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Defense security and sustainable development in Africa: Emerging challenges and response

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Abstract The endemic nature of insecurity in Africa stands out as one which is disastrous, thereby making African a shadow of itself. This study examines defense security and sustainable development in emerging democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa. Methodologically, Cross-sectional descriptive survey design was adopted in the study, while primary and secondary sources of data were relied upon, interview and focus group discussion (FGD) were used as primary instruments of data collections. The social contract theory is adopted as the framework of analysis. Finding of this study revealed that bad governance has perpetuated class antagonism which breeds dissatisfaction amongst people in a bid to seek equality and justice in the distribution of power and economic resources. This process conceives conflict and the result for which many take to demand for rights which are unmet, hence unleashed terror to secure inalienable rights, access to power and economy. An analysis on Sustainable Development in this study, does reveal that denial and lack of access and opportunities are fundamental premises under which devastations of an economy can ensue and hence the entrenchment of the reign of terror. This process, as applicable in Africa, did also permeate the preponderance of reserved armies of unemployed under the guise of mendicant friars that further heightened the predominance of the terrorist regime in Africa amidst destruction of lives and economy. A way out of this is to create mechanism to open up more equitable access to power and economic opportunities which could lead to full capacity utilization of people's potentials and subsequently empower them with incomes and improved living conditions. This requires both commitment and diplomacy of the government and to undertake under the banner of collective responsibility and good governance.

Introduction

The African state over the years have sailed like a troubled and sinking ship on a turbulent sea being tossed up and down in sight of no shore to anchor. To mitigate the heightened tension in such a sinking ship, the African state have adopted the posture of suffering and smiling, praying and hoping that the ship will one day anchor and offer them some respite. For many decades Africa has been seen by many critical observers as a collapsed state which though not in a state of war is a nursery bed for impunity and lawlessness. The situation of the continent paints a picture of a jungle state where everything goes plundering and looting of the public wealth is allowed and even considered a blessing and the life of its citizens is worthless and the destruction of it is inconsequential. This may not be far from the truth. After all, the Rwandan genocide, in which nearly a million people lost their lives, the Liberian, Sierra Leone and Congolese civil wars just two decades ago with their unholy contraption known as child soldiers, provide veritable material with which to substantiate these kinds of portraits (Abdulyakeen, 2021; Ibrahim and Cheri, 2013).

To date the complete anarchy in Somalia, the piracy in Ethiopia, the near-total breakdown of law, order and instruments of governance in Nigeria Africa's most populous country are all part of the litanies of the African dilemma. To these may be added that Africa has the highest illiteracy rate, highest poverty rate and highest mortality rate in the world (Acheoah, 2018), the lamentation appears unending and has been blamed on bad leadership (Igwe, 2010) on corruption (Isiguzo, 1999) and, on overabundance of human and natural resources. This depiction does not however provide an objective picture of African and its predicament. It merely presents a continent grappling with itself, but it does not present any objective explanation on how it found itself in this pitiable state. The political environment of Nigeria has been bedeviled with a lot of socio-political and economic maladies which have resulted to lack of development and systemic failure in both rural and urban settings. This makes Okoli & Ugwu (2019) to aver that "Nigeria is, arguably, a country under distress." Another author agreed to this by saying: "There is insurgency in the North-East, pipeline vandalization and activities of militants in the Niger Delta in the South-South and endemic cattle rustling and rural armed banditry in the North-West and North Central Zones respectively" (Rufai, 2018).

Africa currently grapples with the operation of terrorism and insurgencies which seem to operate in different dimensions. Research on the prevailing precarious security situation of northern Nigeria has been perennial, albeit with disproportionate emphasis on the phenomenon of Boko Haram insurgency and herdsmen-farmers disturbances (Olayoku, 2014; Okoli and Iortyer, 2014; Bagu and Smith, 2017). For example, Boko Haram and bandits majorly occur in the Northwest geo-political zone of the country. In 2009 the activities of the Boko Haram were tagged as a terrorist group, the concept of armed bandit became prominent with the emergence of cattle rustlers in 2014. Their activities were felt more in Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto and Kaduna. Today, other neighboring states like Kebbi state, Niger are also affected. Cattle rustling and armed banditry have become major problems in Zamfara State. Rufai (2018) subscribed to this by saying that, the phenomenon has increased since 2010, leading to violent conflicts between the

Fulani people and their supporters from the Republic of Niger on one side and the farmers on the other. The phenomena has claimed many lives and left thousands homeless and poor.

Nigeria and most African countries suffer the challenges of poverty, insecurity and underdevelopment. And more recently, insecurity, which is bedeviling the entire country, is the hot topic of the day. In order to redress these socio-economic challenges, the government initiated several policies and programmes aimed at promoting economic growth and development. These include post independent national development plans (NDPs), industrialization strategies and agricultural development policies (Salawu, Muhammad, Adekeyer and Onimajesun, 2006; Olowookere, 2012). However, researchers have opined that these social problems persist because of a number of factors, namely: poor implementation of national development plans and national industrial policies, as well as corruption and political instability in the country (Iwuchukwu and Igbokwe, 2012; Raimi, Shokunbi and Peluola, 2012). Consequently, the failed government's socio-economic programmes/policies created 12 million unemployed youth in 2009 and 14 million in 2010. Available records show that unemployment is on the increase (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2020) found that unemployment increased from 23.1% in Q3, 2018 to 27.1%, and underemployment is 55.7%). Youth unemployment in Nigeria is alarming and the consequence manifests in increasing vulnerability of youths to exploitation by some unscrupulous individuals, thereby resulting to anti-social behavior. Indeed the recent incidence in North-East and North-West is argued to represent a classical evidence of such vulnerability where youths are recruited by bandits or "Boko Haram" group for their social and economic gains. Regrettably, the Nigerian government is still unable to find a lasting solution to the problem.

Statement of the problem

The emerging and seemingly endemic challenges arising from armed banditry that Boko Haram latently caused by numerous factors and manifesting in the form of farmers-herdsmen conflicts, kidnappings, cattle rustling, ethno-religious violence, abductions, community raids and invasions have worsened the security situation in Africa. Escalating conflicts among the diversity of occupational, ethnic and religious groups could potentially generate violence on a larger scale capable of crippling the region's economy, destroying the ever-eroding social cohesion among groups and weakening the state's capacity of instigating mass and direct action by different categories of victims. Bad governance in Africa is said to have been largely responsible for the increased rate of the poor, ignorant, deprived and displaced population across the country. The high rate of poverty and unemployment in the country is largely attributed to the bad governance framework that overwhelmed the country for years. This trend has over the years reproduced incessant violence such as, ethnic and religious violence, armed robbery, militancy, armed banditry among many others security challenges.

The endemic nature of insecurity in Africa stands out as one which is the most disastrous, thereby making even the African state a shadow of itself. Whereas uncoordinated efforts by governments at federal and state levels continue to define the weak response strategy against

the endemic spate of banditry in the Nigeria's North-West, al-shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in the Sahel region, military response and dialogue with bandits have been counterproductive. Bad governance and poor rural policies are generally attributed to the rising incidences of banditry in this part of Africa. The rising poverty incidence among the rural population caused largely by a combination of climate change consequences and massive public sector corruption have left many rural dwellers vulnerable to being recruits of armed banditry as substitute to loss of livelihood. Thus, while rejuvenating the security sector is key to tackling criminality, the human security dimension of the rural population appears to be even more relevant and likely effective in designing appropriate response to the dreadful incidences of banditry/insecurity across the states in the Nigeria's North-West/Africa. The local government as the third tier of government in Nigeria's federal system needs to be reinvented as the most closet government to the rural dwellers. The basic social services required of the rural population can be effectively provided by the local governments if their autonomy is restored and corruption checked and controlled. The general objective is to look at Defense Security and Sustainable Development in Africa: its emerging challenges and the response to them. The specific objectives are to:

1. Examine the underlying causes of the current Defense Security and Sustainable Development in Africa.
2. Examine the impact of insecurity on Sustainable Development in Africa.
3. Examine the lessons learnt by Africa and the responses made by African's policy makers.
4. Recommend policy measures to reduce the negative impact of similar crisis in the future.

Conceptualization: defense security

According to Robert McNamara (1968), security means development and development means security. He argues that without development there can be no security. Security is not military force although it may include it; security is not conventional military activity, though it may encompass it; security is not military hardware, though it may include it; He argued further that any society that seeks to achieve adequate national security against the background of food shortages, population increase, low level of productivity and income, low technological development, inadequate and inefficient public utilities and persistent problems of unemployment has a false sense of security. He further argued that, national security is a sensitivity of self-assurance that the tragedy of hostilities and the problems of global political life can be avoided by effective management, to ensure that the state and its institutions can continue to exist in an essentially unimpaired manner (McNamara, 1968).

Insecurity is the most discussed topic in Nigeria and Africa. Thus, Eme and Onyishi (2011) define insecurity as actions that constitute breach of peace and tranquility arising from historical tension, socio-political, ethno-religious and economic factors that result in destruction of human lives and property in society. More so, Otto and Ukpere (2012) viewed insecurity as the opposite of security, the presence of peace, safety, happiness and the protection of human and physical resources or the absence of crisis, among others. Arguably insecurity can be classified

into macro level and micro level analysis. For instance, from macro-level analysis, insecurity in Nigeria manifests itself in four different ways, such as Ethno-Religious Conflict, Politically Based Violence, Organized Violent Groups, Economic-Based Violence (Eme and Onyishi, 2011; Raimi, Akkhuemonkhan, and Ogunjirin, 2015). At the micro-level analysis, insecurity has seven elements such as Economic security, Food security, Health security, Environmental security, Personal security, Community security, and Political security (Tadjbakhsh, 2008; Raimi, Akhue-monkhan, and Ogunjirin, 2015). Thus, Adebakin and Raimi, 2012 argued that the absence of any of these elements creates a state of insecurity characterized by fear, threat and phobia. Therefore, security is an important ingredient for the sustainable socioeconomic and political development of the nation. In meeting the commitment to engender peace and security of lives and properties, including preservation of oil installations in the Niger-Delta, the federal government doled out monthly the sum of 150 million naira (\$1.3 million) to military authorities for logistics (Courson, 2008). And more recently, the Nigerian government spent huge amounts of money to tackle insecurity in northern Nigeria. Despite the huge spending on security, the issue of threat to lives and properties continues to reoccur. Several multinational firms in Nigeria have relocated their employees due to insecurity (Enterprise Resilience, 2008). While defense in military terms is the act of resisting attack in order to protect the individual, property and a group of people who are vulnerable to the attack, defense security is aimed at coordinating all necessary human and material resources to resist an attack from a hostile neighbor or foe (Alabi and Fage, 2003). This, however, involves the method of acquiring or developing the weapon system, training and deployment of personnel for the purpose of attaining defense objectives which comprise the maintenance of territorial integrity, protection of national economic interests, national independence, etc. Many scholars have expressed this narrow, militaristic point of view. Wolfer (1965) maintained that the concept of national security presupposes a preoccupation with issues such as the protection of the physical territory of a state against external aggression, subversion, sabotage, alliance building, etc. which are automatically biased towards the military. By implication, this school holds that once the physical territory of a state is secure, all other concerns of the state would automatically fall into place. There has however been a growing consensus among scholars in the field of strategic studies that while the sanctity of national territorial integrity is hardly in doubt, it is not in any sense synonymous with the political and socio-economic survival of a nation. While not oblivious to the primacy of the physical safety of a nation, Oberg (1984, p. 29) rightly asserts that:

Security measures must be directed towards also immaterial objects like lifestyle, culture, freedom, identity and the protection of nature. An individual who has not satisfied his or her basic needs like food, cloth, housing, health, education and work can hardly be called secure-no matter how much weaponry the individual may have at his disposal. Furthermore, an individual lacking in basic rights to speak, travel, meet and communicate is also not a secure human being.

The point of view of Oberg and other scholars who share the integrated approach to the question of national security is that underdevelopment and poverty are as potentially destructive

as guns in the physical elimination of a larger percentage of mankind (WCED, 1987). In other words, their obvious position is that while man continues to be threatened by bullets and guns, non-availability of bread and butter are no less potent threats.

Development

It can be argued that the exponential growth of a lot of economies around the world is not necessarily depictive of the plight of the poverty stricken majority of the world population. Though it can be said to be really true that globalization has helped the economies of a large segment of the world in significantly increasing their standard and quality of life. In essence, their human security has been greatly guaranteed. This however is not the case in most nations in Africa.

That is why the United Nations (1994) on Human Development Report states that though the human development progress has been impressive on many fronts, the gains have however not been universal among countries, social groupings, races etc. as it is with human security, so also is the paradigm shifts from the extant focus which previously dwelt on economic development to human development. Human development refers to the process of enlarging the range of people's choices in the pursuit of their goals and values (NHDR, 2015).

The term "development" has various meanings to different people and can be explained in different contexts. Ben (2018) citing Seers (1972) asserted that "development means the conditions for realization of the human personality. Its evaluation must therefore take into account three linked criteria: where there has been a reduction in (1) poverty, (2) unemployment, (3) inequality". According to Pearson (1992) development involves "an improvement qualitative, quantitative or both in the use of available resources". He also asserts that development does not refer to one particular perspective on social, political and economic betterment. Instead, it is a hybrid term for a myriad of strategies adopted for socio-economic and environment transformation from current states to desired ones. According to Ake (1996), development is a multidimensional process of change in the social structure, attitudes, institutions as well as the general acceleration of economic growth through the reduction of inequality and poverty.

Sustainable development

The term "sustainable development" appeared in the late 1970s and was definitely consolidated in 1987 by the aforementioned Brundtland Commission. This commission prepared the most broadly accepted definition of sustainable development: Sustainable development is a transformation process in which the exploitation of resources, direction of investments, orientation of technological development and institutional change are reconciled and reinforce present and future potential, in order to attend to needs and future aspirations. The concept of sustainable development has been addressed by many scholars. This depends on the ideological perspective which the concept is viewed by the different scholars (Lele, 1999). According to the United Nations Organization (1987), "sustainable development refers to the development that is designed

to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.

A synthesis of the above definition will bring to mind that it is quite vivid and clear. It can be deduced that it refers to all the indicators of basic needs of the present generation such as good roads, access to pipe borne water, institutional, physical and social infrastructures etc. It equally takes care of future generation, yet unborn (Cooper and Varyas, 2004). Development also harps on the need for the overall transformation of the economies of both the less developed countries (LDC) of the world, as well as the industrialized and advanced nations. To put it simply, sustainable development seeks to make the world a better place for all generation of mankind (Dernback, 2003).

Akinjude, O. (2002) contends that “sustainable development is the pathways which are needed to both developed and underdeveloped countries. This requires a high level of dialogue, cooperation, collaboration and most importantly, trust that is simply not reflected in today multilateral institutions or regions”. If the latter sentence is reversed to reflect the yearnings and aspirations of the vast majority of population residing in both rural and urban sectors of Nigeria economy, sustainable development will be realizable in the near future.

Research methodology

The methodology captures the strategy and design employed in executing the research. It explores the design, methods and sources of data. It deals with methods involved in the collection and analysis of all data collected through the use of interview for the research. It further focuses on research instruments validity and reliability, procedures for data collection, methods of data analysis that are adopted in appropriate sequences.

Research design

This study used cross-sectional descriptive survey design. The study was mainly descriptive in nature, because of its heavy reliance on description, interpretation of the various views and ideas of the respondents. It was cross-sectional since the data was collected from the informers once at a time. This was considered appropriate because it engenders careful description and explanation of factual and detailed information about the opinion of the respondents on Defense Security and Sustainable Development in Africa.

Method of data collection

The methods of data collection for this study were grouped into two, namely; the primary and secondary data collection. The both sources of data (for instance, primary and secondary sources) were extensively used for the purpose of drawing an empirical conclusion for proper analysis of the study so as to come up with objective findings.

Primary data

Primary data for the study was also generated from formal interviewing of respondents to supplement the secondary data. The researcher conducted interview with diplomats and university lecturers. They were chosen on the basis of the researcher's knowledge and judgment that their wealth of experience will help make this research work formidable, unique and stand the test of time, hence my request for their expertise view and contribution towards the success of this research is apt.

Focus group discussion was also used to gathered data. The participants who participated in focus group discussions were drawn from religious, political and traditional leaders. This was apt to find it convenient while discussing among their peers. This method of data collection, in reality, helped the researcher discovered the Security and Sustainable Development challenges in Africa.

Secondary data

Secondary sources relating to the topic and its relevant material are derived from the various books, articles, academic theses and online databases that elaborated more on the topic. The above sources of information enabled documentary analysis on Defense Security and Sustainable Development in Africa.

Instrument of data collection

The instruments for gathering data for this study include the following:

1. **Documentary Instruments:** This research work involves the collection of documentary materials written by various scholars and also some official administrative documents and records from Accra Central Library, Ghana; Aminu Kano Centre for Democratic Research and Training (Mumbayya House, Kano); Arewa House, Kaduna, and Johannesburg City Library. These documents were collected, organized and subjected to critical analysis. This was done to enable the researcher to make a comparative study of the data from the literature reviewed and responses from respondents.
2. **Personal Interview:** The researchers also made use of personal interview so as to obtain first-hand information in the course of this study. It is a data gathering instrument that enables the researcher to have in-depth knowledge of the research topic through face-to-face interaction. This instrument was used because it gives opportunity for deeper probing into issues of study. In the entire interview conducted, only three respondents permitted that their response be tape-recorded. The others permitted note-taking. These responses were then synthesized and analyzed.

Validity and reliability of instruments

The success of any research depends on the validity and reliability of its data gathering instruments. In order to effectively ensure the validity of the instruments used for this study, the instruments were subjected to content validity measurement which involves face validity and predictive validity. Therefore, in order to ensure that the instruments are reliable inferences and conclusions, internal consistency method was effectively adopted. Finally, in order to ensure this research possesses high validity, external criterion method was adopted and was achieved by checking how correct the findings of a particular instrument is by comparing the results with existing knowledge as well as the findings of the research gotten from questionnaire. These methods described above were carefully employed so as to ensure that the study is highly reliable and valid.

Emerging challenges: Secessionist agitation

Africa at present is rocked with cases of secession. Sudan has split into Sudan and Southern Sudan. Independent Sudan was historically burdened with the 38 years long civil war between the central government and southern rebels who demanded regional autonomy and independence later on. The first civil war burst in 1955 and lasted until 1972 when Addis Ababa Agreement, granting regional autonomy to Southern Sudan, was signed. The conflict between the Central Government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) re-emerged in 1983 and lasted until 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was negotiated and signed. Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, South Sudan was given six years interim period before conducting referendum on independence. The initial support for federation was championed by John Garang. However, his death in 2005 begun shift to more pro-independence position as propagated by new SPLM/A leader Salva Kiir (Idris, 2013). According to Riegl and Dobos (2014), South Sudan massively voted in favor of independence in January 2011 and was declared a sovereign state on 9th July 2011 and fully recognized internationally.

On issue of secession again, in reaction to the state institutions' failure in Somalia, after the dispose of S. Barre in 1991, the Somali National Movement (SNM) unilaterally declared independence of the north-western region of Somalia comprising the territory of a former British protectorate as the independent Somaliland in 1991 Act which was reaffirmed in 2001 referendum. Unlike the South Sudanese case where the referendum was negotiated with the central government and approved by the international community, Somaliland unilateral action did not lead to the international recognition of the newly created entity (Riegl and Dobos, 2014). This aspect of secession however, if Nkrumah's philosophy "Towards African Unity" is deeply understood, is the greatest ingredient of disunity that he was afraid of. More recently, the English speaking southern Cameroon has begun similar journey and also the Biafran movement in Nigeria. All of these are unfortunate scenarios as far as African unity as buttressed by many Pan-Africanists is concerned.

On the other hand, the issue of continental government for Africa, as suggested by Nkrumah, has also not been in place adequately. That is especially visible in the areas of a unified military and defense strategy, overall economic planning on continental basis and a unified foreign policy and diplomatic strategy. The crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan has underscored not only the urgent need for adequate funding and the logistic capabilities to handle peace-keeping operations in Africa but has also exposed the inability of the African Union AU to provide for common security for the continent. The conflict has cost at least 200,000 lives and forced more than two and a half million of people to move from their homes, according to the United Nations, though Khartoum contests those estimates, saying 9,000 people have died. The peace-keeping effort by the AU was too weak to handle the humanitarian disaster escalating into genocide. Despite financial and logistic difficulties, the AU agreed to extend the mandate of the AU peace-keeping force in the Darfur region, at which time it was supposed to be replaced by a larger hybrid UN/AU force in Darfur. An agreement was reached with the Sudanese government in April, 2007, which was to allow a hybrid force of 20,000 AU/UN troops into the country to strengthen the 7,000 AU troops that are already on the ground in the Darfur region of Sudan. But the Sudanese government, which reluctantly accepted AU peace-keeping force, has later refused to completely endorse the deployment of the planned UN troops in order to end the tragedy of Darfur (Adogomhe, 2008). This clearly defines that absence of continental military and defense strategy suggested by Nkrumah is what is causing the inability of Africa to combat insecurity and ensure security stability to herself. The question rose by Nkrumah that; which African state can defend its territorial sovereignty against any of the imperialist aggressor (Nkrumah, 1975)? In a personal communication, a religion leader asserted that:

In the present situation of African states, most states could not even defend themselves against some forms of internal subversions and other forms of internal disorderliness. Apart from the mentioned case of Dafur, Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and other similar cases in Mali and other African states were serious security issues that those states could not be able to content alone. President Buhari of Nigeria visited Cameroon in 2015; the two governments announced the formation of Multinational Task Force to combat Boko Haram after the terrorist group killed 60 people in Chad within a month (DW, July 30, 2015).

The Multinational Joint Task Force comprises of troops from Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Chad, and Benin Republic (UN News, March 4, 2017). According to Chimton, (February 20, 2015) there was a battle between the Rapid Intervention Battalion known as BIR of the Cameroon military and the Boko Haram insurgents. It was as an attempt to cross the El Bied River, which separates Gambaru in Nigeria from Fotokol in Cameroon. It's against this backdrop, a Key informant opined that:

It is however, clear that the coming together to form the Multination Joint Task Force was not only influenced by the inability of each country to subdue the insurgents but also because the other country's territory was affected by the insurgents' attack. To Nkrumah, a Continental Military Command

should be charged with the responsibilities of protecting the entire African territory from external aggression and all forms of internal subversion and all manner of disorderliness in African societies (DW, July 29, 2016).

Sit-tight culture in Africa

The introduction of numerous thuggish totalitarian rulers following independence, according to Calderisi's (2006) exhaustive account of Africa's recurrent problems with bad leadership, institutional failure, and widespread corruption, made these issues worse. The fact that "Africa has never had good government", he continues, and that "no other continent has seen such extended dictatorships," is the simplest way to comprehend the continent's challenges. The long-running dictatorships in African nations are to blame for the corruption epidemic, according to Ayittey (2012). Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (44 years), Omar Odimba Bongo of Gabon (42 years), Moammar Gaddafi of Libya (42 years), Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo (37 years), and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt are all examples of long-serving despots (31 years). Similar to those in Angola, Teodoro Mbasosgo in Equatorial Guinea, Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and Paul Biya in Cameroon are among the current tyrants who have governed for more than three decades. These rulers or dictators, like many of their contemporaries, who held positions of authority for an extended period of time, spent their entire careers enriching themselves, intimidating political rivals, eschewing all but the barest forms of democracy, actively thwarting movements toward constitutional rule, and at times subtly, at others blatantly thumbing their noses at the international community. They had no separation between their personal and governmental wealth and ruled like monarchs (Calderisi, 2006). Their success, according to Ayittey (2012), may be ascribed to their dominance over the major governmental institutions, such as the central bank, electoral commission, civil service, judiciary, and military.

Military disruption

It would be an understatement to say that Africa is where military intervention began. Of all the continents, it has experienced the most coups d'état in both its recent and immediate postcolonial past. The coup scenario occurs frequently, quickly following one another in a short amount of time, like a wildfire that resists all attempts to be put out. In 1963, substantial military action in Africa began in Togo, Congo (Brazzaville), and Dahomey, aside from military mutinies that did not result in coups. The 1960s and 1970s were labeled a "decade of coups" on the continent by Guttridge (1975), who noted that 14 noteworthy military coups occurred in Africa between January 1963 and the end of February 1966, and that by early 1968, there had been no fewer than nineteen successful coups. That's not all, though. The total number of coups in eight years had reached close to 30 by the end of 1970. (Gutteridge, 1975, p. 1). Over 70 successful coups and a sizable number of unsuccessful coup attempts had taken place in Africa as of 1999. (Amadife, 1999). Duzor and Williamson (2022) painted a grim image of military coups in Africa, as seen

in Table 1. Out of the 486 coups that have been attempted worldwide, they noted that more than 214 had occurred in Africa.

Table 1. Success Rates of Coup in Previous Decades

Decades	Total Coups Attempts	Successful	Success Rate (%)
1950–1959	6	3	50.0
1960–1969	41	25	61.0
1970–1979	42	18	42.9
1980–1989	39	22	56.4
1990–1999	39	16	41.0
2000–2009	22	8	36.4
2010–2019	17	8	47.1
2020–2022	8	6	75.0

Source: Powel and Thyne (2022), Cline Centre University of Illinois, VOA Research, 1950-Jan.25, 22, adopted in Megan Duzor and Brian Williamson (2022), VOA News, February <https://projects.voanews.com/africancoups>.

