NORWEGIAN SHIPOWNERS IN THE PORTS OF THE POLISH CUSTOMS AREA IN THE YEARS 1919–1939 (MAIN PROBLEMS)

In the interwar period the Norwegian merchant fleet was ranked fourth-sixth in the world. That is why Norway was an attractive economic partner for Poland, which in 1919 did not possess any merchant fleet. In the same year the Norwegian government sent to Poland an economic mission headed by Samuel Eyde, the Norwegian shipowners and their Union were represented by Thor Thoresen. Regrettably, at the beginning of the 1920s financial problems of Poland resulted in the lack of interest in operating the port of Gdańsk on the part of the Norwegian shipowners. In 1921 one of the biggest Norwegian shipowners, Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab (BDS), took up transporting herring to Gdańsk purchased within the so called second Polish-Norwegian Herring Contract. In the same year BDS set up a branch in Gdańsk, and in 1928 – in Gdynia, Bergenske Baltic Transport plc (‘Bergenske’ or BBT). In 1921 BDS set up a navigational line to the Baltic ports and London, and in 1931 – together with Det Stavangerske Dampskibsselskab – another line to the ports of western Norway. BDS participated in the creation of smaller shipping companies (Nord Ost-See Reederei A-G, Standard Line Reederei A-G, Bellmore Reederei A-G, Norna Reederei-Gesellschaft

In the interwar period  the Norwegian merchant shipping was the 4 th to 6 th biggest in the world and its scope of operation included mainly ocean ports of the world. As far as the entries into the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia are concerned, it occupied -respectively -the 5 th and the 6 th places. The importance of the Norwegian shipowner in the Polish harbours (the Port of Gdańsk was included in the Polish customs area on January 1 st , 1922) was augmented by the fact that the Republic of Poland was a young state at that time and possessed a tiny merchant shipping, which could not satisfy the country's shipping needs; additionally, the size and importance of the Norwegian merchant shipping might further the development of the ports in Gdańsk and Gdynia, as well as enhance establishing ocean connections of those ports.
The above presented facts translate into research postulates, which will be analysed in this article. What should be first investigated is the scope of engagement of the Norwegian shipowners in the ports of Gdańsk and Gdynia. Additionally, the article is an attempt to answer the question concerning the extent to which the Norwegian merchant fleet was used by Poland. As this article is an abbreviated version of a wider publication (to be launched soon), here the characterisation of the sources and the current state of research have been omitted. R. Omang, Norsk utenrikstjeneste, vol. 2: Stormfulle tider 1913-1928(Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1959, 304; Szymański, Stosunki gospodarcze, 39; idem, "Etablering av diplomatiske forbindelser mellom Polen og Norge i årene 1919", Folia Scandinavica Posnaniensia 9 (2006: 305. In the letter from KNP to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) dated 17 th June, 1919, and in 'Monitor Polski' there appeared the information that the Polish State had been recognised by Norway by virtue of the Royal rescript dated 21 st May, 1919. Cf.: Archiwum Akt Nowych (henceforth: AAN), Przedstawicielstwo Rady Regencyjnej Królestwa Polskiego w Berlinie, catalogue no. 20, Letter from KNP to MSZ (MFA) dated 17 th June, 1919, 924;'Monitor Polski', 136 (21.06.1919), 2.
