Emperor’s recruitment in the Republic of Poland done by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635

Keywords: dragons, Arnoldin, Thirty Years’ War, the Habsburgs, Władysław IV

Słowa kluczowe: zaciągi, Arnoldin, wojna trzydziestoletnia, Habsburgowie, Władysław IV

The mission of the Imperial Diplomat Arnoldin von Clarstein¹ to the Republic of Poland in 1635, in the context of the talks between Władysław IV and Sweden, was discussed by, among others, R. Lolo in his work on the position of the nobility in the face of the ongoing Thirty Years’ War.² A. Szelągowski³ and recently


³ A. Szelągowski, Rozkład Rzeszy i Polska za panowania Władysława IV, Kraków 1907, pp. 77–119.
R. Skowron⁴ and L. Höbelt⁵ wrote about his mission related to the efforts of the Habsburgs of Vienna to resume the war of the Republic of Poland with the Swedes and permissions for further recruitment to the Imperial Army. Because of the imperial and Spanish diplomacy activities, the aim of which was to take over the soldiers recruited by Władysław IV for the war with Sweden, we have full documentation of the surviving records in the archives in Vienna, Simancas and Madrid.⁶ A number of documents related to these engagements in the context of the participation of Zaporozhian Cossacks in the activities of the Thirty Years’ War were published in the annexes by G. Gajecky and A. Baran.⁷ On the other hand, the unsuccessful recruitment of the crown’s guard Samuel Łaszcza for the Imperial delegate Arnoldin was well described by M. Nagielski.⁸ The instruction given from the Viennese court to Arnoldin on 27 January 1635 even ‘expected’ Władysław IV to help the Empire plunged into war with the Protestant camp in the Reich and thus pointed to the necessity of war with Sweden, not to enter into peace talks with it in the face of the ending of the Truce of Altmark.⁹ Arnoldin’s speech at the Warsaw General Assembly was preceded by the correspondence between Emperor Ferdinand II and Władysław IV, where the Emperor asked the Polish monarch to welcome his delegate¹⁰. Arnoldin carried an embassy himself, reporting to the King and the Senate on the 28 February 1635. The Lesser Lithuanian Chancellor A.S. Radziwiłł spoke very succinctly about this event in his diary: “The emperor’s deputy Arnoldini, just before returning to the Emperor, was

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⁶ R. Skowron, Pax i Mars…, pp. 93–105.


⁹ R. Lolo, Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej…, pp. 357–358.

¹⁰ Ferdynand II to Władysław IV from Vienna, 2 III 1635; Haus Hof.u.Staatsarchiv w Wiedniu (hereinafter only HHu.St.A.), Polen I, karton 57, k.10.
Emperor’s recruitment in the Republic of Poland... graciously dismissed by the King”. The official legacy was to be received from the Polish monarch on March 20, which was confirmed by a personal letter from Władysław IV to Emperor Ferdinand II. According to R. Lolo, during the official legation, Arnoldin did not obtain permission to conduct official military recruitment on the territory of the Republic of Poland, and such permission was to be given by the monarch during a private farewell audience for the Imperial Member. This was in line with the nature and the way in which Władysław IV conducted his diplomacy, which was bound by the laws of the Republic of Poland in this respect. The conduct of the enlistments required the approval of the General Assembly, and Claude de Mesme, Count d’Avaux, the French MP, as the official mediator in the negotiations in Sztumska Wieś between Poland and Sweden, also sought to do so. Probably Arnoldini also consulted the issue of the enlistments from the beginning with the Russian voivode Stanisław Lubomirski, as evidenced by the correspondence between them preserved in the Vienna archives. The participation of the Russian voivode in negotiations with potential recruits to help the Imperial Delegate with capturing volunteers for imperial service is indisputable. R. Lolo was right to point out that the resolution passed by the Warsaw Assembly, entitled “Supporting the war with the Swedes”, gave Polish commissioners another argument that the Republic would not withdraw from the war without significant concessions from the Swedes, i.e. unblocking the Vistula trade. However, the matter of enlistments for the Emperor was not as positive as the Emperor’s delegate Arnoldin would have wished. Lubomirski himself, fearing the loss of popularity of the nobility of Lesser Poland, who re-

