ISSN: 1734-9923
eISSN: 2300-7621
OAI
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2017.39-04
Lista wydań /
39 (2017)
Granice autonomii etyki. O potrzebie uwzględniania wyników nauk empirycznych w etyce (The limits of ethics autonomy. Ethics takes into account the empirycal data)
| Autorzy: |
Natasza
Szutta
Uniwersytet Gdański |
| Słowa kluczowe: | psychological realism ethical theory utilitarianism deontology virtue ethics automatic processes reflective processes moral education |
| Data publikacji całości: | 2017 |
| Liczba stron: | 24 (49-72) |
Abstrakt
This paper focuses on the psychological realism requirement which should be met
by any ethical theory. Even if one should not make normative conclusions out of
descriptive presumptions, there are still some limitations resulting from our nature
about which one should remember when formulating moral ideals. One should not
impose moral ideals which may require of people more than they would ever be able
to bear. The paper’s aim is to emphasize how important it is to ethics to pay attention
to the empirical research carried out within psychology which show that a large part
of our thought and volitional processes is automatic or semi-automatic. This means
that ethicists cannot exclusively concentrate on regulating reflective processes which
underlie consciously made decisions. If ethics is to avoid marginalization, ethicists
must also focus on those automatic processes which control human thinking and
action, especially in the circumstances of a total “ego-depletion”, e.g. when we are
tired, hungry, or under a strong influence of unstable emotions. The paper shows
that virtue ethics is this kind of ethical approach which meets the psychological
realism condition most successfully.
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