

# **Analiza & Egzystencja**

czasopismo filozoficzne

**AiE!V**

**50**

**2020**

Uniwersytet Szczeciński

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**ISSN 1734-9923**

**WYDAWNICTWO NAUKOWE UNIwersYTETU SZCZECIŃSKIEGO**

Wydanie I. Ark. wyd. 5,0. Ark. druk. 5,9. Format A5. Nakład 66 egz.

## CONTENTS

### ARTICLES

- Olga Ramírez Calle, *Meaning under the Threat of Paradox on Two Fronts* ..5
- Olha Honcharenko, *Oleksandr Kulczycki's Philosophy and the Lviv-Warsaw School*..... 19
- Borislav Mihačević, *Heidegger and dóža: an Ambiguous Affair* .....41
- Marta Agata Chojnacka, *The Notion of Existence in Jean-Paul Sartre's and Karl Jaspers' Philosophy in the Literary Context of "Anna Karenina"* .....59

### REVIEWS

- Aleksandra Derra, *Holobionts, Symbiosis and New Narratives for the Troubled Times of Donna Haraway's Chthulucene. Review of Donna Haraway's (2016), "Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene," Durham-London: Duke University Press Books* .....79



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## MEANING UNDER THE THREAT OF PARADOX ON TWO FRONTS

Keywords: Rule-Following Paradox, Family Resemblance, Wittgenstein, Kripke  
Słowa kluczowe: Paradoks przestrzegania reguł, podobieństwo rodzinne,  
Wittgenstein, Kripke

### The Resemblance Paradox

The paradox threatening the understanding of linguistic meaning in terms of ‘family resemblance’ refers to the open character of meaning that derives from it, or what has been called the ‘under-determination paradox’. If all that is needed to belong to the extension of a concept is some kind of resemblance or overlapping of arbitrary features with any of its already existing members (with possibly new members resembling the immediately

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preceding features introduced, and so forth), then ultimately anything could end up belonging to it.<sup>1</sup> So, if the family resemblance model was supposed to free us from a too rigid and fixed conception of meaning, now it appears to allow for the dilution of meaning altogether.

Since the beginning of the debate, there has also been an issue concerning the generality of the family resemblance claim: whether Wittgenstein considered it to apply to some specific kind of concepts only (keeping talk of common features for others), or whether it was intended as a general claim. Opinions diverge<sup>2</sup> regarding the textual evidence and whether it allows one thing or the other to be attributed to Wittgenstein. The way this question is settled will, of course, affect the extent of the threat upon the concept of meaning we see the paradox has.

Wittgenstein first introduced the metaphor of family resemblance in *The Blue Book* (1958, p. 17), expounding on it later in his *Philosophical Investigations* (1953, p. 65). The concept was intended to question the traditional account according to which the meaning of our words is dependent upon certain necessary and sufficient conditions, and to depict it instead as some ‘crisscrossing of similarities’ between the extension members of our terms. However, the reason why speaking of necessary and sufficient conditions did not fit well with Wittgenstein’s understanding of meaning is best grasped, in my opinion, from the perspective of his ‘Rule-Following Considerations’, since the claim that no rule is given in advance for the use of a concept is tantamount to the idea that we cannot pin meaning down to a set of fixed necessary and sufficient conditions. Wittgenstein’s picture of ‘Rules as Rails’ (1953, §218, §219) attempted to make clear precisely that there is no possible understanding of meaning that could predict how we might have to adapt our concepts in light of an unpredictable reality, nor a pre-given reality demanding a given sort of classification in advance. Meaning is not a once-and-for-all concluded issue but a continuously reassessed one in light of new experiences. As anti-realist authors argue<sup>3</sup>, it requires

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<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Wennerberg (1967, pp. 116–117) as quoted by Belleimey (1990).

<sup>2</sup> Against the generalisation, for example, Sluga (2006), Williamson (1994).

<sup>3</sup> In what follows I will take as base line of my perspective the argumentation line introduced by Dummett (1978) and specially developed by Wright in several texts on the matter (1984, 2001, 2007). Although that doesn’t mean that I would underwrite all their arguments, but rather, that I support in general terms the approach and will often be referring to it while adding some insights of my own.

continuous human evaluation to determine whether certain new cases are to count as members of a conceptual extension or not – or to put it another way, ‘whether they sufficiently resemble what we have so far considered as cases of such’ – and, similarly, that there are no fixed conditions to determine this. Therefore, how far or in what direction we might proceed is an open issue here too. But, can we assimilate both questions?

### A paradox on two fronts

Actually, I believe that the Rule-Following Paradox (RFP), elaborated by Kripke (1982), points to the same under-determination problem threatening the idea of family resemblance but from a different perspective. If anything could pertain to the extension of a concept from the one side, from the other the concept or the rule that guides its use can be made to cohere with anything. So, here we have a paradox from two sides. Now, if this is right, and if the RFP is taken to be a general one (or we should refute the paradox as a whole), why is it that many authors deny the Resemblance Paradox (RP) a parallel generality?

Consider claims 1, 2 and 3 below. Claims 1 (RFP) and 2 are obviously reversible. So, have I incurred any non-allowed assumption in asserting that therefore, since 3 (RP) is a case of 2, then the RFP and RP are two sides of the same paradox?

- (1) Any course of action, or sequence of applications, can be made to cohere with the rule.
- (2) The rule, or concept, can be made to cohere with any course of action or sequence of applications.
- (3) The family of resemblances of a concept can end up including anything.

The trouble appears to stem from the introduction of ‘resemblances’ as setting the standard of what can be included under a concept and then reading the ‘coherence with any course of action’ in terms of possible ‘resemblances with anything’ (any new potential instance considered or considerable).

We can make the transition from 2 to 3 plainer by reformulating 3 into 3\*:

- (3)\* The rule or concept can be made to cohere with any course of action, because resemblances can be found with any further moves that might be made.

So, has some objectionable modification been introduced through this move? The perspectives are, first of all, different. The reasons why ‘the rule might expand to any course of action’ in 1, are left unanalysed; it is as though we were thinking in terms of possible descriptive rules, rules that can be reconstructed differently or be seen as having been understood differently by the speaker all the way through each time a new move is made, whatever that is. When we talk about resemblances, though, we are moving at the level of the members of the extension, or referential level and, further, in terms of the ‘likeness’ they bear of each other; as though we would have no problem in understanding the concept or rule, or would take it to be fixed and then try to see how well new candidates fulfil it through the process of comparing them ‘in likeness’ with previous members of the extension. That is, in 1 it is the rule that would not be clear but would need to be determined through, or at least compatible with, the ongoing sequence of moves; here, we get the impression that it would be the other way around. But the difference is only apparent, since both aspects cannot be separated from each other. We cannot consider the rule as fixed in the second case, precisely because depending on which candidates are seen as fit to be included each time will be understood one way or another (and even then, not once-and-for-all); and that is precisely what is said by 1. On the other hand, the decision on which candidates are to be included is, for its part, dependent on the various possible ways of understanding the rule. However, we might insist on the point about the legitimacy of new moves being determined specifically by resemblance, which some might argue need not be read into the RFP.

The RFP differs from this point of view insofar as the various moves that might and can be made to cohere with the rule need to have nothing to do with resemblance but rather with differently motivated decisions, as in the case of mathematics. The members of a mathematical sequence cannot be properly seen as ‘resembling’ each other. But is this so? If we take a look at some of Kripke’s (1982, p. 58) examples to start with, such as the colour ‘grue’, it would appear that if, after a series of greens, the speaker is inclined also to include blues and further yellowish things (I am modifying the example for my purposes), the point might be put in terms of ‘what similarities’ she takes to be relevant. She may have seen a similarity in them

all in the sense that they resemble ‘the colours of a famous folk ceramic’ or some other possibility of the sort (the different instances resembling each other or others already included),<sup>4</sup> since from this perspective they could be claimed to ‘resemble’ each other if not in a strictly perceptual sense then through them having some traceable common connection. But even when talking about mathematical sequences, it can be claimed that different moves ‘resemble’ each other in the sense that some likeness can be discovered in them all (so far) owing to some possible compatible function, be that what it may. We could consider the numbers in a sequence and find several possible functions that could make them alike. That much they would have in common. Remember that saying that there are no necessary and sufficient conditions goes along with the idea that there is no once-and-for-all pre-determined rule; and precisely for that reason, seen from the other side the ‘likeness’ or connections that can be found between members of the extension and new ones is not defined either and allows for different reconstructions. Furthermore, two instances might be alike in expressing a (+2) relation while others express a ( $\times 4$ ) etc., and out of these different ‘likenesses’ we could reconstruct one possible complex rule among others. If we insist that the rule is a determinate one, then the same would go for the likeness. But if we claim that we cannot commit ourselves to there being a fixed rule, then the matter of likeness remains open too.

What appears to be hindering the identification of both problems is that when we talk of ‘family resemblance’, even knowing that the expression is metaphorical we tend to visualise the problem on a perceptual-like level, registering some sort of undetermined likeness between already existing cases and new ones. Therefore, in expanding the rule it all appears to be a matter of finding any such similarities. But the idea that in our rule we should include similar and apparently dissimilar instances, such as from oranges to apples as could potentially be the case (the fact that up until now we have only encountered apples does not mean that the rule might not apply to oranges too), appears to put us in a different place from the problem of resemblance. But that is only because we are expecting the similarities to

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<sup>4</sup> Note that it does not help to say, but ‘they are these specific Folk ceramic colours and those are necessary and sufficient conditions’, since that would be the same as saying, but it is a ‘Family Wittgenstein resemblance’ that is the necessary and sufficient condition they have in common.

follow the metaphor too literally while the user might be moving at a much more abstract level in which aspects beyond form, colour or taste are considered. The resemblance might indeed be found to concern such aspects or might lie, for example, in ‘playing a similar pragmatic role in our nutrition’ or ‘provoking the same kind of reaction’ (being disgusting, for example), and so on. On the other hand, resemblances that allow the speaker to include new members in the extension of the concepts, whatever and how varied these are, will, from the reconstructive perspective of a hearer, be turned into whatever number of rules can make sense of the whole sequence so far.

Thus, as far as it goes, I see no reason to resist the identification of both paradoxes as being the same one from two perspectives; and if generality should be attributable to one, the same, it seems to me, should go for the other.

## The Paradox Again

So far, we have not made the prospects of a satisfactory conception of meaning better exactly but have simply argued that the threat that was seen to come from two sides is actually the same threat. A threat, nevertheless, though. But how bad is it, and how corrosive are the arguments in genuinely undermining our linguistic confidence?

As I see it, the main issue with the rule-following paradox is not most importantly, as Kripke (1982, pp. 96–97) puts it, that we should not be able to appeal to any fact of the matter, either in our mind or from past behaviour, that determines which rule it is that we are following. Rather, it is that there are no facts of the matter about it being a determinate rule because there *cannot be* any once-and-for-all rules fixed in advance, either for the individual or the community. There would be nothing like linguistic normativity in that sense. In this point I go along with Wright’s (1984) interpretation, although I will not be appealing to the question of intentionality that is central to Wright’s paper<sup>5</sup>. So, going back to our problem, we can distinguish various claims made by the RFP: (1) the impossibility of predicting decisions about the future application of a term; and (2) the idea that we cannot say what rule we are following and, therefore, that there is no specific meaning we can be said to attach to our terms. The question is whether the step that brings us

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<sup>5</sup> For example, p. 776.

from (1) to (2) is to be seen as compelling – whether we want to say a) that *because* it is impossible for us to predict all future applications, we cannot say what rule we are following nor attach any meaning to our words; or b) that we could not even say, for independent reasons, what rule we have been following or what we mean by the term, diluting any possible meaning contour. If we mean a), I would say that this is partially right. However, it should be given a qualified reading and surely not one that allows us to assert the second part of it, i.e. that for that reason there would be no meaning we can be said to have attached to our terms, since there is still room for an evolving and open-ended conception of meaning to which I will come in a moment. But if we mean b), that it is not just because of differing evolving possibilities that we cannot be said to know what we have been doing up to now (since we could not pin down normativity itself to any kind of fact, just as we cannot in reality – the Hume’s problem of induction, causality etc. as Kripke argues – not in our mind, etc.), nor because of any specific meaning we have been implementing, then the claim is questionable, not in the sense that there should in our mental life or behaviour be the normativity that Kripke denies but in the sense that we nevertheless know what we have been doing.

The first claim above, (1), is compatible with the following situation (again modifying similar examples<sup>6</sup>): I have been walking through the street lights at green and not at red in a finite set of cases, but one day I stop, puzzled and wondering when suddenly the street lights are purplish rather than red, not knowing whether to cross the street or not. Does it mean that I did not know what I was doing before? The authorities then realise that these new intelligent street lights vary their colour (as in a programme that appears to be affected by the pollution level in the street), now projecting a rather purplish light at certain times of the day in some parts of the city. Instead of changing the whole system, they might adapt the rule to make us pedestrians stop at purplish lights too. Does that mean that I had no guidelines before or that my rule could just as well have been ‘red and purplish when pollution is over 50%’, and that I could not tell which since I could not have said that such a progression could not be? We would rather say in the sense of 1) that my rule has evolved and adapted in light of an unforeseen

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<sup>6</sup> The example can be seen again as a different variation of Goodman (1983) and Kripke’s (1982) ‘grue emeralds’ example.

reality. Insisting on the question, ‘But were you then following the red/green rule or the red-purplish/green rule before (you could have)?’ is in no way unsettling, unless there was some external standard already possessed by someone that could have specified in advance that it was the red-purplish one I was already supposed to be following but I had simply not gone that far in my application experience.