According to the table above, a total of 106 of the 242 successful coups in history have taken place on the continent. Concern has long been raised by the perception that military coups could occur in various regions of the continent. This has been supported by the fact that, of the 54 independent African states, 45 have experienced a military coup d'état, and that, of these, 13 have made coups an everyday occurrence (Duzor and Williamson, 2022). Similar to this are the coups that occurred in Africa starting in the 1950s between 1960 and 1999, namely during the Cold War. Military coups have decreased during the past two decades (2000–2009 and 2010–2019), partly as a result of the democratization process that took place after the end of the conflict.

The continent of Africa did not experience a break in the occurrence of military coups until the Cold War's conclusion sparked a rebirth of civil society movement for democratization throughout African countries in the 2000s. The traditional one-party states were replaced by multi-party systems during the third wave of democracy. Additionally, it cleared the way for a scenario in which military regimes lost popularity, partly as a result of a change in the global paradigm of support for the advancement of democracy and civil rights. These changes have created the notion that military intervention in Africa's political system is no longer an option. Contrarily, the episodes were far from done even if the time period in question had seen a relatively lower number of military takeovers — only 12 coups were recorded from 2000 to 2012 (Felter, 2021).

According to the turn of events, since 2012, military leaders have overthrown civilian governments in Zimbabwe (November 2017), Mali (August 2020), Chad (April 2021), Guinea (September 2021), Guinea-Bissau (February 2022), Sudan (October 2021), and Burkina Faso, among other countries, in the last five years or so (January 2022). The experience of military takeovers in Myanmar, South-east Asia, and Africa, especially in Sudan and the West African sub region,

where serial coup plots resulted in the overthrow of constitutional governments in four countries in 18 months (two of them in Mali within a nine-month period), led the United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, to denounce what he called a “epidemic of coups” (Nichols, 2021). Nowhere has this plague worsened as much as in Africa, which has caused many people to worry that the modest progress that some African nations had made toward democratization over the previous decades may be undone. At the heart of this is the terrifying worry that, unless extra care is taken to halt the ugly trend, the contagion effect of coups could easily drag back some nations into the abominable days of military authoritarianism, with its attendant suppression of civil society and denial of human rights and freedoms.

Generally speaking, despite Sudan tops the list of African nations with the most attempted and failed coups with 17, (out of this number six were successful). With eight successful coups carried out in 1966, 1974, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1987, 2014, and 2022, Burkina Faso holds the top spot. With eight coup attempts, Nigeria is the next country in line, and six of those were successful in July 1966, July 1975, 1983, 1985, 1993, and 1998.

Corruption

Numerous high-profile examples show that corruption is a pervasive aspect of African politics. Before being overthrown in 1997, Mobutu Sese Seko, the long-time dictator of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), amassed a fortune of \$5 billion (Campos, Nauro, Dimova, Ralitza, and Ahmad Saleh, 2010; Pande, 2010). In the Goldenberg affair, millions of dollars were lost on “huge financial subsidies for bogus shipments of gold and diamonds” revealing systemic corruption under Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi, according to Roubaud and Razafindrakoto (2010). Two further public figures involved in significant corruption scandals are Sani Abacha of Nigeria (Lawal, 2007) and Jackie Selebi of South Africa (Sundström, 2013). Recent Arab Spring events showed how hostile Africans are to corruption. Later, occupied Nigeria was established in protest of the loss of an oil subsidy that had supported an uneasy truce between some sectors of Nigerian society and the corrupted government (Anderson, 2011).

Africa is not the only continent with corruption, but it is nonetheless pervasive and among the worst in the world (Pande, 2009; Pallister and Capella, 2000). According to Transparency International (2019), only Botswana is rated as “extremely corrupted” and no African country is rated as “very corrupted” which includes the majority of the economically developed world. Six African countries are classified as “slightly corrupted” (scores under 20), and another 35 are classified as “least corrupted” (scores 20–39). Thus, approximately one billion out of Africa’s 1.2 billion people live under corrupted regimes, which is a higher percentage than the rest of the world.

According to the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index rankings of 2019, Somalia and Sudan are two of the most corrupted nations in the world. Based on our re-rank, they are also the most corrupt nations in our sample of 53 African nations. Contrarily, according to Transparency International rankings (TI), which took place Botswana and Cape Verde at 32 and 41, respectively. In 2000, Botswana, Madagascar, Namibia, and South Africa from the South;

Morocco and Tunisia from the North; and Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal from the West were the least corrupted countries. South Africa had the least improvement in corruption over the time period, while Namibia had the highest. Niger and Burkina Faso in the West, Ethiopia and Somalia in the East, and Mozambique in the South were among nations that had a change from low levels of corruption in 1984 to very high levels of corruption in 2000 rankings.

Africa's least corrupted nation, Botswana, is a regional leader in public services, infrastructure, and education. It also has a long history of relatively robust democratic institutions (Armah – Attoh, Daniel, Gyimah-Boadi and Annie Barbara, 2007). Measures to combat corruption and return stolen money have had various degrees of success (Scher, 2005; Lawson, 2009; Transparency International, 2009; Michael, 2004; Mbaku, 2008; Manga Fombad, 1999). The anti-corruption initiatives in Botswana take place in a setting that precludes comparability. Botswana already had relatively low levels of corruption, despite the fact that the country's Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC) was established in response to a number of corruption scandals in the early 1990s. In addition, the country benefited from a number of factors that make its situation unique: a relatively healthy economy, funds available for public services, a small (and relatively ethnically homogeneous) population, a lack of violent conflicts, and no history of significant corruption (Theobald and Williams, 1999; McFerson, 2009). In addition, the DCEC was modeled after and initially staffed by former members of the Independent Commission against Corruption in Hong Kong (Theobald and Williams, 1999). Although in other African countries, such an agency would be entrusted with tackling bigger corruption with fewer resources, Manga Fombad (2009) mentions the DCEC as an example of what a multi-pronged approach to corruption emphasizing prevention and supporting the rule of law can be, even in Africa (Theobald and Williams, 1999). The history and achievements of Botswana show the diversity of African countries and emphasize the importance of taking into account their political, economic, and historical contexts.

A dismal picture emerges from illustrations from Nigeria and Kenya. By November 2011, as many as 14 former governors of states, 2 former ministers and 59 former senior officials stood a trial accused of corruption. The woman who had achieved that quantity of indictment was dismissed from her job after president Jonathan had allegedly struck a deal with members of the National Assembly, who loathed her zeal, in exchange for their support for legislation in favour of dropping government "subsidy" for the pump price of imported petroleum products. The lack of civic virtue in these beneficiaries of "neo-representative democracy" is indicated by their attempts to subvert the rule of law punishing them for engaging in corruption.

Summary of major findings

The summary of the above issues is that democracy is in progress in Nigeria. The same can be said of the other African countries like Nigeria, these countries are signatories to international conventions and treaties, apart from having elaborate provisions on democracy and the

rule of law, yet good governance has been a scarce commodity for most of them. However, there are some limitations on defense security and sustainable development in Africa. This includes:

1. Economic inequality, which has practically denied a large percentage of Africa's access to government. Poverty, hunger, unemployment, among other economic predicaments has limited people's participation in government in Africa's economies.
2. Ignorance and high level of illiteracy among the people have prevented a large percentage of Africans from benefiting from democratic principles.
3. Many years of military rule has delayed the development of the legislature, thereby subordinating it to the executive. For example, it is still vivid to us how the Federal Executive, under the leadership of Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, muzzled down the legislature in Nigeria.
4. Similarly, the totaling regime of Mubarak of Egypt tried unsuccessfully to muzzle down the opposition and other democratic forces in Egypt. For over 30 years, Mubarak held sway in Egypt, democracy and the rule of law remained mere articles of faith. However, the recent revolution that swept Mubarak regime aside is a cheering news for the enthronement of democracy and the rule of law in Egypt, but whether it will facilitate good governance remains a hypothetical question. It has been noted that 'Egypt has had a great defiance for democracy. The entire citizenry has been so far been subjected to no leadership choice, and what that connoted is the governance would most likely become autocratic.
5. In a similar vein, a coalition of US and NATO, which backed rebels, succeeded in toppling the 42 year-sit tight regime of Muammar Gaddafi last year, and enthroned a National Transition Council (NTC), whose major task is enthrone democracy, the rule of law and ensure good governance in Libya. Whether the NTC will achieve this noble objective is also hypothetical. Although Mustafa Abdel Jalil, who was a former justice minister in Gaddafi regime and later decamped to the rebels and became their spokesperson, had warned 'all Libyans to exercise self-restraint and to respect the property and lives of others and not to resort to taking the laws into their own hands. It is not yet certain the direction of the new government in Tripoli. Laessing and Ryang (2011) have noted that as the loyal remnant forces of Gaddafi made last ditch stands in the capital, world leaders rushed to embrace the fractious rebel movement as new masters of Libyan oil riches. This means that the new government may decide to satisfy the glutton's desires of their new masters at the expense of good governance for the Libyan citizenry.
6. Generally, the emerging African democracies have ample provisions for democracy and the rule of the law, but good governance has been elusive. This largely accounts for low score or outright negative index of African democracies in the benchmark of good governance as corruption, election irregularities, poverty, unemployment, maladministration, gagging of the press, muzzling down of political opponents, emerging one party state, declining per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP) among other negative signals.

7. Rousseau, who equates democracy with the general will of the people, has argued that inequitable distribution of wealth in any society is counterproductive to good governance. He has argued that democracy will only thrive if the government provides for the materials welfare of the people, as well as remove gross inequality in the distribution of wealth in the society (Sabine and Thorson, 1985).
8. Most African economies, including Nigeria are off tangent to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They (African economies) top the index table of corruption in the world as attested by the findings of the Transparency International. Civil wars, refugees problems, military coups, religious fanaticism, terrorism, kidnapping of innocent citizens and political opponents have persisted as the main features of the African countries.
9. The truth is that African people do not make substantial input either the selection or election of their leaders as the latter are usually accountable to their paid masters in Europe and America. Karl Marx has argued that those who control the means of production, distribution and exchange in every state, equally control the political power with which they reinforce and sustain their hold on the economy.

Conclusion

The paper argues that democratic governance in Africa, has not ushered the necessary and desired development. The democratic experience in Africa has been a sharp departure from a people-oriented paradigm of governance. What the people get as their own dividends of democracy is despair and frustration and not improved welfare or overall development. Africa is endowed abundantly with both human and natural resources. The effective and efficient harnessing of these resources through a system that will ensure equity in resource allocation, improvement in the quality of life of the majority and the protection of rights of the poor appears to be the challenge. The quality of governance seems to be deteriorating resulting in restiveness and the weakening of some public institutions to the extent of the continent being contemplated to be ascribed as a failed state. Although Africa has recorded some level of progress in infrastructural and human capital developments, political tussle, corruption, the miscarriage of justice and the insecurity of lives and property have denied majority of citizens the much-needed dividends of democracy and accountable government, as promised by successive democratic governments. If Africa is ever going to witness the goal of sustainable development, this paper believes it will come only when the rest of the world sees a marked difference in the style of leadership, mindset, values and attitudes of those who leads. It is no longer in doubt that Africa is in dire need of committed leaders who will deliver on the gains of democracy. But what is in doubt is the possibility of change in the person of the leaders, structures and process of governance that will bring out sustainable development in our national economy.

Recommendations

In order to avert violence and enhance the survival of sustainable developments in Africa, the following recommendations appear too central to the survival and well flourishing of our nascent democracy:

1. Military option as focused by the government cannot and will not provide solution to the security problems, but rather socio-economic development of the people will provide a lasting solution to the securities challenges. As Robert McNamara rightly said “security is not about military hard or software, though it may encompasses it, but rather, security is development and development is security, without development there will be no security”. This can be done by providing job opportunities for the jobless youths; poverty alleviation programmes for households; free medical facilities for the vulnerable; and subsidies on food and no-food items for the neglected rural majority.
2. Political offices should be made less attractive by regulating the salaries of politicians. As long as the salaries of political office holders quadruple those of Professors, Chief Justices, long standing engineers and other professionals, political positions will remain a gold mine which anyone that discovers, it will go and sell all that he has in order to acquire.
3. There must be sufficient enlightenment to discourage the African electorate from mortgaging their conscience by selling their votes to incumbent politicians. Where the electorate understands the future implications of selling their votes, they would refrain from such practice.
4. Government should regulate and monitor the proliferation of SALWs. It is because, research shows that the availability of SALWs also triggered conflict and violence.
5. Parents should inculcate the culture of values in their children such as respect for constituted authority, hard work and tolerance of one another among other values so that when they grow up, it becomes a part of them.
6. Both kinetic and non-kinetic approaches should be applied in order to bring to an end the menace of insecurity and sustainable development in Africa.
7. Government should as a matter of urgency, restructure the security architecture for effective intelligence gathering. There is a need for a holistic review of the nation’s security framework. The centralized system of defense and policing has proven to be ineffective in a country like Africa. Community policing strategies should be adopted so that policing of a particular region would be the responsibility of the indigenous people of that region who have the knowledge of the region’s peculiar challenges, local inhabitants, culture, and geography and can proffer peculiar solutions that would be commensurate with the region’s insecurity dynamics. There should not be a need for any police officer to be posted to anywhere other than his state of origin for effective citizen-focused security.
8. Most of the security challenges in Africa are rooted around lack of political will, bad governance, unstable economy, illiteracy, corruption, large economic gap and ineffective post-insurgency peace building strategies. The government needs to be proactive in

setting effective poverty alleviation strategies and economic policies that would ensure citizen-based development. For crimes to be properly controlled, our educational sector needs a thorough overhaul to create an educational system that must guarantee jobs at the end through curriculums that would ensure graduates being job providers rather than job seekers.

9. Finally, this study proposes the introduction of a mid-term evaluation of those elected into any political office. Politicians must be able to go back to their constituencies for re-affirmation of their mandate after two years of a four-year tenure or two and a half years for a five-year tenure. Such provision would ensure that politicians are responsive and responsible to deliver the dividends of democracy to the electorate that voted them into office.

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The role of pre-accession assistance in the process of joining the European Union

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Abstract This paper primarily analyzes the classification of international organizations according to different criteria to see the specificity of the EU as a sui generis international organization. The authors specifically examine the legal order of the EU and the process of achieving full membership. They are interested in the EU accession process, particularly for countries in the Western Balkans like Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is covered by the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Candidate countries have access to various EU funds, which the authors analyze as pre-accession assistance. The study assesses Bosnia and Herzegovina's status in European integration and delves into the use of IPA funds in the country, including its withdrawal, scope, and limitations. The authors emphasize the importance of IPA funds for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Introduction

This paper analyses the theoretical concept of classification of international organizations to indicate those organizations with a specific character. The authors decided to view the European Union as a sui generis international organization for the necessary reasoning in this paper. In this context, a particular focus is put on two elements that, in our opinion, make the European Union a specific organization, namely the characteristics of its legal system and subjectivity (Phelan, 2012, pp. 367–371), and the multi-phase and complex process of joining its fully legal membership. This text refers to the financial aid provided by the European Union (EU) to countries interested in becoming full members (Pollack, 2019, p. 9). We will provide more details about

this specific segment later on. The volume and type of pre-accession aid are of exceptional importance for all the countries acceding to the European Union, especially for Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as the BiH), which, due to its complex structure, has additional challenges in the accession process. The IPA and other funds of the European Union are analyzed according to the components that have been implemented in BiH on its way to obtain full membership in the EU.

The research subject is the specificity of the EU *sui generis* international organization, its legal order, and the process of achieving full legal membership. The analysis focuses, in particular, on the specificity of the legal order of BiH and the realization process of obtaining full membership. The described processes are interesting because they can show the way to join the Western Balkan countries, including BiH, and highlight the challenges and opportunities that may arise during this journey. The research question is how BiH fits into the European integration process and the use of IPA funds in BiH with a description of withdrawal, scope, and limitations of this apparatus. The research aims at analyzing the status of BiH in the process of European integration and the use of IPA funds in BiH with a description of the withdrawal, scope, and limitations of this instrument. At the end of the research, we analyzed the importance of IPA funds for BiH.

Methodology

The paper adopts a method to investigate the trends and patterns of scientific publications on the topic of the paper. This method is suitable for research design because it allows for a quantitative and objective evaluation of the scientific output and impact of a research field. The paper uses data from various scientific works from journals categorized in Web of Science and Scopus and is cited several times. These databases were chosen because they contain high-quality journals that have a rigorous review process and a high impact factor, which means that the works published in these journals are often cited in other works. The criteria used in the selection of literature were:

- a) publication date between 2010 and 2020;
- b) language of publication: English, Serbian, or Croatian;
- c) categorization as scientific work.

The paper highlights the similarities and differences between the conclusions and results reached by different authors.

Types of international organizations

From Konstantin Granac "who was a pioneer in the study of international organizations" (Mišćević, 2012, p. 68) until today, the question of the concept and type of international organizations has been continuously studied. Regardless of whether those who dealt with the law of international organizations belonged to the European-continental or Anglo-Saxon schools, similar potential classifications of international organizations (Archer, 2001, pp. 35–45) (hereafter MO) are possible. Concerning the above, they can most easily be divided according to the following

criteria: the breadth of membership, the procedure of opening for access, the method of duration, and the main areas of activity, according to the powers given both to it and to its most important bodies. Professors Račić and Dimitrijević state that

based on the width of membership, the International organizations can be divided into universal and regional and organizations of specially interested countries. According to the degree of openness, they are open and closed, according to their duration permanent and temporary, according to the field of activity general and specialized, according to powers, deliberative, operational and supranational (Račić, Dimitrijević, 1980, pp. 30–33).

Also, Dimitrijević states that international organizations can be insufficiently transparent, responsible, and democratic in their work and management, which can lead to corruption, abuse of power, and lack of participation and control by citizens, civil society, and national parliaments. (Dimitrijević, 2021). Our attention in this paper is dedicated to international organizations that are being viewed based on the breadth of membership, namely those that are a community of particularly interested countries. Following the above, as an example of such a *sui generis* international organization, in the following part, we will point to the European Union (hereafter referred to as the EU).

The European Union as a *sui generis* international organization

Since its inception, the EU has developed as a “self-governing, autonomous entity whose law could not be identified with the national law of the member states or with international law” (Košutić, 2006, p. 151). History has recorded several European integration ideas. “In a series of more or less successful, longer or shorter-term attempts at violent integration, the Roman, Napoleonic, and Hitlerian conquests represent only the most famous examples, which are spatially wide enough to be called European in the true sense” (Košutić, Rakić, Milisavljević, 2013, p. 10). Until the 1950s all of them had one fact in common. They were all violent and followed by an attempt to dominate one of the European states. The evolution of the idea of voluntary integration processes in Europe began to develop at the beginning of the 17th century¹ and had several stages until the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and other communities in the middle of the 20th century. We want to point out, in particular, that the idea of voluntarism led to the creation of a specific national or international organization such as the EU today, although we must emphasize that this is not a generally accepted position. Laffan represented an undefined position on the nature and character of the subjectivity of the EU, who claims that the difficulty of its defining is based on the fact that “the EU swims between politics and diplomacy,

¹ Several historical figures were the originators of the idea of the voluntary European association. Among the most significant, we include Pierre Di Bois – court lawyer at the court of King Philip IV, Czech King Jirži Podebradski, mathematician Emrik Krise, Maximilian de Silly, chief minister of French King Henri IV, William Penn, an English Quaker, Opad de Saint Pierre, Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, Saint Simon, Pierre Joseph Proudhon, Richard Callegri, the Danish doctor Christian Herfort, Goethe, Heinrich Heine, Arstide Briande and others.

between the state and the market, government and management” (Laffan, 1997, p. 1) and that everything leads to the conclusion that it is something between the existing entities defined to date in international (public) law. “The European Union is a specific MO (*sui generis*) as a new form of relationship between states which legal basis for functioning is of a supranational or supranational character” (Halilović, 2013, p. 50). In our opinion, what sets it apart from other similar organizations are:

- specific legal order as well as;
- the multi-phase procedure of admission to full membership.

Not wanting to elaborate on the characteristics of the EU legal system in this paper, we will only state that in addition to real theoreticians, the courts, as a specific branch of government, are also actively dealing with this issue. “The determination of the EU by the courts is important for both the interpretation of the Founding Treaties and secondary European law. The problem is also special for constitutional courts that want to determine the relationship between national constitutional law and legal rules that arise in European supranational institutions” (Rodin, 1996, p. 244). Regardless of the preceding legal order, the EU as a *sui generis* IO can be defined as a set of legal rules whose most significant features are autonomy and supranationality, which is partially limited. Opperman believes it will “keep it forever in the zone between the federal state and the international organization, therefore, will always be suitable for dismantling” (Oppermann, 2005, p. 139–140). In this context, it is crucial to emphasize that the legal subjectivity of the EU was defined only after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. “Before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the EC had a legal personality but the EU did not. Article 281 of the EC granted legal personality to the European Community, but the pre-Lisbon Treaties contained no provisions concerning the legal personality of the EU²” (Horvath, Odor, 2010, pp. 76–77). The issue of legal subjectivity significantly affected the entire legal order of the EU after the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. Only then could the EU, as an independent entity, conclude international agreements with third countries, especially in the areas defined by the mentioned treaty. These changes will lead to the unquestionable fact that since then, the EU has been able to be a subject of international law and resort to all instruments of multinational action both at the regional and world level (Fabbrini, 2021).

When we talk about the procedure for admission to membership, it was, in our opinion, specific due to one specially conditioned characteristic — the geographical position of the candidate’s country. Thus, the states of Western, Central, and Southern Europe had a somewhat shorter, less politically conditioned process of joining and becoming full members of the EU than some former socialist countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe had. For the Western Balkan countries, a specific long-term process is planned. It reflects in the execution of the various phases of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (hereafter SAA). BiH itself has also been included in the SAA since 2006, and in December 2022, it officially received the status of a candidate country for the EU membership, even though it has not fulfilled all the conditions

² The legal personality of the EU practically replaced and succeeded the legal personality of the European Community.

required by the SAA. This leads the authors to the fact that it is about a political decision caused by global circumstances, as it once was during the admission of Bulgaria and Romania to full EU membership. In this process, all countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, used different types of available means to get as close as possible to EU standards in the process of stabilization and association and especially to achieve the greatest degree of harmonization of their law with the EU *acquis*, i.e. *acquis communautaire*. In our opinion, the EU's pre-accession aid in the case of BiH was an additional motive in its process of European integration, which motivated different levels of government in this dysfunctional complex state to devote themselves more seriously to fulfilling their obligations as a country including in the process of stabilization and association, and since the end of last year, officially as a country candidate. The entire procedure for becoming a full member of the EU can generally be divided into two parts:

- necessary material assumptions that must be fulfilled and
- following the multi-phase procedure that is conditionally linked to the first part, which
- involves material assumptions.

Furthermore, there is an implicit requirement for a country to be both a candidate and a European nation to qualify for membership in the EU. This has resulted in Morocco and Turkey being unable to join the EU throughout history. The previously mentioned EU accession procedure was defined in detail by the highest body of the EU – European Council, in Copenhagen, in 1993. It is important to note that “the state should meet the economic and legal criteria for joining the membership. The legal system needs to be unified with the communitarian law and all its assets must be included in”. (Košutić, Rakić, Milisavljević, pp. 166–167). However, in addition to the complicated procedure and the fulfillment of the conditions mentioned earlier, the candidate countries for the EU membership are supported directly and indirectly by the EU institutions to fulfill the set of requirements. As they work towards becoming a full member of the EU, they are given significant financial assistance opportunities available primarily through several pre-accession funds, suitable credits, and loans approved by the EU.

Pre-accession aid from the European Union

Although the EU institutions demand precise fulfillment of the established obligations of the candidate countries, it is necessary to emphasize that the candidate countries for EU membership are not left without the support of the EU itself in this process. The above-stated support takes place in two directions: political and financial. Although both types are necessary and mutually intertwined, our focus in the following text will be the volume and structure of financial assistance available to both candidate countries and potential candidates for EU membership. The EU institutions provide financial resources that must be used transparently and responsibly. The competent EU institutions closely monitor these resources to ensure strict compliance with usage rules. Four main groups form the EU funds, and those are:

1. Grants,
2. Subsidies, whose use is monitored by national or regional bodies,

3. Loan guarantees and equity and

4. Awards to winners in competitions such as within the framework of the “Horizon 2020” program.

Grants from the EU are approved for projects and programs that are related to the implementation of policies and programs of EU institutions in a specific country or region, in the case of BiH, most often for obstacles intended for the Western Balkans or, more specifically, BiH itself. Regarding approved funds, in the form of the subsidies mentioned earlier in coordination with national or regional bodies and authorities, they have the unique name of European Structural and Investment Funds. They occur in several modalities, namely:

- European Fund for Regional Development,
- European Social Fund,
- Cohesion Fund,
- European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development,
- European Fund for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.

The status of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the process of European integration

Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter BiH) today, as a project of the international community confirmed by the Dayton Peace Agreement, is an independent state (Aćić, 2019, p. 25; Hartwell, 2019, p. 44). One of the primary strategic goals of BiH is to achieve full membership in the EU. For BiH, integration into the EU means taking an appropriate place in the European family of democratic countries. BiH and its people (Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks) share the goals, values, and principles of the EU and are committed to developing a society based on the system of values and achievements of European democracies. At the same time, they are determined to be an integral part of modern European political, economic, and security structures.