Official Polish-Norwegian talks took place in Paris in June. 6 The Norwegians had already known that the Polish intended to build a new port on the Baltic shore they were given. The Polish were of the opinion that from among the three Scandinavian states the best choice was Norway, as it possessed a huge merchant fleet and was able to breathe new life into the Polish maritime commerce, at the same time taking care of exports and imports of Poland. Those plans resulted from Poland's aspirations to become independent from the domination of the German economy, and especially the German merchant fleet. 7 The Polish-Norwegian talks produced tangible results already on July 9th, 1919 when -in view of a fall in the turnover with France -a decision was made in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Utenriksdepartementet, UD) to organise an economic mission in Poland headed by S. Eyde. 8 Another important decision was to appoint a representative of the Norwegian Union of Shipowners (Norges Rederforbund, NRF) 9 to be sent to Poland. Kristofer Lehmkuhl, director of Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab (BDS), one of the biggest Norwegian shipping companies, proposed Einar Nielsen for that position, a member of the BDS board and a person responsible for shipping contacts within the Baltic Sea in that company. 10 The management of NRF appointed Thor Thoresen as the shipowner's candidate. 11 The Norwegian mission headed by Eyde came to Poland in August 1919. The meeting of the Polish and Norwegian representatives took place in Warsaw, with 6 E. Denkiewicz-Szczepaniak, "Działalność dyplomatyczna i gospodarcza Samuela Eydego w Polsce w latach 1919", in: Polska-Norwegia 1905, ed. J. Szymański (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2005 Nasjonalbiblioteket i Oslo, Håndskrifstsamlingen, Sam Eydes arkiv (henceforth: NBO, Hs, SE arkiv), untitled document that commences with the words: Under mit ophold i Paris, 1-3. 8 Riksarkivet (henceforth: RA), Utenriksdepartementet (henceforth: UD), catalogue no 2559, H4-NII, Kommersielldelegasjon til Polen fra Norge, Bind I 1919, Letter from UD to Jörgen Blydt, the commissioner for trade, dated 10 VII 1919. 9 The Norwegian Union of Shipowners, since 1984 the Norwegian Union of Shipping Companies (Norges Rederiforbund), was created in 1909 as an organisation protecting shipowners against the state's interference in the technical, financial and organisational questions of the Norwegian sea freight. In the 1920s that organisation gained influence in many ports dispersed all over the world, inter alia in New York, New Orleans, Newcastle, Cardiff, Liverpool, Hull, Atwerp, Hamburg, and Rotterdam. Cf.: S.A. Braekhus, Norges Rederforbund 190915. september -1934(Oslo: Forbundet Oslo, 1934B. Kolltveit, J.G. Bjørklund, "Norsk sjøfart i det 20. århundre", in: Norsk sjøfart, vol. 2, ed. B. Berggren, A.E. Christensen, B. Kolltveit (Oslo: Dreyer, 1989) the participation of -inter alia -Sophus E. Dahl, head of the Norges Bank (Norwegian Bank), Wilhelm Gjersøe, T. Thoresen, Żegowski, Barański 12 and Ludwik Spiess, the Norwegian honorary consul in Warsaw. The most important document that presented the state of research of the Mission is a 37-page study of October 1919, which is a picture of the Polish economy at the beginning of its independent functioning. It contains -inter alia -the record of the conversation between W. Gjersøe and Admiral Kazimierz Porębski, 13 which shows that there was no coordination in the plans of the Polish side concerning the creation of a Polish-Norwegian shipping company. 14 Another problem dealt with at the meetings was the question of the Vistula, which was to facilitate the transport of goods from the whole of the country to Gdańsk and vice versa. 15 Very detailed information on the parameters of tugs, sluices, shipping conditions in particular seasons suggests that the Norwegians treated Poland as a transit country. Such a statement may be deduced from the fact that according to the report of October 1919 the Vistula was still for a long time to play a transit role. The Norwegians also got interested in the Black Sea, which Poland might use for navigation after building a port in the Romanian town of Brăila. 16 Regretfully, the poor financial condition of Poland eliminated the possibility of establishing more intensive Polish-Norwegian shipping relations and of using the port of Gdańsk in 1919. What may be regarded as the only success of the mission of S. Eyde is signing the Polish-Norwegian Herring Contract on November 3rd, 1919 and the related loan of 28 million given by Norway, 17 as well as appointing S. Eyde Norwegian minister and general consul of Norway in Warsaw. On 12 Regrettably, the first names of Żegowski and Barański were unavailable. 13 Admiral Kazimierz Porębski fulfilled the most important post in the sphere of maritime policy, the head of the Department for Maritime Matters; he was responsible for merchant fleet, maritime economy, ports, shipping and inland navigation. 14 NBO, Hs, Se arkiv, Rapport fra den norske delegation til Polen, Kristiania 1919, 33 the other hand, according to Rye Holmboe, Norwegian minister of supplies, the appointment was paid by a huge surplus of herring. 18 There was another Norwegian mission to Poland, in April 1920. That time it was headed by captain Richard Otter and Gabriel Smith, port director, who established contacts with Prime Minister Leopold Skulski and Antoni Olszewski, minister of industry and trade. 19 The envoys were charged with researching the functioning of the future Polish merchant fleet and the usefulness of Gdańsk plots, which the Polish government might purchase to build wharves, shipyards, buildings and storage places. 20 The fact that R. Otter and G. Smith had been employed shows that Poland was still uncertain about the possibility to fully enjoy the rights in the Free City of Danzig/Gdańsk. In spite of such doubts, just after signing the Treaty of Riga, one of the biggest Norwegian shipowners, BDS, invested his capital in Gdańsk, and next quite soon he created one of the biggest broking company there, which enhanced the development of the port of Gdańsk, and in the subsequent years also of the port of Gdynia.