12 Władysław IV to Ferdynand II from Warsaw, 20 III 1635; HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 57, k. 129.
14 See S. Lubomirski to Maciej Arnoldin Clarsteina from Kolbuszowa 7 III 1635 i 19 III tr. From Warsaw and from Łańcut 23 III tr., HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 57, k. 37, 125–128, 144. Ferdinand II himself wrote to the Ruthenian voivode about the aid to Arnoldin in Vienna 2 III 1635; see G. Gajecky, A. Baran, The Cossacks in the Thirty Years War..., p. 93.
16 See the constitutions of the Crown General Sejm of Warsaw on the 6th of Sunday, 1635, commenced on the 31st of January, which can be found among Arnoldin’s reports addressed to Vienna; HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 57, k. 74–103; comp. R. Lolo, Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej..., p. 359.
peatedly spoke out against the recruitment in the area of the Republic of Poland for both sides of the conflict, advised the delegate not to respond with just a letter but to go personally to Łańcut and discuss all matters related to the enlistments.\textsuperscript{17}

Paweł Dworzański was the person who organized the enlistments, as he had the imperial patent for recruitment, which was reported to S. Lubomirski himself. The matters related to the recruitment of cavalry were handed over by Arnoldini to his successor Alexander Greiffenclau\textsuperscript{18}, who, using the Great Chancellor of the Crown S. Koniecpolski, held talks with the Crown Guard Samuel Łaszczyński and the Rittmeister Mikołaj Moczarski.\textsuperscript{19} According to A. Baran–Laszczyński and the Rittmeister Mikołaj Moczarski, the matters related to the recruitment of cavalry were handed over by Arnoldini to his successor Alexander Greiffenclau, who, using the Great Chancellor of the Crown S. Koniecpolski, held talks with the Crown Guard Samuel Łaszczyński and the Rittmeister Mikołaj Moczarski.\textsuperscript{19} According to A. Baran–Laszczyński, was supposed to take part in the preparations for the war with the Swedes in Royal Prussia, and Mikołaj Moczarski resigned from taking command over the recruits.\textsuperscript{20} However, the fact that several thousand horsemen were taken abroad, out of the Republic of Poland is clearly evidenced by the settlements of accounts with the individual rittmeisters who accepted the imperial service. According to the specifications enlisted for the Emperor’s service, from 24 May to the end of July, the following troops set off for Silesia: – Aleksander Sieradzki (Sieracki) – 500 Cossacks – Władysław Zaremba (28 May) – 300 Cossacks – Stanisław Czarniecki (13 June) – 300 Cossacks – Paweł Noskowski (16 June) – 600 and 200 Cossacks – Marcin Jedlicki (26 June) – 400 Cossacks\textsuperscript{21} – Aleksander Zakrzewski (4 July) – 300 and 400 Cossacks – Mikołaj Broniewski (5 July) – 600 Cossacks – Polnischer Edelman Scibiński (6 July) – 200 Cossacks – Erasmus Dembiński (7 July) – 500 horses – Lawrence Feketi (10 July) – 300 Cossacks.\textsuperscript{22} According to the second specification, where we also have the advance payments collected by the rotational masters, the composition of the body taken was as follows: – Aleksander Sieracki – 500 horses – Mikołaj Karaś – 100 horses – Marcin Aleksander Zarem-ba – 300 horses – Stanisław Czarniecki – 300 horses – Paweł Noskowski – 2000 horses (given in three groups on 16 June and 13 and 27 July) – Marcin Aleksander

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item S. Lubomirski to M. Arnoldin from Łańcut 23 III 1635; HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 57, k. 144.
\item See the correspondence between Arnoldin and A. Greiffenklau concerning the recruitment, which was used by L. Höbelt, Barocke Bomberflotten?, pp. 36–37.
\item See S. Koniecpolski’s correspondence with A. Greiffenclau and M. Arnoldini on 20 and 23 May 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 57, poszyt 3, pp. 76, 81–83.
\item Notes at the bottom of the list show that 2800 Cossacks were entered when the calculations show that 2600 were actually enlisted; see HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 58, k. 9 r–v.
\item End of page annotation; 2300 Cossacks; 5100 Cossacks in total, in fact, only 4900.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Zakrzewski – 400 horses – Mikołaj Broniewski – 600 horses – Marcin Jedlicki – 200 horses – Erazm Dembiński – 600 horses (12th showcase, 19th, 20th and 29th July) – Wawrzyniec Fekiety – 300 horses – Jan Achacy Rodaczki on Sieracki’s recommendation accepted for service gave 150 horses. A total of 5450 horses, for which the Imperial Commissioners paid 8,029 reichstalers. Of course, the recruitment was not without the incidents related to the movements to Silesia of such a big number of cavalry divisions simply raiding the neighbouring villages. S. Lubomirski himself, responsible for these troops, had to reprimand officers about their poor leadership over their soldiers being carried abroad. There is a letter to the rittmeister Aleksander Sieracki from Cracow on 10 July 1635, in which the Russian voivode, in the face of the news coming to him from Silesia about the robberies of the soldiers he recruited, threatens Sieracki that if it affects his relationship with the Emperor, he will be waiting for him after his return from abroad:

Please, Your Honour with your reputation, according to my recommendation, and my personal protection of honour, and not only don’t be a reason for such a shame, but if You were, between the company, would You try as a matter of urgency to calm them down for good fame and not for dishonour.