We can agree that there is nothing like a once-and-for-all account of meaning for that reason, but that does not mean that anything goes either. It is the further idea, that anything can be made to cohere with the rule, that should be reconsidered. It is the same with the idea that there could be resemblances all the way through. That a similar issue might be raised with blue, pink, etc. street lights and that in all cases we might have decided favourably to recognise them as members (to be included as those by which pedestrians are to stop too), does not mean that our rule was in a strict sense *already* any of them but just that it might have evolved into any of them ‘if we should have so *decided*’. Virtuality is far from being reality for rules too. Furthermore, the rule could never have evolved into ‘going through green’ since green was explicitly excluded as ‘Not-Red’, implying fixing a necessary and sufficient condition for exclusion.<sup>7</sup> That there should be vague cases that require further decisions (whether something really is green, for example) does not undermine there being clear lines about standard prototype ones. Finally, should life take a perverse turn and we come to reverse the rule and allow pedestrians to proceed through red (which would require fixing green as the opposite), we would need to start talking about following a new (inverse) rule. This is because clearly if right and wrong mingle, then no talk of the same rule makes sense anymore. But it would be absurd to say that the rule I followed was, ‘going through green or red’ as well as ‘going through green only’.

So, again, in the sense of a) neither the individual nor the community can determine which rule it *is*, seen from the perspective of upcoming futures that might turn what we now call ‘a’, into any number of ‘a<sub>1</sub>’, ‘a<sub>2</sub>’, ‘a<sub>3</sub>’, ..., ‘a<sub>n</sub>’

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<sup>7</sup> Timothy Williamson argued in his book *Vagueness* (1994) that the problem of the underdetermination of meaning, could be resolved by appealing to negative resemblances, while he still pretends to avoid any talk of necessary conditions. I think the direction is right, but as a whole the proposal is not in the sense that we do need opposition, but no opposition can be obtained in my view without precisely fixing at least some criteria for exclusion.

(different in themselves, since allowing and forbidding different instances). But whichever rule appears to be displayed in the future and then again in the thereafter following the future, it must conform with the set of cases that have been accepted up until now and be incompatible with those that have been excluded as ‘not-a’<sup>8</sup>; which is actually already quite significant since it amounts to excluding from the rule *to be* (if you wish, or better to say ‘become’) a good amount of possibilities, call them ‘a<sub>-1</sub>’, ‘a<sub>-2</sub>’, ‘a<sub>-3</sub>’, ..., ‘a<sub>-n</sub>’. I would expect my training situation to have made me go through not just positive cases of inclusion but also the most relevant ones to be excluded. Nor should these be arbitrary, but rather their exclusion made dependent upon specific aspects; that is, we should be given reasons for it, ultimately pinned down to some salient features that are supposed to be relevant.

Surely, as Kripke stresses, the point is supposed to be that whatever reasons we give they should be given in linguistic terms, and for each of these terms the problem again arises of what exactly is the meaning or rule to which we are supposed to be referring. Being drawn ultimately to a level where no language is available, we would simply deal just with performance. But we might also argue that at basic levels we pin terms down to basic, unidimensional, easily recognisable properties with clear opposing contraries ‘hot/not hot (cold)’, ‘full/not full (empty)’ etc.<sup>9</sup> For such concepts, up to a certain point, it would be easier to determine whether the corresponding property is lacked or possessed (vagueness aside). But if this is right, and if such characteristics are components of complex concepts, then excluded cases can be justified on the basis of the presence or absence of those and we can be made aware of it.

Therefore, I can consider myself safe to go on matching standardly similar cases to those in my past application history, leaving aside others banned in already experienced situations. Thereby relying on our basic capacity to distinguish cases significantly reiterating marked features in our memory of those already had,<sup>10</sup> from not matching ones.<sup>11</sup> Since, should any

<sup>8</sup> Compare with the discussion of Williamson’s position in Ramirez (2020, pp. 16–20).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>10</sup> Such standard cases do not pose us for a decision whether to implement our pattern further, as will be the case by more diverging or novel ones, since such a decision is in a sense already made and is now a matter of course.

<sup>11</sup> Compare with the idea of a pattern in Ramírez (2020, p. 10, and the previous discussion in pp. 8–9).

apparently non-significant dissimilarities among them have knowingly been relevant or confusing in advance, I would have been provided some such reason for their exclusion (drawn down to non-linguistically cognitively apprehensible ones, if necessary). I would, namely, have been advised of it soon enough in my training. Had decisions in this regard not already been made by my community, it would be meaningless to say that because such cases might be added or refused in a future time,  $t_2$ , *my rule* is already a different one at  $t_1$ .

But if by non-standard cases this picture relies ultimately on the decisions, as I above said, made by my community (and here I side again with antirealist readings of Wittgenstein) a worry might be raised on whether the community will have to be meeting whenever any of us has a problem of non-familiar application. But the fact is, that when such problems are relevant for whichever pragmatic reason, that is precisely what we do: ask others whether there are already laid down criteria or, otherwise, try to find together some in order to fix the line one way or the other. Meanwhile, we help each other by appeal to a history of commonly recorded application. Should some sex couples start wanting to call themselves ‘marriage’ and others finding it a transgression of use, the matter will be solved through a legal decision to avoid further discussion. Not because both could not have been an option from the perspective of past application and considerable resemblance, but because (among other implications of the institution that go along with the term) we must lay ourselves down to communicate, based surely too on independent reasons of social relevance. This might not solve the issue for good,<sup>12</sup> of course, who knows whether a *triple* assemble of a gender mixed character will knock someday at the door wanting to sanctify their union and reclaiming the word ‘marriage’ for themselves. Or whether some future genetical combinatory procedure results in beings not contemplated in today’s legal systems, but with a similar desire to be bind themselves through ‘marriage’ for the eyes and legal recognition of all. Should their union, in this or the previous case, be included as marriage on several occasions, coherence (vagueness aside) will demand to include standard prototype cases of such to be included too from now on. Otherwise, again, we will need to find exclusion reasons for the non-admitted cases, which users should be

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<sup>12</sup> I thank an anonymous referee of *Analiza i Egzystencja* for some clarifications on options available here.

made aware of. Was the linguistic rule of ‘marriage’ from the beginning on to include heterosexual couples and from a given moment on heterosexual and homosexual ones and then again triples or semi-human creatures? Well, yes and no, if you wish. It simply wasn’t definitively fixed one way or the other. The normativity of the rule was no self-runner, no necessity mechanism that implements itself on its own as Wittgenstein argued. From the perspective of the future it was the same one, since it is the same rule or term that has evolved, including all past cases and from a given moment on new ones. Could the user or the community have appealed to any fact of the matter to say that the rule necessarily *must* have excluded homosexual ones? No, the fact that it had not done so, so far, didn’t mean it could not have so evolved. Did it mean that they did not know what they have so far been doing in using the word? Of course not, either. So, if the worry is, how is it that the community can embody normativity any better, if the paradox affects it too, if it need not know any better which rule it will be. The answer is, as Wright puts it, that the point here is not one about knowing, but about deciding<sup>13</sup> on the face of hard cases which way to go. This amounts from my perspective to giving grounds for exclusion and appealing to a precedent history to solve further queries.

Is this appeal to the community to be put together with Kripke’s skeptical solution? I do not think it should. First of all, maybe, because my reading might alter the problem as Kripke sees it. Second, because the point here is not that there should be nothing constraining our behaviour. There is. Not in the sense of there being any fact of the matter, that the rules constitute; in fact, at the personal level I tend to think that what takes place is something more alike, as above said, to sorting out matching and non-matching cases, without what can be considered a constraining normativity.<sup>14</sup> The rule is precisely what results out of the over and over enacted decisions of the community together with the resulting divide in accepted and rejected patterns whose impression in our memories traces a path. The rule could surely become as many  $a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots, a_n$  as you wish, but, so far it cannot be said to be any of them unless we so determine, and I might even know already that

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<sup>13</sup> Wright (2002, p. 10) points out that this point about decision is stressed by Wittgenstein himself in *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), although Wittgenstein notices that this amounts to acknowledging the absence of real constraints.

<sup>14</sup> Compare Ramírez (2020, p. 8).

some possible paths aren't my rule at all. The reason why the community agrees is no casualty here, it is because it has set the terms and will decide them further. This seems to me a good enough solution to restore meaning confidence. But a solution, maybe, to a different problem.

To sum finally up, the proposal here made to deal with the paradox, distances itself both from Kripke's solution for the reasons just stated, and, also, to some extent, from Wright's. While it agrees on the importance of community decisions, the emphasis here given to reasons for exclusions and precedent cases makes much more explicit how such decisions are made, and the role thereby played by some necessary (negative) conditions. It also situates normativity in the meta-commitment with the virtual future decisions of the linguistic community to which one belongs. Together, these added contributions might bring the problem, if they should be right, a little bit further.

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## MEANING UNDER THE THREAT OF PARADOX ON TWO FRONTS

### Summary

The paper defends the argument that the Resemblance Paradox (RP), or the problem of the 'under-determination of meaning', and the Rule-Following Paradox (RFP) are two sides of the same paradox threatening meaning from opposite extremes. After presenting the case, the paradox is reconsidered anew and the supposition that the threat is a pervasive one is challenged.



OLHA HONCHARENKO\*

## OLEKSANDR KULCZYCKI'S PHILOSOPHY AND THE LVIV-WARSAW SCHOOL

Słowa kluczowe: filozofia, Aleksander Kulczycki, Kazimierz Twardowski, Szkoła  
Lwowsko-Warszawska

Keywords: philosophy, Oleksandr Kulczycki, Kazimierz Twardowski, Lviv-Warsaw  
School

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## Introduction

Oleksandr Kulczycki (1895–1980) – the Ukrainian philosopher, psychologist, teacher, public cultural and educational figure.<sup>1</sup> According to the opinion established in the Ukrainian philosophy, the main source of Oleksandr Kulczycki’s philosophical views was philosophy of Immanuel Kant in which Kulczycki allegedly found “two basic principles of philosophical reasoning: critical rationalism and an anthropological approach to all issues of philosophy” (Mytrovych, 1985, p. 7).

The study of Oleksandr Kulczycki’s scientific work by the Ukrainian philosopher Stepan Ivanyk disproved this idea. Ivanyk demonstrated Kulczycki’s affiliation to the Lviv-Warsaw School (hereinafter referred to as LWS) as a multicultural intellectual formation with its Ukrainian branch as an integral part.<sup>2</sup> The reason for this was the correspondence of Oleksandr Kulczycki’s works with Jan Wolenski’s (1985, pp. 9–10) definition of “the Lviv-Warsaw School” and the definitions of “the Lviv-Warsaw School” and “the student of Twardowski” by Stefan Zamecki (1977, pp. 34–35; Ivanyk, 2014, pp. 29–30).

Stepan Ivanyk has found out that Oleksandr Kulczycki studied philosophy under the founder of the LWS, Kazimierz Twardowski. Kulczycki’s written answers of 1913, that were found in the Twardowski’s archive at the University of Warsaw, became the proof of that (Ivanyk, 2014, p. 55). Ivanyk has also revealed that Kulczycki participated at the meetings of Polish Philosophical Society (hereinafter referred to as PPS). The evidence of this were the reports from the scientific meetings of PPS, published between 1904–1911 in the Warsaw “Philosophical Movement”, and since 1911 in the Lviv “Philosophical Movement” (Ivanyk, 2014, p. 48).<sup>3</sup> In addition, Stepan Ivanyk took into account the fact that in 1936 Oleksandr Kulczycki, at the

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<sup>1</sup> The biography and bibliography of the Ukrainian scholar can be found in: Yerzhabkova (1981), Ivanyk (2014).

<sup>2</sup> F. Brentano’s influence on Ukrainian philosophy through K. Twardowski. S. Ivanyk devoted his research: Ivanyk (2019). I. Karivets’s research on this subject is also interesting (Karivets, 2019).

<sup>3</sup> Thus, on March 28, 1939, at the twentieth meeting of PPS Philosophy Teaching Section, Kulczycki gave a report on the evaluation of the Lyceum’s Philosophical Library by the Lviv Pedagogical Library entitled “Discussion of Popular Scientific Papers on Philosophical Studies from a scientific and didactic point of view”. Stefan Swieżawski,

initiative of Ivan Kuhta, the director of the Lviv Pedagogical Library, joined the publishing of book series "Philosophical Library of the Lyceum"<sup>4</sup>. In this series the works of such Twardowski's students as Stepan Baley, Leopold Blaustein, Wladyslaw Witwicky, Stefan Szuman, were published (Ivanyk, 2014, p. 55). All these facts enabled Ivanyk to establish a double genetic relation between Kulczycki and the LWS: via the University of Warsaw and PPS. He proved the substantial relation between Kulczycki and the LWS on the basis of comparative analysis of his work "The Soul of Race as a Totem and the Term" (Warsaw, 1939) with the methodological and ideological ideas of the LWS. Geographical and temporal relation between Kulczycki and LWS also met the criteria of the LWS.

