Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia

Previously: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia

ISSN: 2450-7741     eISSN: 2300-4460    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/frfu.2016.4.82/2-21
CC BY-SA   Open Access 

Issue archive / 4/2016
Zmiana zarządzającego a wyniki finansowe spółki – przegląd wybranych badań
(Managerial Change and Company Operating Performance – the Review of Research Results)

Authors: Agnieszka Preś-Perepeczo
Keywords: CEO change succession operating performance
Data publikacji całości:2016
Page range:10 (261-270)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of the article was to review research results of the relation between CEO succession and firm performance. Design/methodology/approach – The literature study related to the CEO succession and operating performance before and after the event in developed markets was performed. Findings – Results of literature study in the developed markets indicate that an decrease in operating performance is observed before the CEO change. The CEO succession is followed by an increase in operating performance, especially in the case of forced changes. An external CEO operates more effectively in comparison to an internal one. Research result how the gender of CEO could impact company performance are not clear. Originality/value – There is a literature gap addressing CEO changes and operating as well market performance in the Polish capital market. The literature review and observations made in developed markets are the basis for the application and exploration of similar correlations among the Polish public companies
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