The Russian voivode admonished the rittmeister to behave correctly at the places of rest without oppressing the emperor’s subjects, as it is not only about the “honour of the nation” but his own as well. He continued to write:

And this is Your Honour about the situations you can hear about from the locals, which are far beyond the commissar’s regulation, you cut more for yourself, the more you go by as a reckless soldier, as the subjects you oppress, constantly bring complaints to the commissars of the Emperor.

The troops could not go unnoticed by the Cracow nobility because soldiers were led out by whole subunits and not individually, as Władysław IV himself had been

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23 Specyfikacja II; ibidem, k. 7-v; comp. R. Lolo, Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej…. p. 365 (the author mentions Jan Rodaczewski as the last of the rotational masters). Document issued in the work G. Gajecky, A. Baran, The Cossacks un the Thirty Years War…, doc. 9, pp. 98–100.
24 See “Information was für Puncta dem Herrn Palatino Russiae der Zeitzuhalten”, 9 julie 1635; HHu.St.A., Poland I, karton 58, k. 75–76v.
25 S. Lubomirski to A. Sieracki from Kraków 10 July 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 79.
26 Ibidem.
striving for. In the royal ordinance addressed to the citizens of the Republic of Poland, we read about the consent given to an imperial MP to enlist several thousand people for a war service with the consent of the Senate and Ferdinand II’s request. The monarch emphasized that no one should be afraid to go to this service but “with a warning not to go under the flags or in the pile abroad, but separately or a few at the time and without any harm or nuisance”.27

With majority of the matters related to the recruitment and, most of all, to the fact that the recruits were leading the troops through Silesia, the recruiters contacted Arnoldini directly; Władysław Zaręba from Kalinowy wrote to him on 13 July. He complained about the imperial commissioners as they burned down his own pantry: “I have a great obstacle and difficulty in adopting more company, because let the Magnificence of Your Honour imagine, none of our guests, in the house of their Lords are content with that meat and bread” and further emphasized that “neither did we Poles learn to sit behind the table without seasonings on it, even this parable has grown in our house that who does not eat pepper and does not know the king, will not live to war”.28 Arnoldin received similar letters from other Polish recruiters, such as Aleksander Sieracki from Tarnowskie Góry on 22 July. The rittmeister did not decide to visit the delegate personally because, as he wrote, he had to watch over the company when leaving Tarnowskie Góry as the commissioner general changed his quarters and directed him to Oleszyn. He sends a sergeant to him with the task of recruiting soldiers to the company and asking “that your honour give him there, in good memory of our distinctions, all the money which he will need following my letter.29 In the set of correspondence for the Polish Assets we also have other letters addressed to Arnoldin from Paweł Noskowski’s enlistment record30 as well as Samuel Stanislaw on Czarniecki’s Chernica31, Marcin Jedlicki32 or the rittmeister Sebastian Suliński33. The fact that Władysław IV was accurately informed about the enlisting is evidenced by a letter from the monarch to his courtier, the starost of Łomża, Kolno and Zambrów,

27 Batman of Władysław IV from Warsaw, 10 VI 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 57, teczka II, k. 68.
28 W. Zaręba to the delegate Arnoldin from Rybnik, 13 VII 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 110r-v. He also asked the delegate for a loan of 130 thalers for his further service to redeem the pledged items.
29 A. Sieracki to Arnoldin from Tarnowskie Góry 22 VII 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 185v.
30 P. Noskowski to Arnoldin from Łomża 14 July 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 118r.
31 S. Czarniecki to Arnoldin from Gliwice on August 2, 1635; HHu.St.A., poszyt II, k. 3r.
32 M. Jedlicki to Arnoldin from Radzikowo (?) 24 July 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 193r.
33 S. Suliński to Arnoldin of Swibin (?) 18 August 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, poszyt II, k. 41r.
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marked by Arnoldin as a senior recruiter – Paweł of Szreńsk Noskowski, dated 30 August 1635. The monarch wrote in it that:\34

the iuditio of His Majesty the King advises you to respond and do your duty in everything that is knightly and obedient, and you should do your utmost to make sure that you, as a keeper of more entrenched order of war discipline and obedience, would keep the knights’ matters in your hands as a glorious and victorious company.