To prove the substantial relation between Kulczycki and LWS, Ivanyk chose the most representative work of the Ukrainian philosopher – "The Soul of Race as a Totem and the Term" (1939), because it:

- was written during LWS existence,
- is connected with Twardowski's pedagogical and theoretical activity,
- has scientific value (Ivanyk, 2014, pp. 65–66).

Yet, Kulczycki continued his scientific work after the end of the LWS functioning. Since 1940 he was an expatriate. There his teaching, research and public activities were closely connected with the Ukrainian Free University in Munich (hereinafter referred to as UFU). At the UFU the philosopher taught students the basics of philosophy and philosophical studies (1947), structural psychology (1949), introduction to philosophical anthropology (1973)<sup>5</sup>. At these courses the scholar clearly outlined his position concerning the issues under consideration. Thus, it is important to continue the research started by Ivanyk. This will deepen the understanding of Kulczycki's philosophy and his relation to the LWS. The purpose of this

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Leopold Blaustein and Roman Moncibowicz participated in the discussion of Oleksandr Kulczycki's report (Ivanyk, 2014, p. 55).

<sup>4</sup> In this series Kulczycki published his works: "Characterology of F. Künkl" (Pupil's character identification and formation) (1937), "Pedagogics of »free time«, home, school and society" (1937), "Pupil-liar (Education of honesty: its methods and importance)" (1937), "Egocentric types" (Characterology of F. Künkl in light of criticism) (1938).

<sup>5</sup> In Ukraine, only the manuscripts of Kulczycki's lectures on the basics of philosophy and philosophical studies have been prepared for printing. The manuscripts of the lectures on the other two philosopher's courses remain little known.

article is to analyse Kulczycki's methodological and ideological ideas of the post-war period, as well as to identify in them the traditions of the LWS on the basis of comparison with the philosophy of Twardowski in general and his students in particular.

## Philosophy of Kulczycki

### Concept analysis

A characteristic feature of Kulczycki's philosophical works is the precise and clear formulation of concepts. This is evidenced by a detailed analysis of such concepts as "philosophy", "worldview", "personality", "person", "consciousness", "I" and so on.

Kulczycki defined philosophy as worldview universal knowledge. To this definition he gave the following explanations:

- philosophy is universal knowledge due to the focus on cognition in general;
- philosophy is knowledge (not science) because of the incompleteness of its efforts implemented in philosophical works;
- philosophy is knowledge through the ability to create a worldview (Kulczycki, 1995, pp. 24–28).

Clear definition of the worldview concept (*Weltanschauung*) needs, according to Kulczycki, clear understanding of the concept of world-picture (*Weltbild*). Although we know clearly only a part of the world, yet we can have and create indeed world-picture through our general worldview as the sum of «depicted» knowledge of the world. Despite the sound of the "worldview" concept, the philosopher argued that it does not mean the visual nature of the world-picture content of objects as worldview is a selection and combination of intervals of reality essential for human (Kulczycki, 1973, p. 26). Since the worldview is aimed at universal being, which encompasses not only knowledge but also values and experiences, it also includes philosophy.

The understanding of "I" is complicated, according to Kulczycki, by the polysemy and unclearness of the concept of "I". Along with "I" as a unity and bearer of consciousness, the philosopher has also distinguished the phenomenological "I", as well as the somatological-psychological "I", character-creating "I", spiritual-ideal "I", social "I", biographical-historical

“I” and finally the real “I”. The scholar defined the phenomenological “I” as the centre of mental experience that is constantly inherent in a person along with the sphere of his/her experiences. Phenomenological “I”, in accordance with Kulczycki, is “pure I”, on which, depending on the heterogeneous mental content, all aspects of “I” arise. The transcendental basis of all these “Is” Kulczycki called real “I”: “Its hypothetical substantiality cannot be explored by psychology, but it can at least be considered metaphysically” (Kulczycki, 1949, p. 43).

### Psychologism

In Kulczycki's opinion, psychology is a science especially closely related to philosophy. He defined psychology as a science of mental phenomena. According to the scholar, psychology is important for all philosophical studies, in particular for:

- ontology as psychology is about mentality – one of the most important and the closest to human form of being;
- epistemology because cognition is a mental process, and psychology, as the science of mental processes, also explores the process of cognition;
- axiology as values occur in mental processes and experiences, and the striving for truth, goodness or holiness are manifestations of the human psyche, which is the subject matter of psychology (Kulczycki, 1995, p. 49).

Kulczycki defined psychology as the methodological basis for all humanities due to their common subject – actions and products of the human psyche: “Works of art, historical events, features of great historical figures, linguistic systems become clearer if approached with psychological knowledge” (Kulczycki, 1995, p. 49).

The closest to psychology, according to Kulczycki, is philosophical anthropology. The philosopher argued that a man differs from an animal first of all and mostly by a psycho-spiritual structure, so its manifestations, namely “I”, “consciousness”, “person”, “personality” are the basic concepts of both philosophical anthropology and anthropological psychology. If a man exists on the intersection of two realities – material and spiritual, it should be viewed from two perspectives. From the perspective of sciences, because they explain the reasons, and from the perspective of humanities, because

they already emphasize, by their name, the close connection between philosophical anthropology and anthropological psychology as “completing the basic study of human” (Kulczycki, 1973, p. 24).

## Psychology

### Introspectionism

Kulczycki believed that the subject of psychology – mental phenomena – does not exist beyond us, as subjects of sciences, but in ourselves, in our lives. Mental phenomena are not external, but internal. Their observation is not external, but internal, in the “soul”. It is available only to someone who is experiencing them, to an agent: “Mental phenomena exist only for their bearer, for someone who thinks something, feels something, or wants something” (Kulczycki, 1949, p. 8). So, this is an introspection, “looking into ourselves”: “We not only experience, but also know and cognize what we are experiencing” (Kulczycki, 1995, p. 59).

The philosopher considered introspection the main, but not the only method of psychology. In his opinion, psychology should not deny extrospection although its use in the study of psychology of behaviour or actions and products of the human spirit is based on prior familiarization with the mental life is still a method of introspection.

### Intentionalism

Kulczycki did not interpret the dependence of mental phenomena on the agent as their isolation from the outward. On the contrary, he argued that mental phenomena, being given exclusively to the agent and partly dependent on him/her, are simultaneously directed at something that lies beyond them: “Feeling of love, the image of a beloved person, the desire to approach him/her are directed at something that exists beyond the phenomena (love, dreaming, desire), namely, at the beloved one” (Kulczycki, 1949, p. 8). The philosopher called intention or intentionality the orientation of mental phenomena to something: “Mental phenomena in their intentionality transcend themselves, as if transcending the boundaries of the mental” (Kulczycki, 1949, p. 8).

In this context it is worth mentioning Kulczycki’s understanding of consciousness as experiencing mental contents belonging to “I”. According to the philosopher, what we experience is the content of the experience, the

bearer of the experience is our "I", and the function of the experience is the experience itself. Therefore, Kulczycki believed that the contents relation to "I" becomes the meaning of our "I", i.e. the content of consciousness. This idea goes back to Aristotle's affirmation that consciousness is "cognition of cognition" (Aristotle, 1981, 3.430a-431b). This means, in Kulczycki's opinion, that consciousness can be defined as the ability of "reflection": the function of consciousness reflects the cognizable, a cognizer and an act of cognition (Kulczycki, 1949, p. 25).

### The division of mental phenomena

Kulczycki divided mental phenomena into:

- images and concepts,
- judgments,
- feelings,
- acts of will.

Only the judgments, feelings, and acts of will the philosopher considered in the ambivalent form as an expression of their opposites.

Cognition, according to Kulczycki, can occur in two different forms: in the form of perception, when using our senses we portray the world in the concrete, "sensual" images; and in the form of thinking, when we perceive from the abstract content of our consciousness "complexes of common properties" of the whole groups or the so-called "classes" of the subject of cognition by means of "concepts", or affirm or deny the existence of relations between subjects of cognition in "judgments" (Kulczycki, 1995, p. 57).

In the area of mental phenomena the philosopher distinguished two different forms: feelings as our natural "involuntary attitude and inclinations" (e.g., pleasure or displeasure) and acts of will as agreement or disagreement of our "I" to their implementation.

### Logic

In thinking Kulczycki distinguished:

- the act of thinking (is the subject matter of psychology),
- the content of thinking (is the subject matter of logic),
- the subject of thinking (is the subject matter of ontology) (Kulczycki, 1995, p. 36).

According to the scholar, logic studies the structure of a thinking content, paying particular attention to the fact that “in these contents thinking is »supra-individual«, common to all who give rise to thoughts entirely regardless of time and space” (Kulczycki, 1995, p. 36). The philosopher defined the subject of logic as identifying the correct structure (construction) of the thinking content relations. Thus, logic sets the norms of thinking.

Kulczycki considered judgment as paramount in the thinking construction system. In the judgment structure he distinguished three elements – the subject, the predicate and the conjunction. The judgment represented by two elements – the subject and the conjunction (for example, “God is”) or by the predicate and the conjunction (for example, “it thunders”) the philosopher referred to undeveloped forms of common judgments. This is because they can be reduced to the latter (for example, the judgment “God is” to the judgment “God exists”) or to the imperative guess of an event or process (for example, the judgment “it thunders” – to the form of the expression guessing about the process of “thundering”) (Kulczycki, 1995, p. 38).

## Ethics

Kulczycki denied the thesis of ethical relativism that ethical values are relative, dependent on historical period and cultural environment (even on the views of certain groups of people or even individuals). The philosopher did not believe that morality obligatory for all people is impossible. In his opinion, the mental state of ethical guidance is particularly clear in the first place in the moment of universal and objective obligation to act in this way and not otherwise. In addition, it is contrary to an everyday experience: “There are probably actions that will not be approved by any group of people. What kind of people would, for instance, approve a breach of agreement or murder?” (Kulczycki, 1995, p. 132).

Kulczycki claimed that, along with variable elements in the morality of different cultures and different eras there are also common ones. He explained the heterogeneity of ethical views by the historical variability of an ethos, ethics and morality. The variability of ethical evaluation he attributed to the level of human conscience development, man’s ability to judge about ethical values and to implement the moral principles in certain circumstances.

Kulczycki distinguished:

- basic ethical values (respect, honesty, love),

- self-related values (self-faithfulness, sincerity, virtue),
- values associated with the social environment (justice, charity);,
- values associated with the world and reality (courage, heroism, endurance).

All these values, according to the philosopher, comprise self-love, love to one's neighbour, and man's unity with the world and reality (Kulczycki, 1995, p. 135).

## Aesthetics

Kulczycki defined aesthetics as philosophical axiological knowledge of aesthetic value and its implementation in art. The philosopher recognized aesthetic tasks in the study of essence of all that we call aesthetic in the analysis of aesthetic experience, artistic creativity and kinds of art.

The Ukrainian scholar considered essential such features of aesthetic values as:

- visual evidence,
- belonging not only to people but also to things,
- existence in a particular – aesthetic – reality (Kulczycki, 1995, p. 136).

## The Lviv-Warsaw School and Kulczycki's philosophy

### Concept analysis

Clearness and accuracy of a language is the characteristics of Kazimierz Twardowski's philosophical works. According to Aristotle's division of a language into poetic (colourful, extraordinary, and solemn) and usual (daily, common, and clear) (Aristotle, 1932), as well as the analytical method of Rene Descartes (1902), the LWS founder tried to purify the language of philosophy from low-quality and polysemic words. By reasoning the close interrelation between thinking and language, the philosopher denied the idea that unclear style indicates a deep philosophical content and proved that those who think clearly also should write clearly (Twardowski, 1927, p. 204).

Clearness and accuracy of a language was the prerequisite of Kulczycki's philosophism. He was convinced that the unclearness and ambiguity of concepts interfere in their understanding. This demonstrates Kulczycki's

loyalty to the method of concept analysis by Twardowski. In addition, memoirs by Kyryl Mytrovych, Kulczycki's student, can prove this.

He put his knowledge, his beliefs in the frame of historical and current achievement of the examined subject. Therefore, his speeches or writings seemed at first glance overloaded by quotes. But soon his presentation proceeded to available clearness and methodical resolving of complicated aspects, so a listener or reader felt prepared for further searches. Again, it is worth referring to the dialogues of Socrates or Skovoroda, where there is an impression that the author's opinion is lost in the complexity of other people's thoughts. But soon it turns out that we deal with a man whose beliefs are clear, who arouses interlocutors rather than dogmatically narrowing of the idea. In the end, the interlocutor feels openly obliged to express his/her opinion: cognize yourself (Socrates), hear yourself (Skovoroda) – that was the open end of reflection in a conversation with Professor Kulczycki (Mytrovych, 1985, p. 11).

