bishopric of Cammin and the Brandenburg-Rügen gains would be dealt with by a specially appointed commission composed of 4 knights (two for each side). It was to be headed by the Bishop’s trusted representative, Count Otto von Everstein. The bishop was to receive a shilling paid in the Kolberg coin from every arable lahn of the Pomeranian fields subordinated and leased by the Margraves and the prince of Rügen, and 6 denarii for each half a lahn. The final issue to be resolved was the Margraves’ claim to the supremacy over the land of Kolberg, which was restored to the bishop in exchange for the land of Kerkow (“inpetitio quam habebant ad terram Colbergensem, que restaurata est per terram Kirkowe”). This pact was directed against all but those who swore it. It did not envisage an attempt to seize Pomerania earlier than after the death (post obitum) of Mestwin II. First of all, it infringed the

54 PommUB III, 1625; Regesten, 1561; Wehrmann, Jaromar von Rügen als Elektus von Kammin, 135; Ku-jot, Margrabiowie brandenburscy, 65; idem, Dzieje Prus, 1093; Jasiński, Tragedia rogozińska, 82; Spors, Dzieje polityczne, 146, 153; Rymar, “Władztwo biskupów kamieńskich między Unieścią i Grabową w XIII i XIV wieku”, Rocznik Kaszaliński 25 (1995): 44; idem, Stosunki Przemysła II z margrabiami brandenburskimi, 136.
rights retained by Przemysł II. If it were fully implemented, it would also violate the laws of the Polish Church. It was therefore the final act in the strengthening cooperation between the Margraves and the rulers of Rügen: Vitslav and his son, the bishop of Cammin.

According to Wehrmann, the treaty of 1289 was one of the few concluded between the Margraves and the ruler of Rügen, proving the continuing aspirations of both sides to take over East Pomerania. In addition to the diplomatic and military side, the pact also had a financial dimension. Vitslav II had to conclude it, because he gave up the rights to the Sławno land in favour of the Margraves already in 1277.

The next researcher who became interested in the Treaty of Prenzlau of 1289 was Walther Grünberg\textsuperscript{55}. In discussing the Brandenburg-Rügen agreements, the historian tried to make use of the judgements of earlier researchers (primarily Barthold and Nießen). Grünberg pointed to the rights of Vitslav II to the Sławno land, resulting from the lineage of the Prince’s mother. In the agreement of 1277 and in the seizure of Darłowo, he saw not only a certain stage in the march of the Margraves to the shores of the Baltic Sea, but also compensation for the loss of Gdańsk in the early 1270s. The emphasis on this element can be considered a kind of novelty in academic theories related to the agreements between Brandenburg Margraves and Vitslav II. Grünberg also analysed the text of the Prenzlau Agreement. However, he wrote nothing more about it, other than what could already be found in the earlier historiography. In his further discussion, he also took into account the matter of the alliance of the Margraves with Vitslav II, which translated into the election of Jaromar to the bishopric of Cammin in 1289 and the above-mentioned agreement of Angermünde from 1292\textsuperscript{56}. Following earlier researchers, he assumed that the plans of the Ascanians and Vitslav II of joint aggression against the lands of East Pomerania collapsed with the death of Bishop Jaromar around 1293/1294.

Another historian who discussed the Prenzlau Agreement of 1289 in more detail was Kazimierz Jasiński\textsuperscript{57}. While analysing the Brandenburg-Rügen agreements, he drew attention not only to the ancestry of Vitslav II and the resulting rights to Pomerania. He also pointed to the lost Buckow notes, fragments of which were to be preserved in the chronicle by Johannes Bugenhagen. These records included information about Vitslav II’s candidacy to the inheritance from Mestwin II\textsuperscript{58}. The content of this

\textsuperscript{55} Grünberg, \textit{Der Ausgang der pommerellischen Selbständigkeit}, 31.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibidem, 42–43.
\textsuperscript{57} Jasiński, \textit{Tragedia rogozińska}, 84
note should not be surprising, since the 16th-century chronicle of Thomas Kantzow informed that Mestwin II considered West Pomeranian dukes (probably Bogislaw IV) as his successors. Due to the lack of a male heir, the successor of Mestwin II was certainly searched for in Eastern Pomerania. However, the candidacy of Bogislaw IV, like that of one of the Brandenburg Margraves or the ruler of Rügen, was eventually rejected by the society of Eastern Pomerania. Jasiński recognized the impact of the political events of 1287 and 1288 as particularly important for the agreement between the Margraves and Vitslav II in 1289. These events include the conclusion of a defence arrangement between Mestwin II and the Cammin Bishop Hermann of 4 April 1287. Another proof of the growing resistance against the Margraves’ policy was the alliance between Bogislaw IV of West Pomerania, Przemysł II of Greater Poland and Mestwin of Gdańsk-Pomerania in the fall of that year. Also significant were Bogislaw IV’s efforts to regain control of the Bialogard land, previously remaining under the control of Pribislaw (Przybysław) – a vassal of the Brandenburg Margraves and son-in-law of Mestwin II. These factors, according to Jasiński, provoked the Margraves to conclude an agreement with Vitslav II in Prenzlau in 1289.