The Activity of Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab in Gdańsk and Gdynia
After the First World War BDS, Walford Baltic Transports Ltd. (WBT), a London shipping company, and Polskie Towarzytwo Żeglugi Morskiej (Polish Shipping Company) 'Sarmacja', plc, established cooperation providing part of the supplies resulting from the second Polish-Norwegian Herring Contract signed on January 22nd, 1921. 21 The deliveries made by the Bergen shipowner allowed to reveal the condition prevailing in the port of Gdańsk and the needs of the Polish maritime trade; thanks to that, on April 27th, 1921 the representatives of the three com panies signed a contract of mutual cooperation. 22 Therefore, the statement 161 Norwegian Shipowners in the Ports of the Polish Customs Area… expressed by Jan Szymański is false: the idea to create 'Sarmacja' did not mature during the talks within the mission of S. Eyde. 23 The second Polish-Norwegian Herring Contract and the transports of herring were a decisive factor in rapprochement between BDS and 'Sarmacja', and also the port of Gdańsk. Besides, 'Sarmacja' was created on November 9th, 1919 in Cracow without Norwegian capital. 24 The final decision about the cooperation with WBT was made by the management of BDS in July  As early as in the first year of its activity in the port of Gdynia BDS set up a maritime connection with western Norway, the Baltic (Gdańsk, Riga, Tallinn, Petersburg) and London; the Russian port was operated by four to six ships. 30 The potential of BDS as a shipowner in the ports of the Polish customs area was not fully exploited. And even the Polish-Norwegian Commercial and Navigational Contract signed on December 22nd, 1926 could not change the situation, 31 because in 1927 the tariffs on ships up to 5,000 GRT 32 were raised in the biggest Norwegian ports, i.e. for many units of BDS. Because of the increased cost the Bergen shipowner decided to operate only two vessels in the Baltic. 33 In 1931 BDS started a new chapter in its activity setting up -together with Stavangerske Dampskibsselskab (DSD), a shipowner from Stavanger -a new sea connection of Bergenske-Stavangerske Østersjølinjen (Baltic Line). The moment was propitious for such activities because by virtue of the Law dated February 20th, 1929 a new protocol was added to the Polish-Norwegian Commercial and Navigational Contract, thanks to which treacle containing less than 70% of sugar, imported to Norway, was duty-free; all the additional charges on rock salt were done away with, and the duty on herring imported to Poland was decreased by 66.5%. 34 What was more on October 1st, 1929 new tariffs were introduced, whichinter alia -included discounts on the exported grain at the level of 5-10%. 35 APG, Senate of Free City of Gdańsk (henceforth: SWMG), catalogue no. 1078, Letter written by R. Battagli dated 9.07.1936. 30 Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskabs virksomhet i aaret 1921; RA, UD, 2765, H1-F, Danzig: Årsberetninger, Årsberetning for 1922. 31 Polish-Norwegian Commercial and Navigational Contract signed on December 22 nd , 1926 guaranteed equal treatment of ships with their cargoes, passengers and luggage in ports, basins, territorial waters of the sides. Additionally, the contract introduced a uniform norm for all the payments. In the case of granting a profit to a third country the norm was to be automatically implemented in the commerce between Poland and Norway excluding special concessions granted to domestic fishery and cabotage. The conditions of granting tonnage certificates for ships were specified, and so were the questions concerning cargoes in ports and sea rescue. The decisions included in the Contract were in force in the territory of the Free City of Gdańsk. Bergenske-Stavangerske Østersjølinjen operated the ports of western Norway (i.e. Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim and others) according to the contract with Fred Olsen & Co, a shipowner from Oslo, whose ships entered the ports of eastern Norway (mainly Kristiansund, Oslo, Moss, and Drammen). 36 In practice it meant creating a monopoly in sea freights from the ports of the Polish customs area to Norway. Thus BDS and DSD got the guarantee on regular transports, moreover they had only two ships involved in those freights. At the beginning within the 14-day line there was one ship belonging to DSD, S/S Jaederen. When Det Bergenske Dampskibsselskab became more involved in the Baltic freights, it introduced another ship, a small S/S Ursa. 37 After the normalisation of the Polish-Lithuanian relations in 1938 the ships of the Baltic Line reached Klaipėda, which was connected overland with the Polish District of Vilnius. For the shipowners from Bergen and Stavanger the most important were the transports of grain and linen. 