### Psychologism

In philosophy Twardowski represented the psychological trend (Twardowski, 1927d). He treated psychology as the study of mental life, in which direct knowledge is taken through introspection – an internal experience, and indirect one – its manifestations: psychophysical actions and products (Twardowski, 1965). Therefore, the philosopher believed that only psychology can provide reliable knowledge of mental life. Hence, psychology should be the basis for philosophy and humanities. Twardowski attributed some philosophical studies to one group on the basis of their common characteristics – the object existence only in internal experience or both in internal and external experience (Twardowski, 1927d, p. 27). The philosopher defined humanities as studies “whose subjects are mental products that are being considered regardless of mental actions, or also mental products that are manifestations of mental products” (Twardowski, 2013a, p. 178).

Kulczycki's definition of psychology as the basis of philosophy and humanities brings his research position close to Twardowski's philosophical tradition. This is justified by Kulczycki's focusing on specificity of the psychology subject. It is noticeable that Kulczycki emphasized the value of methodological psychologism for philosophy and humanities. As we know, Twardowski also emphasized the possibilities of methodological

psychologism for these studies<sup>6</sup>. Definition of psychology as the basis of philosophical anthropology can be considered a contribution of the Ukrainian philosopher in the development of psychology.

## Psychology

### Introspectionism

Twardowski assumed that mental activity is a function of the brain since changes in the brain cause changes in the activity of a psyche. Nevertheless, the philosopher could not call mental activity a function of the brain as he did not have sufficient evidence that mental activity is solely the result of brain activity. In this regard, he cited the facts that proved the fundamental difference between mental and physical life:

- physiological phenomena have length in space, mental ones – do not;
- physiological phenomena are available to external experience, mental ones – exclusively to internal one (Twardowski, 1927d, pp. 6–9).

Kulczycki's definition of mental phenomena as internal because they do not manifest themselves from the outside, such as the growth or movement of animals, is evidence of their differentiation from physical phenomena. Hopes, dreams, desires etc. are available, according to philosopher, only to those who are experiencing it. Because of this, he called mental phenomena subjective.

The following quotations confirm the similarity of philosophers' opinions regarding the difference between mental and physical life:

Twardowski:

Anyone who wants to impartially consider the real state of affairs must regardless of their metaphysical beliefs recognize that, firstly, physiological phenomena have length in space, mental ones – do not have and, secondly, physiological phenomena are available to sensual experience, which is not true about mental ones.

(Twardowski, 1927d, p. 7).

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<sup>6</sup> See, for example: Woleński (1985, p. 40).

Kulczycki:

The internal perception of mental phenomena as a contrast to the external perception of other manifestations of life means that mental phenomena unlike the “superficial”, namely the physical, chemical, organic, etc., that are spatial in nature, because they fill a certain space and appear in a certain place, have no such outlined relation to space. [...] Such a peculiar relation to space, inability to adapt spatial patterns to mental phenomena most clearly affects another feature of mental life – a way of coexistence of mental phenomena in the unity of one continuous experience.

(Kulczycki, 1995, p. 50).

The French philosopher August Comte believed that internal experience, introspection is not possible because no one can observe their own cognitive activity. A thinking person cannot be divided into two beings, one of whom would think and the other would observe thinking. Therefore, for Comte, introspection as a method of psychology is absolute fantasy. Consequently, psychology, in his opinion, should be attributed to physiology (Comte, 2000, pp. 35–37).

Twardowski, however, was convinced that the perception of one’s mental states is possible for human. Otherwise, it would be unclear how he/she knows about his/her own mental activity. Thus, he did not consider internal experience as a fantasy of psychologists, but the only way to obtain direct knowledge of mental phenomena (Twardowski, 1927d, p. 13). So, psychology, in his opinion, cannot be attributed to physiology.

The impossibility of internal cognitive practice was denied, in particular, by Stepan Baley, the Ukrainian student of Kazimierz Twardowski.

Kulczycki also tried to dispel Comte’s doubts about the possibility of cognition of mental phenomena through internal experience, introspection. The philosopher believed that it is possible to cognize one’s own mental life due to introspection. In this case, we can get not the “astronomical” knowledge about our brain, but the knowledge of our “I”.

The following quotations demonstrate the similarity of Kulczycki and the LWS considerations regarding introspection:

Baley:

After all, it is no wonder that our loved ones know and judge us sometimes better and more successful than we do. Because, when they are

watching us, we are completely in front of them. We, when examining and judging ourselves, must be divided into two parts. There must be an observer and an observed, a judge and a defendant inside us. This self-division, while being a kind of doubling, is an art that requires effort and skill. Psychologists must master the art of looking into oneself, or introspection, as they call it, at the highest level, should train hard in it.

(Baley, 1947, p. 10).

Kulczycki:

Some philosophers (for example, August Comte) deny the value of introspection and, therefore, even the scientific nature of philosophy. [...] Opponents of introspection rely on the fact that it is impossible to internally perceive, examine any mental phenomenon, without changing it. Try to explore introspectively, for instance, anger, and you will see that since you direct your introspection, you will stop being angry. Try to think of something, and unambiguously analyse the thinking process, and answer questions about how we think. In such a situation, there seems to be a split of one's person: one who thinks and one who examines one's own thinking. The ability of introspection within the meaning of simultaneous experience and knowledge of what is experienced is doubtful. The reproaches of the opponents of introspection can be answered that introspection must be understood not as a purely simultaneous cognition of what is being experienced, but as its direct "reproduction" ("direct introspection").

(Kulczycki, 1995, p. 59).

The drawback of introspection – restriction of internal observation only to one's own psyche – in no way meant to Twardowski that its value is not the same in all areas of psychology. Even in the external exploring of mental life, such as animals, children, criminals, the psychologist constantly refers to the internal experience (Twardowski, 1927d, p. 21).

Kulczycki also admitted psychology is in need of external experience although internal experience, in his opinion, should still precede it. This proves his solidarity with Twardowski regarding introspection.

### Intentionalism

Following Brentano (1874, pp. 115–116), Twardowski believed that any mental phenomenon was related to some immanent object (Twardowski,

1965, p. 3). It means that there are no phenomena of consciousness that do not belong to certain objects outside of consciousness and which do not correspond to any content within the consciousness. The Polish philosopher called the common feature of all these mental states when we imagine something an act of imaging. What distinguishes these acts in such a way that one of them is called the representation of something and the other is the representation of something else, is the content of representation; and what we mean when we imagine something is the object of representation.

Kulczycki's conviction about the focus of mental phenomena on something that lies beyond the psychic reveals his familiarity with Twardowski's theory of intentionality. This view is reinforced by the fact that the Ukrainian philosopher distinguished in the function of consciousness the act of cognition, along with the content of cognition and the object of cognition.

### The division of mental phenomena

Twardowski divided mental phenomena into:

- representations (images and concepts),
- judgments,
- feelings,
- manifestations of will.

The Polish philosopher defined representations as the necessary condition and basis not only for judgments, but also feelings and manifestations of will. He also explained the originality of representations by the fact that judgments, feelings, and manifestations of will express themselves in a dual form, revealing a clear opposite, while images and concepts “supply material for the mind, providing its content” (Twardowski, 1927e, p. 41).

Kulczycki's consideration of cognition in the forms of perception (images) and thinking (concepts and judgments), as well as the division of mental phenomena by him into feelings and acts of will, demonstrates his simulation of classification of mental phenomena by Twardowski. Moreover, the Ukrainian philosopher recognized the originality of images and concepts in comparison with judgments, feelings, and acts of will.

## Logic

Logic, according to Twardowski, provides thinking rules, empowering them and is binding on all people. The rules of logic cannot be evaded unless one wishes to mistake (Twardowski, 1927a, pp. 348–349).

Twardowski defined judgment as the axis around which all logical researches revolve (Twardowski 2013c, pp. 31–32). The philosopher called each mental act, which contains the truth or falseness, judgment (Twardowski, 2013c, p. 38). He interpreted the truth as true judgment.

Kazimierz Twardowski contrasted the theory of conformity, which reduces the truth interpretation to the definition of judgment as a synthetic form “*S is P*” or “*S is not P*” that is, the allogenetic theory of judgment (Aristotle, Bertrand Russell) with idiogenetic theory of judgments (Rene Descartes, Franz Brentano) which reduces the truth interpretation to the definition of judgment as a form of “*S is*” or “*S is not*” (Twardowski, 1927b, p. 418).

According to the Ukrainian researcher of the LWS, Borys Dombrowski, the idiogenetic theory of judgment “*A is*” stands for “the existence of the idea of object (ontology), true valuation (logic), belief in the truth and existence of *A* (psychology), intentional attitude to the object which is its assertion or denial (axiology), definition of the *A* object through judgment (semiotics)” (Ivanyk, 2018, p. 14).

By distinguishing content and object in thinking an act, and by defining them as a subject matter of psychology, logic and ontology, Kulczycki, similar to the LWS, emphasized that thinking is the axis around which the researches of particular philosophical studies revolve. By highlighting judgment as central in the system of thinking, the Ukrainian philosopher has clarified this axis. It is the very judgment. By paying attention to the ability of logic to exalt people over opposites and to unite them around the absolute value – the irrespective truth – Kulczycki affirmed, like most of Twardowski’s students, the value of logical culture for man and society. The following quotes convince us of this:

Ajdukiewicz:

A student who does not think logically can know a lot, but will not be able to operate properly, his knowledge will lie like dead capital, from which he will not benefit.

(Ajdukiewicz, 1985b, p. 196)

By spreading logical culture, we prepare the ground for a scientific worldview, and through it we pave the way for progress.

(Ajdukiewicz, 1985a, p. 142)

Kulczycki:

There is no scientific thinking without thinking laws, as there is no true understanding of humanities, legal, economic and social sciences without philosophical preparation.

(Kulczycki, 1995, p. 23)

## Ethics

Twardowski disproved the arguments of the evolutionary ethics supporters that: there is absolutely no agreement on ethical principles and rules, so every nation has a different perspective on a particular issue; there are no universally recognized axioms in ethics that can serve as a basis for derivation the general principles of behaviour. In Twardowski's opinion, the absence of a general consensus on moral truths cannot at all prove that such truths do not exist; even theoretical axioms are not unconditionally recognized, but only when certain obstacles that make that recognition impossible are eliminated (Twardowski, 1927a, pp. 354–355). The philosopher believed that it is not moral truths that develop, but the person in the aspect of conscience. Man is not born with an established ethical system, but has by nature the initial germs of conscience, the development of which he/she promotes by cognition of moral truths. Moral truth is always the same (Twardowski, 1927a, p. 356). Therefore, human conscience should be developed.

Twardowski divided ethics into social and individual. Social ethics recognizes only behaviour on the human coexistence background, individual ethics – only completely isolated individual behaviour. The philosopher coordinated these two ethics as follows: social ethics also recognizes the responsibilities of a person towards himself/herself and individual ethics – towards others. The difference between the two ethics that he saw was that one for one and the other for other responsibilities are basic and others are derivative (Twardowski, 2013b, pp. 407–413).

Obviously, following Twardowski, Kulczycki accepted the thesis of relativity and subjectivity of morality, without excluding the possibility of

its generality. Therefore, he also believed that not moral truths go through different stages of development, but only humanity goes through different stages of conscience development. Kulczycki's division of moral values into individual, social and world-related can be regarded as the continuation of ethics division by Twardowski.

### Aesthetics

Based on the psychological grounds of philosophy, Twardowski believed that in aesthetics there should be a move from a discussion about the nature of beauty to a detailed description and grouping of those mental actions that determine the so-called aesthetic preferences (Twardowski, 1927d, p. 24). This move was accepted and developed by Kulczycki. He associated the purpose of aesthetic with the analysis of aesthetic experiences, artistic creativity and the types of art. By defining the aesthetic values in existence in the particular reality, the Ukrainian philosopher noted that the essence of art is not the imitation of reality, but it is creating a particular reality that would reproduce real reality by its own laws. Such an idea of art was followed by one of Brentano's immediate students, the German philosopher Theodor Lipps. He expressed his belief about absolute isolation of the world of art as "a completely isolated ideal world" (Lipps, 1920, p. 38).

### Conclusions

The comparative analysis of Kulczycki's methodological and ideological works of the post-war period with the philosophy of Twardowski and his students deepens the understanding of Kulczycki's philosophy and its relation to the LWS. It turns out that through his courses at university, Kulczycki transmitted to the Ukrainian students the methodological and philosophical ideas of the LWS, namely: analytical method, psychologism, introspectionism, intentionalism, epistemological and ethical absolutism. In this way, the Ukrainian philosopher promoted the LWS tradition in the Ukrainian culture of diaspora.

There is no doubt that the main source of Kulczycki's philosophy was philosophy of Twardowski. Because it was the LWS founder who defined the aim of philosophy as a search for truth and its scientific justification on

the basis of Kant's criticism, while at the same time advocating the truth that subjectivity sees no obstacles to objectivity.