The Brandenburg-Rügen alliance changed the balance of power to date. Before 1289, Vitslav II did not belong to the allies of the Johannine Margraves. The Rugian prince was even a competitor of the Ascanians in the Pomeranian affairs. For Jasiński, the most important aspect of the treaty of 1289 was the clause stipulating the plans to seize Pomerania by Vitslav II after the death of Mestwin II (importantly, by peaceful means or by force). Noteworthy was also the clause on the equal division of the already conquered Pomerania between the ruler of Rügen and the Brandenburg Margraves participating in the costs of this undertaking. The next steps of the Margraves were: getting closer to the Bishop of Cammin Jaromar and attempting to compromise by diplomatic means the political position of Mestwin II. A way to achieve this was the marriage of Przemysł II with a Brandenburg noblewoman of the House of Ascania,
Margaret – the daughter of Albrecht III and Matilda of Denmark, which was concluded before 23 April 1293. Paradoxically, however, the political situation that was created then prevented the armed intervention of the Margraves in Pomerania immediately after the death of Mestwin II and made it possible for Przemysł II to seize the Duchy for himself.

Johannes Schultze also expressed his opinion about the Prenzlau agreement in the form of a short and concise paragraph. In his synthesis of the history of Brandenburg, he wrote that Otto IV and Conrad did not take their eyes off Pomerania, however, he did not present any broader context of the treaty. On 26 March 1289, they concluded an agreement with Vitslav II that in the event of the death of Mestwin II, Pomerania and the Sławno land were to be divided between them. However, because in 1282 Mestwin II concluded a treaty with Przemysł II, after the death of its ruler, Pomerania was taken over by the ruler of Greater Poland. The Margraves then had to wait with their claims.

At the end of the 1960s Krystyna Zielińska-Melkowska published a work devoted to the Treaty of Kępno from 1282. Pursuant to the agreement, Mestwin II, by “donatio inter vivos”, recognized Przemysł II as his successor. When describing the circumstances accompanying the conclusion of this agreement, the quoted author also referred to the relationship between the Duke of Gdańsk and the Margraves of Brandenburg. She also pointed to specific instances illustrating their mutual relations. One such example was the herein discussed Treaty of Prenzlau of 1289. According to Zielińska-Melkowska, Otto IV and Conrad concluded it with their recent enemy Vitslav of Rügen due to the processes integrating the Pomeranian and Greater Poland rulers. Several alliances were of significant importance in this regard. The first one was of a particularly defensive character and was concluded between Mestwin II and the bishop of Cammin, Hermann von Gleichen on 22 April 1289. The terms of this alliance were accepted in August 1289 by the Pomeranian nobility. The Pomeranian powers then promised to uphold the pact concluded between the Bishop of Cammin, Hermann and Duke Mestwin II, and after the death of the latter, to not accept as their ruler anyone who would not honour this treaty. In November 1289, a congress was held in Slupsk. It gathered the opponents of the Brandenburg Ascanians: Mestwin II, Bogislaw IV and Przemysł II. The Prenzlau agreement was therefore a response to the birth and consolidation

65 See Jasiński, “Genealogia Piastów wielkopolskich”, Kronika Miasta Poznania, 2 (1995): 56. Margaret was the daughter of Christopher I and Margaret Sambiria. Albrecht III’s sister, the last wife of Barnim I and stepmother of Bogislaw IV, and her support for the Brandenburg cause has already been discussed above.
66 Schultze, Die Mark Brandenburg, 192.
67 PU, 333; Zielińska-Melkowska, Zjednoczenie Pomorza Gdańskiego, 95.
68 PU, 421.
69 Ibidem, 424.
70 Ibidem, 426.
of the Pomeranian-Greater Poland alliance. To undermine it, the Ascanians wished to engage the new head of the Cammin bishopric, Jaromar of Rügen. When describing the provisions of the Prenzlau treaty of 1289, Zielińska-Melkowska introduced into the literature of the subject the information about the total of 3,000 marks, which Vitslav II was to promise to the Margraves in exchange for the Sławno land. It is not known whether the source of this information was the fact that the quoted researcher did not closely read the text of the Prenzlau document, or whether this information should be treated as a kind of simplification of the statement. It soon turned out, however, that the statement “3000 marks for the Sławno land” became very popular in the Polish literature on the subject.