38 45 which sailed to Rio de Janeiro, Santos, Buenos Aires, and the Baltic ports, including the Finnish harbours. 46 In 1924 the SAL ships stopped for a while operating the port of Gdańsk. The Norwegian freights of the South-American line to the ports of the Polish customs area was resumed in 1932, but they were never to achieve a significant level. BBT was also engaged in the activities of tiny shipping companies in Gdańsk. On April 4th, 1922 Nord Ost-See Reederei A-G 47 was set up, which altogether had five vessels 48 sailing under the flag of Gdańsk between that town and other Baltic ports and the harbours of the North Sea, 49 as well as between Norway and the Mediterranean ports. The company was closed down at the beginning of 1925. 50 Another company, Standard Line Reederei A-G, was set up on the initiative of BDS and E.B. Aaby, a shipping company from Christiania that operated a connection between the ports of southern Portugal and the western coast of France. After Spain and Portugal imposed an embargo on Norwegian exports goods, inter alia on klipfish, 51 E.B. Aaby registered the ships under the Gdańsk flag in a newly created shipping company, with the help of the capital of BBT. 52 When the restrictions were abolished in April 1923, four ships of E. B. Aaby were registered again under the Norwegian flag. 53 The company was closed down much later, on December 1924. 54 Another company, which cooperated with BDS, was -created on September 9th, 1922 -a partly English company, Bellmore Reederei A-G. 55 The company had a sailing/motor vessel Bellmore (248 GRT) purchased from the company Bell Lines Ltd of Hull. Regrettably, in mid-January 1923 Bellmore was taken in for repair at a shipyard. After the repair the ship kept losing manoeuvrability in bad weather conditions, and as a result almost all her voyages took too long and kept making a loss. That is why since October 1923 Bellmore was moored at a quay in the port of Gdańsk, 56 and the company was soon closed down.
At the turn of April and May 1930 still another shipping company was set up, Norna Reederei-Gesellschaft mbH. 57 The company had S/S Barbara (2,150 GRT), the name of which was changed to S/S Norna by virtue of the contract signed on March 26th, 1930 between BBT and Fridtjof Sundt; at the same time she was registered under the Gdańsk flag as a property of the company Norna GmbH with the headquarters in Gdańsk. 58 Next S/S Norna was made over to Fridtjof Sundt by virtue of a time charter, 59 thanks to which the shipowner took over the whole control over the ship leaving all the formalities to be done in Gdańsk by BBT. 60 Unfortunately, S/S Norna ran aground near Namsos. As a result of the damage 52  the management of BBT revoked the contract with Norna GmbH together with its expiration (the contract was to expire on October 20th, 1931). 61 Undoubtedly, the above mentioned 'Sarmacja' was in the Polish historiography one of the best investigated shipping companies of the interwar, which had close relations with BDS. That fact allows me to pass over the detailed questions related with the functioning of the Polish shipowner referring the reader to the available literature. 62 The only thing I would like to emphasise are the positive effects of the activity of 'Sarmacja'; undoubtedly, the effect that should be regarded as positive is the fact that many sailors working for the company in question were soon employed in Żegluga Polska and Gdynia -Ameryka Linie Żeglugowe SA (GAL).
Additionally, it is worth discussing the question of the collapse of 'Sarmacja'; in relevant publications two events of 1926 are passed over, although they should not be marginalised. In May English miners staged a strike, thanks to which Poland very quickly captured new coal markets in Scandinavia, the region that so far had been buying coal from the United Kingdom. That situation induced the Scandinavian shipowners and the ones coming from other countries to get interested in the ports of the Polish customs area; 'Sarmacja' with its obsolete fleet of ships certainly could not face up to the ensuing intensified competition. Additional competition was to appear in the form of a new Polish shipping company; the Norwegians had known about the plan to set up such a company at least since March 23rd, 1925. 63 Żegluga Polska, a Polish shipping company, was set up in 1926; it was subsidised by the Polish government.