The further study of Kulczycki's philosophy also seems promising. For instance, the philosopher associated the idea of university with making scientific values on the basis of autonomy, academic freedom and communication. He believed that university should have nothing to do with politics. On the contrary, the scientific values which it produces must influence the political situation in the society (Kulczycki, 1970). Such Kulczycki's thoughts are very close to Twardowski's idea of university dignity (Twardowski, 1933). Kulczycki also criticized the Marxist-Leninist concept of man for its considering a man as the manifestation of brain material, highly organized, as the theory of reflection of atheism, as a slave of dialectical necessity and the practices of the proletariat dictatorship and the class struggle, which is the driving force of history development (Kulczycki, 1985). This is also interesting, since the LWS had also a negative attitude towards Marxism mainly because of its dogmatism<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> See, for example: Brożek (2010), p. 175.

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## OLEKSANDR KULCZYCKI'S PHILOSOPHY AND THE LVIV-WARSAW SCHOOL

### Summary

The Lviv-Warsaw School should be treated, due to the research made by Stepan Ivanyk, the Ukrainian philosopher, as a multicultural intellectual formation with its Ukrainian branch as an integral part. In particular, Stepan Ivanyk has proven that Oleksandr Kulczycki, the Ukrainian philosopher was Kazimierz Twardowski's student. To prove the substantial relation between Kulczycki and the Lviv-Warsaw School, Ivanyk has chosen "The Soul of Race as a Totem and the Term" by Kulczycki as the basis because it met the time, genetic, and theoretical criteria.

However, Kulczycki continued his scientific work after the end of the Lviv-Warsaw School functioning (according to Jan Wolenski). Since 1940, his teaching, research and public activities were closely connected with the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. Therefore, it is important to continue the research started by Ivanyk, as it will deepen the understanding of Kulczycki's philosophy and his relation to the Lviv-Warsaw School.



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## HEIDEGGER AND ΔΟΞΑ: AN AMBIGUOUS AFFAIR

Keywords: δόξα, Heidegger, Being, appearance, truth, Aristotle  
Słowa kluczowe: δόξα, Heidegger, bycie, fenomen, prawda, Arystoteles

### Introduction

We can start our investigation of δόξα with Aristotle's clarifications. Aristotle declares in *Nicomachean ethics*, book Z, that δόξα is always present (Aristotle, 2009). In other words, δόξα as an opinion is not something we search, but something we always have. It is daily expressed in our assertions about the world. Although we can change our opinions, we cannot change our perspectives as such. A man without δόξα is not a man at all. On the other hand, an animal has no δόξα because it has no λόγος, faculty of speech, nor a conviction, which is present in an opinion (Aristotle, 1907). Therefore, Heidegger concludes that an animal has no world, only environment, *Umwelt* (Heidegger, 1995). The animal is “poor”, it has no ability of

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world-forming. It most certainly has an αἴσθησις, perception apparatus, which is a condition for forming a view, opinion of something, but it is unable to distinguish beings as such. Because a man has none of the shortcomings animals do, it can distinguish between different beings. That means that δόξα is oriented toward truth or falsity. It can “miss” and “hit” the target. Given the nature of contingent facts, then the same opinion or judgment can be true and false, but regarding things that cannot be otherwise δόξα is not at one time true and at another time false, but rather the same opinion is always true or false (Aristotle, 1933). For example, the statement “The table is black” can be at one time true, and at another time false, because we can repaint the table in some other colour. But if we say “Water is H<sub>2</sub>O”, then the same statement cannot be at one time true, and at another time false. Therefore, contingent truths and scientific ones have a point of departure from δόξα. We will show this ambiguity further on when we will discuss the nature of the premises according to different beings.

But what this also shows us is that all predication *as* something is based upon our intellect (διάνοια), upon different operations in our intellect regarding separation and synthesis. Aristotle declares: “Falsehood, in fact, never arises except when notions are combined. For, even, if white to be asserted to be not-white, not-white is brought into a combination” (Aristotle, 1907, p. 137). Thus every apophantic statement is oriented toward falsity or truth, under the condition that is a combination. The statement “Table is black” is then a combination of the subject and its attributes. In asserting something as something, I give a judgment, an opinion, that this table is black, even though it can be green. But what is a condition for making combinations? Aristotle’s answer is νοῦς ποιητικός, active, unmixed mind or reason, which produces a unity for our intellect, passive mind, νοῦς παθητικός, in order for the latter to think, to judge, to make opinions, etc. In short, to make combinations. Or to put it differently; the function of an active mind is to show unity, ἔν. It is an underlying presence, which enables us or our intellect to make combinations (Sheehan, 1983). Νοῦς is like a light; it enables everything to show itself.

From Aristotle’s previous quotation, we can conclude that if I am to make a false judgment, then it is required for me beforehand to know something that is in my judgment confused with something else. If we can describe this phenomenon in Heidegger’s terms, we could say that the domain of making-present is always broader than what is present at hand. For example,

some person confronts us. We take him as John, our dear friend. We grasp him based on our way of representing him. Thus, in experiencing what confronts me as John, I do not simply take in what I perceive, but I take him based on my representation of him, based on my prior, definitive opinion of him. Heidegger concludes: “Human beings move in the direction of what immediately confronts them, but at the same time they move within the grasping of the content domain, that is, what they have experienced earlier. All cognition has this remarkable double character. Δόξα is both” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 199). Δόξα is the first principle of how life understands, moves itself. Hence, δόξα is not an illusion of some sort because it encompasses the whole world. It is not a subjective fantasy but also not something absolute and valid for all. On the other hand, δόξα is so close to us that mainly we do not reflect on it, and by that, we do not reflect our perspectives towards the world. However, we do not need to reflect everything anew we see, know, perceive, etc. That is impossible. Δόξα, in this sense, is receptive not only to prejudice but also to a certain authority.

If δόξα is by its nature ambiguous, meaning that it encompasses the whole world, then for true convictions, we have to state our reasons for it. This is necessary for contingent truths and also for scientific truths. Given the state of contingent truths in the domain of practical reasoning, we have to elucidate δόξα, make it transparent. That is a task for the so-called art of persuading, rhetoric, even though the rhetoric is not a τέχνη in the fullest sense of the word. Rhetoric belongs to practical understanding, prudence or φρόνησις, and by that extension to politics, to a world of appearances. Heidegger tells us that word δόξα means not only an opinion but also glory, brilliance, splendour (Heidegger, 2000). This latter notion of δόξα is motivated by Heidegger’s presocratic return to the sense of truth as showing, ἀποφαίνεσθαι. Having said that, this article is structured in two parts. One will analyse key aspects of Heidegger’s reflections on δόξα through his phenomenological readings of Aristotle within the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time*. The second part will address δόξα through Heidegger’s 1935 lecture *Introduction to Metaphysics*.

## Heidegger's investigation of δόξα within fundamental ontology

Heidegger was not satisfied with the phenomenological approach in the form of privileged noetic ego, Husserl's transcendental ego constituted beyond the worldliness of the world. The method of going back to the "things themselves" must be in accordance with life's own motives. We must see the ground out of which concepts have arisen, how the "things themselves" meant by these concepts are viewed, in what context they are addressed, etc. Thus, the method of phenomenological looking at the "things themselves" is not a matter of rigorous science. Phenomenology is not a science, as Husserl hoped for it to be, but rather a leap in life itself. Heidegger states: "This primacy of the theoretical must be broken, but not in order to proclaim the primacy of the practical. . . , but because the theoretical itself and as such refers back to something pre-theoretical" (Heidegger, 2008, p. 47). The practical does not need help from theoretical to orient itself. On the contrary, it has its own "sight", the intentionality of dealing with things. Therefore, basic experience is primarily not theoretical but lies instead in the commerce of life with its world (Heidegger, 2009). We cannot objectify life to come to the Archimedean point of view. Instead, Heidegger insists, life is a *how*, a category of Being, and not something wild or mystical.

For the Greeks, basic determination of human beings was λόγος. Term λόγος can mean many things, has many meanings, but the most decisive one is speech. Λόγος is not only a basic determination of human beings but a fundamental one. Speaking is like living. Hence, speech is not only a medium, an instrument for communication, but it determines human beings in their essence. The Greeks did not know the word for language, but only for speech. The Greeks took language as discourse. And only because there is a discourse, there is language. It is no coincidence that the Greeks were known to be "blabbers". Hence, origins of concepts are hidden in the pre-theoretical sphere of facticity, which means that rhetoric is the first part of an attempt to grasp the forms of conceptuality developed in scientific logic.

A concept has two sides. One side has a nominal character; it gives in its generality something that everyone can understand it. The nominal definition of the concept gives the existence of the thing, while the real definition gives us the essence of the thing. Hence, if the nominal side of a concept is given, then it means that everyone already understands it without the need to question it further, to investigate it. This state of affairs is a result of the

fact that life has already been interpreted by itself. I grow into a language, I grow into common intelligibility, which has a peculiar character of averageness. When I utter a word, then it belongs to everyone; words are often consumed without an explicit relationship to the matters spoken about. This common intelligibility is not something that we can put aside; it is a positive phenomenon because the Greeks conceived the truth as something negative in the sense that must be wrested from concealment. As Heidegger puts it in his Marburg lectures *Plato's Sophist*: “Ἀλήθεια means: to be hidden no longer, to be uncovered. This privative expression indicates that the Greeks had some understanding of the fact that the uncoveredness of the world must be wrested...” (Heidegger, 1997, p. 11). Therefore, truth is not some “value”, truth is not a state of objective affairs as some universal validity. Something can be universally binding and still not be true. But how is then the truth given?

When we are talking about Being, we are talking about the truth of Being. And disclosure concerning ἀλήθεια is itself a mode of Being and the beings, we call a human being (*Dasein*, being-there). If according to Heidegger, human life is nothing else than a *how*, category of Being, then we must view man's connection toward the truth of Being in accordance with different modes in which truth is given. The truth is disclosed within these different modes. This refers back to Heidegger's investigation of “dianoetic virtues” in *Nicomachean ethics*. There are five in number: art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and intuitive reason (Aristotle, 2009). These modes are ways in which the soul is most of all true. Being of beings is unconcealed in a true primordial safekeeping of them (Heidegger, 2002). They constitute “virtues”. Within these modes, we are given a terminological, explicit meaning of Being of beings. Hence, these modes are ἀληθεύειν, modes of disclosing the truth of beings in their Being. But is a δόξα mode of disclosing the truth? The short answer is yes, it is, but not completely. We can have opinions which are true, but also which are false. That is why Aristotle does not place δόξα among these modes. But Heidegger states that in chapter 5, book Z of *Nicomachean ethics*, in the delimitation against scientific knowledge, φρόνησις or practical wisdom emerges as δόξα (Heidegger, 1997). Is then practical wisdom some kind of δόξα?

If practical wisdom is orientated towards a human being who can perceive and most importantly, act in accordance with his best self-interest,

then strangely enough φρόνησις indeed looks like δόξα because in my immediate disclosure of the world I have a strong sense of belief in my opinions and strong opinion of myself. All our daily affairs are built around certainties that are unshakeable and understandable (Bonic, 2005). But if all men have opinions, then all men are not prudent. Why is that? Because the possibility of actualizing φρόνησις rests upon πράξις. Even if I have the best opinion on a situation that needs resolving, it is not guaranteed that I will practically resolve the situation in the best possible way. Actions determine who I am. However, it may be so that I am determined to act in such and such a way. In other words, I have such and such an opinion to act in such and such a way. Nevertheless, what follows the decision on how to act is deliberative thinking. Thinking is searching, but δόξα is not searched. And in contrast to a decision, I can have the best possible opinion on a given situation, but the decision, and therefore the choice is oriented towards what is good or bad, not towards what is true and false (Aristotle, 2009). Furthermore, I can have opinions about impossible things, but choice or decision is always what is in my power to do. Hence, φρόνησις is not a δόξα; it only looks like one. In any case, it is important to know that for Heidegger the phenomenon of φρόνησις plays a key role in his fundamental ontology. How? It derives from the fact that for Aristotle, virtues were indeed conceptually distinguished, but not separated from one another because Aristotle had a definite view of *unity* and movement of factual life. Contemplative life was for Greeks indeed highest *how* of life, but a possibility that was not separated from modes of art and practical wisdom. As Gadamer states: “Practical reasonableness, though, is the precondition for engaging theory and in developing theoretical reasonableness. At the same time, practical reasonableness is also something highest” (Gadamer, 1986, p. 176). Because we are mortals, and not gods, wise men should not neglect to act in practical ways and *vice versa*. Or for example unity of τέχνη and φρόνησις; τέχνη or art is not only directed to the production of artefacts (ποίησις) but is in a broader sense knowledge. I do not need to know how to build a table or chair, but I know how to use one. In everyday existence, I know how to manipulate things in their usefulness. In *Being and Time*, this state of affairs is described as *Umsicht* or precisely as prudence because what is at first given in my immediate disclosure of the world, namely things, there are at the same time other people present. They as much, like myself, are “busy” with daily caring about projects, and so forth. Through my involvement with

daily things, others are also present, from which I am not separated. We all share the same hopes and fears. But how is this concretely viewed? Τέχνη is a mode, which has a manipulative behaviour regarding things – art is in a specific manner cleverness, ingenuity. And in my daily facticity, there is a tendency to view and deal with others in the same way, I do with things, namely manipulative. Or to put it differently; it is based on routine. On the other hand, in practical wisdom, I cannot manipulate with my Being, and by that with others. The question is not if the goal is achieved but rather how it is achieved. Means are important as much as the goals are. Therefore, we can see why was this very problematic for Heidegger, and his notion of authentic φρόνησις. The “solution” of this problem had a consequence of how Heidegger viewed the importance of δόξα. How does Heidegger resolve this Aristotle’s unity of virtues? We will address this later on.