In the 1970s, a work by Józef Spors was published and it dealt with the political history of the lands of Sławno, Słupsk and Białogard in the 12th–14th centuries. Its author tried to collect and make use of all the previous scientific opinions present in the literature on the Brandenburg-East Pomeranian relations. He devoted a lot of attention to the claims of the Brandenburg Margraves to Gdańsk Pomerania and the Sławno land. Agreements concluded by the Brandenburg Ascanians with the Rugian rulers also found their proper place in this work. This work contains very well elaborated fragments of the history of Pomerania and some fragments of lower quality, which is understandable in the light of such a wide range of topics. Spors claimed that in the Prenzlau Treaty of 1289, which concerned the division of Pomerania after the death of Mestwin II, the Duke of Rügen, Vitslav, “promised to give 3,000 marks of Brandenburg silver” to the Margraves of Brandenburg. The quoted researcher also maintained that “this sum was undoubtedly the return of the payment for the purchase of the Sławno land in 1277”. The 3,000 marks that Vitslav II was to pay to the Margraves also meant for Spors that the transaction from 1277 was cancelled.

It is difficult to understand what the legal situation between the Margraves and Vitslav II was supposed to be after the reversal of the transaction from 1277. According to Spors, Vitslav II gave the Ascanians their money back in 1289. However, the quoted researcher did not specify how the 3,000 marks (actually 3,050) was to compensate for the 3,600 marks. However, the accuracy of his idea can be assessed by re-referring to the text of the document from 1277.

On 18 January 1277, near the bridge called Ziznow (in Galenbeck), Prince Vitslav II of Rügen declared that he had made a pact with his brothers-in-law, the Brandenburg Margraves, John II, Otto IV and Conrad. Pursuant to this agreement, he sold the

---

71 Zielińska-Melkowska, Zjednoczenie Pomorza Gdańskiego, 95.
72 Ibidem, 96.
74 Spors, Dzieje polityczne, 141.
Sławno land with its fortified towns and the city of Darłowo to the Margraves. The Ascanians and their 20 knights were to pay 3,600 marks of Brandenburg silver for it. However, this transaction was subject to certain conditions. Two thousand three hundred marks was to be deducted from this sum, to be repaid later by Vitslav II’s suzerain, i.e. the Danish King Erik. This repayment was to be guaranteed not only by the King, but also by his guarantors: the Pomeranian Duke Barnim I and a relative of Vitslav’s – Lord Waldemar of Rostock. In the event that Erik died and his guarantors did not pay, the Margraves undertook to pay Vitslav the sum of 2,300 marks. The Ascanians were to do it in consecutive instalments and pay in the following two years by the Shrovetide, 1000 marks respectively. Of the 300 remaining silver marks, 25 were to be counted in gold and Vitslav was to receive them from King Erik. In exchange for the remaining 1,000 marks, the Margraves were to give Vitslav their estate owned in Denmark, namely the islands of Æerø, Søby and Grosbol. If four knights sworn on each side calculated that the value of these Danish estates would be less than 1,000 marks, the Margraves were to pay the difference. If, on the other hand, they calculated that the Margraves’ Danish estates were worth more than 1,000 marks, Vitslav was to return the surplus to the Margraves. In addition, Erik, in accordance with the Danish custom, was to act as the Margraves’ guarantor for the island of Æerø, as it was the inheritance of the Brandenburg Margraves. Vitslav undertook further that, together with his 20 knights (on a specific year and day), he would hand over the land of Sławno with its fortified towns and the city of Darłowo, which he owned and had inherited (“proprietatis titulo et hereditario warandium faciamus”). Finally, the Margraves promised to release Vitslav from the debt of 319 marks which he had with the Jews in Magdeburg.

The reading of the document issued on the occasion of concluding the agreement in 1277 clearly indicates the complicated procedure that its contractors used in determining the sum and circumstances of the transaction concerning the sale of the Sławno land. The payment of the 3,600 marks was an undertaking divided into instalments. The matter was probably also connected with the plans of Erik of Denmark and the Brandenburg Margraves’ intervention on behalf of Waldemar of Sweden. It is known that in 1277 Erik Glipping in fact led an expedition to Sweden. Its costs proved to be so high that the ruler devalued the Danish coin to finance it. The money that was supposed to go to him in connection with Vitslav II and the Brandenburg Margraves’ transaction meant solid financial support for him.