Before the units recruited for imperial service in Brzeg, negotiations between the soldiers and imperial commissioners took place on the question of the recruitment and the remuneration due for the service. The answers to the requests made by Mr Arnoldin and his Commissioners have been preserved. The delegate said that the recruited had committed themselves to accept a person delegated by the emperor and the king of Poland as the commander of the enlistments. After the capitulation, after taking the money for 3 months, they were to go to the emperor’s service, including the pay, the commissioners proposed that not more than 6 thalers could be proposed to pay, because:\35

for the six thalers, many famous colonels and the people of Emperor served faithfully; we have no more money ready above the six thalers for three months; even more, you were also in the position of five thalers, which the noble people of his Emperor Majesty earned when the Polish army served before; that His Majesty the king of Poland and honourable senators judged the pay to be right; and when eight thalers were given, they were only for one month, not three, as now.

The commissioners responded to the other soldiers’ desiderata in points – gratefully accepting the election of Paweł Noskowski, recruited as the senior district governor of Łomża; – they confirmed that the relevant letters would be given; – Losses during service may be considered as well as an increase in salary, but for faithful service and merit during the campaign; The emperor will make the General’s lodging as well as the Rittmeisters appropriate, “with the old ordinary horses here, the old customs will be preserved”; – The following proposal was made: Colonel for a month of thalers 200, rittmeister 100, lieutenant 50,

\34 Władysław IV to P. Noskowski from the camp near Kwidzyn on 30 August 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 59, item 33.
\35 “Transactio litterarum super quibus se Poloni resolvere debent” 19 augusti 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, poszyt III, k. 103–104v.
ensigner 30, regiment guard each 80, state 50 and each companion of thalers 6. The Commissioners also undertook to add 30 thalers for each flag, as secretaries and chaplains were not included in the posts. This did not mean that the conditions were already agreed upon, because in 18 points to surrender between commissioners (M. Arnoldin and John Winss) and soldiers under P. Noskowski’s regiment we find much better conditions for the recruited. Due to the specificity of this document I decided to give it ‘in extenso’:

1. Enough doing towards His Majesty’s will and reproach, having appeared in His Majesty’s service under the regiment of Paweł in Srzeńsk Noskowski, Łomża, Zambrów, and Koło, as Starost, as well as the Emperor of His Majesty the General, to our army all the military given to us, whose army, having all the goods in good order, promises to be in military discipline and to show all obedience.

2. The appropriate letters (enlistment letters) for His Majesty’s service to the General as Lords Colonels and Lords Rittmeister of the Imperial Chancellery are so given.

3. Since the army has suffered great losses when going to the borders in His Majesty’s service, we ask for letters of recommendation to the Emperor and to the King of Hungary, so that we may receive not only the pay, but also an additional reward, with this pay for these three months and given 6 hard thalers each, and then increased by what we send our Messengers so to His Majesty [Ferdinand II] as well as to His Majesty King of Hungary [Ferdinand III].

4. The payment of 20,000 hard thalers to the General for every month for the kitchen to be given, for the mace-every month 2,000 red zloty. Colonels – for every month as many hard kitchen thalers as many horses in the regiment. As for the colour parties of Rittmeisters it is customary in Poland to have each one per 100 horses – 12 horses should have, and at the same time to give the General a fair reward in connection with the costs incurred by each soldier in the company recruitment as well as to Rittmeisters, who also commented on each companion. To every rittmeister as many thalers as they have horses under their flags. The lieutenants for each month also – 80. To the ensign – 60. To the Guard – 200, to the Quartermaster – 100, to the Secretary for three months – 90 and to the Chaplain – 40. For the flag of each of the thalers – 100.

5. It appears to the army that not only the General, but with all the officers of the army, no treaty has been received before, even though it was due to him; with this, the General has made a great deal of money in advance, and everyone is to take into account the present time of surrender (agreement) and the
general circle of the army. We ask that to this extent these expenses forward so to the General as other gentlemen will be rewarded.

6. The freedoms of our nation and the ordinary courts are to remain with us.

7. The honourable Lord General, in the office of nobility, as well as in his life, with ordinary provisions and all the hospitality to be sheltered; also the other Lords of officers and the Knighthood, so that the army will not be led by empty (not destroyed) countries.

