Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia

Previously: Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia


ISSN: 2450-7741     eISSN: 2300-4460    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/frfu.2016.4.82/1-75
CC BY-SA   Open Access 

Issue archive / 4/2016
Rentowność agencji ratingowych
(Profitability of Credit Rating Agencies)

Authors: Patrycja Chodnicka-Jaworska
Keywords: credit rating competitiveness effectiveness
Data publikacji całości:2016
Page range:11 (907-917)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

Purpose – The goal of the article is to analyse the profitability of the credit rating agencies in the European Union. Design/methodology/approach – It has been prepared the literature research and analysis of the financial statements published by the credit rating agencies. There are collected data published by ESMA about competitiveness of the credit rating agencies. Findings – Despite the introduction of regulations aimed at limiting the oligopoly of rating agencies is a further increase in the importance of their functioning. Profitability analysed entities belonging to the Big Three is improving. Originality/value – So far not been carried out analysis of the profitability and competitiveness of credit rating agencies.
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