Bosnia and Herzegovina applied for EU membership in February 2016. Whether the state could carry out this act depended on the implementation of economic, social, political, and rule-of-law reforms, as well as the protection of minority rights. Bosnia and Herzegovina had to take a series of complex steps in the process of negotiations on the Stabilization and Association Agreement. This Agreement between the EU and its member states on the one hand and BiH on the other came into force on June 1, 2015. As a guarantee for the proper execution of the SAA, several organizations were created, such as:

- Parliamentary Committee for Stabilization and Association – a forum of deputies from the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Parliament;
- Council for Stabilization and Association – it consists of members of the EU Council and members of the European Commission together with representatives of the Council of Ministers of BiH, and is responsible for supervising the implementation of the SAA;
- The Stabilization and Association Committee – a body at the technical level that assists the Stabilization and Association Council in the performance of its duties and

- The Stabilization and Association Committee can establish sub-committees for appropriate implementation of obligations.

In 1997, Bosnia and Herzegovina established the essential political and economic prerequisites to cultivate cooperative connections with the European Union. In June 1998, the EU-BiH Consultative Working Group was established (Parliament of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2023). In June of 1998, Bosnia and Herzegovina took their first official step towards the EU membership by creating the EU/BiH Consultative Working Group (CTF). The CTF offers technical and professional assistance in administration, regulatory framework, and policy. In June of the same year, the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina officially signed the “Declaration on Special Relations between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The regional shift in terms of integration occurred in 1999, with the clear dedication of the Western Balkans to EU membership. Namely, the new Stabilization and Association Process (PSP) for the five countries of Southeast Europe, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, was proposed in May 1999 (Delegation of the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Office of the Special Representative of the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2021). In this regard, in June 2000, the EU member states decided to grant the status of potential candidates to all countries of the Stabilization and Association Process (PSP), including BiH.

The following year, begins the first year of the new CARDS program, specially designed for the needs of countries in the PSP. The Summit held in Thessaloniki in June 2003 held significance for Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the Summit, the PSP was established as EU policy towards the Western Balkans, and the EU’s perspective on the countries in that region was confirmed. Also, in November 2003, the European Commission prepared a Feasibility Study which assessed the capacity of BiH to implement a possible future SAA. In June 2004, the EU established the first European partnership for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then, in October 2005, the European Commission evaluated BiH’s implementation of the reforms outlined in the Feasibility Study and deemed it satisfactory. As a result, the commission recommended starting SAA negotiations, marking a significant milestone in BiH’s journey toward the EU. In the month after, dialogs regarding the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the European Union (EU) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) began officially. By December 2006, technical negotiations of the SAA between the two parties were completed. However, the Agreement cannot be signed and concluded due to the insufficient progress that had been made in crucial reforms. In December 2007, the Stabilization and Association Agreement with Bosnia and Herzegovina was initiated in Sarajevo. This decision was made after the Commissioner for Enlargement, Olli Rehn, determined that there was enough consensus among the country’s political leaders about necessary reforms. In January 2008, the visa facilitation and readmission agreements would have become effective.

In 2008, Bosnia and Herzegovina set its sights on joining the EU by establishing diplomatic relations and signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement. This agreement laid out the necessary steps for implementing reforms in various areas, such as legal, administrative, institutional, and economic, as a requirement for moving closer to the EU. In February 2008, the

European Council adopted a new European partnership, and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Framework Agreement on IPA funds. A dialogue regarding the cessation of visa requirements was initiated in May of that same year. On June 5, 2008, the European Commission introduced the Road Map, which established benchmarks for eliminating the visa system. The following month, on July 16th, the European Commission and BiH signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement and the interim agreement on trade and trade-related matters. After 15 days, BiH and the European Commission signed the Financial Agreement on the State Program for the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) for 2007. December 15, 2010, marked a significant milestone for BiH's journey to the EU as the visa-free regime was implemented for all BiH citizens with biometric passports. In June 2015, the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and BiH entered into force. On February 15, 2016, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted a formal request for membership in the European Union to the Presidency of the Council of the EU, marking the first step in becoming a candidate state. Later that year, on September 20, 2016, the European Council invited the European Commission to provide their opinion on BiH's application for membership. Finally, on December 9, 2016, the Questionnaire from the European Commission was delivered to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council asked the European Commission to prepare an avis (opinion on BiH's ability and readiness for the EU membership), which is prepared based on the analytical instrument of the EU enlargement policy, the so-called Questionnaire. In December 2016, a questionnaire consisting of 3,897 questions was sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The questionnaire aims to review the country's political, legal, economic, and administrative systems.

In February 2018, authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina responded to 3,442 questions from the European Union Questionnaire, which were submitted to President Juncker and Commissioner Hahn. In March 2019, they also submitted answers to an additional 665 questions. On May 29, 2019, the European Commission released an Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina's application to join the European Union, along with an Analytical Report outlining necessary reforms in areas such as democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights, and public administration. The Commission stated that negotiations for membership could only begin once Bosnia and Herzegovina meets the required criteria. Finally, on December 15, 2022, Bosnia and Herzegovina was officially granted a candidate status for membership in the EU, at a summit in Brussels.

Use of IPA funds in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has gradually increased its involvement in the EU programs, which receive funding from the IPA funds. At the moment, BiH is participating in several programs, including COSME, Creative Europe, Customs 2020, Europe for Citizens, Erasmus+, Fiscalis 2020, Horizon 2020, the Third Program for the Union's actions in the field of health, and the INTERREG program. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU provided BiH with 7 million euros for urgent public health needs and 73.5 million euros for socioeconomic recovery projects. Additionally, in May 2021, the EU mobilized 13.7 million euros in aid to help BiH procure

vaccines against COVID-19. Since 2007, BiH has been approved for over 600 million euros in IPA funds, but not all of the funds have been utilized (European Commission, 2018, p. 54–58).

The European Commission³ introduced a new pre-accession assistance instrument called IPA II during the budget period of 2014–2020. The proposed budget for IPA II is 14.1 billion euros. The new Regulation on the establishment of IPA instruments has abolished the previous division into five components and introduced policy areas:

1. Process of transition towards membership and capacity building.
2. Regional development.
3. Employment, social policies, and development of human resources.
4. Agricultural development.
5. Regional and territorial agreements.

BiH now has an access to funds from all five policy areas through the new pre-accession aid instrument, IPA II. The first draft of the Strategic Documents for IPA II for BiH outlines the key sectors and priorities for IPA III support for 2014–2020, along with specific conditions for using IPA III support for individual sectors⁴. However, the planning of IPA II was put on hold due to the unresolved case of “Sejdić and the Finns against Bosnia and Herzegovina⁵” and the absence of a coordination mechanism⁶.

Significance of IPA funds

The EU provides significant financial support to BiH. From 1996 to 2007, BiH was a beneficiary of the EU financial aid through the Phare, OBNOVA, and CARDS programs. (Central Agency for Financing and Contracting: SAFU, 2008, p. 11; Directorate for European Integration, 2023). Since 2007, BiH mainly receives aid from the EU through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which is directly managed by the EU Delegation in BiH. The IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance – IPA 2007–2013) was established by the European Council Regulation no. 1085/2006 on July 17, 2006. It is an instrument consisting of five components designed to build institutions and the rule of law, promote human rights (including fundamental rights, minority rights, gender equality, and non-discrimination), facilitate administrative and economic

³ According to Article 57 of the Regulation of the European Commission no. 718/2007. From June 12, 2007. On the implementation of Council Regulation No. 1085/2006 establishing the IPA, the goal of the evaluation is to improve the quality, effectiveness, and consistency of aid from EU funds, as well as the strategy and implementation of the program. Evaluation can be ex-ante (evaluation before implementation), interim (during execution), and ex-post (after execution). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Commission is conducting an interim evaluation of IPA.

⁴ The document envisages support for eight sectors: good governance and public sector management, the rule of law, transport, environment, and climate change, integrated local government, education and human resource development, employment and social policy, and agriculture and rural development.

⁵ “Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina” is the name of the court case that was conducted before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, following a lawsuit by Derva Sejdić and Jakob Finci, who, as members of national minorities, were prevented from being elected to the Presidency of BiH and the House of Peoples of BiH.

⁶ The coordination mechanism between different levels of government should ensure the transmission, application, and enforcement of European Union laws so that the state can act unanimously in matters related to EU integration.

reforms, encourage economic and social development, promote reconciliation and reconstruction, and enhance regional and cross-border cooperation. (Central Agency for Financing and Contracting: SAFU, 2008, p. 38). The last three components are designed to closely mimic the EU rural development funds to help countries prepare to manage them effectively. It will ensure that when these countries become full members, they are ready to handle the funds efficiently (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Summary overview of contracted and disbursed funds from the IPA for BiH (IPA I 2007–2013 and IPA II 2014–2020)⁷

Source: Directorate for European Integration (2020).

States must establish administrative capacities and structures that can take responsibility for managing aid funds. It is important to have well-defined and sector-specific strategies to obtain funding through IPA III's strategic framework. The IPA III plan aims to make small but significant adjustments to aid planning. It will prioritize the strategic and dynamic allocation of aid based on crucial membership criteria. In addition, it aims to boost sustainable economic development, investments, and help to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic crisis (Source: Directorate for European Integration, 2023, p. 6). IPA III will provide support to beneficiary countries with a total budget of 14.2 billion euros, which is a significantly greater amount compared to IPA II and IPA I. Between 2007 and 2013, the budget for IPA was 11.48 billion euros. From 2014 to 2020, approximately 12.8 billion euros were allocated. Thematic priorities of the judiciary, are the fight against corruption, fight against organized crime, migration and border management, fundamental rights, democracy, and civil society (Directorate for European Integration, 2023, p. 16).

⁷ During 2014, money was approved and paid out through a special program of special measures for flood recovery and protection.

Throughout its growth and development, the European Union has established various aid initiatives for countries seeking to join the Union, as well as for developing countries and those under the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Pre-accession aid instruments are grants offered to countries aspiring for membership. These grants aim to assist in training these countries to meet all the necessary political, institutional, and socio-economic criteria for full membership. As time passed, these programs grew more complex and multiplied, presenting challenges regarding their diverse uses, programming, and monitoring. The Single Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) replaced the previous instruments, overcoming these problems. The IPA was created to assist individual countries based on their needs and progress. The allocation of funds is determined by assessments made for each country and region. IPA funds function as an instrument that depends, on the one hand, on the political priorities and positions of the EU concerning the issue of enlargement and, on the other hand, on the ability of the institutions in BiH to meet the political and technical criteria for accession, but also on the potential of the institutions to absorb the offered resources.

The target group includes organizations or individuals directly affected by a particular project and involved in its implementation phase. However, the end users are organizations and individuals who are not directly involved in the implementation of the project, those on whom the project has an indirect impact.

In the project planning phase, it is necessary to determine the target group and its end users. In doing so, it is crucial to predict that the target group is directly involved in the project and has measurable benefits from the project. Also, it is necessary to determine the number of members of the target group as precisely as possible because the value and significance of the project are measured by the positive effects resulting from the implementation of the project itself.

Conclusion

The progressive development of international law enabled the establishment of the EU as a sui generis International Organization. The EU has followed a specific legal order and implemented a multi-phase admission procedure, which has resulted in several stages of expanding the number of full members in the organization. The EU provides significant financial support to foundations and candidates for membership, mainly through IPA funds. Since 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina has received 1,045,760.00 KM through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). A significant portion of this 701,083,000.00 KM has been used under the supervision of the EU Delegation to BiH. The IPA is comprised of five components and designed to assist in establishing institutions and the rule of law, promoting human rights (including fundamental rights, minority rights, gender equality, and non-discrimination), implementing administrative and economic reforms, fostering economic and social development, promoting reconciliation and reconstruction, and facilitating regional and cross-border cooperation. The IPA III program has a budget of EUR 14.2 billion to assist countries that will benefit from it. Thematic priorities are justice, the fight against corruption, the fight against organized crime, migration and border management,

fundamental rights, democracy, and civil society. Whether or not IPA funds can be utilized depends on the political will to meet the EU membership requirements (such as achieving candidate status) and having the necessary technical capabilities to access these funds. The instrument of pre-accession assistance (IPA) offers significant opportunities for the institutional and socio-economic development of society in areas where our country is lagging in the European integration process. However, the results so far in using the IPA funds indicate that institutions at all levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina must provide much larger support and involvement in the political and technical sense. The costs of becoming a candidate country go beyond meeting political and economic criteria. It also includes building up the administrative and technical capacities necessary for utilizing IPA funding to its full potential. Many other countries that receive IPA funds also face similar issues, as demonstrated by the ratio of approved and utilized IPA funds outlined in the Multiannual Indicative Financial Framework (MIFF) for the 2007–2013 period. Despite numerous publications and efforts by governmental and non-governmental institutions on IPA funds, data shows a need for more education on how to withdraw approved funds. It will contribute to an even greater added value of the EU funds approved for the countries by providing more incentives for changes in their societies, legal systems, and economies to the mutual benefit of the European Union, the beneficiary countries of the IPA program, and their citizens. The methodology used in the work also contains certain shortcomings. Studying data from only a handful of scientific journals is not sufficient to provide a comprehensive understanding of the scientific literature on this subject. One drawback of this methodology is that it only considered papers that were cited, potentially missing important papers that were not cited in other research.

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Imigranci i uchodźcy w dyskursie politycznym i medialnym w Królestwie Szwecji po 2015 roku

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Słowa kluczowe kryzys migracyjny w Szwecji 2015, uchodźcy w Szwecji, prasa polska o Szwecji, światowa opinia o Szwecji, przestępczość imigrantów w Szwecji

Abstrakt Podstawą niniejszej analizy są przekazy prasowe, artykuły naukowe i opracowania (w wersji papierowej i elektronicznej) dotyczące m.in. stanowisk przedstawicieli elit politycznych Królestwa Szwecji, ludzi mediów, funkcjonariuszy służb publicznych, czy zwykłych obywateli, którzy zetknęli się ze skutkami kryzysu uchodźczego po 2015 roku i niekontrolowanym napływem imigrantów (zwłaszcza z krajów muzułmańskich). Starano się uzyskać odpowiedzi na następujące pytania badawcze: 1) które siły polityczne w Szwecji wsparły napływ imigrantów do tego kraju po 2015 roku i jakie znalazło to odbicie w politycznym i medialnym dyskursie? 2) jaki był i jest stosunek rdzennych mieszkańców Szwecji do uchodźców i imigrantów? 3) jakie czynniki miały wpływ na przekaz medialny dotyczący skutków kryzysu uchodźczego w wybranych miastach Szwecji w latach 2016–2017? Podczas pracy wykorzystano następujące metody badawcze: *case study*, porównawczą, decyzyjną, instytucjonalno-prawną i analizy. Przeprowadzony przegląd pozwolił na stwierdzenie, że masowy napływ imigrantów i uchodźców wpłynął na zmianę poczucia bezpieczeństwa obywateli Szwecji po 2015 roku.

Immigrants and the refugees in political and medial discussion in the Kingdom of Sweden after 2015 year

Keywords Immigration Crisis in Sweden 2015, Refugees in Sweden, Polish Press about Sweden, World's opinions about Sweden, Criminality of immigrants in Sweden

Abstract The basis of this analysis is press coverage, academic articles and studies (in paper and electronic versions) on, among other things, the position of representatives of the political elite of the Kingdom of Sweden, media people, public servants, Swedes who have encountered the effects of the refugee crisis after 2015 and the uncontrolled influx of immigrants (especially from the Islamic world). The article sought to answer the following research questions: 1. what political forces in Sweden supported the influx of immigrants to Sweden after 2015, and what was reflected in the political and media discourse; 2. what were and are the attitudes of Swedish natives toward refugees and immigrants; 3. what factors influenced

media coverage of the effects of the refugee crisis in selected Swedish cities in 2016-2017? In seeking to answer the above questions, the following research methods were used: case study, comparative, decision-making, institutional-legal and analysis. The analysis proved that the massive influx of immigrants and refugees has changed the sense of security of Swedish citizens after 2015.

Wprowadzenie

Jednym z głównych zagadnień, według autora tego studium, są następstwa swego rodzaju „zderzenia cywilizacji”, co miało miejsce za sprawą kryzysu migracyjnego z 2015 roku i w latach kolejnych, czyli konsekwencje napływu ogromnej liczby ludzi – sięgającej setek tysięcy – obcych kulturowo i mentalnie mieszkańcom Królestwa Szwecji. Kraj ten przez wieki będący narodowościowo homogenicznym, zwłaszcza od drugiej połowy XX wieku stał się „przyjazny” wobec wszelkiego rodzaju migrantów i uchodźców z różnych części świata, co rozpoczęło długi proces „mieszania kultur” i składu etnicznego, czego skutki widzimy obecnie. Od wieku XX rozpoczął się kilkudziesięcioletni okres powstawania „państwa opiekuńczego” określanego jako *Folkhemmet*, *welfare state* (Andersson, 1967, s. 307 i nn.; Nowiak, 2011; Muciek, 2018, s. 336 i nn.). W powszechnej opinii Szwecja kojarzona jest z wolnością seksualną, parytetami płciowymi i lansowaną przez feminizm polityką równości, ekologicznym trybem życia, koncepcją szczęścia (*Lagom*), firmami IKEA, VOLVO, z książkami Astrid Lindgren, ponadto ze złotym okresem muzyki rozrywkowej, tj. przebojami ABBY, czy równie znanej grupy Roxette. Stereotypowy obraz rdzennego Szweda przywołuje na myśl człowieka małowódnego, pedantycznego, punktualnego, bardzo spokojnego i unikającego konfliktów, kulturalnego i zorganizowanego, tj. trzymającego się zawsze planu i nastawionego na indywidualizm – niekiedy skrajny (Lewandowski, s. 111 i nn.; Booth, 2015, s. 265 i nn.; Kołaczek, 2017; Åkerström, 2017; Tubylewicz, 2021, s. 29 i nn.). Na przestrzeni nieco ponad stu lat, poczynając od pierwszej połowy XX wieku, ten bardzo jednorodny pod względem kulturowym i etnicznym kraj zaczął się zmieniać, co stało się szczególnie widoczne w ostatnich kilku dekadach. Podstawą niniejszej analizy są komunikaty prasowe, książki, artykuły i inne przekazy, w których zawarto stanowiska i wypowiedzi polityków szwedzkich, przedstawicieli mediów, funkcjonariuszy służb publicznych czy zwykłych obywateli, którzy zetknęli się z problemami, które ujawniły się w związku z napływem migrantów (zwłaszcza z krajów muzułmańskich), tak w latach poprzedzających rok 2015, jak w kolejnych. Teksty polskojęzyczne bardzo często są odbiciem relacji i doniesień szwedzkich mediów, autorów czy komentatorów. Celem artykułu jest ukazanie bardzo złożonej kwestii relacji między niektórymi rdzennymi mieszkańcami Królestwa Szwecji a przybyszami, zarówno w aspekcie pozytywnym, jak i bardzo krytycznym. Cezurę końcową stanowi sytuacja po wyborach parlamentarnych, które odbyły się na początku września 2018 roku.

Sformułowano następujące pytania badawcze: 1) które szwedzkie siły polityczne wsparły napływ imigrantów do Szwecji po 2015 roku i jakie znalazło to odbicie w politycznym

i medialnym dyskursie? 2) jaki był i jest stosunek rdzennych mieszkańców Szwecji do uchodźców i imigrantów? 3) jakie czynniki miały wpływ na przekaz medialny dotyczący skutków kryzysu uchodźczego w wybranych miastach Szwecji w latach 2016–2017? Dążąc do uzyskania odpowiedzi na powyższe pytania wykorzystano następujące metody badawcze: *case study*, porównawczą, decyzyjną, instytucjonalno-prawną i analizy. Przeprowadzona analiza dowiodła, że masowy napływ imigrantów i uchodźców wpłynął na zmianę poczucia bezpieczeństwa obywateli Szwecji po 2015 roku.

Problem imigrantów i uchodźców w opiniach elit politycznych od lat 90. XX wieku po 2015 rok i lata kolejne

W XX wieku Królestwu Szwecji (niegdyś jedno z najbardziej jednorodnych etnicznie państw europejskich) udało się stworzyć wizerunek kraju przyjaznego imigrantom i wszelkiego rodzaju uchodźcom. Ten obraz utrzymywał się przez dziesiątki lat, choć niektóre wydarzenia przypominały, że rzeczywistość jest bardziej złożona. Pierwszym takim wyłomem stała się kwestia deportacji do ZSRS byłych żołnierzy Armii Czerwonej, którzy służyli w różnych formacjach antystalinowskich, formowanych pod egidą III Rzeszy, a po zakończeniu drugiej wojny światowej tam się schronili. Szwedzi wyciągnęli z tego taką lekcję, że deportacja uchodźców jest nie mniejszą skazą moralną niż niewpuszczenie ich do kraju, a w ogóle „uchodźcy to coś jednoznacznie dobrego”. Jak wskazał Douglas Murray (2017, s. 322), w każdym razie tak myśleli Szwedzi do pewnego czasu.

Duma mieszkańców tego nordyckiego „raju socjalnego” z wizerunku „bezpiecznego kraju dla uchodźców z całego świata” zaczęła się powoli chwiać, co wiązało się z napływem dziesiątków tysięcy ludzi z krajów byłej Jugosławii, doświadczonych na początku lat 90. XX wieku konfliktami zbrojnymi i czyszkami etnicznymi. Tylko z samej Bośni i Hercegowiny do Szwecji przyjechało ich około 70 tysięcy (Podhorodecki, 2000, s. 212; Wybranowski, 2011, s. 245). Tym problemem, podobnie jak analizą ówczesnej polityki migracyjnej tego skandynawskiego kraju i jego wielokulturowości (ostatnie lata XX i pierwsza dekada XXI wieku), zajmowały się m.in. Monika Banaś (2011, s. 53–73) i Paulina Roicka-Gruca (2016, s. 29–43). Wówczas po raz pierwszy dały o sobie znać tak istotne napięcia społeczne i zagrożenie bezpieczeństwa bardzo stabilnego i spokojnego dotąd kraju, wywołane przez uchodźców i imigrantów. Gangi tworzone m.in. przez byłych mieszkańców Bośni i Hercegowiny, Serbii, Albanii czy Kosowa i ich przestępcza działalność zaczęły być coraz częściej tematem wiadomości i programów informacyjnych.

Kwestia tak ogromnego przyrostu imigrantów i „uchodźców” (tak niektórzy z przybyszów się określali) jaki zaistniał w drugiej połowie 2015 roku, podobnie jak i w innych krajach Europy, mocno podzieliła tamtejszą scenę polityczną. Niemniej jednak, poparcie dla nich płynęło zwłaszcza ze strony szwedzkiej lewicy. Okazało się, że polityka „otwartych drzwi”, podobnie jak w przypadku Niemców, czy niektórych innych krajów Unii Europejskiej, generowała ogromne problemy z coraz nowymi przypadkami przestępczości, czy potencjalne zagrożenie infiltracją członków organizacji salafickich i dżihadystowskich. Stąd też 25 listopada 2015 roku, premier

Stefan Löfven i wicepremier Åsa Romson przedstawili wspólne stanowisko, które nakładało pewne ograniczenia dla kolejnych przybyszów. Wśród kwestii zaprezentowanych wówczas kilka było szczególnie istotnych: 1) zaostrzenie kontroli na granicach; 2) zezwolenie na pobyt tymczasowy; 3) ograniczenie prawa do łączenia rodzin (Tomala, 2017, s. 509). Wicepremier Romson z Partii Zielonych, ugrupowania najbardziej przychylnego migrantom także wskazała na minusy nowej polityki, ponieważ: „(...) postanowienie rządu uczyni życie uchodźców jeszcze bardziej niepewnym” (Tomala, 2017, s. 510). Zupełnie inne stanowisko reprezentowali przedstawiciele ugrupowań prawicowych i centroprawicowych. Liderka Umiarkowanej Partii Koalicyjnej Anna Kinberg Batra generalnie poparła stanowisko rządu, choć wskazała, że „zapowiedziane restrykcje nie są wystarczające”. Natomiast Szwedzcy Demokraci stwierdzili, że „działania rządu są niewystarczające i zostały podjęte zbyt późno” (Tomala, 2017, s. 510).

Kwestia problemów z imigrantami stała się w niedalekiej przyszłości tym elementem programowym, który z tej partii mającej wcześniej bardzo niewielkie poparcie społeczne oraz spotykającej się z ostracyzmem ze strony lewicy i liberałów czy sprzyjających im mediów, uczynił bardzo istotną siłę na szwedzkiej scenie politycznej. Efektem konsensusu między rządzącymi socjaldemokratami ówczesnego premiera Stefana Löfvena, a czterema partiami opozycyjnymi (Moderaterna, Centerpartiet, Liberalerna, Kristdemokraterna) było wspólne stanowisko premiera i wicepremier (uzupełnione kolejnym pakietem ustaw o czasowym pobycie), które weszło w życie 16 lipca 2016 roku. Sens nowych przepisów prawnych polegał zatem na przyjęciu zasady przyjmowania mniejszej liczby imigrantów i ograniczeniu świadczeń społecznych dla tych, którzy uzyskali zezwolenie na pobyt (Kubka, 2017, s. 34).