8. After the initial battle for a month to be granted as a custom if shot and wounded after every victorious battle to rest being allowed so that the reward may be made from His Imperial Majesty’s treasure and from the quarters of his office for service in the cities shown, or food (victuals) of any kind.

9. Prisoners from the enemy’s army of His Imperial Majesty, who would get into our army, would be left with those who look after them, from whom they are captured, and if justice should be done for them so be it.

10. God have mercy and protect from death our great commander, which if the unfortunate case occurs, that we may select a new general from among us ourselves.

11. That our army should not be torn between any different commands, and that our General should not obey any orders except the King of Hungary himself or his deputy in his place.

12. That our army should walk ahead in front of other troops, and that the quarters should be prepared, because we are walking without the carts.

13. The dismissal of our army from service is to be announced before the end of the month, and after the month has passed and the full payment has been received, our army as a free nation of Poland, without any engagement from His Imperial Majesty, but a favour for the commissioners being given to carry out their duties, and please God protect us from any dangers on the Polish Crown or the pacts against it which, when received from our Republic and King [Ladislaus IV] so that the army, having taken a month’s time and payment, would have a free passage to rescue our country instead, and for the further desire of His Imperial Majesty to use the Polish army, that at the dissolution of a month’s time, a gift (additional) month would be given and given with thalers of good silver or gold pay to be paid always from now.

14. That the army, after the show of the good quarters, may have two Sundays of rest for the adaptation of the war equipment.

15. Our Polish Army, which has been in the service of His Imperial Majesty since the old days, to be joined to us for the General’s service, and to leave under His command all others who come to His Imperial Majesty’s service.

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38 The troops were passing to Silesia without all the necessary food supplies, simply hoping to be supplied with everything later by imperial commissioners.
16. If any of our troops, by any means, gets to the foreign troops under no conditions to be released without any difficulty.

17. Ordinary soldier’s pay for 500 dragoons to be given to the General, according to his permission, which dragoons he should have and always have with the Polish army.

18. The Commissioners to give support to the army and with the signature of His Imperial Majesty and the King of Hungary and the war council for all these points above and for our further merits, so that we may stay with them effectively (realistically) all the time”.

Of course, none of the above-mentioned points could be accepted by the commissioners; hence the negotiations with the units led by P. Noskowski and S. Lubomirski, the Russian Voivode himself, were still in progress. Despite difficulties in convincing the soldiers to serve there were often conflicts with the imperial troops present in Silesia. An example was the protest of Polish army deputies from Brzeg on 10 October 1635 by W. Sulmirski and Lawrence Feketi for the imperial infantry officer Funck. They accused him of killing his comrade Mr. Prakowski by his soldiers, raiding Marcin Jedlicki’s inn and killing the deputies of this company, robbing them and taking 1442 thalers paid for this company.39 Both signed in protest handed over the hijacked goods to Colonel Funck, complaining about “the shame on the Emperor as well as the Polish army” and promising to seek justice from both the Emperor and the Hungarian King.40 A very interesting is the list of flags of all those enlisted on the Emperor’s payroll and shown by Commissioner Well, who at each company marked the actual number of horses brought in and the so-called ‘blind horses’ which meant funds intended to pay for the command staff, to which the Imperial Commissioners did not agree. In the flipchart, we give in brackets the states of individual rotations including blind horses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Horses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Red Company of Noskowski</td>
<td>226 horses (291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Company of the same</td>
<td>101 horses (131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Makowiecki</td>
<td>177 horses (205)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Czarnecki (Stanisław)</td>
<td>214 horses (257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Sulński</td>
<td>112 horses (123)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Horses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company of Moszczewski</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Zaremba (Marcin Aleksander)</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Ciekliński</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Wesla</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Gołkowski</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Sieracki (Aleksander)</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Kępniński</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Woykowski</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Bylicki</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of of the Rodacki (Jan Achacy)</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Fekiety (Lorenzo)</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Broniewski</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Zagurski</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Strzałkowski</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Zakrzewski(Marcin Aleksander)</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Jedlicki(Marcin)</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Grzywy (Mikołaj)</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Bervinsky (?)</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Prakowski</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Chrząstowski</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company of Waskiewicz</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this census carried out by Mr Welli we can see as many as 9 out of 11 rittmeisters appearing in the census of August 1635; only Mikołaj Karaś and Erazm Dembiński are missing. Also, the number of their soldiers is much smaller and results from the actual census carried out in Brzeg before the march to the Reich. In total, there were 26 rittmeisters, who had 4,340 horses, not including the ‘blind horses’, on which they also demanded payment and to which the commissioners were strongly against. Their number is consistent with the census made earlier, as it amounts to 5,200 horses, not counting Mr. Kwiatkowski’s rotation.