The relatively small number of source materials does not allow to precisely determine to what extent the terms of the agreement of 1277 were fulfilled. However, in the literature of the subject it is assumed that the Margraves actually entered the Sławno

---

75 The Margraves may have acquired the rights to it through their mother Sophia – daughter of Waldemar II. Cf. Krabbo, in: Regesten, 1102.
76 PommUB II, 1045; PU, 285; Regesten, 1102; Diplomatarium Danicum, 283.
land on the basis of this treaty. This may indicate the implementation of at least one of the essential clauses of the said agreement. Other conditions, due to the provisions of the treaty and political circumstances, would have to be completed by the beginning of the 1280s. The treaty of 1277 between Vitslav II and the Johannie Margraves was concluded when the dispute over the appointment of the Archbishop of Magdeburg after the death of Archbishop Conrad (15 January 1277) began to increasingly aggravate. This conflict had an impact on the relations between the Ascanians and Barnim I of West Pomerania. This ruler may have felt threatened by the Margraves as late as April 1277. He then concluded an agreement with the Bishop of Cammin, Hermann, on the transfer of rights to the Kolberg land. He agreed to it under the condition that the Bishop would never hand it over to the Margraves. However, already in June this year, the Margraves apparently sought the favour of Barnim I, expecting from him military aid in exchange for granting fiefs. After the death of Barnim I, Margrave Conrad I was also probably seeking favour of the Pomeranian rulers. In December 1278, he came to Szczecin to the court of the eldest son of Barnim I, Bogislaw IV. However, already in the summer of 1280, Bogislaw IV and the townspeople of Szczecin began asking Lübeck for help against the Margraves. In January 1277, the aforementioned city, on the order of the Roman King Rudolf, paid the Margraves of the younger line – Otto V and Albrecht III – 1,000 marks of silver. In August 1280, Rudolf granted to the Margraves John II, Otto IV and Conrad control over the fiefdoms of the Reich, including Lübeck. As has already been mentioned this caused resistance from the...
Lübeck townspeople, who quickly joined the alliances that were being created against the policy of the Ascanians.

Due to the lack of sources, it is difficult to describe the position taken by Vitslav II of Rügen in relation to these events. The document by Waldemar of Sweden, which deals with the granting of Gotland, does not mention him. On 8 September 1277, Waldemar with his wife Sophia promised John II, Otto IV and Conrad Gotland; in exchange, the Margraves (acting in person or through their representatives) were to help recapture the lands which were his in half of the kingdom of Sweden. In addition, he promised to pay 4,000 marks in 4 yearly instalments of 1,000. Had Gotland not become the part of the kingdom of Sweden taken over by Waldemar, the aforementioned Ascanians would receive an equivalent in the form of other lands of similar value. In this pact, there was absolutely no mention of the Danish vassal, Vitslav II. The ruler of Rügen was therefore omitted when concluding this treaty, even though Vitslav II, by agreeing to transfer in 1277 a part of the payment for the Sławno land to Erik Glipping, was supposed to be an important link in the coalition supporting Waldemar.

Between 1283 and 1284, when the Brandenburg Margraves fought the alliance of the feudal lords and Baltic cities, Vitslav II was a signatory of the treaty directed against the Ascanian family. Relations between Rügen and Brandenburg improved only after the peace in Vierraden of 13 August 1284. At that time, however, the Sławno land had been again seized by Mestwin II of East Pomerania. Therefore, it seems that Spors, on the basis of the grants of the Brandenburg Margraves to the Buckow (Bukowo) and Kolbatz (Kolbacz) Cistercians from 1281 and 1282, correctly marked the introduction of the Ascanian rule in the Sławno land.

When discussing Spors’ hypotheses, it is worth considering the price that the Margraves were to pay to Vitslav II in 1277. For this purpose, one must refer to another, aforementioned treaty. It was concluded on 30 April 1277 between the Pomeranian Duke Barnim I and the Bishop of Cammin Hermann von Gleichen. It concerned the Kolberg land, which the Duke gave to the Bishop in exchange for 3,500 marks, in order to receive it back as a fief. This operation, meaning in fact the change of a lord into a vassal, was connected with the necessity to pay an appropriate fee. It probably oscillated around the generally recognized value of a given territory. Importantly, the described transaction concerned areas adjacent to the Sławno land. Both agreements were concluded by different contractors, although the agreements were signed in the same year of 1277. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the sum of 3600/3500 marks was the market price that was agreed to be paid in the 1270s for the property rights to

85 PommUB II, 1045; PU, 285; Regesten, 1102; Diplomatarium Danicum, 283.
86 PommUB II, 1332; PU, 323; Spors, Dzieje polityczne ziem sławieńskiej, 141.
87 Spors, Dzieje polityczne ziem sławieńskiej, 141; Rymar, Wielkie Pomorze obszarem lennym, p. 37.
88 PommUB II, 1060; Regesten, 1109.
compact territories in this part of Pomerania. However, this price has been lowered mainly in Polish literature on the subject.