The intelligibility in which human being or *Dasein* moves, the One, is grounded in δόξα, in the average meanings of things and of oneself. From there, δόξα has a peculiar feature of authority or stubbornness, and stability in guidance of being-with-one-another in the world. Because I am not alone in this world, because I, for the most part, do not distinguish from others, δόξα has a specific character of elusiveness. But if δόξα is also that which can be otherwise, then it is a possibility, δύναμις. Therefore, in matters which can be negotiated the peculiar authority of δόξα can be questioned, brought into disclosure. This is the task of rhetoric.

Heidegger began an analysis of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in the summer semester of 1924. The title of this lecture is *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*. Heidegger’s analysis of rhetoric is not a random one. On the contrary, it is a part of the elucidation of life’s basic movement. We have established that the human being is a being endowed with the faculty of speech. And the concrete human being with others, that is in average existence is totally dominated by language and its meanings. The elucidation of rhetoric is important, because we in daily existence do not rely upon absolute truths but on probable opinions. And he who is capable to uncover the truth is also capable to uncover the truth in probable opinions (Aristotle, 1909). Therefore, the elucidation of δόξα in rhetoric indeed presents some kind of search because we are after the truth already implicit in the opinions or probabilities. This is the reason rhetoric is not sophistry, because what seems probable may not be probable. In other words, for a sophist, everything is possible and probable, so it is important to separate cleverness from practical

wisdom. For a rhetorician, the task is to know how to separate the real from apparent syllogism. And because of its manipulative character, rhetoric is not a τέχνη, but rather is connected to φρόνησις. In an attempt to persuade people, a prudent person is more likely to be able to convince listeners than a non-prudent person. Furthermore, a prudent person would know not only how to talk to others or with others but also how to listen. He would know how to listen to what is good, bad, or dangerous for his Being. Therefore, not only speaking in the right way is important but also being able to listen (Kisiel, 1993). This is how Heidegger started his reinterpretation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Heidegger declares: "The human being is not only a speaker and a hearer, but is for itself such a being that hears itself" (Heidegger, 2009, p. 72). What Heidegger describes here is nothing else than a description of Socratic two-in-one, which was from Plato on conceptualized as thinking. Men do not exist in the plural as do all earthly beings but have an indication of this plurality within themselves. The ability to have a dialogue between me and myself is nothing other than the ability to think. If I can rephrase this in Wittgenstein's manner, we could say that not without language, we could not communicate with one another, but rather without language on others, we cannot communicate and influence in a such-and-such way (Wittgenstein, 2009). While I am alive, I cannot escape this condition. The other in me is a basic condition of living.

But every listening is not hearing; to hear means to take something, to follow up, reflect something. It means I will not pay attention to all of the talking, I will not be immersed in "babble". In other words, I will discard every talking about everything and everybody. Of course, there is also a counter possibility that I become even more absorbed into the basic danger of language, its banality. My view does not change; it becomes even more hardened. But whether I follow up on my friend's advice, or not *decision* rests solely upon myself. I can, or I cannot disclose the truth of my δόξα. What is in the community shared, heard, talked about, etc. I will take up without any reflection. And in this manner, Heidegger says that rhetoric is not a school discipline, not a τέχνη, because it has no subject area, but rather a hermeneutic interpretation of concrete *Dasein*. Because rhetoric is δύναμις, it is a possibility of seeing, what is given at the moment, it is a faculty. It is a possibility for the elucidation of δόξα in speaking with others and thus speaking with myself. In short, it is the elucidation of λόγος itself.

On the other hand, the ambiguity of δόξα shows itself concerning scientific knowledge; having a view presupposes certain disinterestedness with regard to that which the view is about. If I possess knowledge of something, in the sense that I have true information about it, I can say something about it even if I do not have it before my eyes. Δόξα is akin to scientific knowledge because it is a yes-saying, affirmation of something. But in relation to ἐπίστίμη, a view is still not a knowing, because it only has an orientation to the being. This notion of the Greek conception of science Heidegger presents in connection to Aristotle's *Topics*, however what is important for the purpose of this paper is a practical orientation of δόξα.

We have already pointed out the importance of φρόνησις in Heidegger's thought. And now we have to analyse this phenomenon in its relation to δόξα. To some degree, it was shown that within φρόνησις relation of a decision to δόξα exists some kind of hierarchy. Which kind? To be able to answer this question, we have to turn our attention to another Heidegger's lecture: *Plato's Sophist* from the winter semester 1924/25. In other words, we have to go back to Aristotle's investigation of virtues and find Heidegger's solution for Aristotle's unity of life. Lecture encompasses Plato's late dialogue named *Sophist*, but the main goal for Heidegger is to approach Plato with the help of Aristotle. What was implicitly said about in Plato (truth, Being) must be explicitly rendered with Aristotle, because Aristotle represented a synthesis of all the Greek thought. We will only focus on φρόνησις.

When we said that for Aristotle virtues are conceptually distinguished, but not separated from one another, we meant that in the form of a higher mode of living, namely contemplation, other modes are not discarded, on the contrary, they become explicit in their completion. I do not become more or less practical when I am engaged in a life of wisdom. Σοφία is the highest mode of life, is most free and truth orientated, because its activity is the excellence, virtue, itself. The same can be said for φρόνησις, but the realization of prudence is still dependant on πρᾶξις. Both φρόνησις and σοφία are most authentic modes because κίνησις in both cases is most authentic, self-sufficient. However, that is not the case with τέχνη, because with art there is no authentic movement; it is impossible to say that at the same time I am building the house and have built it (Aristotle, 1933). The unity of τέχνη and φρόνησις is the ontological "basis" of our orientation in the world. It carries with it our implicit knowledge of the world. Heidegger describes this unity in *Being and Time* as *a priori perfect* (Heidegger, 1996). It denotes the

difference between self-sufficient movement and non-self-sufficient movement, but in a way that this self-sufficient movement is still associated with the ontic side of facticity. In other words, it is still burdened with average, ontic, everyday facticity associated with τέχνη.

Heidegger concluded in his analysis of Aristotle that life itself holds a ἀρχή, cause, to “see more” (μάλιστα εἰδέναι). And for Heidegger it is φρόνησις, not σοφία, the highest faculty to “see more”. But why is φρόνησις so important for Heidegger? Because φρόνησις is not just ordinarily understood as ἔξις, a composure of the soul. If I can lose ἔξις of a τέχνη, for example, the ability of table making, I cannot lose ἔξις of φρόνησις, but I can only distort it. Practical prudence is more than a ἔξις. This is a correct view of looking at the matter because Aristotle himself gave a strong hint. Practical wisdom is not only a part of the soul’s reasoned state, but “this is shown by the fact that a state of that sort may be forgotten, but practical wisdom cannot” (Aristotle, 2009, p. 107). If practical wisdom is more than a ἔξις, then what is it? Heidegger gives an answer; it is *conscience*. “Φρόνησις is nothing other than conscience set into motion, making an action transparent. Conscience cannot be forgotten” (Heidegger, 1997, p. 117). What I learned through art and scientific knowledge I can unlearn, forget, whereas φρόνησις is in each case new. Even more; practical wisdom issues a command, same as conscience. Therefore, the faculty to “see more” is in connection to φρόνησις; the goal of φρόνησις is to make my Being transparent, authentic. In short, the unity of φρόνησις and τέχνη must be sublimated or in case of Heidegger even broken to achieve the transparency of understanding my Being, under which also falls authentic disclosure or understanding of Being itself. This gives us an orientation towards δόξα.

If the unity of τέχνη and φρόνησις must be breached, then what about the unity of φρόνησις and σοφία? This is also insufficient. Why? Because Greek ontology drew its roots from the sphere of τέχνη. Οὐσία still retained its relevance in the sphere of everyday objects of use (Heidegger, 2009). And in return, Heidegger thought that σοφία was also “contaminated” with this notion. Heidegger tells us: “As we have seen, Aristotle strives, precisely with his idea of σοφία, to go beyond λόγος to a νοεῖν that is free of λέγειν. But closer inspection shows that even his determination of the ultimate ἀρχή, the ἀδιαίρετον, is acquired only within an orientation toward λόγος” (Heidegger, 1997, p. 155). In other words, Heidegger tells us in this quotation that Aristotle’s σοφία is problematic because it is still bonded to

λόγος, to λέγειν as addressing something *as* something. This is a powerful hint that Heidegger gives us. Hence, the unity of σοφία and φρόνησις is not acceptable as an authentic mode of revealing the Being of beings. The task for Heidegger is now to elucidate φρόνησις alone in connection to νοῦς or νοεῖν, meaning to “see” or to grasp the ultimate causes of Being of beings. Λόγος becomes problematic because all three modes of truth are connected to it. Practical wisdom, scientific wisdom, and art are all connected to λόγος. Precisely speaking, they are forms of syllogism. Therefore, λόγος as speech, as the possibility of addressing something *as* something, is not a privileged place of truth.

Φρόνησις must be freed then from λόγος in its path to “see more”. This seeing, εἰδέναι, must be an authentic one. Practical wisdom must be liberated from λόγος to achieve pure perceiving. Both σοφία and φρόνησις have this in common, namely the ability of pure grasping what is disclosed. They are both possibilities of νοῦς; φρόνησις discloses what is in each situation most extreme concretion, and σοφία discloses the most extreme general universality (Heidegger, 1997). Therefore, for Heidegger φρόνησις is a mode of transparency of our Being in which perceiving, not speaking or deliberating with others, holds a privileged position. Regarding φρόνησις, we must make a situation transparent from the start to the end. The moment, *Augenblick*, upon I make a decision, or choice of action is only and always mine. Immediately grasping the look of the situation is καιρός, moment, in which there cannot be any falsity; this is a reflection of the pre-predicative work of active νοῦς. This is so-called hermeneutical “as” structure, which is different from apophantic speech (Sheehan, 1983).

When all deliberating stops, then it is time to act. But strangely enough, for Heidegger, the action does not have any advantage, plays no role, certainly not in the sense that Aristotle had in mind for the political sphere, but only perceiving. Why does not action have any validity in Heidegger’s φρόνησις? Because in acting, politically speaking, I am never alone, I move within public space with others, and their δόξαι, their opinions. Hence Aristotle’s φρόνησις is different than of Heidegger’s reinterpretation. Heidegger’s one is an ontological one, but this is not what Aristotle had in mind when talking about practical wisdom; it was meant to be a mode where others are present, where there is the elucidation of δόξα (Taminiaux, 1997). In short, where rhetoric is present as a mode of understanding my Being. Rhetoric is indeed part of practical prudence. But all of that is absent from Heidegger’s

reinterpretation (Zickmund, 2007). Prudence, an authentic one, is in *Being and Time* described as a call of conscience (Heidegger, 1996). To put it differently; conscience call is no Socratic two-in-one. In doing so, Heidegger excludes others from the authentic mode of existence, and from any participation in sharing a world in deeds and words (Smith, 2003). It is not, then surprising that δόξα in *Being and Time* is reinterpreted one-sided; it is a part of average, everyday facticity and the public world.

### Δόξα as Being

The starting point for this part of the paper is Heidegger's 1935 lecture *Introduction to Metaphysics*. To understand δόξα as a Being or becoming into unconcealment, it is necessary to explore the presocratic notion of ἀλήθεια. How did the Greeks understand beings? The answer is through φύσις, "nature". The beings of φύσις are on their own emerging into the unconcealment. But φύσις is not a being itself, it is not nature in a sense we today are talking about it as a part of natural processes; on the contrary, φύσις is Being itself. For example, a human being is not a φύσις, therefore φύσις is *not* a being, but it is in accordance with φύσις. Aristotle states in his *Physics*: "For instance, for fire actually to rise, as distinct from having the tendency to rise, neither is nature nor has a nature; but it comes about by nature and is natural" (Aristotle, 1929, p. 111). What does this mean? Nothing other than that we are dealing here with Heidegger's ontological difference, which was still present in Aristotle, although only as a clue. There is a difference between being and Being. This is the oldest difference there is, oldest as language himself. It is not in the natural processes that the Greeks experienced φύσις, but the other way around: based on the fundamental experience of Being in poetry and thinking, φύσις disclosed itself to them (Heidegger, 2000).