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41 Note: Contrary to Mr. Wężyk K. 322.
42 See the letter of Commissioner L. Pixius probably to Arnoldin from Lviv on 16 July 1635, informing that rtm. Mikołaj Grzywa took a thousand thalers for the recruitment of 300 people; HHu.St.A., Polen I, karton 58, k. 141.
43 No data.
A separate issue is the contract signed with the consent of Władysław IV and through the intermediary of the Russian Voivode S. Lubomirski – the Guardian of the Royal Crown. Samuel Łaszcze was associated with the person of the hetman S. Koniecpolski, whose correspondence can also be found in Arnoldin’s papers. The fact that the enlistment led by S. Łaszcze was accepted by the King is evidenced by his letter to Arnoldin of August 23, 1635, when he writes that “to serve the Emperor’s Majesty, I am even more willing to do when the Lord’s Majesty’s permission and command opened the way for me to do so”. The Crown Guard informed the deputy that he was waiting for an answer to his desiderata in relation to the recruitment of those willing to take up the Imperial banners, and now he was to be “hauled away, which would be a considerable inconvenience for me, as there were already many people here who would listen to this message of Your Majesty’s service.”

Talks with S. Łaszcze were conducted by a courtier of S. Lubomirski – Paweł Dworzański. However, the conditions that S. Łaszcze set in terms of recruitment were very exorbitant. We get to know their content from the declaration given to the deputy; in particular points, the guard emphasized: – his willingness to join the service of the emperor; – that he does it on the order of his majesty and the will of the Russian voivode S. Lubomirski; – that all the trains that have already gone to Silesia as well as those that are presently under his command; – that he be subject only to the King of Hungary [Ferdinand III] or those delegated by him; – that it is necessary to leave 100 thousand złoty for the recruitment in Krakow; – to get 15,000 thalers for every quarter that Colonel Winss was to promise him; – that he wants to take 4,000 troops “except the ones that are already at the borders there,” and that the Emperor will pay at least 1/3 of his wages for their service; – that colonels, rittmeisters, lieutenants, and enlisted men should be immediately paid out of the payroll, and 20 rittmeisters should have no more than 200 men under the flags “for a better government and faster company assembly”; – that the imperial side should pay 24 thalers per horse as soon as it crosses the border, and the service to the flags should be granted as soon

44 See letters from S. Koniecpolski to Aleksander Greiffenclau, MP, concerning the soldiers contracted by S. Łaszcza and rtm Moczarski from Brodow on 20 May 1635 and to Arnoldin from Brody on 23 May 1635; HHuSt.A., Polen I, karton 57/IV, k. 76-v, 81–83.
45 S. Łaszcz do Arnoldina z Jarosławia 23 VIII 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 111r.
46 Ibidem. At the same time, he asked for a quick decision whether or not to be in the imperial service and for the letters to be sent to Zamość or Rachanie.
47 See “Memoriale pro Generoso Domino Paulo Dworański” of 31 July 1635; HHu.St.A., karton 58, k. 54-v.
as it is “on the Silesian border”. At the same time S. Łaszcz demanded that the remuneration for the staff to be paid according to the following rule:\textsuperscript{48}

Colonels, that wants to have warrior-quality men, I’m right to give the content to a quarter of two thousand thalers over the payroll. Rittmeister on a quarter of a thousand thalers. Lieutenants – a half of what rittmeisters have. The Ensign – third of a quarter of what Rittmeisters, the prefect – a quarter and five hundred thalers for the kitchen on the payroll.

Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the recruitment finally did not take place and those troops which had been recruited earlier by S. Lubomirski were moved abroad. The same one, as his correspondence with commanders proves, had great problems with maintaining proper discipline among soldiers during the march through Silesia in the face of repeated requests for better consistency for these units. After Władysław IV entered into a truce with the Swedes in Sztumska Wieś (12 September 1635), delegates and their recruits competed for the soldiers from the dissolved troops against the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs as well as Louis XIII (deputy Claud de Mesmes, Count d’Avaux). R. Skowron wrote in detail about the Spanish recruitment, emphasizing that the first attempts to enlist Polish soldiers on behalf of Philip IV were made by the Spanish ambassadors in Vienna, Inigo Vélez de Guevara y Tassis, Count de Onate and Sancho de Monroy Zuniga Marquís Castaneda.\textsuperscript{49} Philip IV was supposed to try to enlist as many as 10,000 Cossacks and 8,000 Hungarians, for which he allocated 300,000 thalers. The list of funds transferred by the Vienna embassy to Emperor Ferdinand II shows that from 19 May to 15 September, 207,000 florins were transferred to Maximilian Greiffenbach, Georg Heinrich Reitenspiess, Balthasar Walderody, with Arnoldin himself receiving 3,000 florins from B. Walderody in Cracow for the organisation of the recruitment on 13 July. The documents talk about the enlistment of Polish Cossacks, but of course it’s not about the Zaporozhian Cossacks as G. Gajecky and A. Baran want to see it, but about Polish soldiers recruited in the Lesser