The literature is silent about the circumstances in which BBT was closed down. The discussion about this topic should be started with the information that the Norwegian shipowner decided to close down the activity in Gdańsk and Gdynia because of the escalating conflict between Poland and Germany in the Free City of Gdańsk, and by the efforts of Poland to increase its influence in 'Bergenske'. Finally, in place of the BBT branches a new company was set up in Gdańsk The conflict between Polish and German influences took also place in the management of BBT. E. Nielsen represented the German side and Jens Ejbøl, a Dane, the Polish one. At a moment they both negotiated on their own; the Norwegian consul not being able to reach some German circles came to an agreement with the Gdańsk Senate. The talks of E. Nielsen were to closer bind BBT to German capital when loans from Dresdner Bank and Bank von Danzig were taken out to reorganise the company. On the other hand, since the end of 1936 J. Ejbøl had been in touch with Bohdan Nagórski, the director of the Council for Ports and Water Ways, who represented the Maritime Department. 65 According to Zygmunt Jędrzejewicz, employed in 'Bergtrans', the Norwegians who were alarmed at the prospect of taking over the capital of BBT by the Germans joined J. Ejbøl. 66

The Remaining Norwegian Shipping Lines and Tramp Fleet
As far as ocean sailing is concerned an interesting shipowner was Wilhelm Wilhelmsen from Tønsberg, who on January 1st, 1914 had taken over the Norwegian Line to the Gulf of Mexico (Norge-Mexico Gulf Linjen, NMGL). 67 In the years 1920-1956 the post of the NMGL director was fulfilled by Christian Strand, 68 a worker of Wilhelm Wilhelmsen. The most important merchandise that was transported by the Tønsberg shipowner was cotton. As early as in 1924 there were attempts to direct NMGL from New Orleans to Gdańsk, thanks to which it could have been possible to import American cotton and tobacco to Eastern Europe omitting the ports in Hamburg and Bremen. 69 In 1925 BBT set up an agency in Gdańsk for Wilhelm Wilhelmsen and a few Swedish shipowners, including the ones belonging to Broström. 70 In the years 1923-1925 the ships of the Tønsberg shipowner reached Gdańsk.
A bigger involvement of Wilhelm Wilhelmsen in Gdańsk and Gdynia resulted from a meeting that took place in October 1930 in Grand Hotel in Oslo between the representative of the Tønsberg shipowner (C. Strand) and the ones of the Broström Concern (Vidar Olburs and captain Birger Zander) who were to finally endorse the plan to create cotton transports to Gdynia. 71 The talks ended with signing an agreement between the Swedish American-Mexican Line (A/B Svenska Amerika-Mexico-Linjen, SAML) and Wilhelm Wilhelmsen, which regulated the future transports of cotton to Gdynia. The Tønsberg shipowner wanted his ships to enter Gdynia once a month and to transport cotton and tobacco. 72 Undoubtedly, the cardinal factor in organising cotton transports was played by the decision of the Ministry of Communications dated January 1st, 1931, according to which cotton transported through the German-Polish border was moved from tariff class 3 to tariff class 2. 73 In February 1931 that propitious situation made Wilhelm Wilhelmsen together with SAML set up a new navigation line from the Gulf of Mexico to Gdynia and Gdańsk, Gulf-Gdynia Line (GGL), which actually was a branch of NMGL. In May of the same year Wilhelm Wilhelmsen' ships sailing within that line started voyages to Galveston, Houston, New Orleans, 74 and a little bit later to Tampa and Tampico; and trans-shipment to and from the islands of Middle America took place in New Orleans. 75 The GGL vessels were among the biggest ones that called in at the Polish ports, as on average they had 8,000 DWT. 76 The Norwegians wanted to streamline the cotton line by setting up a vice-consulate in Łódź on September 21st, 1932; it was headed by Arno Kindermann, the sales manager of the Pabianice company Krusche & Ender. 77

Norwegian Shipowners in the Ports of the Polish Customs Area…