W okresie 2015–2017 oceny i opinie zaczęły się stopniowo zmieniać, wraz z pojawiającymi się niestety kolejnymi przypadkami przestępstw dokonywanych przez imigrantów (i ich wzrastającą liczbą). To z kolei było konsekwencją wzrostu popularności ugrupowań antyimigranckich (zwłaszcza marginalizowanych dotąd politycznie i medialnie Szwedzkich Demokratów) i ich retoryką, którą politycy lewicowi określali jako „rasistowską”, „faszystowską”, czy jako „prawicowy populizm”. Konieczne stało się ze strony szeroko rozumianej lewicy uzasadnienie dla coraz bardziej krytykowanej polityki rządu i walka o „rząd dusz” w sferze propagandowej i utrzymanie za wszelką cenę politycznej poprawności, nawet za cenę negacji faktów (Kubka, 2017, s. 34).

O ile media prawicowe i politycy, a nawet zwykli mieszkańcy Szwecji zaczęli wyrażać opinie krytyczne o przypadkach czynów kryminalnych z udziałem imigrantów, czy uchodźców, o tyle gazety lewicowe i liberalne starały się temu zaprzeczać jako „prawicowym fake newsom”, bagatelizować „wybryki młodzieży”, nawet je przemilczać bądź bardzo lapidarnie informować o faktach, ale bez podawania jakichkolwiek danych o sprawcach (a szczególnie o ich pochodzeniu). Działo się tak zresztą nie tylko w Szwecji. Mimo oficjalnego dementi ambasady o „braku stref szariatu w Szwecji”, w wypowiedzi medialnej premiera Löfvena z 19 listopada 2015 roku (Wybranowski, 2018, s. 147–148) znalazło się odniesienie do aresztowania Irakijczyka podejrzanego o przygotowywanie zamachu, inspirowanego przez powracających z wojny w Syrii obywateli szwedzkich (pochodzenia arabskiego), walczący w armii Państwa Islamskiego (*Szwedzi*

rewidują swoją politykę..., 2015). Pomimo dyplomatycznych sformułowań, między wierszami można było dostrzec realny problem: „Muszę przyznać, że Szwecja była w tym względzie naiwna. Może było nam trudno zaakceptować, że w naszym otwartym społeczeństwie, wśród nas są ludzie – obywatele Szwecji – którzy sympatyzują z mordercami z Państwa Islamskiego” (*Szwedzi rewidują swoją politykę...*, 2015). Mimo różnych sygnałów ostrzegawczych, tempo migracji do Szwecji zaczęło w kolejnych latach XXI wieku nabierać dynamiki. Tak szybki wzrost ludności, spowodowany przez napływ imigrantów musiał wywołać także poważne obciążenia infrastrukturalne. Z oficjalnych statystyk i prognoz demograficznych (tworzonych w pierwszych latach XXI w.) wynikało, że w 1969 roku kraj zamieszkiwało 8 milionów ludzi, w 2017 roku liczba ta wzrosła do 10 milionów, a w 2024 roku sięgnie pułapu 11 milionów. To z kolei tworzyło konieczność budowy 71 tysięcy mieszkań rocznie, czyli w sumie 426 tysięcy do 2020 roku (Murray, 2017, s. 323). Można jedynie dodać, że zakładany wzrost demograficzny do poziomu ponad 10 milionów stał się faktem już w roku 2021, a nie w 2024 (Sweden CIA Factbook, 2021).

Widoczne poparcie i solidarność Szwedów z imigrantami zaczęło się kruszyć jeszcze na początku lat 90. ubiegłego wieku. W 1993 roku popularna gazeta *Expressen* opublikowała sondaż, który dla świata polityki i mediów, sprzyjającego w ogromnym stopniu lewicy, liberalizmowi, feminizmowi i politycznej poprawności w ogóle, był wtedy swego rodzaju szokiem i stanowił istotne złamanie istotnego dotychczasowego dogmatu szwedzkiej polityki społecznej. Pod nagłówkiem – *Wyrzucić ich!*, wspomniana gazeta ujawniła, że aż 63% Szwedów chce powrotu uchodźców do krajów ich pochodzenia (Murray, 2017, s. 323)¹.

Mimo tego, że w pierwszych latach XXI wieku, migracja do Szwecji zaczęła znacząco wzrastać, to „urzędowy optymizm” i korzystny dla niej przekaz debaty publicznej udawało się utrzymać dzięki swego rodzaju jednomyślności, czy sojuszowi nie tylko klasy politycznej, ale przede wszystkim zbliżonemu profilowi ideowemu mediów głównego nurtu. Jak wskazał w swej książce wspomniany Douglas Murray (2017, s. 324):

Może w większym stopniu, niż w innych krajach Europy szwedzkie media podchodziły do kwestii migracyjnych z lekceważeniem, a jednocześnie poczuciem zagrożenia. Badania sondażowe nad sympatiami dziennikarzy, przeprowadzone jeszcze w 2011 roku ujawniły, że około połowy z nich (41%) to zwolennicy Partii Zielonych. Na dalszych miejscach znalazła się Partia Lewicy (15%), Partia Socjaldemokratyczna (14%) i liberalno-konserwatywna Umiarkowana Partia Koalicyjna (14%). W tym sondażu, w granicach błędu statystycznego (1%) znalazło się poparcie dla Szwedzkich Demokratów – Sverigedemokraterna, SvD.

Jednak właśnie to ostatnie ugrupowanie polityczne w realiach kryzysu migracyjnego 2015 roku i kilku lat następných zaczęło notować bardzo istotny wzrost poparcia społecznego. Natomiast

¹ Jej redaktor naczelny, Erik Månsson napisał: „Naród szwedzki ma ugruntowany pogląd na imigrację i politykę uchodźczą. Władza ma przeciwny pogląd. Tego się nie da pogodzić. To jest światopoglądowa bomba, która niedługo wybuchnie. Dlatego o tym piszemy, zaczynając od dzisiaj. Mówimy jak jest naprawdę. Czarno na białym. Zanim bomba wybuchnie”. Można tylko dodać, że publikacja tak „nieprawomyślnego” sondażu przyniosła zwolnienie przez właściciela gazety wspomnianego redaktora.

powyższe zestawienie wyraźnie pokazywało, która orientacja polityczna do tej pory cieszyła się największym poparciem.

Tematem wywiadu udzielonego przez Joannę Teglund (Polkę od lat mieszkającą w tym kraju, współpracującą z Urzędem Imigracyjnym), redaktorowi Grzegorzowi Lindenbergowi z portalu Euroislam.pl, opublikowanym 30 listopada 2015 roku na portalu WirtualnaPolska.pl, był kryzys migracyjny w Szwecji. Wśród znacznej liczby problemów tam przedstawionych, szczególnie podkreślono, że

(...) zgodnie z panującą tam liberalno-lewicową polityczną poprawnością, władze szwedzkie starały się ukrywać problemy związane z imigrantami. Według niej, wszyscy ci, którzy próbowali opisać rzeczywistość byli często w różny sposób zastraszeni lub uciszani przez atak inwektywami w rodzaju „rasista”, „ksenofob”, „islamofob” lub „faszysta”. Przez dziesiątki lat, jedynie słusznym poglądem było to, że „imigracja ubogaca Szwecję (*Fala uchodźców...*, 2015).

Absolutna większość reportaży w mediach publicznych, czyli głównie liberalno-lewicowych, zawierała podobne twierdzenie. Jednak, jak powiedziała J. Teglund:

Imigracja ubogacała Szwecję do momentu, kiedy to była imigracja zarobkowa, dopóki była praca dla stosunkowo dobrze wykształconych uchodźców z naszego kręgu kulturowego. Nadal imigracja lekarzy, czy programistów wzbogaca Szwecję, ale ogromna liczba analfabetów, półanalfabetów i ludzi o niskim poziomie wykształcenia z krajów Trzeciego Świata, którzy nigdy nie dostaną pracy, jest ogromnym obciążeniem (*Fala uchodźców...*, 2015).

Napływ dziesiątek, a potem setek tysięcy imigrantów stworzył dla Szwecji jeszcze w 2015 roku ogromne problemy logistyczne związane z zakwaterowaniem mas ludzi, (część obiektów pałacowych i nieruchomości użyczył nawet król Karol XVI Gustaw) i przede wszystkim, wydatki rządu miliardów koron na pomoc socjalną i utrzymanie azylantów (w 2015 r. wstępnie 40 mld, w roku następnym przewidywano wydanie 74 mld, co i tak okazało się sumą zbyt małą) (*Fala uchodźców...*, 2015). Mimo dramatycznej sytuacji rząd twierdził, „że sobie poradzi” (podobnie jak i rząd Niemiec). Ówczesna minister finansów (następnie premier Szwecji w latach 2021–2022), Magdalena Andersson zapowiedziała wówczas, że „Szwecja będzie zmuszona wprowadzić program oszczędnościowy, ale też zaciągnąć pożyczkę na finansowanie wydatków na imigrację (*Fala uchodźców...*, 2015).

Trzeba było także stworzyć ogromną ilość nowych klas szkolnych dla dzieci w różnym wieku, do czego system edukacji nie był przygotowany. Dla przybyszy Szwecja była nader atrakcyjnym krajem pod względem socjalnym. Według prawa, imigranci mają możliwość „łączenia rodzin” pod warunkiem zapewnienia jej utrzymania (w praktyce 99,3% z tej liczby jest na utrzymaniu państwa). Ta sama minister w wywiadzie dla *Dagens Nyheter* z grudnia 2017 roku mówiła już otwarcie o tym, że kraj nie może przyjąć, ani zintegrować zbyt dużej liczby imigrantów:

Integracja nie przebiega tak, jak powinna, mieliśmy z nią problem w 2015 roku. Dla mnie jest oczywiste, że nie możemy przyjąć większej liczby szukających (azyłu) niż jesteśmy w stanie zintegrować.

To nie będzie dobre dla ludzi, którzy tu przyjeżdżają, ani dla całego społeczeństwa (*Wywiad z Magdaleną Andersson...*, 2017).

Problem przestępczości w dzielnicach imigranckich i jej odbicie w wybranych relacjach medialnych oraz w świecie polityki

Kolejne problemy to wysoki współczynnik przestępstw popełnianych przez niektórych imigrantów (także w szkołach, które coraz bardziej zmieniają swój profil narodowościowy), powstałe dzielnice etniczne, nazywane niekiedy *no-go-zones* opanowane przez gangi, gdzie straż pożarna i pogotowie ratunkowe boją się zapuszczać (np. Tensta w Sztokholmie) i utrzymujące się bardzo wysokie bezrobocie (*Fala uchodźców...*, 2015; Czarnecki, 2019, s. 283).

W drugiej połowie 2015 roku do Szwecji przyjechał znany reporter telewizyjny (a wkrótce reżyser, scenarzysta filmowy i autor powieści o tematyce sensacyjnej) redaktor Tomasz Sekielski razem z ekipą programu *Po prostu*. Swoją reportaż robił w owianej już bardzo złą sławą dzielnicy Malmö-Rosengård (znajdującej się na policyjnej liście *no-go-zones*), spotkał się również z rysownikiem Larsem Vilkssem (autorem karykatur Mahometa, co ściągnęło na niego wyrok śmierci ze strony fundamentalistów islamskich – zginął w październiku 2021 r. w wypadku samochodowym) i z Ingrid Carlquist, która bada przypadki gwałtów (Pw, lulu, 2015).

Komisariat policji, przedstawiony w reportażu, przypominał „warowną twierdzę” (z uwagi na realne niebezpieczeństwo). Natomiast autorzy przytoczyli m.in. bardzo ostrożne i dość oględne wypowiedzi policjantów, np.: „Czasami mamy tu niepokoje społeczne, ale nie jest to zjawisko stałe. Pojawiają się od czasu do czasu” (Pw, lulu, 2015). Natomiast bardzo przygnębiające były słowa I. Carlquist, która wskazała, że złe mówienie o uchodźcach jest niemile widziane, a krytykowanie zbyt dużej ich liczby może wywołać środowiskowy ostracyzm. Szczególnie przejmująco zabrzmiało zdanie: „Imigranci stanowią większość gwałcieli. (...) Np. Somalijczycy gwałcą 20 razy częściej niż Szwedzi. Nie pisząc o tym, dziennikarze szwedzcy wyrządzają dziewczynom wielką szkodę” (Pw, lulu, 2015).

Problemy związane z powstałym kryzysem i rosnącą liczbą przypadków przestępstw i aktów przemocy wobec Szwedów wydatnie wpłynęły na wyniki wyborcze Szwedzkich Demokratów (w 2010 r. – 5,7%, w 2014 już 12,9%) – partii o profilu prawicowym, co przy tak wysokiej dotychczas supremacji lewicy socjalistycznej, Zielonych i feministek na scenie politycznej było czymś wysoce zaskakującym (*Fala uchodźców...*, 2015). W lipcu 2016 roku na Festiwalu Wielokulturowości „Peace&Love” doszło do serii bardzo brutalnych gwałtów, podobne akty przemocy zdarzyły się wcześniej na największym festiwalu – Bravalla (*Szwecja: seria gwałtów...*, 2016). Jak wskazał D. Murray, już wcześniej, w 2014 roku na festiwalu „Sztokholm to MY” członkowie gangów z Afganistanu zgwałcili setki dziewczyn, niektóre miały zaledwie 14 lat (Murray, 2017, s. 326). Cała sprawa została jednak zatuszowana przez policję, a w oficjalnych raportach nie było o tym mowy. W 2015 roku Szwecja pod względem liczby gwałtów na tysiąc mieszkańców, ustępowała tylko Lesotho. W raportach policyjnych jako sprawców wskazywano niekiedy Szwedów, choć najczęściej okazywali się oni Somalijczykami, jak podczas rejsu promem z fińskiego

Turku do Sztokholmu (*Szwecja: seria gwałtów...*, 2016). Szlachetna w teorii idea multikulturalizmu zaczęła się powoli w Szwecji chwiać, choć wielu polityków, intelektualistów, ludzi mediów, zwłaszcza liberalnych i lewicowych, oficjalnie starała się temu zaprzeczać.

Szczególnie dramatyczna sytuacja pod względem stanu bezpieczeństwa i stopnia rozwoju przestępczości zaistniała w Malmö, którego część opanowana została przez gangi (szczególnie wspomniana dzielnica Rosengård). Jak podawała Agnieszka Gromkowska-Melosik, Malmö miało najwyższy procent wyznawców islamu w całej Skandynawii, a Rosengård jest niemal jednorodna etnicznie (dane z 2012–2013 r.). Aż 25% mieszkańców to muzułmanie (tj. 80 tys.) z ogólnej liczby 300 tysięcy (Gromkowska-Melosik, 2013, s. 65–66). Jest to także obszar charakteryzujący się wysokim poziomem bezrobocia – ponad 80% mężczyzn nie trudniło się tam (niemal dekadę temu) żadną pracą (Kern, 2013; Gromkowska-Melosik, 2013, s. 72).

Coraz liczniejsze stawały się artykuły i relacje medialne o przypadkach strzelanin i wojen gangów, napadów na sklepy, podpalania samochodów, zaczepek wobec przechodniów. Ludzie (zwłaszcza kobiety) obawiali się wychodzić wieczorem z domów (Zuchowicz, 2017; Sharma, 2017). Szczególnie dzielnica Rosengård budziła i budzi wiele emocji. Dziennikarz Paul Wilson napisał, że „jeśli jakiś dziennikarz twierdzi, że Szwecja jest bezpieczna, zapłacę za jego podróż i noclegi, by pobył na ogarniętych przestępczością przedmieściach imigranckich Malmö”. Podobne wyzwanie podjął Maciej Czarnecki (2019, s. 6–7)², dziennikarz *Gazety Wyborczej*, który w swej książce opisał wrażenia z pobytu w Rosengård. Z jego relacji i spotkań z mieszkańcami oraz przedstawicielami policji wyłania się bardzo różnorodny i złożony obraz. Jego przewodniczka Gemila (ojciec Irakijczyk, matka Polka) mówiła:

Wiadomości, które cytują, są dramatycznie przesadzone. Żyję tu 28 lat i nigdy nie zostałam napadnięta, obrabowana, dżgnięta nożem. Kocham to miejsce. Gdyby w Malmö rzeczywiście było tak źle, toby nie powstawały te nowe dzielnice. Dlaczego tylu ludzi chce tu żyć. Bo miasto się rozwija, jest muzyka, teatr. Jesteś głodny w środku nocy? Zawsze coś jest otwarte (Czarnecki, 2019, s. 7).

Z kolei Housam Abbas i jego rodzina są imigrantami z Iraku. Są przykładem ludzi, którym w Szwecji się powiodło. Abbas mówi natomiast o wykorzystywaniu nastolatków (nie podlegają sankcjom karnym) w przemyśle broni z Danii dla gangów w Rosengård i możliwości zakupu np. pistoletu „za trzy tysiące koron”. M. Czarnecki rozmawiał także o skali przestępczości w tej dzielnicy z wicekomisarzem policji w Malmö, Andersem Wibergiem i pytał, czy „można ją zaliczyć do *no-go zone*?” (Czarnecki, 2019, s. 13–15)³. Dalsza część wypowiedzi wspomnianego

² „Przechadzamy się po zaułkach i głównych ulicach. Proste, zadbane elewacje bloków, dużo drzew, stojaki z rowerami, pojemniki do segregowania śmieci, klomby i ogródki, jak na zrewitalizowanym gierkowskim blokowisku. Tylko że prawie wszyscy mają ciemny odcień skóry. Niektóre kobiety założyły chusty i tradycyjne stroje muzułmańskie do kostek. Inne odkrywają włosy, wcisnęły się w obcisłe dżinsy. Szwedzki miesza się tu z arabskim, choć ten drugi słychać częściej”.

³ „Zidentyfikowaliśmy łącznie dwieście pięć osób, które mają na koncie łącznie tysiąc siedemset wyroków (!?) To młodzi w wieku, powiedzmy, od piętnastu do dwudziestu pięciu lat. Nie mówimy o gangach lecz o lokalnych grupach przestępczych. (...) M. Czarnecki: Jestem tu od kilku dni i nie widziałem żadnego patrolu – Jesteśmy obecni w dzielnicy kiedy trzeba – odpowiada zdawkowo Wiberg. (...) M. Czarnecki: Rosengård to *no-go zone*? W Szwecji nie

policjanta wskazuje, że w Szwecji powoli zaczęło powstawać coś, co Niemcy nazwali *Parallellgesellschaft* (społeczeństwem równoległym), a sytuacje, które się tam zdarzają, bardzo przypominają to, co dzieje się m.in. na obszarach francuskich *banlieu* (fr. przedmieście, tu jako synonim trudnej dzielnicy). Zaletą tego reportażu było choćby to, że dziennikarz starał się wskazać przypadki integracji migrantów z lokalną społecznością, wskazując m.in. na pozytywne opinie mieszkańców o Persach, opisał też drużynę piłkarską złożoną z Kurdów – Dalkurd FF, która działa w mieście Börlänge (region Dalarna), a jej mecze były obserwowane z uwagą przez kurdyjską diasporę na Bliskim Wschodzie, a także w innych zakątkach globu. Wspomniał też o rozmowie z feministką Mają – Polką z pochodzenia, czy o jej koleżance – robiącej karierę urzędniczą, której rodzina przybyła z Angoli (Czarnecki, 2019, s. 18, 249 i nn.; 279–283).

W kolejnych latach zaczęło przybywać obszarów niebezpiecznych, zwanych eufemistycznie „szczególnie narażonymi na wykluczenie”. Podobną listę 23 stref opublikował dziennik *Dagens Nyheter*, o czym informowała *Gazeta Prawna* (*W Szwecji przybyło stref wysokiego ryzyka...*, 2017). Oprócz kolejnych dzielnic Sztokholmu, Göteborga i Malmö doszły także osiedla mieszkaniowe w Uppsali, Boras oraz Lundzie. Jeszcze w 2016 roku policja wskazała 53 takie strefy, gdzie „ludność jest w różnym stopniu narażona na wykluczenie ze względu na m.in. wysoką przestępczość oraz niski status społeczny i ekonomiczny”. Zwalczania przestępczości nie ułatwiają też braki kadrowe, np. w Malmö brakowało aż 200 funkcjonariuszy (*W Szwecji przybyło stref wysokiego ryzyka...*, 2017). O problemie owych 53 dzielnic „które są w coraz większym stopniu dotknięte przestępczością, niepokojami społecznymi i brakiem bezpieczeństwa” wiadomo też z aktualnych danych ze strony internetowej ambasady Królestwa Szwecji w Warszawie (*Jakie są fakty na temat migracji...*). W zamieszczonym tam komentarzu wskazano, że „miejsca te są niepoprawnie nazywane „strefami no-go”. Prawdą jest natomiast, że w wielu z tych miejsc policja doświadczyła trudności w wykonywaniu swych obowiązków. Nie jest jednak prawdą, że policja się tam nie pojawia i że nie obowiązuje tam szwedzkie prawo” (*Jakie są fakty na temat migracji...*).

W mediach nie było (i nadal nie ma) przyzwolenia, aby pisać o przypadkach gwałtów dokonywanych przez migrantów (pisze się ostrożnie i ogólnie o mężczyznach jako sprawcach, najczęściej bez podawania informacji o pochodzeniu etnicznym, czy wyznaniowym), po to, by „nie wzbudzać paniki”, także przez wzgląd na zakorzenioną mocno mentalnie polityczną poprawność (Zuchowicz, 2017).

Właśnie ta kwestia dotycząca różnych aktów przemocy na kobietach, a zwłaszcza przypadki gwałtów, była jednym z istotnych wątków symptomatycznych dla problemu braku asymilacji i przestępczości wśród imigrantów i rosnącej od 2015 roku liczby uchodźców. Spór o liczbę

ma takich stref. To nieporozumienie, które kreują zagraniczne media. Dla nas to wręcz *go zone*. Mamy tam komisarjat. (...) Pytam o „strefę szariatu”. Także zaprzecza. Dodaje jednak, że w całym kraju policja zidentyfikowała piętnaście obszarów, na których, choć obowiązuje szwedzkie prawo, występują tam „paralelne struktury społeczne”. Wśród nich jest Rosengård”. (...) Według raportu „nie ma w Szwecji obszaru na którym paralelny system istnieje w pełni”. Ale są namiastki, które – jeśli wymkną się spod kontroli – mogą się rozwinąć. Zwłaszcza że we wspomnianych miejscach występują „generalna niechęć do uczestniczenia w procesach sądowych”, „trudności policji w wykonywaniu swych misji, „promujący przemoc ekstremizm religijny”.

podobnych przypadków, pochodzenie sprawców, różne dementi, próby tłumaczenia, m.in. bardzo młodym wiekiem przestępców, który w związku z tym nie podlegali sankcji karnej, były bardzo widoczne w artykułach prasowych i programach telewizyjnych (*Fala uchodźców...*, 2015).

Wspomniana wyżej Joanna Teglund wskazała, że Szwecja znalazła się na pierwszym miejscu wśród krajów UE pod względem zgłoszonych przypadków gwałtu. W roku 2014 zgłoszono 20 300 przestępstw na tle seksualnym, z czego 6294 to gwałty. W porównaniu z rokiem 1975 (gdy Szwecja już oficjalnie stała się „państwem wielokulturowym”), liczba przypadków gwałtów wzrosła aż 15-krotnie (*Fala uchodźców...*, 2015). Kilka lat później te zatrważające statystyki wyglądały jeszcze gorzej. W emitowanym w sierpniu 2018 roku popularnym programie TV – *Uppdrag grannsking*, dziennikarze przedstawili 843 sprawców, którzy zostali skazani przez sąd rejonowy za gwałt lub jego próbę w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat. Okazało się, że w przeważającej mierze (58%) to osoby urodzone poza granicami Szwecji (*Przybywają obcy...*, 2018; Czarnecki, 2019, s. 21). W sytuacjach, gdy przestępca nie znał wcześniej swojej ofiary, sprawcami – w ośmiu na dziesięć przypadków – byli cudzoziemcy. Wielu z nich przebywa w Szwecji od roku lub krócej. W przypadkach gwałtu z napaścią aż 97 ze 129 sprawców to migranci spoza Europy (*Przybywają obcy...*, 2018).

Prof. Jerzy Sarnecki, znany kryminolog mieszkający w Szwecji, ostro skrytykował powyższą audycję i stwierdził, że „program nie powinien być emitowany”. Ponadto „opiera się na starej teorii spiskowej, według której do Szwecji przybywają obcy mężczyźni i gwałcą Szwedki (...) i że establishment, elita poprawności politycznej usiłuje to ukryć”. Zarzucił też dziennikarzom, że „koncentrują się na ograniczonym materiale, na podstawie którego nie powinno się wyciągać wniosków. Jedynie ok. 13% ofiar gwałtu zgłasza to policji i tylko 15% ze zgłoszonych napaści kończy się wyrokiem” (*Przybywają obcy...*, 2018).