The authoritative position of Zielińska-Melkowska and Spors largely swayed any further research by Polish historians on the Treaty of Prenzlau of 1289. Writing a few years later about the Principality of Rügen, Janisław Osieckowski correctly read and described the terms of the pact between the Brandenburg Margraves and the Rugian ruler of 1277. However, unexpectedly, a passage about 3000 marks appeared in his work as well\(^{89}\). Importantly, however, according to Osieckowski, these 3,000 marks were the sum for which the Rugian Prince agreed to buy the Sławno land from the Ascanian family, although at that moment it was owned by Mestwin II\(^{90}\). The hypothesis about the purchase of the Sławno land by Vitslav II from the Brandenburg Margraves was soon expanded by other researchers with the idea that the Rugian Prince would attempt to buy this land for the aforementioned 3000 marks from Mestwin II\(^{91}\). While appreciating the creative effort of researchers trying to describe the situation in 1289, it must be stated that such hypotheses are significantly detached from the source text, which is the basis for research on the problem of the Rügen-Brandenburg treaty.

Błażej Śliwiński was the last researcher who was interested in the matters of the Rügen-Brandenburg agreements of the 1270s and 1280s. This historian attributed the establishment of the Rügen-Brandenburg alliance of 1289 to at least several reasons. These include the strengthening of Mestwin II’s influence in the western frontiers of his realm, as evidenced by the defence agreement concluded between the East Pomeranian Duke and the Bishop of Cammin Hermann on 22 June 1287 in Malechów\(^{92}\). Contrary to some researchers, Śliwiński concluded that this agreement protected both parties not against the attack of the Brandenburg Margraves, but against the invasion of Vitslav II of Rügen or Bogislaw IV of West Pomerania. The Ascanians were excluded from this group, because they could attack the Duchy of East Pomerania through the Bialogard land, which was indirectly subordinate to them. They did not need to lead their armies through the dominion of the Bishop of Cammin.

---

89 Rymar, *Wielkie Pomorze obszarem lennym*, 37 also believed that in 1277 the Margraves bought from Vitslav II of Rügen the hereditary right to the Sławno land for 3000 marks.

90 Osieckowski, *Polityka zewnętrzna Księstwa Rugii*, 90, 92 (despite the fact that in note 158 the author quoted a fragment of the Prenzlau treaty).


The second reason for the Rügen-Brandenburg alliance was the exclusion, in 1287, by the East Pomeranian nobles of both the Rugian ruler and one of the Brandenburg Margraves from the group of potential successors of the Duke of Gdańsk\textsuperscript{93}. Both were previously considered as potential heirs of Mestwin II. The negotiations on this matter must have been quite advanced, which was favoured by the fact that Przemysł II did not have a male heir either. Mestwin II was to finally agree to the possible succession of the Brandenburg Margrave. His candidacy was presented at the assembly of East Pomeranian Lords. An alternative candidate to take power in Eastern Pomerania as the successor of Mestwin II, and who was supported by the knights of the Sławno land, was Vitslav II. According to the above-mentioned Buckow notes, these plans were thwarted by the Pomeranian barons. At the same time, they declared their support for further cooperation with Bogislaw IV of West Pomerania. It was in him that they saw the successor of Mestwin II in the event of the death of Przemysł II without male issue. Mestwin II agreed with the Pomeranians’ stance. Przemysł II also respected the opinion of the Pomeranian nobles and ceased to cooperate with the Brandenburg Margraves. According to Śliwiński, these decisions were taken during the assembly in Słupsk, which took place on 15 August 1287\textsuperscript{94}. Its indirect effect was another colloquium on 23 November 1287, which gathered Mestwin II, Przemysł II and Bogislaw IV\textsuperscript{95}. Failure to keep the promises given to the Brandenburg Margraves, together with the irretrievably lost material and financial outlays incurred by the Ascanians\textsuperscript{96} and the failed expectations of the ruler of Rügen, led to the alliance and aforementioned Rügen-Brandenburg Treaty of 20 March 1289 in Prenzlau\textsuperscript{97}.

While the dashed hopes could actually be the bond in the alliance of the Margraves and the Rugian ruler, it must be clearly indicated that the cooperation between both parties was certainly in existence already in the summer of 1287. As in the case of the agreement between Vitslav II and John II, Otto IV and Conrad of 1277, the Scandinavian affairs were the underlying cause here. On 22 November 1286, the son of Christopher I and Margaret Sambiria, the Danish King Erik Glipping died, stabbed to death (during a hunt) by unknown perpetrators. The murderers were never found.


\textsuperscript{94} PU, 424; Śliwiński, \textit{Mściwoj II (1224–1294)}, 330.

\textsuperscript{95} PU, 426.

\textsuperscript{96} According to the Buckow notes known from the mention by Johannes Bugenhagen (Otto Heinemann, hrsg. v., Johannes Bugenhagens, \textit{Pomerania}, III, XIV, 123), Mestwin II was to receive grain and silver from the Margrave of Brandenburg. Labuda, \textit{Kultura materialna i artystyczna}, 574; Śliwiński, \textit{Mściwoj II (1224–1294)}, 329.