The line developed quickly and in October 1933 70% of the cotton imported from America to the Polish customs area was transported by Norwegian ships. 78 As early as in 1933 it was certain that breaking the monopoly of Bremen was only the matter of time when new warehouses had been built, new contracts with the American producers of cotton signed and export duties on cotton reduced three times; the reduction was restricted only to the cotton imported thorough the port of Gdynia. 79 In 1937 Wilhelm Wilhelmsen became a shareholder of the company 'Bergtrans' (he held 26 out of 1,000 shares); the company was set up in place of BBT which had been closed down. 80 At the beginning the cooperation with the new broker did not indicate a significant growth, but as early as in January 1938 Wilhelm Wilhelmsen recorded seven entries into the port of Gdynia. 81 Wilhelm Wilhelmsen tried to expand his activity in the ports of the Polish customs area creating in 1933 a branch of the Norwegian Africa & Australia Line, which connected the Australian ports with Gdańsk and Gdynia. The merchandise transported to the Polish port was wool, and that time the function of broker was fulfilled by the Polish Maritime Agency (PAM). 82 Regrettably, the line to Australia and Africa stopped functioning in 1935. 83 In 1933 Wilhelm Wilhelmsen together with the Swedish East Asiatic Company of Göteborg set up another short-lived sea connection between Gdynia and the ports in British India. 84 Among the Norwegian shipping companies that operated the lines to Gdańsk and Gdynia in the interwar period the shipowner from Farsund, Gunstein Stray & Sønn, should be mentioned; its director was Andreas Stray, who in January 1932 set up a new line (Vore-Line) connecting Antwerp with the ports of the Polish customs area. The line was operated by three ships, S/S Doravore, S/S Bravore and S/S Ellavore, for which the function of broker was fulfilled by BBT, and in Antwerp -the Agence Maritime Zeyen (AMZ, since May 9th, 1935 AMZ was renamed Société Anonyme Zeyen, SAZ). 85 In 1933 as a result of misunderstandings BBT stopped being the broker for Vore-Line, and PAM occupied that post. 86 The contract with PAM included a stipulation that Vore-Line in cooperation with AMZ would be operating first of all the ports of Gdańsk and Antwerp, and other Belgian ports -Ghent, Brussels and Ostende -would be less important. 87 Thanks to the Rhine River navigation the merchandise transported by the ships of Vore-Line (in that case wood) reached Basel and Strasbourg through Antwerp. The freights were transported also to Haren, 88 Szczecin 89 ,and Bristol 90 with Antwerp used as a trans-shipping port.
The activity of Vore-Line was mainly based on complying with the conditions of the contracts concerning the transport of merchandise such as wood and corn (from Gdańsk and Gdynia) and scrap metal (return cargo from the Belgian ports). The main feature of those contracts was the interference on the part of the state authorities of the Republic of Poland through PAM. For those reasons the Norwegian shipowner could expect many financial profits and standing orders for transport of a lot of merchandise. This fact cannot be ignored while analysing the decision of Gunstein Stray & Sønn to go over to the Polish broker. Regrettably, Vore-Line kept suffering from problems concerning clearances of ships with full cargoes and the competition from the area of Finland. 91 Those problems contributed to the conflict between Gunstein Stray & Sønn, SAZ and PAM. Judging only from documents it is difficult to say who was right in the conflict, but what may be said is that the freights were poorly organised through the fault both of the Polish side and the Belgian one. The cooperation between Gunstein Stray & Sønn and SAZ was finished when on June 29th, 1939 the Norwegian shipowner signed a contract with Norwegian Shipowners in the Ports of the Polish Customs Area… Agence Maritime Baltique (AMB) represented by Henry Fiechter and Paul Braun 92 . In Brussels AMB was represented by J. J. Claes & Co, and in Ghent the company P. Best & Co SA, 93 but -according to the documents -PAM still was the agent of Vore-Line in Gdańsk and Gdynia.