What is then a connection between φύσις as a Being of beings and δόξα? Regarding the necessity of recovering the original experience of φύσις, Heidegger tells us that it is urgent to address Being in connection to its restriction. This restriction with the difference to Being was known throughout metaphysical tradition – "Being and becoming", "Being and seeming", "Being and thinking", "Being and the ought". These differences are not arbitrary ones, they are historical ones in which Being was delimited

against the others, and thus already had a determinateness. Even more, these differences played in the history of the West key role in formulating Being as an everlasting presence. For example, the pair “Being and becoming”, which is also a most familiar restriction echoes the pair “Being and seeming”, because every appearance is mere appearance, an illusion, in the sense of unsteady becoming in contrast to constant Being as an unchangeable presence. On the contrary, Heidegger insists that we must grasp the unity of Being and an appearance. In short, we must understand the unity of Being and becoming and with that unity of Being and seeming. Hidden unity of Being and an appearance consists of three aspects of showing. The first way or mode of seeming is *Schein*, shining, or glitter. The second way is *Scheinen* as appearing or manifestation, self-showing. The third way as *Schein* is a mere semblance or mere appearance. The decisive manner of showing is the second mode because it occupies *Schein* as a glow as well as a *Schein* in the sense of mere semblance. Self-display encompasses *Schein* as lustre and as mere appearance. Therefore, Being cannot be differentiated from appearance and becoming because appearance as a self-glowing display means Being. In other words, ἀλήθεια as a truth of Being is appearing. The presocratic notion of truth that can be found in such thinkers as Parmenides and Heraclitus is not in relation to the validity, to “objective” state of affairs, and so forth. Being of beings is never full presence, it is never full disclosedness. Φύσις, as a Being of beings, is emerging in its self-showing, from concealment to unconcealment. And it is here where we come to δόξα; beings are dispersed in manifold ways in their path from concealment to unconcealment.

What appears in this or that way is given an aspect, δόξα. Hence, δόξα is an aspect in which one stands. Every being in its display and look possesses δόξα. Heidegger maintains that δόξα was for the Greeks the highest manner of Being. Δόξα also means glory; I show myself, I step into the light. I reveal myself in the glory of the words and deeds. Δόξα is a “product” of the unity of Being and appearance. But because Being, φύσις, consists in appearing as offering looks and views, there is a possibility of a look that precisely covers over and conceals what beings are as themselves. We said that *Scheinen* could also mean mere semblance. It stems from the fact that φύσις is not an actualized presence, but a possibility, and hence beings can show themselves in many ways (Brogan, 2005). For Heidegger, this becomes very problematic because if beings can show themselves as something they are *not*, then there

is a need for some other mode to protect the Being of beings in appearing. Even if Heidegger is maintaining the unity of Being and appearance, and therefore the tragic faculty of appearing as such, it is precisely because of the latter that there is a need for another mode for defending beings in their standing-in-the-light. What mode is that? Answer: τέχνη. However, this is not a τέχνη we had found in *Being and Time*, which was understood in unity with φρόνησις in our daily, average facticity, but it is reinterpreted based on the presocratic notion of ἀλήθεια. Here τέχνη is still knowledge, but not in the service of our daily dealings. On the contrary, τέχνη, now free from its daily dealings, belongs to very few creators. For example, a national State is also a being that is created by the creators. These creators, Heidegger points out, are rising high in the site of history. As creators and doers, they also become ἀπόλις, without city and state, lonesome, uncanny, with no way out amidst beings as a whole and at the same time without limit “because they as creators must first ground all this in each case” (Heidegger, 2000, p. 163).

Although this notion of Heidegger’s presocratic ἀλήθεια, and with it, a notion of how ἀλήθεια is disclosed, is in contrast to Plato’s ἰδέα, it still establishes a hierarchy. Doing so, Heidegger becomes in his anti-platonic manner very much a platonic thinker (Villa, 1995). Regarding the ontological status of δόξα, the result is the same as in *Being and Time*; the possibility of authentic, discursive action with others is reduced to a zero. Wresting, unconcealing the truth from the “irresponsible” majority is the task only for the lonesome, few creators. The elucidation of hermeneutical self-understanding, rhetoric, which is only possible with others, is also reduced to a zero.

## Conclusions

Heidegger’s *Destruktion* of the Western metaphysics, which from Plato and Aristotle on conceived Being of beings as a presence (*Anwesenheit*) in the form of οὐσία, resulted in a differentiation between *Who* and *What* of those beings who are only capable of understanding Being as such. A man is not a thing, he is not created, etc. The critique derived from Greek ontological prejudices of privileging understanding Being in the form of τέχνη. This is the reason, I argue, that this distinction can mislead us into thinking that with Heidegger we are not dealing with the philosopher’s traditional views

on the community because *Dasein*, according to the distinction, cannot be an isolated subject that subsequently needs connection with the world (Heidegger, 1996). However, it was shown that Heidegger's *Selbst*, this *Who*, in authentic disclosure of the truth, is not only alone but also lonesome. In other words, what was once regarded as a condition for the activity of thinking, namely a company that I keep between myself and me, Heidegger dismisses as an illusion. Hence, ultimately resoluteness is radically private, opposed to anything public, which relegates δόξα into fallen everydayness. But plurality exists even when I am alone because in thought I do not live only with others, but also with myself. I can never escape the realm of plurality. I live in a world of appearances. Furthermore, we saw how Heidegger reformulated Aristotle's φρόνησις by evading its plural dimensions. A prudent man is not only a man who cares for oneself in his solitude. This is clearly stated by Aristotle himself: "For all these faculties deal with ultimates, i.e. with particulars; and being a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgment consists in being able to judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned; for what is equitable is the common concern of all good men in their dealings with others" (Aristotle, 2009, p. 113).

Heidegger's version of practical wisdom is reformulated βίος θεωρητικός. Given the structural connectedness between modes of truth, namely dianoetic virtues, we could say that Heidegger's reformulated φρόνησις is on course with Aristotle's because a wise man is indeed a prudent man, but for Heidegger Aristotle's idea of σοφία was not radical enough; it was still connected to λόγος. It was connected to the possibility of addressing beings, and where there is λόγος, there is also a possibility of falsity. This led to the identification of Being with nothingness, which in turn had a consequence of identifying Heidegger's authentic *Selbst* as a "master of Being" because he can imagine that he stands in the same relationship to Being as the God stood before creating the world, *creatio ex nihilo* (Arendt, 1994). This is also the reason why actions of this *Who* are not just God-like, but divine itself. We could even say that *Being and Time* is a reformulated Plato's *Republic*; from the standpoint of others, plurality, it reveals a kingship of the philosopher. The latter one in authentic disclosing the truth of Being becomes a solipsistic ruler of the community, which must be "liberated" from everyday fallness. Hence, no δόξα is possible; it cannot shine nor appear. Consequently, the result is the same in the second part of our dealings with δόξα; to be able to show oneself, to be seen and heard by others was for the

Greeks great privilege attached to public life. Disclosure of the truthfulness of our opinions is conducted by persuading (rhetoric) because persuasion does not come from truth; it comes from opinions. Heidegger's deficit was an inability to disclose ἀλήθεια in its connection to plural elements of δόξα. Instead of doing so, he chose the mode of authentic disclosure, which does not need any public sphere; it is not bound to a plurality – τέχνη. A creator can create in solitude. In both cases, authentic *Selbst* is beyond Being and appearance. He is voluntarily absent from the world of appearances. It is only later that he joins others, much like Plato's liberated prisoner of shadows, but he joins them not as an equal, but as someone who has all sovereignty, just like the creator.

In the end, I have to agree with Hannah Arendt who said, that what separates philosopher from other men is not the ability of wonder, the pathos of wonder, but rather that other men are unable to endure it (Arendt, 2005). The pathos of wonder is a fundamental condition of men but the inability to endure it led to a conflict between πόλις and the philosopher because if most people are not capable of enduring wonder, then this has a consequence in forming stable opinions, which are in contrast to the philosopher, who when returning to the realm of appearances will not have any opinions. Furthermore, he will most likely despise them. In other words, the philosopher also arrives at his δόξα, because of thinking dialogue of the two-in-one. The difference is not that he possesses any special truth from which others are excluded, but that he always remains ready to endure pathos of wonder.

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## HEIDEGGER AND ΔΟΞΑ: AN AMBIGUOUS AFFAIR

### Summary

The purpose of this article is a clarification of Heidegger's philosophical stance on δόξα. Although it is not explicitly mentioned in his *magnum opus*, *Being in Time*, δόξα is always in the background of philosopher's analyses of *Mitsein*, being-with-others, rhetoric or speech (*Rede*), our self-understanding in the world, etc. Much of Heidegger's stance towards δόξα derived from his early analyses of Aristotle and presocratic notion of ἀλήθεια. While δόξα is in itself ambiguous, namely it is not aimed only at what is possible, contingent (πρακτά), but also what is eternal (πάντα), what cannot be otherwise, it is also true that Heidegger's treatment of δόξα is very ambiguous. Many of Heidegger's commentators have split views regarding the intersubjective nature of others in fundamental ontology; based on his strong anti-Cartesian *Geschmack*, some view it positively, others do not. In the article, I will argue for the latter in the sense that his phenomenological reflections on δόξα paradoxically led to the conclusion, which Heidegger tried to avoid, namely the hierarchy between Being and appearance.

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THE NOTION OF EXISTENCE IN JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S  
AND KARL JASPERS' PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE LITERARY CONTEXT OF *ANNA KARENINA*

Keywords: existence, Karl Jaspers, Jean-Paul Sartre, *Karenina*, human being, situation  
Słowa kluczowe: egzystencja, Karl Jaspers, Jean-Paul Sartre, *Karenina*, ludzkie  
istnienie, sytuacja

### Introduction

In the first chapter of the book *At the Existentialist Café* Sarah Bakewell writes:

It is sometimes said that existentialism is more of a mood than a philosophy, and that it can be traced back to anguished novelists of the

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nineteenth century, and beyond that to Blaise Pascal, who was terrified by the silence of infinite spaces, and beyond that to the soul-searching St Augustine, and beyond that to the Old Testament's weary Ecclesiastes and to Job, the man who dared to question the game God was playing with him and was intimidated into submission. To anyone, in short, who has ever felt disgruntled, rebellious, or alienated about anything.

(Bakewell, 2017, p. 1)

A popular belief that the subject of existentialism lies in the domain of philosophers, writers and prophets, albeit attractive, seems rather trivial. It came under attention of three prominent modern philosophers: Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre and Karl Jaspers. The works that represent *opus magnum* of each of these thinkers i.e. *Being and Time*, *Philosophy*, and *Being and Nothingness* respectively, now belong to the canon of existential thought, but according to Jean Wahl, philosophy of existence has ancient roots (Wahl, 2019). David E. Cooper claims, that "Sartre, Heidegger, and Karl Jaspers are existentialists not because of a shared philosophical position but simply because that is what they have been labelled" (Cooper, 2012, p. 28), so existential reflection can also be found in great works of such philosophers as Plato, Immanuel Kant, Martin Buber or Friedrich Nietzsche.

What is more, it is present in great literary works of such authors as Lev Tolstoy, Fyodor Dostoevsky, Thomas Mann, Albert Camus, Samuel Beckett, not to mention many other less prominent writers. Wesley Barnes in the book *The Philosophy and Literature of Existentialism* claims that the abundance of existential threads in literature warrants an idea of a coherent existential literary theory (Barnes, 1968). Polish researchers like Michał Januszkiewicz (1998) and Rafał Koschany (2016) speak in a similar tone. They point to a number of common features present in existential literature, stressing at the same time that existentialism cannot be attributed to a single, well-defined philosophical tradition. Walter Kaufmann notices that:

Existentialism is not a philosophy but a label for several widely different revolts against traditional philosophy. Most of the living "existentialists" have repudiated this label, and a bewildered outsider might well conclude that the only thing they have in common is a marked aversion for each other. [...] In view of this, it might be argued that the label

“existentialism” ought to be abandoned altogether. Certainly, existentialism is not a school of thought nor reducible to any set of tenets.

(Kaufmann, 1960, p. 11)

At present, existential thought can be found in many, seemingly distant fields of research. Existential and near phenomenological perspective is developed in psychiatry, psychology, psychopathology and cognitive science. “First-person” narrative or approach (defined as world’s experience from the first-person point of view) emphasized by existentialists is being developed by researchers such as Shaun Gallagher, Dan Zahavi, and Alva Noë (Depraz, Varela, Vermersch, 2003; Gallagher, Zahavi, 2008). We can find here the role of the notion of intentionality understood as an ability to be in relation with things as well as the phenomenological concept of human being thrown into the world.

As far as Polish field is concerned, one should not forget about outstanding researchers of existential thought, such as Małgorzata Kowalska (1997), Rafał Abramciów (2015), Piotr Mróz (1992), and Andrzej Kapusta (2014), who constantly strive to instil existential reflection in other research fields.

This raises a question of what makes the notion of existence so appealing. Bakewell writes of existential mood underlined by loneliness, anxiety and fear and William McBride defines existentialism as a popular, cultural movement (McBride, 2012, pp. 50–69). While we are all familiar with such states of mind, abstract philosophical theories seem far removed from our everyday experience. The issue of existence, as opposed to an abstract theory of the definition of a human being stems from our everyday life and forces us to reflect. As such, the notion of existence is both valid and pressing, and its presence in literature may help us arrive at being whose presence may render it more understandable.<sup>1</sup>

This paper attempts to explain the notion of existence on the basis of a specific literary example. Firstly, we will analyse this concept in the thought of two most prominent representatives of existentialism<sup>2</sup>: Karl Jaspers and

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<sup>1</sup> This kind of analyzes we can find in Sartre’s writing. According to Polish philosopher Hanna Puszko, Sartre’s literary works (protagonists, their behaviour and their lifes) are illustrations to his philosophical works – see: Puszko (1993).