Problem ten jest znacznie bardziej złożony i tylko niektóre media poza mainstreamowymi odważyły się podejmować ten trudny temat. „Wolny od poprawności politycznej i niezależny” (jak sam się reklamuje) blog Avpixlat opublikował jeszcze w 2014 roku artykuł, który wcześniej ukazał się w czasopiśmie *Skolvärladen*. To tekst o problemach z trudną młodzieżą, gdzie absolutna większość to muzułmanie, którą charakteryzuje pogardliwy, czy nawet bardzo agresywny stosunek do nauczycieli (zwłaszcza nauczycielek), kobiet i dziewcząt – uczennic. Jeden z fragmentów jest szczególnie wymowny:

Media mainstreamowe próbują nas przekonać, że przestępczość i problemy społeczne nie mają nic wspólnego z pochodzeniem etnicznym, kulturą, czy religią. Uczestnicy gwałtów zbiorowych o imieniu Ali, Ahmed, czy Mohammed otrzymują w artykułach gazetowych imiona Kalle, Pelle, czy Olle. Rasistowsko umotywowana przemoc wobec Szwedów określana jest mianem „młodzieńczych wybryków” (*Wrogość wobec Szwedów...*, 2014).

Mimo oficjalnych zapewnień, że „tak nie jest” problem nie zniknął i pojawiał się w kolejnych latach. W 2021 roku głośne stały się doniesienia medialne o profesor medycyny, Kristinie Sundquist z Uniwersytetu w Lundzie, która w swych badaniach wykazała, że „większość gwałtów

dokonują imigranci”, za co spotkały ją na macierzystej uczelni sankcje m.in. w postaci skierowania jej sprawy do komisji etyki i do sądu (PAP, 2021; Mężyński, 2021).

Dla Królestwa Szwecji, prawdziwym *annus horribilis* stał się z różnych względów rok 2017. Sytuacja w Malmö, opisana we wspomnianym już reportażu K. Zuchowicz z portalu Natemat.pl i rozmów z mieszkańcami (zwłaszcza z Polakami) nie była odosobniona. Od kilku lat (zwłaszcza od 2015 r.) sytuacja uległa istotnemu zaostrzeniu także i w innych miastach, np. na terenie przedmieść Göteborga czy Sztokholmu. W styczniu nasilenie różnych aktów przemocy było tak duże, że podczas debaty liderów partii w Riksdagu, były premier Stefan Löfven mówił, iż:

krwawe porachunki między gangami i powiększająca się szara strefa, coraz częściej stają się realnym zagrożeniem dla szwedzkiego społeczeństwa. Dalej będziemy zdecydowanie i alternatywnie zwalczać alternatywne społeczeństwa. Kiedy uda się nam odciąć możliwości finansowania grup przestępczych, zmniejszy się przemoc na ulicach” (*Premier Szwecji...*, 2018).

W czasie swego przemówienia, lider partii Szwedzcy Demokraci, Jimmi Åkesson, zaproponował by „do walki z gangami skierować wojsko”. Wówczas ten pomysł, jak na warunki szwedzkie, był wręcz rewolucyjny, chociaż w kraju działało wtedy około 500 grup przestępczych, a tylko w 2016 roku w porachunkach między gangami życie straciły 42 osoby. Jak na bardzo spokojną dotąd Szwecję, było to wynikiem szokującym (*Premier Szwecji...*, 2018). S. Löfven zapytany po zakończeniu debaty, czy rząd nie wyklucza pomocy wojska, odparł: „Nie jest to rozwiązanie, o jakim myślę w pierwszej kolejności, ale musimy przyjrzeć się, jakie istnieją możliwości, by zlikwidować gangi”. Natomiast wspomniany już kryminolog, Jerzy Sarnecki powiedział dziennikowi *Svenska Dagbladet*, że „wprowadzenie wojska doprowadziłoby do wojny domowej” (*Przybywają obcy...*, 2018).

Już w lutym 2017 roku obraz sytuacji w dzielnicach imigranckich, a zwłaszcza w Malmö, według mediów szwedzkich i zagranicznych był wręcz dramatyczny (Rakowski, 2017). Portal *express.co.uk* zamieścił m.in. taką relację:

Malmö stało się miastem bezprawia. Policja przyznała, że nie była w stanie zabezpieczyć zabawy sylwestrowej (2016) w mieście. Odnotowano przypadki otwartego nawoływania do dżihadu przez imigrantów, co wywołało przerażenie wśród uczestników miejskiej zabawy. Według ubiegłorocznego raportu szwedzkiej policji, w kraju jest 55 stref określanych jako no-go zones (media szwedzkie i policjanci używali bardziej oględnych określeń, np. „obszarów szczególnie zagrożonych wykluczeniem”). Dochodzi w nich do regularnych ataków na policję, a także napaści na tle seksualnym. Odnotowano nawet przypadki posiadania broni palnej przez dzieci.

Sytuacja powstała w wyniku kryzysu migracyjnego w Szwecji i niepokoje w dzielnicach imigranckich, które miały miejsce na początku 2017 roku znalazły odbicie w jednej z wypowiedzi ówczesnego prezydenta USA, Donalda Trumpa (który był i jest przez światową lewicę i liberałów politykiem szczególnie nielubianym). Podczas wiecu na Florydzie (schyłek lutego), prezydent przekonywał Amerykanów że zapewni im bezpieczeństwo, ograniczając imigrację – jej negatywne skutki opisywał, posługując się przykładem Szwecji (Kociszewski, 2017). Na jego

słowa żywiołowo na Twitterze zareagowali Szwedzi, pisząc m.in. że wtedy, gdy rzekomo miało dojść do zamieszek w dzielnicy imigranckiej w Sztokholmie, „emocjonowali się wyborem reprezentanta na konkurs Eurowizji”. A według dziennika *Aftonbladet*: „w piątek wieczorem zmarła ofiara wypadku przy pracy, a policja sztokholmska była zajęta ofiarą samospalenia i pościgiem za pijanym złodziejem samochodów” (Kociszewski, 2017). Wprawdzie Donald Trump twierdził, że „korzystał z materiałów Fox News i relacji Tuckera Carlssona” (bardzo znanego i popularnego, konserwatywnego telewizyjnego i internetowego komentatora polityki – przyp. DW), ale Szwedzi uparcie utrzymywali, że „to co widział, nie odnosiło się do teraźniejszości, lecz było materiałem archiwalnym”. Do wypowiedzi Trumpa odniosła się minister spraw zagranicznych Margot Wallström, określając ją jako post-prawdę, zaś słowa [prezydenta USA] to efekt emocji, a nie faktów. Niedługo potem na portalu pojawił się wpis brytyjskiego ambasadora – „zamiast atakować Trumpa, ucz się od niego. Szwecja kiedyś była rajem, a teraz wygląda jak strefa działań wojennych” (Kociszewski, 2017).

Kolejna z relacji prasowych z początku marca tego roku dotyczyła także Sztokholmu i bliższej Rinkeby dzielnicy Kista. Oto jej fragment:

W zamieszkaney w większości przez imigrantów dzielnicy Kista, nieznanymi sprawcy z bliskiej odległości postrzelili śmiertelnie w głowę przywódcę gangu „Lwy” oraz jego kompana. Policja podejrzewa, że dokonali tego członkowie gangu „Bractwo” rywalizującego o wpływy na lokalnym rynku handlu narkotykami. Okazało się, że na przedmieściach stolicy Królestwa Szwecji toczy się 12 różnych konfliktów między poszczególnymi grupami przestępczymi. Na konferencji prasowej w dniu 9 marca 2017 roku, przedstawiciel policji Gunnar Appelgren powiedział: „Jeśli nie otrzymamy kolejnych środków, nie będziemy w stanie kontrolować tych wydarzeń” (Kociszewski, 2018).

Sztokholmska policja poinformowała, że prowadzi obecnie (tj. w 2017 r.) 47 śledztw w sprawie morderstw oraz 57 w związku z usiłowaniami zabójstwa. Problem walk między gangami i zabójstw na tym tle był i jest niestety nadal aktualny.

W pierwszych miesiącach 2017 roku ogromny rezonans medialny, zarówno w Szwecji, jak i poza nią, wywołał zamach terrorystyczny, którego dokonał w dniu 7 kwietnia w Sztokholmie Rachmat Akiłow, były mieszkaniec Uzbekistanu. Narzędziem, które wykorzystał do zamachu była ciężarówka – swą jazdę po zatłoczonej ulicy handlowej Drottningsgatan zakończył, uderzając w ścianę domu towarowego Ahléns. Zginęło wówczas 5 osób, a 15 zostało rannych – w tym 8 ciężko (*Attentat i Stockholm*, 2017; *Attentat á Stockholm...*, 2017; Tas/ja, 2017; Andersson, Sørensen, 2017; *Stockholm truck attack...*, 2018).

Gwałtownie rosnąca ilość przypadków przemocy w różnych szwedzkich miastach z udziałem imigrantów stała się podstawą do bardzo krytycznych, czy gorzkich słów niektórych przedstawicieli policji. Dość mocny oddźwięk w kraju wywołała m.in. wypowiedź funkcjonariusza Petera Springare z Örebro, zamieszczona na Facebooku, pisał, że „jest bardzo zmęczony sytuacją, gdy polityczna poprawność wręcz chroni przestępców, którzy przybyli z różnych krajów islamu, a są sprawcami gwałtów (niekiedy ze szczególnym okrucieństwem), morderstw, wymuszeń rozbójniczych, aktów agresji wobec policjantów i napadów” (*Mocne słowa szwedzkiego*

policjanta, 2017). Jest to tym bardziej przykre, że mówienie i pisanie o tym, że przestępstw dokonują imigranci, będący w większości muzułmanami, ma swoje konsekwencje służbowe w postaci wymuszonej przez czynniki oficjalne zmyły milczenia, której przerwanie może się odbić w negatywny sposób na karierze, czy doprowadzić do zwolnienia (*Mocne słowa szwedzkiego policjanta*, 2017)⁴. Ten pełen goryczy wpis P. Springarego spotkał się na Facebooku z licznymi głosami wsparcia ze strony policjantów z innych miast.

Jak wskazano wyżej, o ile część rdzennych Szwedów (i osób, które już wcześniej osiedliły się w tym kraju) z różnych powodów deklarowała sympatię do imigrantów i popierała dalszy ich napływ, o tyle niektórzy z nich poczuli, że niektóre skutki rosnącej „wielokulturowości” mają negatywny wpływ na ich komfort psychiczny i poczucie bezpieczeństwa. Takim przykładem mogła być decyzja Grety Magnusson, która na skutek wydarzeń towarzyszących kryzysowi migracyjnemu, przeprowadziła się w końcu 2017 roku ze Sztokholmu do Szczecina. Udzieliła obszernego wywiadu dla Radia Szczecin, podczas rozmowy z redaktorem Przemysławem Gołyńskim wyjaśniła, dlaczego zdecydowała się na wyjazd z ojczystego kraju i jak postrzega Polskę, Polaków i realia życia w Szczecinie (*Szwedka, która wybrała Szczecin*, 2017):

W Sztokholmie mieszkałam przez 21 lat. Przeprowadziłam się tam z Göteborga, gdzie się urodziłam. Na początku w 1995 roku kiedy się tam znalazłam było bardzo przyjemnie. Niestety, te kilka ostatnich lat [2015–2017] nie były już tak przyjemne. Sztokholm, moim zdaniem, stał się za bardzo wielokulturowy. Zrobiło się niebezpiecznie, zdecydowanie za dużo razy dochodziło do strzelanin. Stał się jednym z wielu niebezpiecznych miejsc w Szwecji.

Do podjęcia decyzji o wyjeździe z kraju ostatecznie skłoniło ją to, że:

Z czasem zauważyłam, że zmienia się ludność tego miasta. Nie potrafiłam się wśród nich odnaleźć. Wydawało mi się, że znajduję się w innym kraju. Czulałam się nieswojo, spacerując po Sztokholmie. Ulicami tego miasta jeździły furgonetki z zaciemnionymi szybami, do których nie można było zaglądać. Dziś większość mieszkańców wie, do kogo należą [tj. do gangów różnego pochodzenia etnicznego – przyp. DW] te samochody. Zaczęłam odczuwać, że to już nie jest mój kraj, moja Szwecja, jeśli można tak to powiedzieć (*Szwedka, która wybrała Szczecin*, 2017).

Ponadto, podczas wywiadu powiedziała, że o swoich obawach mogła powiedzieć tylko kilku z zaufanych przyjaciół, bo inni, którzy się od niej odsunęli „woleli schować głowę w piasek, by tylko nie widzieć tego, co się dzieje dookoła” (*Szwedka, która wybrała Szczecin*, 2017).

⁴ „No to jedziemy – takimi sprawami zajmowałem się od poniedziałku do piątku w tym tygodniu. Gwałt, gwałt, gwałt ze szczególnym okrucieństwem, wymuszenie, wymuszenie, groźby karalne, użycie przemocy w stosunku do funkcjonariusza policji, narkotyki, usiłowanie morderstwa, znów gwałt, znów wymuszenia i napaść. Podejrzani: Ali, Mohammed, Mahmud, Mohammed, Mohammed, Ali, i znów... i Christofer... co? Naprawdę? Tak, jedno szwedzkie imię przewinęło się na marginesie sprawy narkotykowej, Mohammed, Mahmud Ali i tak dalej. Reprezentowane kraje: Irak, Irak, Turcja, Syria, Afganistan, Somalia, Somalia, znowu Syria, Somalia, nieznany kraj pochodzenia, Szwecja. Nie znamy pochodzenia połowy podejrzanych, ponieważ nie mają żadnych ważnych dokumentów i w związku z tym najczęściej kłamią w kwestii swojego pochodzenia i tożsamości. Tak to wygląda teraz i przez ostatnie 10–15 lat”.

Na pomysł wyjazdu do Polski pani Greta wpadła, oglądając program *Ingrid i Konrad*, w którym nasz kraj został pokazany w pozytywnym świetle – to właśnie sprawiło, że podjęła decyzję o przeprowadzce (przekonały ją również wypowiedzi niektórych polskich polityków, sprzeciwiające się relokacji uchodźców). Żałowała, „że nie ma takiej partii w Szwecji” (co nie do końca jest prawdziwe, w podobny sposób wypowiadają się Szwedzcy Demokraci – przyp. DW), a poza tym uważała, że obraz Polski jest w szwedzkich mediach „zdeformowany” i że jest to „niesprawiedliwe” (*Szwedka, która wybrała Szczecin*, 2017). W wywiadzie, pani Magnusson podkreśliła, że „Szczecin bardzo się jej podoba i jest fantastyczny”. Poza tym czuje się tam bezpiecznie, a ponadto wskazała na życzliwość Polaków wobec niej i chęć nauki polskiego (*Szwedka, która wybrała Szczecin*, 2017).

Tak ogromny napływ imigrantów do Szwecji, siłą rzeczy musiał mieć wpływ na nastroje społeczne, ocenę sytuacji i poczucie bezpieczeństwa mieszkańców Królestwa, zwłaszcza w 2015 roku i w kolejnych latach (Moore, 2015; Hagelund, 2015; *How did Sweden...*, 2015). W opublikowanym w kwietniu 2018 roku sondażu Ipsos, który został udostępniony w gazecie *Dagens Nyheter* okazało się, że aż 60% Szwedów jest przeciwna polityce tak licznego przyjmowania uchodźców. 14% badanych opowiedziało się za znacznym zmniejszeniem liczby uchodźców, a 19% stwierdziło, że ich przyjęcie należy w pewnym stopniu ograniczyć. Tylko 12% respondentów było zdania, że ich kraj powinien przyjmować więcej uchodźców (*Szwedzi przejrżeli na oczy...*, 2018). Mimo formalnego zaostrzenia polityki migracyjnej i jej kryteriów przyjmowania przez rząd po rekordowym roku 2015 (aż 163 tys. ludzi złożyło wówczas wnioski), w 2016 roku wnioski o azyl złożyło 29 tysięcy imigrantów, a w 2017 nieco mniej, bo 25 tysięcy (*Szwedzi przejrżeli na oczy...*, 2018).

Podsumowanie

Autor obecnego studium starał się przedstawić szerokie spektrum problemu, jednak przytoczone opinie i cytaty to zaledwie część, niewielki wycinek szwedzkiej rzeczywistości sprzed kilku lat. Część uchodźców i migrantów odnalazła się i zaadaptowała w nowym kraju, ma pracę, osiągnęła stabilizację materialną i życiową. Niestety, widać jednak, że mimo obaw, politycznej poprawności w wypowiedziach mieszkańców Szwecji, przedstawicieli rządu, czy różnych instytucji, ten kraj, będący niegdyś synonimem nordyckiej stabilności, wymarzonego miejscem do życia dla przybyszów, także Polaków, dość mocno się zmienił, jeśli chodzi o bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne. Napływ imigrantów, a zwłaszcza przestępcza, czy terrorystyczna działalność pewnej ich części (to właśnie międzynarodowe gangi i islamscy radykałowie negatywnie rzutują na obraz całości) mocno zachwiały, jak zostało to ukazane, poczuciem bezpieczeństwa i stabilności w wielu regionach Szwecji. Szczególnie trudny, z uwagi na natężenie różnych aktów przestępczości na przedmieściach miast szwedzkich i kwietniowy zamach w Sztokholmie, był 2017 rok. Media poza Szwecją, z różnych względów (także, by podnieść nakład, cytowanie, czy oglądalność) pełne były wręcz apokaliptycznych obrazów przemocy, choć w tych rodzimych starano się unikać przesadnych opisów. Choć nie spełniły się czarne scenariusze, czy dramatyczne tytuły

widniejące w niektórych tytułach prasowych, mówiące wręcz o rychłym upadku Królestwa, to niektóre problemy związane z przestępczością, czy „wojną cywilizacji” nadal są widoczne, szczególnie na przedmieściach takich miast jak m.in. Malmö, Göteborga, czy stołecznego Sztokholmu.

Podobnie jak w Polsce i innych krajach, tak i w Szwecji okazało się, że oficjalna, pozytywna i politycznie poprawna wykładnia rządu, także opinie przedstawicieli lewicy i liberałów, nie pokrywają się z nastrojami społecznymi i odczuciami części mieszkańców Królestwa Szwecji. Dużą niechęć budzi także stosowana często praktyka przemilczania obrazu przestępczości z udziałem imigrantów, ich pochodzenia, czy wyznania (choć strona rządowa to oficjalnie cały czas dementuje). Dowodem na to m.in. było i jest rosące poparcie dla „ksenofobicznych” i „rasistowskich” Szwedzkich Demokratów. Nawet mniejszy niż w ostatnich latach napływ wyznawców islamu do Szwecji jest dziś zaczątkiem wobec procesu nieuchronnego starzenia się i przemijania rdzennej ludności, daleko idących perspektywicznych zmian etnicznych, strukturalnych i kulturowych, zwłaszcza w miastach. Wzmożony napływ mas ludzi bardzo często zupełnie obcych kulturowo i mentalnie, mocno zachwiał także światem wartości Szwedów, wychowanych od dziecka w warunkach stabilnej demokracji, indywidualizmu, unikania konfliktu, praworządności, poszanowania cudzej własności, liberalizmu obyczajowego, wyznaniowego itp. Niektórzy z migrantów przynieśli ze sobą także przemoc, skłonność do anarchizacji życia, kompletny brak szacunku dla cudzej własności, darwinowskie prawo silniejszego i lekceważenie tego stanowienia, terroryzm na tle wyznaniowym, pogardę dla kobiet i dziewcząt, mniejszości seksualnych LGBT, wysoką przestępczość i inne antywartości, co dla przeciętnych mieszkańców Królestwa okazało się wówczas prawdziwym wstrząsem.

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The impact of French foreign policy towards Africa on the external migration policy of the European Union

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Abstract This article analyses France's foreign policy towards Africa from a realist perspective. It identifies how this policy creates a state of inequality in terms of Franco-African relations through the *Francafrique* system and how the long-term policy's consequences have led to negative impacts on the European Union's External Migration Policy towards the world's poorest continent. This inequality in terms of Franco-African relations is explained from the perspective of other theories including the Dependency theory and Capital System that highlight inequality between the Global South and the Western world. As a result, it is highly important to examine the volumes of illegal migrant flows to the European territories crossing the Mediterranean Sea from the Sahel and Sub-Saharan Francophone countries to understand how the EU's External Migration Policy is impacted by the foreign policy adopted by one of the most powerful players in the international system and EU's member states towards Africa.

Introduction

In this article, the impacts of French foreign policy towards Africa on the European Union's external migration policy will be analysed. The examination of France's foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa will be mainly from a realist perspective to understand the factors shaping this policy after the colonial era. To understand the connection between the two policies, the interrelated impacts will be examined through reports and data on irregular migrants heading to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea.

The overall purpose of this research paper is to highlight the French foreign policy towards the African continent, especially the region of Francophone Africa during and after the decolonization era in the 1960s. It is important to conceptualize and analyze France's foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa from a theoretical framework and different approaches. For this reason, it is necessary to highlight the theoretical dimensions of foreign policy in general before focusing on French foreign policy towards Africa and the historical background of the African-French relationships.

After World War II, Charles De Gaulle founder of the 5th Republic decided to adopt a new model of foreign policy towards Africa to defend the interests of Paris in the continent. In this context, the *Francafrique* system was founded as the neo-colonialist policy of France toward the poorest continent in the world and as the most important tool in shaping the foreign policy of France towards Africa. It is necessary to conceptualize this policy from the perspectives of International Relations Theories such as realist theory and other theories to understand the roots of inequality between the Global South and the West and the origins of French foreign policy towards Africa based on political and economic factors through the adoption of the *Francafrique* System. Additionally, the factors shaping the French foreign policy towards Africa shall be examined empirically to understand the impacts of the *Francafrique* system on the EU's external migration policy.

Furthermore, the French foreign policy towards Africa is an important factor in understanding the economic underdevelopment of French former colonies such as the Sahel countries and other Sub-Saharan Francophone countries like Guinea Conakry. As many European political public figures have declared, this policy is seen as an obstacle to the economic development of African countries. As a result, Francophone nationals are under pressure to leave their countries and migrate illegally to France and other EU member states to live in better conditions. With the developments after the Arab Spring, the problem of irregular migrants has come to the fore and has become an important issue the EU has to deal with.

Methodologically, this research is based on the qualitative analysis of primary and secondary data sources including interviews, official documents, policy statements, and reports. Moreover, the theoretical analysis in this research is mainly based on the realist approach to highlight the inequality in terms of Franco-African relations based on which the impacts of *Francafrique* policies on the EU's external migration policy will be examined.

Consequently, this research tends to examine the credibility of a hypothesis stating that France's foreign policy towards Africa, driven by realist considerations of power, security, and national interest, creates an unequal relationship between France and African countries, as manifested through the system of *Francafrique*. This inequality in Franco-African relations, exacerbated by global dynamics highlighted by theories such as the Dependency theory and the Capital System, has negative repercussions on the EU's External Migration Policy, specifically in terms of illegal migrant flows from Sahel and Sub-Saharan Francophone countries crossing the Mediterranean Sea to European territories.

Foreign policy behaviours of states and international policy in terms of Realist Theory

Generally, foreign policy refers to the way how a state shall interact with other global actors. While in the nowadays complex world order, this definition has several limitations since there is no precise definition of foreign policy. It is somehow seen as a complex system of actions and agencies aimed to alter the behaviour of other states and allow their state to adapt to the global environment. Foreign policy is a boundary issue between the international environment and domestic politics. Understanding foreign policy requires creating a mixture of the knowledge of political science related to domestic policies and the International Relations discipline related to international politics. Therefore, foreign policy plays the role of a bridge between the nation-state and its international environment (Tayfur, 1994, p. 115).

Theoretically, realist political scientists emphasize the importance of national interest in shaping any state's foreign policy. They assume that the national interest assures all the dimensions of power such as the state's survival, security, and well-being. For example, according to Morgenthau, the foreign policy of the United States is based on two main major interests: maintaining its security and dominance in the Western Hemisphere and maintaining the balance of power in Europe. According to the realists, the US shapes its foreign policy on these two axes. Therefore, realists claim that in such an international system, where there is no higher authority to which individuals can turn whenever they get into trouble, the States intend to strengthen their forces and there is no way for cooperation among them due to the dominance of mistrust. As a result, realist foreign policy is generally based on external factors, and actions of other states since they are the only actors in the international system (Morgenthau, 1954, p. 20).

The achievement of national interests is the main purpose of states in the anarchic international system since it is the only way for them to survive in this system of mistrust and non-confidence. Therefore, the States are to avoid falling into a case of military weakness since military power is necessary for their survival (Waltz, 1959, p. 160). For realists, the absence of a higher authority is the source of international anarchy. As a result, the maximization of power is the priority of any state to defend its interests. In such a case, there is no way to cooperate among the international system's unique actors since they usually see themselves in a mistrustful situation. For this reason, the neorealist theorists highlight the concept of structural anarchy referring to the argument of Kenneth Waltz asserting that the States have only a chance to enhance their power to survive under the given circumstances. This behaviour of states reflects the logical result of the anarchic nature of the international system and even the approach of structural realism (Waltz, 1959, p. 40).

In parallel with this approach, the realists emphasize the violation of moral norms by the powerful States. The States tend to comply sometimes with moral norms without taking into consideration the cost of non-compliance. For this reason, despite the state of international anarchy, in some instances, the States can afford to be moral such as in the case of spreading democracy or combating preventable childhood diseases that may be certainly costly. Realists argue that politicians and even ordinary citizens in democratic states tend to exaggerate the pursuit of moral

interests. According to them, there should be a balance between moral interests and immoral interests in the adoption of foreign policy. In other words, decision-makers must weigh the costs and benefits of pursuing all relevant interests alike. Therefore, foreign policy must be based on a rational calculation of benefits and costs (Burchill, 2005, pp. 49–50).

