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ISSN: 2450-7733     eISSN: 2300-4096    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/sip.2016.45/2-02
CC BY-SA   Open Access   CEEOL

Issue archive / nr 45/2 2016
O ROLI GIER TOWARZYSKICH W TWORZENIU I ROZWOJU TEORII GIER ORAZ JEJ EKONOMICZNYCH ZASTOSOWAŃ
(On the role of the social games in creation and development of game theory, statistics and its applications)

Authors: Ewa Drabik
Politechnika Warszawska
Keywords: game theory games with perfect and imperfect information social games gambling games one-armed bandit chess
Data publikacji całości:2016
Page range:14 (23-36)
Klasyfikacja JEL: C72
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

The game theory was created at the beginning of the 20th century upon the basis of social as well as gambling games, such as chess, poker, baccarat, hex or one-armed bandit. The aforementioned games lay solid foundations for analogical mathematical models (e.g. hex), artificial intelligence algorithms (hex), theoretical analysis of computational complexity attributable to various numerical problems (baccarat), as well as for illustration of several economic dilemmas – particularly in the case where the winner takes everything (e.g. noughts and crosses). The aim of the paper is to discuss these social games along with their potential mathematical models which are governed by the rules predominantly applicable to the social and natural sciences.
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