While analysing navigation lines it is worth mentioning a few facts related to the shipowner Fred Olsen & Co, in spite of the scarcity of sources. First of all it should be underlined that Fred Olsen & Co belonged to the oldest Norwegian shipowners, as it had been set up in 1848. 94 According to some sources he started operating a navigation line from the Norwegian ports to Gdańsk in 1921. 95 The ships of Fred Olsen & Co transported corn delivered by the Polish Union of Corn Industry. 96 The sources indicate a cooperation between Fred Olsen & Co and the Polish Exports of Iron plc, which by virtue of the contract signed in February 1936 enabled the Norwegian shipowner to transport scrap metal and rails to the ports of eastern Norway. 97 An important element of the activity of the Norwegian shipowners was tramp shipping, i.e. irregular shipping. As far as Gdańsk was concerned the number of arrivals of tramps at the port was higher than the number of arrivals of liners throughout the interwar period. 92  Analysing Diagram 1 attention should be paid to the changing share of tramps in particular years in the port of Gdańsk. In the years 1921-1925 (in the years 1919-1920 the Norwegian shipping lines did not operate in Gdańsk) the degrees of the involvement of tramps and liners were almost identical, but in 1924 the number of liners was higher than the number of tramps. In turn, since 1926 the advantage of tramps over liners had been visible. What is more, that phenomenon cannot be explained by the strike of English miners and the ensuing increase of quantities of coal exported from the Polish customs area. Because of the fact that the Polish-Norwegian commercial and navigational contract was signed as late as in December 1926 the export of coal from Gdańsk on board the Norwegian ships started to the full in 1927.  1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939    Before 1925 the port of Gdynia had not played a significant role in Poland's maritime commerce 98 , and the Norwegian fleet was little engaged there. The proportion of arrivals of tramps and liners was different in Gdynia and Gdańsk. The advantage of tramps over liners was still visible, but in the years 1934-1936 liners gained an advantage in deadweight tonnage mainly thanks to a significant 98 W. Stopczyk, Handel międzynarodowy na Bałtyku (Toruń: Instytut Bałtycki, 1928), 69.  1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939  activity of Wilhelm Wilhelmsen's ships, which conclusively contributed to granting the privilege of 'base port' to Gdynia. 99 The available documents suggest that out of all the Norwegian lines operating in Gdańsk in the years in turn, in the years 1927-1939 There were other Norwegian shipping companies operating in Poland: Bergenske-Stavangerske Østersjølinjen, Vore-Line, Gulf-Gdynia Line and SAL; the last two had ships of the biggest capacity. In the port of Gdynia the most significant role was played by Wilhelm Wilhelmsen, next Fred Olsen & Co and Bergenske-Stavangerske Østersjølinjen. The vessels of SAL rarely called in at the Polish ports.

DWT
As far as the merchandise transported to Gdańsk in the interwar period is concerned the biggest share had package cargo (1291). 100 In addition to herring, of which the biggest cargoes were delivered to the port of Gdańsk in the years 1920-1926, important merchandise was scrap metal. It should be remembered that the majority of the voyages of the Norwegian ships to Gdańsk were made without cargo. The Norwegian ships took package cargoes from Gdańsk, with the exception of 1927 when wood was the dominant cargo, and the years 1928-1932 when coal was the dominant freight.
If countries are taken into consideration the most important was Norway: 1,352 arrivals at the port of Gdańsk; Great Britain -665, Sweden -559, Denmark -470, and Germany -424. Altogether from the non-Norwegian ports the Norwegian ships called in at Gdańsk 3,305 times. Norway also played a very important role in departures from the port of Gdańsk (1,739). Great Britain was the second (804) In the years 1935-1938 the import of scrap metal to the port of Gdynia displayed an increasing tendency (altogether 259,417,792 kg). The package cargo was the second most important merchandise (91,975,675.2 kg), followed by herring (45,288,000 kg). As far as export from Gdynia is concerned the most important was coal (1,216,269,750 kg), which was the most important merchandise exported from that port. A bit less important was coke (78,769,918 kg) and package cargo (340,363,008 kg), the freights of which exceeded half of the values of the exported coal in 1937.
The analysis of the arrivals at the port of Gdynia according to the countries indicates that the main role was played by Norway (302 arrivals), Great Britain (104 arrivals), Sweden (196 arrivals), Denmark (108 arrivals) and Germany (81 arrivals). There were 851 arrivals for the non-Norwegian ports. As far as departures are concerned: 399 vessels sailed away to Norway, 110 to Great Britain, 104 to Sweden, 35 to Germany, 30 to Denmark (Diagram 58). There were altogether 1090 voyages to non-Norwegian ports.