Realists have turned to arguments against moral goals. According to George Kennan, a US realist diplomat and the father of the “containment doctrine”, the primary obligation of any government is to protect the interests of the national community it represents. Therefore, it does not have to be bound by moral rules. In this context, he warned of the negative aspects of the American moralist-legal tradition. The field of International Relations is anarchic, it is a futile effort for states to try to maintain international order. For Kennan, the national interest is paramount, the “inevitable necessity”, therefore he claims that it is not a subject to classification as either “good” or “bad”. For example, there is no reason to judge the international political behaviour of the States if it requires national interest. It is a ‘necessity’ regardless of physical or logical compulsion (Burchill, 2005, pp. 49–50).

Joseph Nye, one of the pioneers of neoliberal theory, focused on the moral views impacting the foreign policies adopted by the American administrations. Nye takes a more flexible approach to morality in shaping policy. He argues that it is pointless to claim that ethics will have no role in foreign policy debates. For Nye, it is necessary to accept that moral reasoning is used to judge and evaluate a state’s foreign policy, and political scientists and thinkers should learn how to use this reasoning better in terms of analysis (Nye, 2020). It is not true to state that the struggle for survival is identical to the struggle for power but the international system and its structure push the States to behave according to the dictates of realism. However, many moral foreign policy objectives pose no risk to national survival (Burchill, 2005, p. 51).

Constructivists have a different point of view from the realist paradigm. For instance, Alexander Wendt accepts the existence of an international field of anarchy but interprets it from a different perspective (Wendt, 1999, p. 2). For constructivists, identities and interests are the most important tools for shaping the State’s behaviour. In the case of compatibility of the structure of identities and interests, the States can find an environment to cooperate. On the other hand, the incompatibility of interests and identities would produce competition and in some cases, conflicts that can be intensified and lead to wars (Weber, 2005, p. 66). For this reason, it can be understood that constructivism builds a bridge between realism and liberalism. As a result, the realist paradigm offers a meaningful theoretical framework for analyzing France’s foreign policy towards some African countries (its former colonies).

Key characteristics of French foreign policy towards Africa

France historically has been one of the imperial superpowers. For this reason, the analysis of its foreign policy towards Africa, as it was one of the most important regions for France during the colonial era, is defined by a variety of factors. The Berlin Conference of 1884-5 was a major turning point for the start of European colonial history and new imperialism in Africa (Iliffe,

2007, p. 195). France tends to maintain a foreign policy toward Africa based on a realist approach since the colonial period focusing mainly on its national interests. The signs of French appetite for Africa came into existence with the establishment of a trade port on the West African coast at St. Louis in Senegal in 1848 (Sıradag, 2014, p. 101).

After the period of decolonization of French Africa, which coincided with the era of the Cold War, France had to maintain its relations with Africa. For this reason, several agreements were enacted with many African Francophone countries, various military interventions started, and financial assistance policies have been adopted. France decided to adopt a strategy of economic cooperation with the African Francophone countries to carry on its colonial policy. The political and economic interests of the Elysee are the main basis of the French foreign policy towards Africa (Sıradag, 2014, p. 101).

Generally, French foreign policy is based mainly on three principles. The first principle is the Independence of Action which is preeminent in terms of shaping a foreign policy independently from the behaviours of other superpowers in the international arena and without many preventive restrictions (Tiritilli, 2017, pp. 22–26). The second one is mainly based on the position of France in the biggest international organization. The permanent membership of France in the United Nations Security Council is one of the most important factors of the influence of France internationally since it allows it to be autonomous and use the right of veto to oppose any decision that is not compatible with the French interests. The third principle is the Europeanization process. In this sense, France needs to move forward with the European project to form a European coalition (De Galbert, 2015).

France's foreign policymakers towards Africa tend to adopt a realistic perspective. This approach shapes the African policy of France. Moreover, many realist factors shape the foreign policy of Paris. The understanding of French foreign policy requires the division of French national interests into three categories. The first factor that shapes French foreign policy is mainly political. The interventions of France in several African countries have been sometimes welcomed by some regimes protected by Paris but they have also been the subject of controversy and rough criticism and seen as neo-colonialist interference in the internal affairs of these countries such as the case of the intervention in Ivory Coast launched at the request of the UN Secretary-General to help enforce respect for the result of an election. This French intervention was roughly criticized by the supporters of Laurent Gbagbo who was forced out of power (Melly and Darracq, 2013, p. 11).

The second category is based on economic factors. Africa is the most important region for France economically. Recently, countries like China and other rising economic powers have started significantly increasing their presence and strengthening their positions in the African continent. The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flowing from France to Africa reached over \$19 billion in 2014 according to the report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on world investment (Zhan, 2015).

During the beginning of the decolonization process, France established two banks to deal with the monetary policy and currency management of the Francophone countries. The economies

of Eight West African countries are under the control of the French Central Bank managing the West African CFA franc which was pegged to the value of the French franc and is currently pegged to the Euro (Mensah, 1979, p. 55).

The third category is fundamentally based on French national security and is deeply tied to the stability of Africa not only because of its historical and economic ties but also due to its geographical proximity. After the decolonization era, France enacted several bilateral treaties with its former colonies. These treaties are to pledge various degrees of military support to confront external and internal threats while some of those treaties remain state secrets (Hansen, 2007).

The map (Figure 1) shows the former French colonies in Africa. All of the countries shown in red are countries of the Sahel and Sub-Saharan countries. The five countries of Sahel are French Sudan (Mali), Mauritania, Niger, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), and Chad. All of these countries gained their independence in the 1960s. While the general decolonization process in Africa did not end until the 1970s. The period of the 1960s was known as a post-colonial era during which several cooperation agreements were signed between the former African colonies and France under the leadership of De Gaulle. During and after the Cold War, France's relations with Africa, which it sees as its backyard, were based on the *Francafrique* system (Sıradag, 2014, p. 102).




Figure 1. The Map of Former French Colonies in Africa

Source: *Deutsche Welle* (2020).

Within this context, the foreign policy of France toward Africa is based on a realist approach since nearly all of the French administrations in the period of the 1960s adopted a neo-colonial policy towards their former colonies. This policy creates a kind of inequality and an enormous gap between a rich France and a poor Africa. The French former colonies were forced to import

French goods at expensive prices compared to other exporters. While those countries export raw materials to France cheaply (Hrituleac, 2011, p. 36). The lack of balance in the economic cooperation between France as a member state of the European Union and the African Francophone countries had not only led to a huge gap regarding income and development between France and Africa but also to the failure of the EU's financial aid for the African countries and even for the illegal migrants' transit countries such as Morocco and Tunisia (Yıldız, 2016, p. 157). Therefore, the immense gap between a rich France and a poor continent is a logical result of the *Francafrique* policies.

In this case, it is important to focus on the World System and the Dependency approaches in order to understand the nature of this system which can be understood from these two theories' perspectives. These two interrelated theories criticize the unequal relations of Western countries with the Third World countries since the 1960s (Smith, 1979, p. 248). The Dependency theory highlights the traces of colonialism. According to this theory, the backwardness of the Third World countries is mainly related to the economic success of developed countries. The lack of development of these countries can be understood by looking at their historical processes, not their internal dynamics. Non-Western societies, as colonies or semi-colonies, had to struggle with problems such as civil wars and coups under the intervention of Western states. Political interventions are the main reasons for the political instability in these countries. The main reason for the wealth of developed countries is their exploitation of underdeveloped countries. World System Theory was influenced by Marxism and developed by the political scientist Immanuel Wallerstein. According to this theory, there are certain divisions of labour between the developed core countries and the underdeveloped peripheral countries. The role of the environment in this division of labour is to supply the core countries with raw materials and cheap labour. This dependency relationship would hinder the development of underdeveloped countries. For this reason, the foreign policies of developing and underdeveloped countries are not adopted independently. Accordingly, developed countries have intense political control over undeveloped countries (Mansbach & Rafferty, 2008, p. 581).

Within the same framework, the Italian political scientist Dario Battistella focuses mainly on the keys of capitalism that tend to create economic inequality and the huge gap between the global south such as the exportation of capital, the domination of monopolies, and the share of global territories among the world's superpowers. These keys shall help us understand the function of *Francafrique* in the Francophone countries (Battistella, 2012, p. 261).

Given the colonial circumstances, the realist approach dominated the foreign policy of France towards Africa during the Cold War era. France expanded its sphere of influence over Africa through military interventions and other plans of the *Francafrique*. During this period, Franco-African relations have been defined by neo-colonial dimensions (Martin, 2000, p. 4). The concept of 'Neo-Colonialism' was defined for the first time at the All-African People's Conference held in Cairo in 1961. The definition was as follows: "The survival of the colonial system despite the formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries which become the

victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical means” (Smith, 2003, p. 76).

Despite the dominance of the realist approach to the foreign policy of France, it is important to focus on the constructivist dimension of this policy as well. From this perspective, France tends to maintain its historical relations with its former colonies throughout the establishment of the International Organization of *La Francophonie* (L’Organisation Internationale de La Francophonie). The OIF aims to develop the historical relations of France with the francophone countries through the spread of language and maintaining the French identity in the region. Moreover, this organization tends to organize summits held every two years with the attendance of the Heads of State and the governments of member states (Siradag, 2014, p. 105).

***Francafrique* as the most important tool of French foreign policy towards Africa**

The *Francafrique* System is a preeminent issue to analyze since it is one of the most effective factors shaping the foreign policy of France towards Francophone Africa. The system of *Francafrique* is the neo-colonialist policy of France toward the poorest continent in the world and a network of political and public figures and companies that tend to work in Francophone Africa to serve French interests. This network was established by Charles De Gaulle in 1961 although the real designer of *Francafrique* was Jacques Foccart (Verschave, 2006).

Francafrique is a French tool or a stick by which the French Republic started a new process of colonial governance in the world’s poorest continent. The aspects of this tool did not emerge until the mid-1990s with the emergence of the *ELF* incident. The company *ELF* was founded in 1967 and tended to target Africa as a private oil and mining company. After the independence of Algeria, the company was deprived of oil revenues in the North African country. In this case, France needed to find alternative resources. Therefore, *ELF* started using the network knitted by Foccart for many years not only in the Francophone African countries but also in non-French former colonies like Angola to look for new resources. De Gaulle appointed Defense Minister Pierre Guillaumat to head the company which has implemented many “secret service” activities such as bribery, corruption, financing of governments, interference in the appointment of high officials, and infiltrating state bodies. The distorted political-economic system that France established in Africa through *ELF*, was exposed in the first half of the 1990s due to the “sharing fight” of the company’s senior management. For instance, *ELF* supported the president of Congo Denis Sassou Nguesso between 1979 and 1991 despite his Marxist orientations. Moreover, *ELF* helped him to return to power in 1997 after overthrowing Pascal Lissouba who started cooperating with American companies (Gaston-Breton, 2006). The emergence of the *ELF* incident in 1997 has demonstrated the real face of France in Africa and the nature of its foreign policy towards the region, especially towards its previous colonies (Vampouille, 2011).

For more than one century, twenty African countries were under French colonization. However, the French hegemony in Africa started drawing back with the emergence of several movements of Liberation and resistance by the mid-20th century. In this case, France had to adopt

a new strategy to launch a new process of colonialism in the name of deepening the historical relationships with Africa. By 1958, Charles De Gaulle accessed power again and the fifth Republic was founded. De Gaulle proposed independence for fourteen African countries by 1960. He was tending to adopt a strategy to make Africa fall into another process of colonialism for more than a half-century. De Gaulle was convinced that the political and economic weight of France in the international system is mainly dependent on meeting the needs of raw materials. For this reason, the new tasks of this strategy were assumed by two ministers Pierre Guillaumat and Jacques Foccart who were the designers of the *Francafrique* system (Vampouille, 2011). The function of this network was mainly based on the use of hidden diplomatic pouches that were not under the control or investigation of the state or the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This procedure used to be managed directly by the president. The *Francafrique* network does not only deal with economic issues but also with the accomplishment of several political tasks including Coup d'états, the nomination of presidents and leaders, financing the rebellion movements, and the execution of political assassinations (Verschave, 2006).

Guinea Conakry was the starting point of *Francafrique*. This Western African country became independent in 1958 after the establishment of several liberation movements under the leadership of Ahmed Sekou Toure who was targeted by the system of *Francafrique*. Maurice Robert the vice former intelligence officer decided to adopt a new monetary policy as a way to control the Guinean economy through the use of a weak currency pegged to the African Franc, which was under the control of France and the exploitation of natural resources. A few years after the independence, Robert started financing and training some rebellion movements and Sekou Toure's opponents to overthrow his regime. The failure of these attempts made Sekou Toure become one of the most brutal dictators in Africa (Blum, 2013, p. 4). Through the same process, France started exploiting the natural resources in Niger including the Uranium mines. Niger is the fourth producer of Uranium Globally. This process of exploitation made Niger among the poorest countries in the world (RFI, 2012).

Like the case of other French former colonies, the Republic of Ivory Coast signed a pact of defence with Paris just after its independence. In 1961, an agreement was signed between France and Côte d'Ivoire stating that Abidjan was allowed to call for French military aid to protect its regime and authority. During the first periods after its independence, the Republic of Ivory Coast experienced a state of stability since it was governed by one single president. After the death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993, a power vacuum led to instability and violence in the 21st century. In this case, France had to maintain its military relationships with Côte d'Ivoire. In 2012, French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the president of Côte d'Ivoire Alassane Ouattara signed a new agreement of defence replacing the treaty of 1961 and giving the Republic of Ivory Coast the same direct line to the French aid militarily under the same conditions of the *Françafrrique* (McGowan, 2020, p. 55).

The Central African Republic was also affected by the *Francafrique*. France needed to maintain its interests in the country. On January 1st, 1966, Jean-Bedel Bokassa seized power from President David Dacko in a coup d'État. In the context of the Cold War and because of threats

posed by China and the Soviet Union in the East of the Central African Republic, Bokassa was supported by France militarily and the Elysee decided to send troops in 1967 when he was threatened by opponent groups. Bokassa was a close ally of France. In 1977, France supported and helped organize the emperor's coronation ceremony of Bokassa. During the same period, the Central African emperor started building ties with Muammar Gaddafi the Libyan leader. This approach was seen as a threat to the French interests in Bangui. For this reason, the well-known military *Barracuda Operation* started in September 1979 to overthrow the regime of Bokassa (Sixdenier, 2017, pp. 3–4).

The Republic of Gabon is also one of the most important legacies of the *Francafrique* network. Gabon became independent in 1960 with Léon M'ba the first post-colonial president of the country. By the beginning of the 1960s, France started displaying a kind of interventionist attitude that left no doubt as to its intent to continue to influence political life in this former colony. The gradual drift of M'ba towards autocracy led to a military *Coup d'Etat* on February 17th, 1964. The Elysee sent 2,000 French troops who had quelled the revolution and restored Mba. The coup started in 1964 but Leon Mba died in 1967. As a result, Gabon was in the quasi-state of a protectorate ruled directly by Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Foccart (EuropeNow, 2018). So, it is understood that the political role played by the *Francafrique* network is important in the overthrow of several regimes in Africa through military interventions and coups.

Generally, it can be assumed that the French neo-colonial policy towards Africa has made the world's poorest continent's economy under the control of Paris, especially when it comes to the case of French former colonies. Jacques Foccart, who is the artisan of the *Francafrique* network, designed this system to recolonize many African Francophone countries economically. Therefore, the *Francafrique* system can be also understood from a neo-Marxist perspective taking into account the inequality in terms of the economic relations between France and its former colonies (Battistella, 2012, p. 265).

According to the United Nations Development Reports, the Sahel countries and other Francophone countries impacted by the policies of the *Francafrique* including Benin, the Central African Republic, and Guinea are among the world's less-developed countries (UNCTAC, 2020). As a result of the *Francafrique* policies over many decades, the political regimes of the Francophone countries in Africa have become more corrupted since they are mainly protected by France. These high corruption rates reflect the critical economic situation of the Sahel and the other Francophone countries. Over the last decade since 2012, most Francophone African countries have been ranked in the category of the most corrupt countries in the world. Except for a few countries such as Benin, Senegal, and Burkina Faso which have been ranked; the other countries are considered to be among the most corrupt countries worldwide like Guinea, Niger, and the Central African Republic. According to the last reports of the International Organization of Transparency for both 2020 and 2021, these countries have scored less than 30 in transparency rate (Transparency International, 2020).

The accumulation of *Francafrique* policies over long decades reflects also the situation of the Sahel and Sub-Saharan countries in terms of poverty rates over the last years. Most of these

countries suffer from extreme poverty such as the Central African Republic, Niger, Mali, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Guinea (World Bank Group, 2020). The extreme poverty from which these countries suffer pushes their people to leave their countries in illegal ways as shall be stated in the next section.

The impacts of France's foreign policy towards Africa on the external migration policy of the European Union

As noted previously, the French policy towards Africa can be understood from the realist perspective since it is mainly based on a pragmatic view and tends to serve the national interest of the republic. For this reason, France aims to strengthen its position in Africa. As the statistics and reality demonstrate, Franco-African relations are not based on the principle of win-win because of the dependence of the African Francophone countries' economies on France. The colonial history of France helps any scholar or political thinker to analyse its foreign policy towards Africa from the perspective of colonial roots to understand why the Francophone countries suffer from poverty, famine, and weak services of health care. As a result, the realist foreign policy of France can be one of the reasons why Africa is currently under neo-colonial domination. This process of neo-colonialism, which started after the decolonization period, is seen by various leaders and decision-makers as an obstacle to the development of Francophone countries. For this reason, the EU has encountered difficulties due to the emergence of numerous irregular migrant movements, as these migrants often seek to enhance their economic circumstances and find living conditions that align with their aspirations. A significant portion of these irregular migrants originate from French former African countries (Yıldız, 2016, p. 16). The irregular migrants usually head to Europe through the two Spanish enclaves (Ceuta and Melilla) close to the Moroccan territories (Vacchiano, 2013, p. 342).

Generally, irregular migration is a multi-faceted phenomenon that refers to the mode of entry into a country, residential status there, employment status and type of employment. Taking each of these elements in turn, four questions can be specified:

1. Was the migrant's entry into the country regular or irregular?
2. Is the migrant's residence status regular or irregular?
3. Is the migrant entitled to work? If not, and s/he is working, this constitutes irregularity.
4. Is the nature of the employment and the work done regular or irregular (the latter refers to the avoidance of tax and insurance payments, rates below the minimum wage, etc.)? (King & DeBono, 2013, p. 4).

With the emergence of irregular migration from the Mediterranean Sea in the 1990s, which has become increasingly one of the hard security issues with the high intensity of transnational organised crimes and human trafficking, twenty-seven European and Mediterranean countries signed the Barcelona Process on 28 November 1995 known also as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Barcelona Declaration. It is a multilateral initiative to establish a framework for dialogue and cooperation in different fields including security issues such as migration between

the EU and the Mediterranean countries, encompassing both North African and Middle Eastern countries and to promote stability, peace, and prosperity in the Mediterranean region through political dialogue, economic integration, and cultural exchange (IEMed, 2009). After the implementation process of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership during the period 1995–2005, the Union for the Mediterranean was established in 2008 at the initiative of France to promote dialogue and cooperation in terms of various common issues in the region (France Diplomacy, 2023).

Despite these initiatives in which France played a crucial role, the negative impacts of the *Francafrique* policies over long decades on the EU's migration policy and other issues related to the Mediterranean policies remain intense. These policies are considered to be obstacles to the EU's initiatives to deal with the issue of migration including the root cause approach as will be examined. For instance, the French president Jacques Chirac who was one of the first public figures and political leaders demonstrated the black face of the *Francafrique* network despite being one of its members. Chirac dared to declare a historical confession on the function of *Francafrique* despite being criticized for supporting the corrupted regimes in Africa. Chirac declared that it is necessary to confess that a big part of the budget of the Central French Bank comes precisely from the exploitation of African sources for long centuries. Then he claimed that France had no right to criticize the situation in Africa after exploiting its natural resources and raw materials, and then destroying the culture of Africans in the name of religion (Franceinfo: Afrique, 2019).

Furthermore, Deputy Prime Minister of Italy Luigi Di Maio reiterated that France's policies in Africa were creating poverty and causing migration. Di Maio said: "France is one of those countries that by printing money for 14 African states prevents their economic development and contributes to the fact that the refugees leave and then die in the sea or arrive on our coasts". In this context, Di Maio highlighted the African Franc currency used in 14 African francophone countries since it is also one of the economic dimensions and aspects of the *Francafrique* domination in the world's poorest continent. These declarations led to a diplomatic crisis between France and Italy and impacted negatively the image of France in the European arena. The statements of Maio demonstrated that France's foreign policy toward Africa in the context of illegal migration has caused discussions within the EU. Moreover, these declarations coincided with the arrival of migrants to the Italian coastline coming from Tunisia. Most of these illegal migrants were originally from Francophone countries. Moreover, Maio's declarations led to one of the most intense diplomatic crises between Italy and France since the 2nd World War (Reuters, 2021).

Therefore, the EU's external migration policy is directly or indirectly impacted by France's foreign policy towards Africa. For this reason, Di Maio described France's foreign policy towards Africa as a neo-colonial policy and one of the obstacles to the economic development of Francophone Africa and the efforts accomplished by the European Union through several visions and approaches including the *Root Cause Approach* to migration mainly based on the causes of migration, such as the lack of job opportunities and poverty. The European Commission tends to adopt this strategy and such an approach to minimize poverty rates and create job opportunities as a method aiming to eradicate illegal migration (Yıldız, 2016, p. 15). In the same context,

another approach was adopted to manage the issue of migration (Ruhrmann & FitzGerald, 2016, p. 31). The *Remote Control Approach* is security-based and reactive and mainly aims to restrict the movement of people (Zolberg, 2003, p. 202).

Within the same framework, the EU has implemented various support programs aimed at addressing the root causes of irregular migration from Africa. These programs encompass areas such as economic development, governance, security, education, and job creation. For instance, the EU started supporting various programs such as the European Development Fund, the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, and the EU Trust Fund for Africa. These programs provide financial assistance and technical expertise to African countries to tackle migration-related challenges. Moreover, the EU started guiding its approach to migration cooperation with partner countries, particularly in Africa, through a comprehensive framework known as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) within which the *Root Cause Approach* recognizes that addressing the underlying factors driving migration, such as poverty, lack of opportunities, and political instability, is essential to reduce irregular migration flows (European Commission, 2015).

Despite the adoption of these initiatives and approaches over the last decades to restrict irregular migration, especially the *Root Cause Approach*, the EU did not succeed in eradicating the root causes of illegal migration (Yıldız, 2016, p. 16). These root causes are also the results of the *Francafrique* system such as the high rates of poverty in the French former colonies. The table below shows the number of illegal migrants from Francophone countries, and the number of illegal crossings between border crossing points in the European Union in the last decade.




Figure 2. Number of Illegal Crossings between Border-crossing Points in the European Union from 2009 to 2020.

Source: FRONTEX (Statista, 2022).

As Figure 2 shows, the number of illegal migrants to Europe has increased radically throughout the last few years due to several factors and events that led to the rise of refugees. As can be seen, together with the poverty caused by neo-colonialism in Africa, and the recent events such

as the Arab Spring, Europe is faced with serious irregular migration and refugee crises. For this reason, it is important to review the number of illegal migrants from 2009 to 2020. In the previous decades, the number of irregular migrants and illegal residents in Europe was not exact and the statistics were insufficient to examine the consequences of the *Francafrrique* system. An important number of these migrants are originally from African Francophone countries (Ambrosetti and Paparusso, 2018, p. 155).

Taking into consideration the geographic proximity to the countries where the African migration flows come from and to which European territories, it is necessary to examine the number of illegal crossings to Europe throughout the coastlines of North African countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya (Yıldız, 2016, p. 152). For instance, Spain since its accession to the European Community in 1986, used to be an attractive destination not only for Spanish-speaking communities from Latin America but also for African irregular migrants due to its close location to Africa (Ahrens, 2013, p. 116). Based on the number of illegal crossings presented in Figure 2, Table 1 shows the number of illegal migrants and crossings through the West and Central Parts of the Mediterranean Sea according to the data of Frontex (Statista, 2022).

Table 1. Number of Illegal Crossings by Migrants from 6 African Francophone Countries through the West and Central Maritime Routes of the Mediterranean Sea

Country/Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Niger	4	2	55	154	694	432	77	28	29
Mali	244	1,906	8,799	5,767	10,008	6,624	926	416	816
Cameroun	147	283	928	1,331	3,677	3,074	1,324	278	367
Ivory Coast	109	144	1,727	4,267	13,946	12,692	5,191	1,391	2,083
Republic of Central Africa	103	27	287	99	107	73	105	6	11
Guinea Conakry	30	307	1,416	3,078	13,725	9,751	864	404	943
Total	637	2,669	13,212	14,696	42,157	32,646	8,487	2,523	4,249

Source: FRONTEX (Statista, 2022).

