Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia

Wcześniej: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia

ISSN: 2450-7741     eISSN: 2300-4460     DOI: 10.18276/frfu.2016.4.82/1-39
CC BY-SA   Open Access 

Lista wydań / 4/2016 (82) cz. 1
Nowe tendencje w polityce pieniężnej po kryzysie finansowym 2008–2012

Rok wydania:2016
Liczba stron:30 (461-490)
Słowa kluczowe: kryzys finansowy polityka „pieniędzy z helikoptera” polityka luzowania ilościowego polityka „wytycznych na przyszłość” polityka zerowych i ujemnych nominalnych stóp procentowych
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:
Autorzy: Dariusz K. Rosati

Abstrakt

Cel – Syntetyczne omówienie niekonwencjonalnych instrumentów, które zostały albo zastosowane albo miały być zastosowane w polityce pieniężnej wybranych banków centralnych. omówiono politykę zerowych i ujemnych nominalnych stóp procentowych, politykę luzowania ilościowego (QE), politykę „pieniędzy z helikoptera” (helicopter money) oraz politykę „wytycznych na przyszłość” ( forward guidance). Metodologia badania – Analiza dokumentów ECB, baz Eurostat i OECD oraz Fed. Oryginalność/wartość – Zaproponowanie modyfikacji strategii bezpośredniego celu inflacyjnego.
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