Analiza i Egzystencja

ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2017.38-04

Lista wydań / 38 (2017)
O sprawcy działania i odpowiedzialnym działaniu u Arystotelesa

Autorzy: Maciej Smolak
Instytut Filozofii UJ
Słowa kluczowe: decision fine man of the highest order responsibility virtue of character
Rok wydania:2017
Liczba stron:22 (67-88)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:


At EN III.1 1109b31-32 Aristotle says we praise and censure voluntary actions and we feel sympathy for involuntary actions, and sometimes even pity. Next he examines which actions are voluntary and involuntary. This examination is connected with determination of the conditions under which the person is auctor agendi and thus can respond for the action. But it is not right to say, when somebody is auctor agendi his action is responsible. Hence, to answer to the question which action is responsible action in Aristotle, the author considers the issue in two stages. The first stage is devoted to clarification what does it mean to be the agent of action. The second stage gives the explanation of what does it mean “to decide for the action accordance with virtue because of it”. As the result, the author demonstrates that the responsible action is taken on the basis of decision and for the sake of fine. He shows such action is fine because: a) the realized end is fine; b) it is choiceworthy in itself; c) the motive of the agent is the fine.
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