As Table 1 shows, the consequences of the *Francafrrique* system stated in the previous section can be observed empirically through these numbers and data of migrant flows from Francophone countries. The numbers of migrants who are originally from Niger and the Central African Republic are not high compared to the other illegal migrants due to several factors that must be taken into account including the geographic position of these two countries which makes them far from the sea. Apart from the northern coastlines of transit countries like Morocco and Tunisia, many flows of illegal migrants coming from countries like Cameroun, Senegal, Mali, and the Republic of Gambia consider Morocco as a transit country to head not only to the South part of Spain but also to the Canary Islands (Yıldız, 2016, pp. 158–159). The number of irregular migrants from the Francophone countries has increased dramatically during the last decade. Moreover, these numbers and rates are the consequences of the *Francafrrique* system policies

over many decades since the main causes of irregular migration that the EU has tended to deal with over the last decades are the high rates of poverty and economic dependency. These are the same results of the *Francafrique* policies that have been accumulated over many years.

It is highly complicated to determine the nationalities of African irregular migrants from Francophone countries since many of them head to Europe through the Mediterranean without their identity cards or passports to avoid any possibility of repatriation. The Sub-Saharan migrants represented the majority of irregular boat migrants while 86.8 per cent of migrants were from West African countries. Therefore, the *Francafrique* system over many years led to the results of a brutal war without weapons. Hein de Haas who concentrates on the relationship between migration and social transformation and development, claims that illegal migration from Africa to Europe is not so new but there has been a major change at the beginning of the 21st century. According to De Haas, the issue of migration is an integral part of international change and transformation and also develops a long-term perspective on migration, challenging the traditional understanding that dominates migration debates. Haas, on the other hand, asserted that 30 per cent of migrants heading to Italy were from Sub-Saharan countries. But at the same time, Haas pointed out that it is not fair to just focus on the illegal status of these migrants, there are also many migrants from the same region who usually enter the European territories legally and become irregular migrants by overstaying their visas (Haas, 2008, p. 17). Therefore, the rate of illegal migrants started increasing over the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century reflecting the failure of EU efforts in terms of the democratization process of the African states, especially the French former colonies. The real causes of illegal migration have been ignored, as EU member states, including France, adopt their foreign policies towards Africa with a 'realistic' perspective and reject the root causes of migration.

Conclusion

Discourse and practice are preeminent and interrelated in terms of the analysis of French foreign policy toward Africa and its impacts on the EU's external migration policy. To comprehend this interrelation, it was necessary to analyse the French foreign policy towards Africa from a realist approach after reviewing the theoretical framework of foreign policy from a realist perspective as well.

The French foreign policy is based on a pragmatic and realist approach toward Africa. So, it is understood that Franco-African relations are not based on the win-win principle. They are mainly based on the historical colonial background. The establishment of the *Francafrique* system in the 1960s was the starting point of a new era of colonization of former French colonies in the world's poorest continent. In this case, the *Francafrique* has become one of the factors shaping the foreign policy of France toward Africa and preventing the development and economic independence of the Francophone countries. As a result, the flow of irregular migrants from these countries started increasing because of the critical economic situation of their countries and the high rates of corruption, poverty, and unemployment. Under the given circumstances,

the EU was obliged to adopt new policies and approaches to deal with the issue of irregular migration. France, as an EU member state, should not only assume the responsibility of being a post-colonizer who makes Africans leave their home countries illegally but also is responsible for several humanitarian crises including the high number of dead bodies of irregular migrants found on the Mediterranean coastlines monthly.

To conclude, it can be claimed that despite the criticism of the foreign policy of France towards Africa that is based mainly on the network of *Francafrique*, the responsibility must be assumed commonly with the European Union since the latter failed to deal with the root causes of the irregular migration for many years. The European Union in its policy towards the African countries has tended to focus on its economic interests with these African countries and failed to deal with the issue of irregular migration despite the adoption of several methods and approaches. But the failure of the European Union to deal with the issue of immigration via different approaches is not only a result of a pragmatic view of the EU but also a result of the accumulation and process of *Francafrique* policies since they are based mainly on a realist perspective that makes France neglect the main causes of illegal migration including poverty, and corruption in the French former colonies.

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Zatopione w Morzu Bałtyckim bojowe środki trujące – analiza możliwości wykorzystania ich przez Federację Rosyjską w działaniach terrorystycznych

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Słowa kluczowe bojowe środki trujące, Rosja, Morze Bałtyckie, terroryzm, sabotaż

Abstrakt W artykule przeprowadzono analizę możliwości wykorzystania przez Federację Rosyjską zatopionych w Morzu Bałtyckim bojowych środków trujących do przeprowadzenia ataków terrorystycznych i działań sabotażowych. W tym celu zostały wykorzystane następujące metody badawcze – historyczna (w celu ukazania przyczyn zatopienia w Bałtyku broni chemicznej), a jako metodę główną – podejście polemologiczne.

Ze względu na trudności z dostępem do informacji (lub ich niejawność) część rozważań ma charakter hipotez. Zbadane natomiast zostały procedury (a właściwie ich brak) przewidziane na wypadek masowego uwolnienia bojowych środków trujących do Bałtyku. Głównym wnioskiem płynącym z artykułu jest to, że żadne z państw mających dostęp do Morza Bałtyckiego nie jest przygotowane na ewentualne wykorzystanie przez Rosję zdeponowanej w nim broni chemicznej. Zazwyczaj taki stan rzeczy jest tłumaczony niewielkim prawdopodobieństwem takich zdarzeń. Jednak biorąc pod uwagę aktywność rosyjskich jednostek oraz postęp technologiczny i miniaturyzację urządzeń (w tym wojskowych, które pozwalają prowadzić operacje militarne zdalnie) można dojść do wniosku, że takie działania są możliwe.

Toxic warfare agents dumped in the Baltic Sea – analysis of the possibility of using them by the Russian Federation in terrorist activities

Keywords poison warfare agents, Russia, the Baltic Sea, terrorism, sabotage

Abstract The aim of the article was to attempt to analyze the possibility of the use by the Russian Federation of toxic warfare agents dumped in the Baltic Sea to carry out terrorist acts and sabotage activities. For this purpose, the following research methods were used: historical in order to show the reasons for dumping chemical weapons in the Baltic Sea. However, the main method was the polemological approach.

Due to the difficulties with access to information (or its confidentiality), some of the considerations were hypotheses. However, procedures (or rather the lack thereof) provided for in the event of a mass release of poisonous warfare agents into the Baltic Sea were examined. The main conclusion of the article is that none of the countries with access to the Baltic Sea is prepared for the possible use by Russia of chemical weapons deposited there. Usually, this state of affairs is explained by the low probability of such events. However, after taking into account the activity of Russian units, technological progress, and miniaturisation of devices (including military ones that allow remote military operations), it can be concluded that such actions are possible.

Wprowadzenie

Bałtyk jest małym morzem śródładowym (zajmuje czwartą pozycję wśród akwenów tego typu). Powstał około 10 tys. lat temu na skutek topnienia skandynawskich mas lodowych i jest najmłodszym morzem na świecie. Co gorsza, jest także jednym z najbardziej zanieczyszczonych i stwarzającym wiele zagrożeń dla mieszkańców państw położonych wokół Morza Bałtyckiego. Głównym źródłem zanieczyszczeń jest zatopiona w tym akwenie po II wojnie światowej broń chemiczna. Bojowe środki chemiczne były już stosowane podczas I wojny światowej, a ich produkcja i składowanie kontynuowano przed i w czasie II wojny światowej, co skutkowało ogromną ilością amunicji chemicznej i bojowych środków trujących (BST) składowanych w arsenałach wszystkich stron tych konfliktów (Vanninen i in., 2020).

Zakłada się, że w Morzu Bałtyckim zatopiono około 65 tys. ton amunicji zawierającej do 13 tys. ton bojowych środków trujących (BST), z czego od 55% do 77% znajduje się w Głębi Gotlandzkiej i w rejonie Bornholmu (Toczyński, 2021, s. 180). W innych źródłach podaje się, że w akwenie tym znajduje się 15 tys. ton BST – głównie iperyt siarkowy oraz Clark I, Clark II, adamsyt, chloroacetofenon i tabun (Fundacja MARE). Dane te nie dotyczą cieśniny Skagerrak, w której zatopiono co najmniej 150 tys. ton BST (Fundacja MARE). Dokładne określenie ilości i miejsc zatopienia amunicji w Morzu Bałtyckim jest praktycznie niemożliwe. Przede wszystkim ze względu na to, że strona radziecka (a później rosyjska) nie informowała aliantów ani o ilości, ani o miejscu zatapiania amunicji (Wilkinson, 2017). Niemniej na podstawie badań i incydentów z amunicją zawierającą broń chemiczną, cały obszar Bałtyku Południowego można uznać za region występowania amunicji chemicznej (Miętkiewicz, 2022, s. 5–6).

Niebezpieczne dla mieszkańców wybrzeża Bałtyku są nie tylko BST, ale również produkty powstające w wyniku ich rozpadu. Wyniki badań i analiz przeprowadzonych przez Hannę Niemikoski (2022, s. 60–61) wskazują, że uwalniające się BST i ich toksyczne metabolity ulegają bioakumulacji w morskich gatunkach fauny i flory.

Jarosław Michalak, zajmujący się badaniem zagrożeń związanych z bronią chemiczną zatopioną w Morzu Bałtyckim podkreśla, że BST znajdujące się w tym akwenie stanowią zagrożenie między innymi dla: rybołówstwa, bioty, bezpieczeństwa żeglugi i turystyki, żywności, prac podwodnych oraz czystości plaż. Zauważa ponadto, że, chociaż obecnie jest to mało prawdopodobne,

zatopiona amunicja zawierająca BST może potencjalnie zostać wykorzystana w atakach terrorystycznych (Michalak, 2019, s. 4). Należy jednak pamiętać o tym, że rzeczy mało prawdopodobne nie są niemożliwe. Jest to istotne zwłaszcza w kontekście działań hybrydowych prowadzonych przez Federację Rosyjską (FR) wobec Zachodu, których elementem może być celowe uszkodzenie znajdujących się w Bałtyku pojemników zawierających BST (jako sukcesor ZSRR Rosja może znać ich dokładne położenie).

Kluczową kwestią podniesioną w artykule będzie próba odpowiedzi na pytanie dotyczące tego, czy i jakiej skali, w regionach położonych wzdłuż wybrzeży Morza Bałtyckiego, instytucje odpowiedzialne za zarządzanie kryzysowe i ochronę ludności są przygotowane na tego rodzaju zdarzenia. Natomiast główna hipoteza badawcza dotyczy możliwości wykorzystania przez Federację Rosyjską, w działaniach skierowanych przeciwko mieszkańcom państw, które uważa za wrogie, zatopionych w Morzu Bałtyckim BST.

Geneza zanieczyszczenia Bałtyku przez BST

Poważne dyskusje nad zagrożeniami wynikającymi z zanieczyszczenia oceanu światowego rozpoczęły się dopiero na początku lat 70. XX wieku. Było to związane przede wszystkim z obserwowanymi skutkami katastrof tankowców i zanieczyszczeniem mórz. Wcześniej pozbywanie się odpadów w morzach i oceanach było powszechnie akceptowaną praktyką. Nie może zatem dziwić, że po zakończeniu II wojny światowej państwa koalicji antyhitlerowskiej postanowiły zatopić broń chemiczną nazistowskich Niemiec w morzu. W zniszczonej wojną Europie nie istniała możliwość utylizacji BST zgodnie z normami bezpieczeństwa (Lisichkin, 1994). Z powodu obawy przed jej użyciem, podjęto decyzję o zniszczeniu broni chemicznej tak szybko, jak to było możliwe. Nawet teraz, po upływie niemal 70 lat nie ma wielkoskalowych i całkowicie bezpiecznych technologii przemysłowego niszczenia BST. Według niektórych ekspertów utylizacja tych środków, podobnie jak ich spalanie czy składowanie w głębokich kopalniach, jest bardziej szkodliwa dla środowiska naturalnego niż zatopianie na dużych głębokościach. Trzeba również pamiętać, że niemieckie składy broni chemicznej znajdowały się w gęsto zaludnionych rejonach Europy, tak więc wybrany wówczas sposób na pozbycie się amunicji chemicznej wydawał się najlepszy z możliwych.

Przejęta przez aliantów broń chemiczna charakteryzowała się dużą różnorodnością – to kilkaset tysięcy ton substancji toksycznych takich jak: gaz musztardowy i jego odmiany, związki zawierające arsen (np. luizyt), chlor (np. fosgen), kwas cyjanowodorowy, związki fosforoorganiczne (np. tabun). BST były przechowywane w kilku arsenałach na terenie Niemiec (we wszystkich strefach okupacyjnych) zarówno w postaci już gotowej do użycia amunicji – bomby lotnicze, pociski, miny, jak i składowane w beczkach czy kontenerach. Zdecydowano, że administracja wojskowa każdej ze stref okupacyjnych zajmie się zniszczeniem broni chemicznej znajdującej się na jej terytorium.

Początkowo zakładano, że amunicja chemiczna zostanie zrzucona do Oceanu Atlantyckiego w miejscach o głębokości co najmniej 1000 m. Jednak ze względu na pośpiech i brak

przystosowanych do transportu BST statków, zmniejszono wymagania dotyczące głębokości do 100 m. Umożliwiło to zatopienie niemieckiej broni chemicznej w Morzu Bałtyckim. Istnieją również opinie, że broń chemiczna została zatopiona na innych wodach – w Zatoce Biskajskiej, na Morzu Białym czy w Oceanie Arktycznym – jak dotąd nie udało się jednak tego oficjalnie potwierdzić.

Od niemal 70 lat na dnie Bałtyku trwa korozja pojemników, w których znajdują się toksyczne substancje. Czas niszczenia korozyjnego cienkościennych bębnow, beczek o grubszych ścianach i jeszcze grubszego korpusu bomb jest oczywiście niejednakowy. Należy także wziąć pod uwagę różnice w jakości metalu, a także to, że amunicja znajduje się zarówno pod warstwą osadów, jak i na stałym dnie. Zatem prawidłowo sformułowane pytanie powinno brzmieć – nie „czy”, ale „kiedy” nastąpi uwolnienie BST w ilości mogącej w sposób bezpośredni zagrozić zdrowiu i życiu osób przebywających wzdłuż wybrzeża Bałtyku. W tym kontekście problemem drugoplanowym wydaje się być przyczyna takiego zdarzenia – naturalne procesy (np. korozja) czy celowe działania człowieka. Trzeba mieć jednak świadomość, że obecna polityka Rosji zwiększa prawdopodobieństwo wystąpienia kryzysu, którego skutkiem będzie uwolnienie BST.

Istnieje także niebezpieczeństwo, że na początku lat 90. XX wieku radziecka (a później rosyjska) marynarka wojenna zatapiała w Bałtyku kolejne ładunki zawierające BST oraz odpady radioaktywne (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2010).

Morze Bałtyckie jako arena konfliktu Rosji z Zachodem

Region Morza Bałtyckiego, szczególnie państwa bałtyckie, jest obszarem strategicznym, w którym krzyżują się interesy NATO i Rosji. Zniszczenie infrastruktury gazociągu Nordstream 2, niezależnie od tego, kto dokonał ataku, pokazało, że konflikt w regionie już trwa. Próbuąc odwrócić uwagę od braku znaczących sukcesów militarnych w Ukrainie, Rosja testuje granice wytrzymałości NATO i zdaje się szukać słabych punktów w obronnym systemie sojuszu. Obecnie jest to całe spektrum działań hybrydowych: dezinformacja i propaganda, cyberataki, prowokacje w przestrzeni powietrznej, działania wywiadowcze i dywersyjne (Herdt, Zublic, 2022).

Wydaje się, że poczynania mające sprawdzenie i/lub złamanie spójności NATO są i będą permanentną częścią aktywności Rosji, także na Morzu Bałtyckim. Może to zagrażać podmorskiej infrastrukturze, której przykładem są terminale skroplonego gazu ziemnego (LNG) w Polsce i na Litwie czy Baltic Pipe. Dotyczy to również infrastruktury teleinformatycznej, przed czym 3 maja 2023 roku ostrzegł szef wywiadu NATO David Cattler: „Istnieją uzasadnione obawy, że Rosja może celować w podmorskie kable i inną krytyczną infrastrukturę, próbując zakłócić życie Zachodu i zyskać przewagę nad państwami, które zapewniają bezpieczeństwo Ukrainie” (Reuters, 2023).

Neoimperialna polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa FR polega między innymi na nieliczeniu się z życiem ani przeciwników, ani własnych obywateli (Iwaniak, 2023). Zatem uzasadniona wydaje się być obawa, że dla osiągnięcia korzyści, Rosja jest w stanie wykorzystać zatopione w Bałtyku BST. Tym bardziej, że po eksplozjach gazociągów Nord Stream, NATO

zintensyfikowało nadzór nad podwodną infrastrukturą na obszarach Morza Północnego i Bałtyku (Tynmaa, 2023). Trzeba jednak zwrócić uwagę na to, że postęp technologiczny i miniaturyzacja wykorzystywanych urządzeń (np. podwodnych dronów) zwiększają szanse na powodzenie takich działań.

Zauważyli to już fińscy eksperci, stwierdzając, że współcześnie dokonanie zamachu terrorystycznego lub aktu sabotażu nie wymaga bezpośredniego działania człowieka i może zostać wykonane zdalnie (Rantapelkonen, 2018, s. 48).

Według specjalistów wyciek zaledwie jednej szóstej zatopionych w Bałtyku BST może spowodować zanik wszelkich form życia w akwenie na co najmniej 100 lat (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, 2019). Należy również wziąć pod uwagę działalność rosyjskiej agentury w Europie, która jest szczególnie aktywna w państwach wspierających Ukrainę (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2023).

Znawcy rosyjskiej polityki zwracają uwagę, że w przypadku braku sukcesów w wojnie przeciwko Ukrainie, rosyjskie służby mogą planować ataki terrorystyczne w Europie. Działalność taką wydają się potwierdzać zamachy i próby zamachów w Hiszpanii przeprowadzone w drugiej połowie listopada 2022 roku, przy użyciu bomb wysłanych w listach (Kantola, 2023). Akcje tego typu mogą mieć na celu zastraszenie społeczeństw krajów udzielających pomocy Ukrainie. Mogą również stanowić element działań hybrydowych (destabilizacja sytuacji w tych państwach na skutek zaangażowania znacznych sił i środków), a w połączeniu z akcjami dezinformacyjnymi spowodować utratę zaufania obywateli do państwa i jego organów.

Można również założyć, że zagrożenie atakami terrorystycznymi inspirowanymi przez Moskwę rośnie, a wykorzystanie do tego celu zalegającej w Bałtyku broni chemicznej wydaje się być realne. Potwierdzać to mogą ujawnione w kwietniu 2023 roku przez telewizje publiczne państw nordyckich informacje o rosyjskich statkach „widmo” (ukrywających się przed radarami) przebywających na wodach w pobliżu Finlandii, Szwecji, Danii i Norwegii. Według źródeł nordyckich może to świadczyć o przygotowywaniu przez Rosję działań sabotażowych wymierzonych w infrastrukturę energetyczną (Business Insider, 2023). Mimo że takie działania są najbardziej prawdopodobne, nie można wykluczyć, że część aktywności rosyjskich jednostek skupia się również na przygotowaniu ataków terrorystycznych z użyciem znajdujących się w Bałtyku BST i/lub odpadów radioaktywnych.

Ochrona ludności w przypadku uwolnienia znacznej ilości BST w Bałtyku

Bez względu na przyczynę wystąpienia skażenia chemicznego morza i wybrzeża, może ono stanowić duże zagrożenie dla zdrowia i życia osób przebywających na skażonym obszarze. W takim przypadku niezbędne jest wdrożenie wcześniej opracowanych procedur. Tymczasem z raportu Najwyższej Izby Kontroli (NIK) wynika, że w przypadku stwierdzenia skażenia BST na wodach terytorialnych Polski działanie Służby SAR (Morskiej Służby Poszukiwania i Ratownictwa) polegałoby jedynie na poinformowaniu o zdarzeniu właściwego terytorialnie urzędu morskiego i służb operacyjnych Marynarki Wojennej oraz wsparciu jednostek prowadzących

akcję (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, 2020, s. 20). Ze wspomnianego raportu wynika również, że Siły Zbrojne RP nie miały (w czasie przeprowadzania kontroli) zdolności do likwidacji skażeń chemicznych, a procesy likwidacji BST były realizowane przez podmioty zewnętrzne (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, 2020, s. 22). Jednocześnie, z powodu nieumieszczenia w wykazie substancji priorytetowych, w programach monitoringu wód morskich nie zostały uwzględnione substancje pochodzące z BST oraz powstające w wyniku ich rozpadu (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, 2020, s. 23, 27). Wydaje się, że obecnie Polska nie jest przygotowana na ewentualność wielkoskalowego skażenia chemicznego Bałtyku, a działania wojska polegają na monitorowaniu i likwidacji powstałych przypadkowo skażeń i rejestrowaniu incydentów z udziałem BST w ramach Systemu Wykrywania Skażeń Sił Zbrojnych RP (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej, 2021, s. 4).

Pod względem ochrony ludności przed potencjalnymi skutkami przeprowadzonych przez Rosjan ataków terrorystycznych, z wykorzystaniem zatopionych w morzu BST czy materiałów radioaktywnych, sytuacja jest porównywalna we wszystkich państwach mających dostęp do Morza Bałtyckiego. W przypadku Szwecji można nawet mówić o celowym ukrywaniu wiedzy o istniejących zagrożeniach – nie opracowano stosownych procedur, nie mówiąc już o podejmowaniu szerzej zakrojonych działań (Frankfurter Rundschau, 2010).

Nie można jednak wykluczyć, że państwa zagrożone atakami ze strony Rosji monitorują sytuację związaną z możliwym wykorzystaniem znajdującego się w Bałtyku arsenału. Nie można również wykluczyć, że, ze względów bezpieczeństwa, nie informują opinii publicznej o monitorowaniu potencjalnie zaminowanych pojemników zawierających BST. Niepokojące jest natomiast to, że w planach zarządzania kryzysowego nie zawarto procedur postępowania w przypadku masowego uwolnienia BST zdeponowanych w Morzu Bałtyckim.

Podsumowanie

Wydaje się, że w kontekście możliwego wykorzystania przez Rosję do działań terrorystycznych lub sabotażowych znajdujących się w akwenie Morza Bałtyckiego BST i materiałów radioaktywnych, państwa zagrożone takim atakiem przejawiają myślenie życzeniowe. Brak odpowiedniego przygotowania do tego typu zdarzeń może prowadzić do wniosku, że państwa autorytarne mają pod tym względem przewagę ze względu na sposób sprawowania władzy. Autokraci wykorzystują wszelkie możliwe środki do osiągnięcia celów, natomiast cechą systemów demokratycznych jest konieczność działania w granicach określonych prawem. Nie można wykluczyć, że Rosja jest w stanie zniszczyć całe życie w Bałtyku i w jego bezpośrednim sąsiedztwie tylko po to, aby zademonstrować, że jest zdolna do wszelkich działań w celu spełnienia swoich imperialnych ambicji.

W związku z tym należy brać pod uwagę nieprzewidywalność działań Rosji oraz to, że od dawna sygnalizuje ona agresywne zamiary względem państw Europy Środkowej, w tym położonych nad Morzem Bałtyckim (Wawrzusiszyn, 2022, s. 271). Dlatego też niezbędne wydają się być działania zwiększające świadomość społeczeństwa na temat istniejących zagrożeń. Dodatkowo niezbędne wydaje się również przeprowadzanie ciągłych badań na zawartość BST

i produktów ich rozpadu znajdujących się w organizmach żyjących w Bałtyku, szczególnie polawianych w tym akwenie ryb.

Wydaje się, że w obecnej sytuacji międzynarodowej i wobec agresywnych i prowokacyjnych działań Rosji powinny zostać przygotowane procedury ewakuacji ludności z obszarów nadmorskich – w przypadku uwolnienia znacznej ilości BST w Bałtyku. Jest to szczególnie istotne nie tylko ze względu na napięte relacje Rosja – Zachód, ale również ze względu na możliwe samoistne uwalnianie się BST.

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Road to Democratic Confederalism – from idea of Socialist Kurdish State to Autonomous Administration

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Abstract

The article analyzes the theory of Democratic Confederalism that had been established in Northern Syria in the beginning of 2014. Three cantons had been declared in Northern Syria, a region also called as Rojava by Kurds and the system for governance of the cantons was Democratic Confederalism. Democratic Confederalism is a governance system which had been theorized by Abdullah Ocalan. Democratic Confederalism is a governance system that rejects the nation-state and its ideology and proposes a new system that does not rely on any kind of state. The article started with the evolvement of A. Ocalan's ideology from socialism, in the early 1970s, to Democratic Confederalism in the beginning of 2000s. The article also explained Democratic Confederalism and introduced the main principles of the system. After explaining the system of Democratic Confederalism, the article focuses on governance of Cantons that had been declared in Northern Syria. The last part of the paper finds out whether Democratic Confederalism is functional or not based on experience in Northern Syria.

