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ISSN: 2450-7733     eISSN: 2300-4096    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/sip.2016.43/2-02
CC BY-SA   Open Access   CEEOL

Issue archive / nr 43/2 2016
FUNKCJONALNOŚĆ PARTYCYPACYJNEGO MECHANIZMU CENOWEGO PAY WHAT YOU WANT
(Functionality of participative price mechanism – pay what you want)

Authors: Ilona Bondos
Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie
Keywords: price pricing participative pricing innovative pricing Pay What You Want
Data publikacji całości:2016
Page range:12 (17-28)
Klasyfikacja JEL: M31
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

This article aims to verify the findings from scientific literature about the functions of Pay What You Want (PWYW) mechanism. It is a form of participative price mechanism that gives the buyer the greatest impact on the level of paid price. The author presented the results of her own study based on scenario method, the main conclusion is that the sellers’ fear about the result of applying PWYW in the form of buyers’ request of free products / services is unfounded. In the last part of the article practical conclusions regarding the potential of the analyzed price mechanism are presented.
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