\textsuperscript{97} See Śliwiński, \textit{Mściwoj II (1224–1294)}, 349, where the author referred to the signatories of the treaty as those who were united by the harm done to them in 1287.
Accusations made against the potential assassins of the King, however, at that time became a weapon in the struggle for power and influence in Scandinavia. Accused of murdering the ruler were, among others, Count Jacob Nielsen of Halland and the royal steward, Peter Höfel and his associates. Later, the accusations were also made against Waldemar IV of Schleswig, who, together with the Queen Dowager of the murdered King, became the legal guardians of the under-age Prince Erik Menved. On 25 May 1287, a congress of Danish lords took place in Nyborg. Further steps to be taken in the face of the king’s death were discussed. The congress was attended by Queen Dowager Agnes' brother, i.e. Otto IV “with the Arrow”, Margrave of Brandenburg. He then supposedly knighted Erik Menved. Vitslav II, the Danish vassal from Rügen, was also present there. He had already arrived there around 1 May 1287, as on that day he was making grants for the monastery in Neunkamp. On 5 May 1287, Vitslav II can be found (next to Margrave Otto IV) in a document issued by Erik Menved for the Cistercian convent in Reval. A day later, while already in Wagria (in Grobenitz), Otto IV and Conrad (who probably also participated in the congress in Nyborg) issued a document in which they informed that without the consent of Agnes, the widow of Erik Glipping and her son Erik Menved, they would not conclude any peace with the murderers of Denmark’s ruler. This commitment would also be repeated by Waldemar IV of Schleswig and Vitslav II of Rügen.

While organizing the affairs of the deceased Danish king (signatory to the agreement of 1277 involving the Margraves of Brandenburg and the ruler of Rügen and regarding the sale of the Sławno land to the Ascanians), the question of ownership of the said territory was raised again. It is actually unknown to what extent the deceased King fulfilled his financial obligations made in 1277. It is therefore possible that during the meeting of the Margraves with the Rugian ruler after the death of Erik Glipping, the plan of a renewed alliance began to ripen, and its aim was to seize the Pomeranian territory by the Margraves. The Margraves also maintained their contacts with the ruler of Rügen in the fall of 1287, when they met with him at the already mentioned congress in Schwedt. It should be remembered that during this colloquium, Otto IV and Conrad tried, inter alia, to secure the interests of the widow of Barnim I, Matilda

---


PommUB III, 1427.

Ibidem, 1425, 1427; Regeste, 1432.

PommUB, 1419; Regeste 1424.
of Brandenburg and her sons: Barnim II and Otto I, and perhaps neutralize Bogislaw IV\textsuperscript{103}.

On 24 June 1287, in Angermümde, Otto IV and Conrad made a pact with the son-in-law of Mestwin II Pribislaw of Bialogard and Richard von Friesach, among others on the military aid of the said vassals against every enemy of the Margraves\textsuperscript{104}. They also promised that they would not betray the Margraves in the future and that they would not wage any war without their consent. It cannot be ruled out that the terms of this agreement should be treated as preparations for a planned military action. Due to the location of the lands ruled by Pribislaw, only Pomerania could be the enemy against whom this alliance would be effective.

It is possible that the family ties of Pribislaw II with the ruler of East Pomerania and the feudal allegiance he pledged to Otto IV and Conrad gave him one more role to play. It was the function of a mediator between Mestwin II and the Ascanian family. At the end of January 1289, Pribislaw II travelled to the Duchy of East Pomerania. It is possible that he went to Mestwin II with a mission, the purpose of which was to test the possibility of financial settlement of the Margraves' claims to the Sławno and Darlowo lands\textsuperscript{105}. As mentioned above, on 20 March 1289, Otto IV and Conrad concluded in Prenzlau a treaty with Vitslav II. It included a stipulation enabling the land of Sławno to be obtained through voluntary entrustment of it to the ruler of Rügen by Mestwin II. Apparently, this possibility had been considered before. It is no coincidence that Vitslav II soon went to Kolberg, controlled by his son, the Bishop of Cammin. On 30 April 1289, he met with Pribislaw II there\textsuperscript{106}. The latter, addressing Vitslav II as his relative, gave up his claims to two villages in favour of the Cistercian abbey in Dargun in exchange for 100 marks in Kolberg coin. It was then probably concluded that any form of peaceful renunciation of the Sławno land by Mestwin II had no chance of being fulfilled. Hence, the only option left for the Rugian ruler and the Brandenburg Margraves was the military way. Conflict started after the death of Mestwin II and his successor Przemysł II. Rügen was first to join the fray. At the beginning of the 14\textsuperscript{th} century, Vitslav II’s son, Sambor, attempted to seize the Sławno land\textsuperscript{107}. However, the Middle Pomeranian engagement ended in his death. In 1306, the territory was

\textsuperscript{103} PommUB III, 1472, Otto Heinemann hrsg. v., ibidem, Bd. VI, (Stettin: Verlag Paul Rikammer 1907), 3937.