Voyages without cargo were typical of the freights operated by the Norwegian merchant fleet. The Norwegian ships called 1,898 times at the port of Gdańsk without cargo, they sailed away from Gdańsk without cargo 577 times. In the case of the port of Gdynia the numbers were respectively 892 and 598 in the years -1938. 101 101 APG, RPiDW, catalogue no. 1438, Schiffseingangs Journal vom 30 Juli 1918bis 30 Januar 1924catalogue no. 1439catalogue no. , Schiffeingags 1924catalogue no. -1926

Broking and Freight Forwarding
An essential aspect of the involvement of the Norwegian shipowners in operating Gdańsk and Gdynia was broking and freight forwarding, and BBT was the only Norwegian company that decided to undertake it. As far as broking is concerned, the most important partner of 'Bergenske' was Svenska Orient Linien (SOL); on March 24th, 1933 the two companies set up the Shipping Agency 'Poland-Levant' (Limited Liability Company) 'Polska-Lewant' Agencja Okrętowa Spółka z ograniczoną poręką with its headquarters in Gdynia. 102 In 1934 a few modern ships were added; they were equipped with the latest cooling apparatus. The Swedish line cooperated also with the Polish shipowner Żegluga Polska SA, whose ships participated in transports to/from the Near East since September 1st, 1935. The terms of cooperation between SOL and the Polish shipowner were set on the basis of the agreements of May 26th, 1934 and September 9th, 1935. On September 15th, 1934 a Polish-Swedish line was started. 103 The ships of that line operated Algiers, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Greece and the ports of the Black Sea. 104 Further profits were expected from the cooperation with the Polish shipping company on account of greater concentration of the trade in the ports of the Polish customs area. 105 According to the data depicting broking in 1936 'Bergenske' provided broking service to all the Norwegian shipowners who had regular connections with Gdańsk and Gdynia with the exception of Gunstein, Stray & Sønn, the owner of Vore-Line. BBT provided service to five Swedish shipping companies, three English companies and three German companies. The Finnish shipowners played a minor role. 'Bergenske' was among the leading Gdynia brokers, just after PAM and 'Polskarb '. 106 BDS exploited the potential of the port of Gdańsk, from which huge quantities of wood were exported in the interwar period. The management of B & WBT decided to deal in freight forwarding of wood setting up the company 'Bergford' Holz-Speditions und Lager GmbH between September 30th and October 10th, 1921. The name of the company was a combination of BERG-enske and Wal-FORD. The greatest credits for organising the company should be given to J. Ejbøl and Wilhelm Wirtschaft, 107 a Gdańsk businessman representing the wood sector; Wilhelm Wirtschaft and Otto Bühler 108 were directors of the company. Since May 22nd, 1932 the post of director was occupied by Ralph Johannes, who developed 'Bergford' establishing contacts with many companies of the wood industry. He set up a branch in Amsterdam, Antwerp, Pressburg (now Bratislava), Lviv, Paris, Prague, Warsaw and also in Vienna. 109 A difficult situation of 'Bergford' resulting from closing down BBT, as well as incertitude compounded by NRF, which in 1936 decided to decrease wood freights from the Baltic Sea and the White Sea, made BDS put its companies in Gdańsk and Gdynia up for sale. R. Johannes bought 'Bergford' for 1,000,000 Gdańsk gulden on credit obtained from Deutsche Bank. 110 The company 'Berghof' Lager und Warrant GmbH ('Berghof'), functioning under the wings of BDS, had a similar profile to 'Bergford'. The company was set up on the initiative of J. Ejbøl, M. Slaweit and S. Owren on June 23rd, 1923 in Gdańsk, where the company's headquarters were situated. 111 Because of the dependence on the economic situation of the wood market the development of 'Berghof' was parallel to economic fluctuations. The company was closed down on January 24th, 1938. 112 BBT also cooperated with companies dealing in freight forwarding of other goods than wood. In 1923 'Sarmacja' as the supplier of forwarding service was replaced by the Polish Lloyd plc, run by Aleksander Lednicki. 113 At the beginning the activity of the company was focused on agency in freight between Poland and także z polskimi firmami spedycyjnymi -Polski Lloyd SA i C. Hartwig SA. Wszystkie te firmy miały filie w Polsce i zagranicą, co pozwoliło BBT prowadzić transport komplementarny, a więc z użyciem transportu morskiego i lądowego.