\textsuperscript{48} “Declaratia J.M. Pana strażnika koronnego taka jest”; HHu.St.A., karton 57, k. 23-v. At the end of his declaration, S. Łaszcz wrote that “these conditioners are so determined that nothing can be changed in them”; see M. Nagielski, Wpływ wojny trzydziestoletniej na przemiany w sztuce wojennej..., pp. 31–33.

\textsuperscript{49} R. Skowron discusses extensively the negotiations between Philippe IV and the Vien- nese court and the attitude of his ambassadors, who were cautious about the transfer of funds to Władysław IV for the trains in relation to the Polish-Swedish talks in Sztumska Wieś and the French diplomacy contract; see R. Skowron, Pax and Mars..., pp. 138–141.
Poland as well as in the Russian province. This does not mean that there were no Orthodox Cossacks who were part of such a court troops or returned to their homeland from the Smoleńsk and Kamieniec campaigns in 1634. According to R. Skowron, the cost of recruiting one Polish Cossack was approximately 20 thalers (i.e. 30 florins), and taking into account the amount paid for the trains by the Spaniards (207,000 florins) there could be even 6 thousand recruited. The recruitment concerned mainly the cavalry in view of the need to move quickly to the theatre of the war in the Reich. According to R. Skowron’s findings, at the beginning of X 1635 the Polish corps set off from Silesia to Nuremberg and was incorporated into the imperial forces of Matthias Gallas. In December 1635 the Rhine was crossed and Polish soldiers fought in Lorraine, Champagne, Picardy, Burgundy, Hanau, Artois and Luxembourg. The successful enlistment on behalf of Emperor Ferdinand II and King Ferdinand III of Hungary, as well as the shortage of personnel in the Spanish army, resulted in the issue of the next enlistments in the Republic being entrusted to the next Spanish ambassadors – Alonso Vazquez and the Count de Solre. R. Skowron also presented their mission in 1635. The new recruitment of about 10–12 thousand Cossacks did not manage to be completed because the diplomats did not arrive in Krakow until mid-June 1636, while in the autumn, after signing the truce with Sweden, the masses of enlisted soldiers were already dismissed and some of them started their service elsewhere. As I have already pointed out, Count d’ Avaux made efforts to take over well-trained soldiers from some foreign enlistments. Louis XIII intended to grant as many as 300,000 livres for enlisting dissolved soldiers so that they would not find themselves in the ranks of the imperial army fighting on the Rhine on the Habsburg side. Only a small fraction of the forces dissolved after the treaty was concluded in Sztumskia Wieś; however, it is clear that Frenchmen as well as the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs, in view of the shrinking recruitment possibilities in the Reich, were trying to enlist these soldiers. Again, the Spaniards proved to be quicker and sent the Colonel Johann Mörder to Prussia. There, he

51 L. Höbelt, *Barocke Bomberflotten?…*, pp. 40–42, wrote about the actions of these forces under the command of Gen. leutnant Matias Gallas.
53 R. Skowron, *Pax and Mars…*, pp. 73–84.
54 M. Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648)…*, p. 144.
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encouraged many troops to accept the imperial service. R. Skowron presented the composition of 10 enlisted regiments, whose staff was paid in Wroclaw, where the headquarters of the recruitment commission headed by Georg Gottfried Reitenspiess were located. Jakub Butler was put at the head of this company, as he had previously served in the Imperial Army. The individual regiments were led by: Jakub Butler, Johan Mörder, Hungarian, Matthison, Ludovick Lindsay, Adam Gordon, Thomas Lyon, Cochrum (Kochrane), Edmund Butler and Warłowski.\(^{55}\)