\textsuperscript{104} PommUB II, 1431; Regesten 1426; Wybranowski, “Upadek polityczny księcia Przybysława II, pana na Dobrej, Białogardzie i Olesznie, a sprawa likwidacji enklaw wpływów brandenburskich na Pomorzu Zachodnim do 1291–1292 roku”, Przegląd Zachodniopomorski, 14 (43), (1999), 2, 12. This treaty was connected with the homage paid to the Margraves by Pribislaw of Bialogarda, Dobra and Oleszna.

\textsuperscript{105} PommUB II, 1489; any doubts as to the political status of Pribislaw at the time were probably correctly removed by Wybranowski, Upadek polityczny, 13–15.

\textsuperscript{106} PommUB III, 1504; Wybranowski, Upadek polityczny, 14.

\textsuperscript{107} Śliwiński, Fragmenty dziejów politycznych ziemi sławieńskiej, 7–24.
taken over by the Margraves of Brandenburg, to the detriment of Władysław Łokietek (Ladislaus the Elbow-high). At the end of the above analysis, it is necessary to try and explain the reason for the occurrence of 3,050 marks, i.e. the amount which Vitslav II of Rügen undertook to pay in Prenzlau in 1289. This attempt should be treated as an alternative proposal to the ones already existent in the literature and also attempting to solve the above-mentioned puzzle. However, they leave room for further research and are currently difficult to accept. The need to pay for the territory that was to be acquired by peaceful means or by force by one of the parties to the political pact should indicate the rights to the acquired land being accepted by others. This activity also needed to have an appropriate legal basis in the system in which both parties to the contract were functioning and which they accepted. The promise of payment, therefore, cannot be reduced to mere monetary compensation for a previous sales contract (of 1277). In 1289, the Ascanians agreed that the Prince of Rügen should seize, by all available means, the land to which they claimed suzerainty and property rights. The sum mentioned in the treaty of 1289 was probably the price for the permission to take over the territory which the Margraves considered theirs and for which Vitslav II had to pay. It is therefore possible that it was a case of a legal regulation resembling the so-called “relevium”. In the fief system, this term represented a succession fee which was paid to the senior lord when the vassal was changed. Initially, it was a fee for a life fief. Later, the heirs of the deceased vassal, initially male and later also female, paid it to their lord. Next, “cognati”, i.e. collateral relatives also on the distaff side were allowed to inherit the fief. Of course, this right was limited in some respects by the will of the senior lord who, under certain conditions, could take the fief from his vassal and grant it to another person. It was important that the recipient was of equal status with the deceased vassal and was born in wedlock. Ancestors of both lines of the Brandenburg Margraves: John I and Otto III were to pay such a fee in 1231 in Ravenna, when Emperor Frederick II granted to John I (and in the event of his death to Otto III) the lands owned by their father Albrecht II. In that case, however, these costs were covered by the then Archbishop of Magdeburg, Albrecht II von Schwarzburg. Earlier, however, he collected a large sum from them.

---

110 Reynolds, Lenna i wasale, 969–970.
for granting the Margraves their allodial lands as a fief\textsuperscript{112}. The young Ascanians had to pay it, if only on account of the defeat they suffered in the battle against the Archbishop at Plan in 1229\textsuperscript{113}. In the light of the law recognized by the Brandenburg Margraves, from 1269 (i.e. from the homage of Mestwin II paid to the Margraves in Arnswalde (Choszczno)), every ruler of the Sławno land should settle the matter of his authority with the Ascanians of the Johannine line. After the purchase of the Sławno land from Vitslav II in 1277, the Margraves wished to convert the fiefdom into actual possession of this territory. Its recovery by Mestwin II thwarted this intention and forced them to undertake attempts to retrieve the Sławno land. This could be achieved through a buyout from the East Pomeranian ruler or an armed invasion. According to the plans, both variants were to be carried out by Vitslav II (nephew of Mestwin II). It is believed that the Prince, through a grant by Rudolf Habsburg, became in 1283 the vassal of the German Reich in terms of the continental estates belonging to Rügen. As regards the island itself, however, he was still to recognize Danish suzerainty. So at least with regard to estates located outside Rügen itself, he had to obey the laws in force in the Reich. It also concerned the claims of the Brandenburg Margraves to the Sławno land. For these reasons, when substituting for the current vassal of the Ascanian family, his uncle Mestwin II, Vitslav II had to pay them for it. For this price, the Margraves probably gave up their feudal rights to the Sławno land and agreed to its equal division, similar to the planned division of the part of Gdańsk-Pomerania.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

**Sources**


\textsuperscript{112} Alfred Bauch, *Die Markgrafen Johann I und Otto III von Brandenburg in ihren Beziehungen zum Reich 1220–1266–1267* (Breslau: Verlag von Edward Trewendt 1886), 6, note 5 (which explains the problem of feudal suzerainty of the archbishops of Magdeburg over the allodial lands of the Brandenburg Margraves) and 19.