Introduction

The Kurdish political movement has followed different paths since its inception (1978) to solve the Kurdish problem in the Middle East. Kurds are divided into four Middle East states which are Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. The division into the above countries influenced the emergence of several political movements with different characteristics. This article will focus on the Syrian Kurdish political struggle and their new administrative system in Northern Syria. During the Syrian Civil War, Kurds have declared autonomy in North Syria. The administrative system for the region was Democratic Confederalism, a system that has been theorized by Abdullah Ocalan, leader of Kurdistan Workers' Party, (Kurdish. Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK)),

an organization that has been recognized as a terrorist group by European Union, Turkey, United States and many other states. Democratic Confederalism is a governance system that rejects the nation-state and its ideology and proposes a new system that does not rely on any kind of state. The existing literature about Democratic Confederalism have not been quite objective on the theory and praxis in Northern Syria. As Pinar Dinc criticizes, the part of existing literature on cantons Autonomous Administration tends to describe region as a safe haven (Dinc, 2020, p. 48). Although democracy was introduced in Northern Syria under the Charter of the Social Contract, there were violations of human rights in this region. Human Rights Watch claims that the Democratic Union Party (Kurdish. Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD)) committed many human rights violations during its rule. Unsolved killings and disappearances of the PYD's political opponents, suppressing anti-PYD's protestors are some examples of human rights violations and anti-democratic acts (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

This paper defines the main principles of Democratic Confederalism in Northern Syria. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) started the declare the establishment of cantons in Northern Syria in 2014. The administrative system of the cantons was Democratic Confederalism. The article starts with a brief history of the Ocalan's ideology and the path towards Democratic Confederalism. The article's two goals are as follows: First, the article briefly describes how A. Ocalan's Socialist United Kurdish State ideals evolved into Democratic Confederalism and outlines its fundamental tenets. Second, it attempts to address the issue of whether the Autonomous Administration in Northern Syria practices democracy as claimed or not. This paper claims that the Autonomous Administration in Northern Syria is functioning in practice and its practices are suitable with criteria of Democratic Confederalism. The paper has used the Autonomous Administration as a case study to investigate the second objective of the paper and prove its claims. It has focused on three main issues to explain the claims of the article. The political representation of groups like minorities is the first point. The engagement of women in sociopolitical life is the second criteria, and whether the Autonomous Administration can defend the region on its own or not is the final point.

A. Ocalan's Ideology: from Social to Democratic Confederalism

During the 1970s, revolutionary leftist movements were quite strong and socialist revolution was a possibility among them in Turkey. A. Ocalan and other founding members of PKK, such as Cemil Bayik, Duran Kalkan etc. were also involved in Turkish leftists' movement. However, after the military memorandum of 1971, students started to think about a Kurdish movement. Abdullah A. Ocalan states that from spring 1973, while he was in prison, he thought that a group based on Kurdistan may have played an important role in solving the Kurdish issue (Akkaya, 2013, p. 97). The Kurdish youth who were students in Ankara and Istanbul, believed that a Socialist revolution in Turkey would be the solution to Kurdish issue. However, in the second half of the 70s, Kurdish youth started to consider, a Kurdish leftist organization which just focused on Kurdish issue and would organize in Kurdistan, not in big cities such as Ankara and Istanbul.

Five years later, in 1978, under the leadership of A. Ocalan, the PKK had been established. It was a Marxist-Leninist party which aimed to establish a united and independent Kurdish state based on socialist ideas. A. Ocalan claims that PKK was formed during the 70's when the world was divided by two camps – a bipolar system of Cold War – the capitalist and the socialist camps. It was inspired from the rise of decolonization movements which spreaded all around the world (Ocalan, 2011, p. 7). The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) was inspired by the decolonization movement because it views Kurdistan as a land that has been invaded by foreign nations and as a colonized country. In the manifesto of PKK, *The Path of Kurdistan Revolution*, A. Ocalan describes Kurdistan as a colony which is divided into four parts: Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran (Ocalan, 1993, p. 80). The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) had been established in the 70's and was highly affected by contemporary politics of the 70's but it never regarded Kurdish question as a merely ethnicity or nationhood problem. It was a project of liberating society and democratizing it (Ocalan, 2011, p. 7).

However, the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of Cold War had changed A. Ocalan's ideology. It was also clear that none of the sides, neither Turkey nor PKK, can win the armed conflict. The warfare reached a balance point (Ayboğa et al., 2019, p. 49). Hence, A. Ocalan and PKK started to be interested in new methods and policies to solve the Kurdish question. In order to find a democratic solution to Kurdish question, PKK declared ceasefires from 1993 but they did not end with a solution and the war broke out again after all of these ceasefires. In the last years of 20th century, Turkey started to oppress Syrian government to stop PKK's existence in the soil of Syria. A. Ocalan left Syria and was captured by Turkish intelligence service in Nairobi, Kenya on February 15, 1999. Since then, he has been imprisoned in Turkey. The capture of A. Ocalan did not result either with dissolution of PKK or termination of the Kurdish question. During his years in prison, A. Ocalan continued his ideological studies in order to end the Kurdish question by democratic means. After his capture, he believed that the period of armed conflict was over and a political solution in the existing borders should be the new aim of Kurdish movement (Gerber, Brincat, 2018, p. 4). He started to reread Marxist theory and praxis in a critical way. He had been influenced by libertarian theorist Murray Bookchin. He had also studied the ideas of Michel Foucault and Immanuel Wallerstein as well as Sumerian mythology, Athenian democracy, religion, philosophy, history, and physics. Benefiting from all of these sources, he developed the idea of Democratic Confederalism and Democratic Autonomy (Ayboğa et al., 2019, p. 49).

Democratic Confederalism and critique of nation-state

In a letter to Murray Bookchin, A. Ocalan states that he had completely given up the idea of establishing a state. Given up the idea of establishing a Kurdish nation-state leads A. Ocalan to consider different models of governance in order to solve the Kurdish question. He started to theorize the Democratic Confederalism model. The model refers to a non-state democratic organization (Ocalan, 2011, p. 3). He denies nation-states and global capitalism and criticizes both concepts. According to A. Ocalan, the origins of contemporary crises, such as conflicts in the

Middle East or global financial crisis, are nation-state and capitalist system. Democratic Confederalism is not a top-down, democratic system but rather democracy that is based on bottom of the society and is only way to solve modern problems of the world. Democratic Confederalists' program covers the main issues of contemporary world such as women's liberation, direct communal democracy and ecological society (Huff, 2018, p. 2). Contemporary indirect democracy failed to solve issues such as unequal distribution of wealth, participation of women in politics, and, of course, the Kurdish question. Nationalist and state-centric model of administration are the sources of contemporary politics' problems. According to A. Ocalan, the new nationalist wave will not be beneficiary to society, but it will bring loose as it did in the previous century (Ocalan, 2015, p. 3). The 20th century witnessed two great wars: the rise of nationalism and fascism which had resulted with millions of casualties, economic destruction, and Holocaust. To understand Democratic Confederalism there are some concepts that need to be explained, especially the notion of nation-state and the ideology of nation-state.

The end of 30 Years of War and the Peace of Westphalia are the beginning of nation-states era in Europe. Establishment of nation-state closed the Age of Empires and started a new era. Unlike the empires, in nation states, people should share a common history, common language and common values. National education, standing armies, and territorial integrity are some of the main features of the nation-state. Establishment of nation-state had resulted with minorities within nation-states such as Kurds and dividing nations with artificial borders. Minorities generally had witnessed oppression, and assimilation. Nation-states brought external problems as well as internal problems such as wars between nation-states and independence war against nation-states. Kurdistan is one of the examples that witnessed creation of the artificial border which divided Kurds into four different states: Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The concept of Kurdistan does not refer to a country or political concept but rather to a geographical concept. Kurds, in all mentioned countries, had witnessed oppression as well as assimilation. Due to nationalist policies of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, Kurds had suffered for decades. Kurdish language has been banned in public places as well as in social life. In Syria, Kurds had been stripped away from their citizenship and many other rights. In Iraq, Halabja Massacre happened, where chemical weapon had been used against Kurds in 1986. In Turkey, revolts against government had been harshly suppressed. For instance, during the Dersim rebellion, thousands of Kurds had been killed.

According to A. Ocalan, the problems of Kurds and other nations such as Palestinians, Armenians, Arabs are rooted in the emergence of nations-states. He claims that territorial borders remained flexible and multi-ethnic empires rose with consistently changing borders. Great Empires such as Roman, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian or British Empires had ported many different ethnicities, languages, and religions (Ocalan, 2011, p. 9). For instance, Kurds during the Ottoman Period were not divided into four countries. Kurds in Syria, Iraq and Turkey had free movement of people and goods without any restrictions. Many Kurdish tribes had members in the two countries. Even though the empires had borders, these borders did not have great impact on the social life of ordinary people. However, the nation-states eliminated (or tried to eliminate)

diversity of societies and states. A state with a single official language, one nation and oneness of all symbols such as flags or legendary heroes resulted in discrimination of minority groups.

In the nation-states, the power is concentrated on a specific center. However, in empires the power was distributed over a wide range of secondary small powers. This was one of the reasons that empires survived long periods of time and many challenges (Ocalan, 2011, p. 9). The nation-state has power over all kinds of political activities in determined territory. Decisions that are being taken by a center are applicable to all parts of state but in empires decentralization was an important element. In the nation-states power is highly concentrated in a specific center. State has monopoly on using power. A. Ocalan claims that the nation-state itself is the most developed complete monopoly (Ocalan, 2011, p. 9). Another problem of nation-states which A. Ocalan focuses on is their homogeneity. Nation-state eliminates the plurality of the societies. Creation of one official language, a flag, a nation, and a religious community is the aim of nation-state (Ocalan, 2011, p. 9). This policy resulted in the annihilation of minorities and their culture and language. Kurds in newly established nation-states, such as Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran, had suffered due to the process of creation of nation-states. Problems regarding cultural, historical, and social issues have not been solved yet. In 2011, at the beginning of Syrian Civil War, the Syrian government still refused to give citizenship to all Kurds that live in Syria. Centrality and oneness of nation-state had led to problems among and within societies. A. Ocalan claims that the problems of contemporary politics can be solved through Democratic Confederalism. According to A. Ocalan, nationalism, positivist science, sexism and religiousness are the ideological foundations of nation-state (Ocalan, 2011, p. 15–18). In A. Ocalan's works nationalism is being viewed as quasi-religious justification and its mission is to serve nation-state. If the nation-state is a living God, the nationalism would be its religion (Ocalan, 2011, p. 15). Another ideological foundation is religiousness. Religion still plays an important role in contemporary politics, especially after the 70s, with Iran's Islamic Revolution. For instance, in Turkey the government has been using religious rhetoric and considers themselves as a conservative party. It is very common for government members to show up in religious places and being recorded while they are praying. A. Ocalan claims that even though a nation-state acts like a secular state, it does use *mélange* of nationalism and religion for its purpose (Ocalan, 2011, p. 17).

The states are the main and powerful actors of international politics. The United Nations (UN) consists of only nation-states. The existence of the UN had been able to prevent a world scale war but not regional and internal armed conflicts. The Gulf War (1990–1991), civil wars after collapse of Yugoslavia, war in Iraq (2003) are some examples of the conflicts. According to A. Ocalan, the UN system has failed. The Problem of Iraq had proved this bankruptcy (Ocalan, 2011, p. 4). The problems regarding the existence of nation-state can be solved through the Democratic Condefederalist system. Democratic Confederalism develops an alternative which is open to different political formation, multiculturalist, ecologic and feminist, and does not allow monopoly (Ocalan, 2011, p. 4).

The right of self-determination of people is an international right that has been granted to all nations. One of the purposes of the UN is to develop friendly relations among nations based

on equal rights and the right of self-determination of people (the UN Charter Article 1). There are different approaches to the concept of the right of self-determination of people, such as the liberal approach and Marxist approach, which A. Ocalan and PKK was once inspired by. Due to its historical context, the right of self-determination of people is not a proletarian socialist concept. It emerged after the French revolution which stated of democratic principles and equality of all nations (Tatar, Toprak, 2015, p. 61). In Marxist literature Vladimir Lenin explains the right of self-determination. V. Lenin claims that the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of a national state. And the national state is a typical and normal state of the capitalist period (Lenin, 2004, p. 47). Based on the economic era and history of national movements, he gave a definition of the right of self-determination of people. "It means the political separation of these nations from alien national bodies and the formation of an independent national state" (Lenin, 2004, p. 47). A. Ocalan disagrees and criticizes the definition that was made by V. Lenin. He states the right of self-determination does not only mean to establish a state. According to him, this right means to establish their own democracy and non-state way of ruling themselves. It is the right to form a model that non-state communities can discuss and decide about their problems in villages, in neighborhoods and in periphery of cities (Ocalan, year, p. 5). A. Ocalan himself is an anti-nation-statist politician and leader. He criticizes the nation-states for bringing nothing but problems for the people. Therefore, formation of a Kurdish state in the Middle East will not solve the problems of Kurds, because A. Ocalan believes that a nation-state in the Middle East will eventually have a despotic characteristic (Ocalan, year, p. 5). Some Middle Eastern countries are examples to the A. Ocalan's statement. For instance, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Saudi Arabi are countries that can be considered as non-democratic, authoritarian, and dictatorial governments. Even Turkey cannot be defined as a liberal democratic state. According to Visual Capitalist, there are no countries falling under the category of full democracy in this region. Only Israel and Cyprus are considered flawed democracies (Amaros, 2022). To conclude, Kurdish nation-state may have the same democratic problems as other countries in the Middle East do and will not contribute to a democratic society for Kurds.

Principles of Democratic Confederalism

In 2005, PKK declared that their party views nation-state as a barrier to freedoms and stated that it is not aiming to establish a nation-state anymore (Jongerden, 2015, p. 1). On March 20, 2005, in a letter to PKK, A. Ocalan defines the main principles of Democratic Confederalism and he declares the inception of process of building the system in Kurdistan. It is a rule or administration without a state (Ocalan, 2011, p. 21). In Democratic Confederalism, society will organize itself from scratch. Decisions regarding the local problems will be taken by people with manners of direct democracy. All institutions do organize and rule themselves. It will not aim to change the existing state border through force. Self-ruling organizations and societies do not fight (physically) against nation-states but focus on democratizing society, the region and the world. As A. Ocalan states that Democratic Confederalism is not at war with any nation-state but it will not stand idly

by assimilation efforts (Ocalan, 2011, p. 32). Societies will be in a position of self-defense against nation-states.

In contrast to nation-states, Democratic Confederalism does not aim to create a monistic society. It is open to all cultures, languages, religions, and political groups and is a multi-culturalist society. Feminism and ecology are central elements of Democratic Confederalism (Ocalan, 2011, p. 21). Environmental and gender problems are popular issues of contemporary politics. Women are not being represented in global politics as well as men. Environmental problems such as climate change are threatening the environment as well as human life. Democratic Confederalism aims to equal representation of women and men. It also aims to end production based on profit, which causes environmental problems. The main principles of the system are as follow (Ocalan, 2011, p. 33–34):

1. The right of self-determination of the people includes the right to a state of their own. However, the foundation of a state does not increase the freedom of people. The system of the United Nations that is based on nation-states has remained inefficient. Meanwhile, nation-states have become serious obstacles for any social development. Democratic Confederalism is the contrasting paradigm of oppressed people.
2. Democratic Confederalism is a non-state paradigm. It is not controlled by a state. At the same time, it is the cultural organizational blueprint of a democratic nation.
3. It is based on grass-roots participation. Its decision-making processes lie with the communities. Higher levels only serve the coordination and implementation of the will of the communities that send their delegates to the general assemblies. For limited period space of time, they are both mouthpiece and executive institutions. However, the basic power of decisions rests with the local grass-roots institutions.
4. In the Middle East, democracy cannot be implemented by the capitalist system and its imperial powers which only damage democracy. The propagation of grass-roots democracy is elementary. It is the only approach that can cope with diverse ethnical groups, religions, and class differences. It also goes together well with the traditional confederate structure of the society.
5. Democratic Confederalism in Kurdistan is an anti-nationalist movement as well. It aims at realizing the right of self-defense of the peoples by the advancement of democracy in all parts of Kurdistan without questioning the existing political borders. Its goal is to establish federal structures in Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria that are open for all Kurds and at the same time form an umbrella confederation for all four parts of Kurdistan.

The idea of Democratic Confederalism would remain as a theory until the establishment of the Autonomous Administration during the course of Syrian Civil War. The Democratic Union Party (PYD), which considers A. Ocalan as an ideological leader, will try to implement the idea of Democratic Confederalism in Northern Syria. The Civil War has resulted an administrative gap which will be fulfilled by the PYD and Democratic Confederalism was declared in Northern Syria.

Declaration of Autonomous Administration in Northern Syria

The inception of creation of autonomous regions can be dated back to 2011. In 2011, PYD created the Peoples Council of Western Kurdistan (PCWK) which has 320 elected members with legislative and executive branches. The aim of PCWK was to provide social services and decrease the level of anarchy under the situation of civil war (Gunter, 2014, p. 111) and to further develop people's councils, commissions, and coordinating bodies. The Peoples Council of Western Kurdistan (PCWK) has members in every Kurdish region, and they act as mayors and tried to rule society instead of Syrian government. It can be interpreted that PYD started the project of autonomous Kurdish region from the very beginning of the civil war.

After the withdrawal of Syrian government from Northern Syria where majority of population is Kurdish, the Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM) which is a coordinating body that has been elected by the PCWK, alongside with PYD, declared the Charter of Social Contract in January 2014, which can be considered as constitution of Autonomous Administration and created Autonomous Regions, the self-administrative units. Democratic Autonomy had also been declared alongside with the Charter of Social Contract and Northern Syria had been divided into three cantons: Canton of Jazira declared on January 19, 2014, Canton of Kobane on January 27, 2014, and Canton of Afrin on January 29, 2014. Declaration of Cantons laid a ground for the implementation of Democratic Confederalism in Northern Syria.

After the declaration of autonomy, each canton formed a democratic-autonomous administration which was transitional administration, and each administration has a legislative council which can be identified as a local parliament. Members of the Legislative Council are elected for a four-year term. The Legislative Council elects an Executive Council which has two co-chairs: one male and one female. All three cantons adopt Democratic Confederalism and its means of governance. The sole source of authority resides within people of regions. All cantons have the right to freely elect their representatives and representative bodies. This right is assured via the Charter in article 8. Each body of Autonomous Regions has different responsibilities and different duties to implement principles of self-administration in the region. The Legislative Assembly is elected by the people by secret ballot and for duration of four years (The Charter of Social Contract, Article 45). The Legislative Assembly is the main organizational and legal body of The Autonomous Regions. As mentioned in the Charter, in the section of the functions of the Legislative Assembly, it has right and power to establish rules, signing international treaties and agreements, declare war and peace etc. The other body of governance in the Autonomous Regions is the Executive Council. The Executive Council is the highest executive and administrative body in the Autonomous Regions. It is responsible for the implementation of laws, resolutions and decrees as issued by the Legislative Assembly and judicial institutions (The Charter of Social Contract, Article 54). Northern Syria does not only consist of Kurds. It ports different ethnicities and religions such as Muslims, Christians, and Yazidis. Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmens, Chechens and Circassians are the ethnicities that live in Northern Syria (Ayboğa et al., 2019, p. 33–41). The first sentence of the Charter of Social Contract emphasizes this diversity and states that the Charter has been declared by all these ethnic and religious

groups. Article 6 of the Charter focuses on the equality of all individuals and communities in the eyes of the laws. The Cantons are founded based on the principle of self-government and each of the cantons is free to choose its representatives and representative bodies. Cantons are also free to choose their own flags, emblems, and anthems (The Charter of Social Contract, Article 6, 8, 11). The cantons are still part of Syria rather than a separatist movement. Article 12 of the Charter of the Social Contract states that the cantons are integral part of Syria. In March 2016, Federal System of Rojava/ Northern Syria had been established. It brought three cantons together as well as newly liberated areas. In November 2016, the name of the federation has been changed to Democratic Federation of Northern Syria. The name of the federation has been changed and the concept of Rojava has been removed. Because as Democratic Federation of Northern Syria is not only consisting of Kurds but also different other nations and minorities such as Arabs, and Assyrians (Ayboğa et al., 2019, p. 120). Therefore, using the term Rojava, a Kurdish term, would mean that Autonomous Administration is a Kurdish federation and would not be suitable with Democratic Confederalism. A member of Northern Syria Federal System Organizing Council said that one reason for removing the word Rojava is region's plan to join the mainly Arab provinces of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zur in Northern Syria (Arafat, 2016). Due to territorial expansion, the name of Autonomous Administration has been changed once again to its final version in 2018, which is the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), to include new regions such as Raqqah, Manbij, and Deir al-Zour (Van Wilgenburg, 2020). It can be concluded that the changing of names was a result of geographical expansion and a need for political administration.

Conclusion

The Democratic Union Party (PYD) had aimed to build a different system of governance that would create a democratic society and a democratic governance. The system of Democratic Confederalism has been applied in Northern Syria by PYD. It was developed by A. Ocalan, an imprisoned leader of PKK. PYD considers A. Ocalan as an inspiration. Therefore, the ideology of PYD is based on the ideology of A. Ocalan. His ideas have evolved through the years. In 1978 (the year that PKK was formed), the main ideology of PKK and of A. Ocalan was to establish a united and socialist Kurdistan which will include Kurds in all part of Middle East which is: Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) had been formed during the Cold War period and it was affected by the bipolar world system and independence wars of colonies. It has started to wage a guerilla war against Turkey in 1984. However, during the 1990s, warfare reached a balance point. It was clear that neither PKK nor Turkey can win the war. With the collapse of the socialist bloc and dissolution of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), PKK witnessed the collapse of real socialism. Hence, the ideology of PKK and A. Ocalan had shifted from socialism to Democratic Confederalism.

Democratic Confederalism proposes a democratic society that does not rely on the existence of nation-state. During the Syrian Civil War, a power gap emerged in Northern Syria when the

Syrian government withdrew from the region. PYD took control of Northern Syria and declared the establishment of canton administration in three regions of Northern Syria. Democratic Confederalism aims at creating a democratic society and an administration.

This section of the article addresses the second objective of the paper. The paper claims that the Autonomous Administration in Northern Syria is functioning in practice and its practices are suitable with criteria of Democratic Confederalism. The paper has used the Autonomous Administration as a case study to investigate the second objective of the paper and prove its claims. It has focused on three main issues to explain the claims of the article. The political representation of groups like minorities is the first point. The engagement of women in sociopolitical life is the second criteria, and whether the Autonomous Administration can defend the region on its own or not is the final point.

Declaration of the Charter of Social Contract (herein after the Charter) was one of the first steps toward a democratic and equal society. The Charter includes all ethnicities and minorities in the region to socio-political life. Kurds, Arabs, Armenians, Arameans, Turkmens, and Chechens were mentioned in the region and all minorities have equal rights. Particularly comparison between Syrian Constitution and the Charter of Social Contract shows that PYD create an administration which is more democratic than Syrian government. Syrian Constitution states on Arab characteristic of Syria. In the preamble of the Syrian Constitution, it states that Syrian Arab Republic is proud of its Arab identity and the constitution considers its people as an integral part of the Arab nation. Article 1st of the Constitution also focuses on the same points. It defines Syria as a part of Arab homeland and Syrian people as a part of Arab nation. Only official language of Syria is Arabic (Syrian Arab Republic's Constitution of 2012, Article 4.). In contrast to Syrian Constitution, the Charter focuses on pluralist characteristics of the region. For instance, Article 9th of the Charter of Social Contract states that Canton of Jazira has three official languages and all communities are granted to teach and be taught in their native language. Each canton has the right to freely elect their representatives and has the right to have its own flag, emblem and anthem (the Social Charter, Article 8, 11). It can be concluded that PYD had succeeded in creating a pluralist and democratic society based on Democratic Confederalism.

The second point is women's participation to socio-political life. Women are visible in all parts of social and political life of Northern Syria. Every administrative unit should have 40% women quota and should have two co-chairperson, one male and one female. Article 27th of the Charter of Social Contract states that women have inviolable rights to participate in political, social, economic, and cultural life. The Charter of Social Contract also mandates all public institutions to work towards elimination of gender discrimination. The Charter of Social Contract states the equality of all genders in front of law. One of the bodies of the Executive Council of Autonomous Regions is Body of Family and Gender Equality (the Social Charter, Article 95). In practice, women in Northern Syria have great contribution to the establishment of a new system both in defending Northern Syria and organizing women in the region. Specially in the war against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) women had fought alongside with men and played a major role in defeating it.

A. Ocalan states that Democratic Confederalism is not at war with any nation-state but it will not stand idly by assimilation efforts (Ocalan, 2011, p. 32). There are mainly two threats to Autonomous Administration: ISIS and Turkey. ISIS started to launch an offensive towards Northern Syria, Kobane, in September 2014. Military wing of PYD, People's Protection Units Kurdish, Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (YPG) and Women's Protection Units, Kurdish. Yekîneyên Parastina Jin (YPJ) defended the city for almost six months and defeated ISIS. After defending Kobane, YPG and YPJ launched an offensive and liberated Northern Syria. ISIS no longer possesses a threat to the Autonomous Administration. However, Autonomous Administration was not able to defend region against Turkish operations. For instance, in January 2018, Turkey launched an operation against Afrin canton and took control of the city in March. Since then, the city has been under control of Turkish forces and Syrian National Army.

First two points clearly state that Democratic Confederalism has proven itself to be functional in praxis and it created a society based on equalities and liberties in Northern Syria. However, it can also be concluded that Autonomous Administration is not capable of defense of region against nation-state and seems to be fragile. By the time of writing this article, Turkey still has intention to dissolve the Autonomous Administration, and it is still unknown if the Autonomous Administration will be able to defend itself against Turkey.

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