In total, over 10 thousand soldiers were enlisted and led out into the Republic. Almost 8 thousand soldiers set off in September 1636 from Silesia to Burgundy and the second group of about 3 thousand soldiers headed for Italy.\(^{56}\) In the competition for the Polish recruiter, French diplomacy was clearly distanced by the Spanish Habsburg diplomacy, and the main reason for this was the slowness of Louis XIII in transferring the funds for the trains to Count d’Avaux. The deputy of King Louis XIII – Claude de Salles, Baron de Rorté, sent from the Reich to the Republic of Poland, was meant to negotiate with Władysław IV on the issue of the recruitment of 4,000 Polish or Cossack rides (the so-called “Cossacks”) for French service. In the war archives in Vincennes preserved is the capitulation for the enlistment of this company, signed in Moissy on 20 December 1636, entitled:\(^{57}\)

\[
\text{Articles de la capitulation que le Roy a commandéau Sieur Baron de Rorté envoyé par Sa Majestaté en Allemagne, de passe rent son nom pour la levée de quatre mil hommes à cheval Polonois ou Cosaques pour son service, avec telz chefz et capitaines de la dite nation qu’il verra estre àpropos.}
\]

The mission of Baron de Rorté, who arrived in Gdansk only in the second half of 1637, was presented by M. Serwański, and all efforts to enlist Polish soldiers failed due to, among other things, the attitude of the Swedes, who did not see the possibility of locating the enlistments in Pomerania for fear of its devastation.\(^{58}\) So we see that the competition for the Polish recruits between the

\(^{55}\) R. Skowron, W służbie Filipa IV..., p. 270.


Habsburgs and the Bourbons in 1635–1637 ended with the victory of the former, who twice in autumn 1635 and one year later altogether managed to enlist over 15 thousands soldiers. The whole recruitment army, prepared for the war against Sweden, which was a tremendous effort made by Władysław IV⁵⁹ ceased to exist, passing to a peaceful position of only 3300 paid soldiers.⁶⁰

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**Zaciągi cesarskie w Rzeczypospolitej**

**Macieja Arnoldina von Clarsteina w 1635 roku**

**Abstrakt**

Podpisany przez Władysława IV rozejm ze Szwedami w Sztumskiej Wsi w 1635 roku spowodował konieczność rozpuszczenia zaciągów wojskowych złożonych z wyborowych oddziałów piechoty i jazdy. O te oddziały zabiegali tak Habsburgowie, jak Francuzi wobec trwających działań wojny trzydziestoletniej. Do Rzeczypospolitej wysłano posła cesarskiego Arnoldina, który uzyskał od Władysława IV zgodę na werbunek żołnierzy. Udało mu się zwerbować ponad 5 tysięcy ludzi, którzy wzięli udział w walkach w Rzeszy nad Renem w służbie cesarza Ferdynanda II. Natomiast rozmowy komisarzy cesarskich z Samuelem Łaszczem nie powiodły się wobec wygóranych żądań finansowych stawianych przez strażnika koronnego. Korpus polski walczył na terenie Lota-ryngii, Szampanii, Pikardii i Burgundii pod komendą gen. Matthiasa Gallasa, oddając
duże usługi Habsburgom. Drugi zaciąg na terenie Rzeczypospolitej przeprowadzono we wrześniu 1636 roku i był on dziełem dyplomacji hiszpańskiej. W sumie wyprowadzono ponad 15 tysięcy żołnierzy z granic Rzeczypospolitej, a dyplomacja Habsburgów zdystansowała w tej kwestii dyplomację francuską Ludwika XIII.

**Emperor’s recruitment in the Republic of Poland done by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635**

**Abstract**

Emperor’s Ties in the Republic of Poland by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635. The truce signed by Władysław IV with the Swedes in Sztumská Wieś in 1635 made it necessary to dissolve the military enlistments consisting of selected infantry and driving units. The Habsburgs as well as the French were striving for these troops in the face of the ongoing Thirty Years’ War. An imperial deputy, Arnoldin, was sent to the Republic of Poland. He received permission from Władysław IV to recruit soldiers. He succeeded in recruiting more than 5,000 men who took part in the Rhine War in the service of Emperor Ferdinand II. On the other hand, talks with Samuel Łaszeć of the Imperial Commissioners failed in the face of excessive financial demands made by the Crown Guard. The Polish Corps fought in Lorraine, Champagne, Picardy and Burgundy under the command of Gen. Matthias Gallas, giving a large service to the Habsburgs. The second enlistment on the territory of the Republic was carried out in September 1636 and was the work of Spanish diplomacy. In total, more than 15 thousand soldiers were led out of the borders of the Republic of Poland and the Habsburg diplomacy distanced the French diplomacy of Louis XIII.