\textsuperscript{113} Regesten, 598; Bauch, *Die Markgrafen Johann I und Otto III*, 19.


Literature


Kujot Stanisław, „Dzieje Prus Królewskich”, Roczniki Towarzystwa Naukowego w Toruniu 22 (1915): 823–1166.


Remarks on the Treaty of 20 March 1289 between the Brandenburg Margraves... 81


Rymar Edward, „Mściwoj II jako lennik margrabiów brandenburskich (w latach 1269–1273)“, *Studia z Dziejów Średniowiecza* 23 (2019): 216–244.


Sello Georg, „Brandenburgisch-Magdeburgische Beziehungen 1266–1283”, 


On 20 March 1289 in Prenzlau, the Rugian Prince Vitslav II concluded a treaty with the Brandenburg Margraves from the Johannine line: Otto IV “with the Arrow” and Conrad. The agreement concerned an equal division of Gdańsk Pomerania, which was intended to be seized after the death of Mestwin II. It also contained clauses regarding the possibility of acquiring the Sławno land by peaceful means or by force. Its takeover was to be handled by Vitslav II. The Brandenburg Margraves, Otto IV and Conrad, committed themselves to military and financial support of Vitslav II in this undertaking. After seizing the Sławno land, Vitslav II agreed to pay the Margraves 3,050 silver marks.

The Treaty of Prenzlau has been discussed several times in the literature of the subject. However, for some reason the development of research on the relationship between Brandenburg and Pomerania has not broadened the knowledge of its content in the literature on the subject. With regard to some items, one can even speak of a regression in the knowledge of the provisions of the Treaty of Prenzlau. For this reason, this study attempts to indicate the simplifications that contributed to the ever-rudimentary knowledge of the agreement in the works of contemporary researchers.

It seems that the Prenzlau Treaty should be considered in the light of the fief law functioning in the German Reich. It was concluded by the parties that recognized and respected this law. This fact possibly explains why it was necessary for Vitslav II to pay the Brandenburg Margraves a fee after the seizure of the Sławno land.
UWAGI W SPRAWIE HISTORIOGRAFICZNEGO SPOJRZENIA NA UKŁAD Z 20 MARCA 1289 R. MIĘDZY MARGRABIAMI BRANDENBURSKIMI Z LINII JOANNICKIEJ I PRINCEPSEM RUGIJSKIM WISŁAWEM II ORAZ MIEJSCA TEJ UMOWY W PLANACH ZAJĘCIA POMORZA GDANSKIEGO PO ŚMIERCI MŚCIWOJA II

Słowa kluczowe: Pomorze, Brandenburgia, Rugia, Wielkopolska, książęta pomorscy, Mściwoj II, Bogusław IV, margrabiowie brandenburscy, Jan II, Otton IV ze Strzałą, Konrad, princeps (= Fürst) Wisław II rugijski, biskupi kamieńscy Herman von Gleichen, Jaromar, Przemysł II, układ w Prenzlau (20 marca 1289 r.)

STRESZCZENIE

20 marca 1289 r. w Prenzalu princeps rugijski Wisław II zawarł układ z margrabiami brandenburskimi wywodzącymi się z linii joannickiej: Ottonem IV ze Strzałą i Konradem. Umowa dotyczyła równego podziału Pomorza Gdańskiego, które zamierzano opanować po śmierci Mściwoja II. Zawierała też klauzule dotyczące możliwości pozyskania na drodze pokojowej lub militarnej ziemi sławieńskiej. Operację jej przejęcia przeprowadzić miał Wisław II. Margrabiowie brandenburscy Otton IV i Konrad zobowiązali się do militarnego i finansowego wspomożenia Wisława II w tym przedsięwzięciu. Po zajęciu ziemi sławieńskiej Wisław II zgodził się zapłacić margrabiom 3050 grzywien srebra.

Układ prenzlawski kilkakrotnie był już omawiany w literaturze przedmiotu. Z jakiegoś jednak powodu rozwój badań nad relacjami między Brandenburgią i Pomorcem nie pogłębił znajomości jego treści w literaturze przedmiotu. W niektórych punktach można wręcz mówić o regresie w znajomości postanowień umowy prenzlawskiej. Z tego powodu w niniejszym artykule starano się wskazać uproszczenia, które przyczyniły się do coraz słabszej recepcji układu w świadomości współczesnych badaczy.

Wydaje się, że układ prenzlawski powinien być rozpatrywany na tle prawa lennego funkcjonującego w Rzeszy Niemieckiej. Zawarły go strony, które owe prawo uznawały i je respektowały. Dzięki temu być może daje się wyjaśnić konieczność zapłaty margrabiom brandenburskim przez Wisława II, po zajęciu przez niego ziemi sławieńskiej.