<sup>2</sup> It should be emphasized that the word existentialism, the philosophy of existence and existential philosophy means different philosophical traditions. Naming Jaspers an existentialist is a simplification. About differences in terminology see: Wahl (2019).

Jean-Paul Sartre. I am going to demonstrate that despite striking differences in the way both thinkers understand the notion of existence, they complement each other. I will characterize the approach of each philosopher, indicating the sources of their differences and points where they meet. In the next step I will apply the concept of existentialism to a specific literary example of *Anna Karenina*. I will analyse one, in my opinion very important scene from the novel in order to demonstrate how the theories of Sartre and Jaspers are reflected in specific human actions in given circumstances. I am not going to explain the whole concept of existence in Sartre and Jaspers' philosophy as it has already been well described by other researchers. I will rather focus on these areas where the concepts of the two philosophers who are frequently placed in opposition to each other, contain similar intuitions and can complement each other. The literary example is only an illustration of how philosophical considerations can be applied to an analysis of a life of a literary heroine, and in a broader perspective - in the lives of each of us, because according to Jarosław Jakubowski:

Interpretation of a given literary character will mean not so much describing his or her psyche (especially psyche understood traditionally as human's "inner life") but, first and foremost, it will consist in recognizing and elucidating existential situation in which they find themselves. In particular, it will be about showing the possibilities of action that are drawn before them and at the same time the motivations on the basis of which this action can be and could be realized. Love considered from such an existential angle will therefore not be a "matter of feelings", "inner life" [...] but it will be an entanglement into a boundary situation, in the Jaspersian sense of the word.

(Jakubowski, 2012, pp. 145–146)

### Jaspers and Sartre – a psychiatrist and an existentialist

Philosophical writings of Jean-Paul Sartre hardly contain any mentions of a German psychiatrist and philosopher, Karl Jaspers. It is rather surprising, given that Sartre frequently refers to another existential philosopher who used to closely cooperate with Jaspers, i.e. Martin Heidegger. However, the fact that Sartre did not develop Jaspers' conceptions should not be interpreted as a complete lack of interest in Jaspers on Sartre's part. In fact, quite to

the contrary, Sartre was interested in Jaspers in early years, when the main research interests of the former concentrated on psychology.

It is worth remembering that psychology (to be precise: the role of an image in psychological context) was the topic of Sartre's thesis for Master's Degree written under the guidance of Henri Delacroix, who also encouraged Sartre to continue his psychological research. Hence, sooner or later, he was bound to come across the works of a prominent psychiatrist, Karl Jaspers. As Philippe Cabestan notices:

Sartre always displayed interest in psychology, reflected by his involvement in translating *General Psychopathology* (1913) of Karl Jaspers. It is also reflected in Sartre's *Imaginary. Phenomenological Psychology of Imagination* and his abandoned draft of *Psyche* [...]. All Sartre's psychological reflections are closely related to his first philosophical essay *The Transcendence of the Ego* (1937) where he discovered consciousness defined as pure spontaneity.

(Cabestan, 2007, pp. 9–10)

Karl Jaspers devoted his works to psychology and psychopathology and he claimed that the tendencies to treat psychology as science deprive it of its most significant – human dimension (Jaspers, 1990, p. 86). Researchers of Jaspers' philosophy Fuchs, Breuer and Mundt write that:

The central motive that connects Jaspers' manifold works is the idea of human existence. He conceives it as the foundation of all scientific theories which are based on the human being without being able to grasp it completely. Scientific investigation should therefore be complemented by a permanent reflection on prescientific human experience. This idea remains valid independently of Jaspers' existential philosophical terminology. It may be reformulated as follows: Science is based on the human life-world, i.e., on subjective and intersubjective experience. It starts from this experience and gains its final destination from it. Only in constant dialogue with the life-world is science able to attain relevant knowledge without decoupling itself from human self-understanding. This is true in particular for the sciences, whose subject matter is the suffering human being, i.e., medicine in general, and psychopathology and psychiatry in particular.

(Fuchs, Breuer, Mundt, 2014, p. 5)

In *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* Jaspers criticizes psychoanalysis for its superficial and trivial view of the nature of human beings. For him, the concept of existence is a concept that begins every possible consideration. In the Introduction to *Reason and Existence* we can read, that: “Jaspers’ philosophy as a whole is Existenz-philosophy [...] The world is not considered as something in itself, but as that in which Existenz is, and toward which Existenz may be oriented” (Jaspers, 1957, p. 11). In his main work, *Philosophie*, published in 1932, Jaspers attempted to delineate the differences between psychological and philosophical reflection: “Even the seeming relaxation of objectifications and rules, their transformation into an abundant »psychology of understanding« that seems to penetrate the inner man and his depths, will always leave the inadequacy that man is taken for an object” (Jaspers, 1969, p. 153).

Sartre, like Jaspers, accused contemporary psychology of becoming a science by splitting from philosophy. In his *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* Sartre writes:

Psychology is a discipline which claims to be positive; that is, it tries to draw upon the resources of experience alone. We are, of course, no longer in the days of the associationists, and contemporary psychologists do not forbid themselves to interrogate and to interpret. But they try to confront their subject as the physicist confronts his.

(Sartre, 1962, p. 14)

Sartre propounded to replace a methodological approach with a phenomenological one, as he turned towards Martin Heidegger and his notion of *Dasein*. According to Heidegger the notion of *Dasein* opens the world, which means that everything I experience is experienced through the lens of my *Dasein*. *Dasein* cannot be objectively examined, and such examination would certainly be an aim of psychology. Heidegger claimed that *Dasein* cannot be cognitively accessed. How, therefore, can it be examined? Heidegger proposed a solution based on existential analytics, i.e. an analysis of all the possible ways in which *Dasein may exist* in the world. Jaspers, on the other hand, held that we can gain knowledge of ourselves only through communication or border-situations. Finally, according to Sartre we cannot say anything about existence because existence is pure. It simply states: “I am”. Nothing more. The notion of existence defined by Jaspers as the essence of being a human did not play any significant role for Sartre who treated it only

as a point of departure and did not develop it any further. It should be added that the concept of essence also appears in Sartre's conception. As I will try to show, this concept of essence in Sartre's philosophy will have a similar meaning to the concept of existence in Jaspers' philosophy.

According to Jaspers, the notion of existence defined in a specifically philosophical way was formulated for the first time by Kierkegaard:

Kierkegaard's feat of grasping human Existenz as no one before him and yet keeping his belief in Jesus as the God-Man was accomplished by an act of forcible faith, by turning Jesus into an absurdity, a paradox, and otherwise abandoning factual Christianity and the church.

(Jaspers, 1969, p. 315)

Kierkegaard, on the basis of everyday use of the term *existence* defined it as a deep essence of human beings, their inner nature. The author of *Kierkegaard's Concept of Existence* claims that:

What is distinctive, however, about Kierkegaard is that he did not arrive at his penetrating understanding of existence solely through consistent dialectical reflection, but in his attempt to describe the complex of issues related to existence he drew upon sad and difficult personal experiences, plus the experiences he could borrow from his insight into other people's psychical and spiritual situations and conflicts. Kierkegaard very early realized that human existence consists essentially of three elements: the subject (the self), freedom, and the ethical — constituted in such a way that in his freedom the subject must continually make ethical choices. But this also means that existence always involves movement.

(Malantschuk, 2003, p. 11)

Jaspers followed in the tracks of the Danish thinker. He was not interested in examining a human being as such. According to Jaspers:

what happened and what was done, is for Kierkegaard always capable of being understood in a new way. As it is interpreted anew, it becomes a new reality which yet is hidden; temporal life can therefore never be correctly understood by men; no man can absolutely penetrate through his own consciousness.

(Jaspers, 1969, p. 33)

Sartre also claimed that he won't arrive at a new, general theory of human being. This approach is also emphasized by Bakewell, who claims that the key to existentialism is our inability to access our own inner essence by way of external experience. Yet, despite the fact that it cannot be described by empirical science, it can be analysed. How, therefore, does the notion of existence is defined in the philosophy of Sartre and Jaspers?

### *I exist* – existence according to Sartre

The statement “I exist” or “being” was a point of departure for Sartre, initiating his philosophical enquiry. Sartre adopted Hegel's definition of being and nothingness. According to Hegel: “The beginning is not pure nothing but a nothing, rather, from which something is to proceed; also being, therefore, is already contained in the beginning. Therefore, the beginning contains both, being and nothing; it is the unity of being and nothing, or is non-being which is at the same time being, and being which is at the same time non-being” (Hegel, 2010, p. 51).

German philosopher claims that “now” does not exist. According to Sartre who is inspired by Hegel, reality exists either as the past or the future, i.e. it is simply nothingness: “But Being thus undetermined immediately »passed into« its opposite. »This pure Being«, writes Hegel in *Logic* (of the *Encyclopaedia*) is pure abstraction and consequently absolute negation, which taken in its immediate moment is also non-being” (Sartre, 2003, p. 37).

In Sartre's philosophy the core of my existence is being-in-itself understood as a general being. This is our existence, the pure fact that “I am”. So, first we have existence – “I am”. No more can be said about being-in-itself or existence that... it exists. Steven Crowell claims that: “being-in-itself is what consciousness reveals, and if one tries to characterize this transphenomenal dimension without any appeal to consciousness, one can only say that it »is«, it »is in-itself« and it »what it is«” (Crowell, 2012, p. 204).

In the next step Sartre affirms, that “I am” is connected with “I am some kind of” or “I am for some reason”. Here, we encounter another important category, i.e. being-for-itself:

To say the for-itself is a pursued-pursuing, or that it is in the mode of having to be its being, or that it is not what it is and is what it is not

– each of these statements is saying the same thing. The for-itself is not the in-itself and can not to be it. But it is a relation to the in-itself. It is even the sole relation possible to the in-itself. Cut off on every side by the in-itself, the for-itself cannot escape it because the or-itself is *nothing* and it is separated from the in-itself by *nothing*. The for-itself is the foundation of all negativity and of all relation. *The for-itself is relation.*

(Sartre, 2003, p. 384)

Being-in-itself provides a basis for being-for-itself. I may not find being-in-itself in a pure form as I cannot isolate myself from all the experiences coming from external world, because my world, my reality, my situation creates my being-for-itself. I am not able to describe my pure existence because I am always some kind of. Mark Meyers explains:

The categories “being-for-itself” and “being-in-itself” were intended to replace the more traditional Kantian dualism between phenomena and noumena – between the appearance of a thing as opposed to the thing’s bring “in itself”.

(Meyers, 2008, p. 79)

In Sartre's view people are “thrown into the world”. This state of being (being-for-itself) is immersed in the world and comprehends the world through being in the world. Its nature is active and dynamic. It transcends what is “stagnant” into what is “projected”. For Sartre, existence is pure, it is a level of “stagnant”. Existence as a statement of pure being does not contain any other terms. We cannot say anything about it. Hence, existence can be synonymous with the concept of being. Sartre's logical starting point for further reflection is the assertion of the pure fact that one “is” because only after stating that one “is” we can start talking about “how” one is and “why” one is. We cannot find this logical beginning in Jaspers' philosophy. The level of existence in Sartre's philosophy remains pure. There are no predicates or purposefulness, but we will find it in Jaspers' theory.

### Existential elucidation as purpose of life in Jaspersian philosophy

Existence for Sartre was only a point of departure for further research. On the contrary, Jaspers emphasized a different aspect of the notion of existence, i.e. the very possibility of an individual gaining knowledge of oneself.

Jaspers, as well as Heidegger (albeit the latter applied different instruments) postulated that existence should be clarified. Jaspers emphasized the role of existential communication and of experiencing „boundary situations”. For Jaspers interpersonal communication was the main method of shedding light on existence, or, to use a different expression, elucidating it. “the clarification of Existenz lights up its possibilities, its relations to other Existenzen and to Transcendence; it is a clarification of Existenz to itself” (Jaspers, 1957, p. 11). He stressed the constancy of communication is as opposed to a temporary shock caused by „boundary situation”, which does not have to necessarily be experienced by every individual. For him it is communication that enables us to elucidate, i.e. understand our own existence:

Existence analysis is existentially noncommittal. It is performed in consciousness at large, which also comprehends itself in it. It shows the universal of existence. In existence analysis everyone will recognize himself, not as this individual, but as an I at large. It is unequivocally and directly communicable. Elucidation of Existenz, on the other hand, involves commitment. It speaks from the individual to the individual.

(Jaspers, 1969, p. 71)

In the act of communicating the other person shows me, through their reactions to my actions, who I am. Long-term communication between two people who are close to each other may result in each of them shedding light on existence of the other (Piecuch, 2011, pp. 137–145). Jaspers frequently compares communication with love. Constancio Rodriques interprets his theory in the following way:

Though love and communication are not identical, they are inter-dependent. Without love there cannot be communication. Jaspers has called communication a loving struggle. It is love that gives rise to truthfulness in this struggle. Love is the fountainhead of communication. It is a basic requisite. Jasper says, “It (love) is its (communication’s) font and its luminary”. Without communication no love is possible. Love must undergo the test of communication. The end of communication is the death of love. If love is real, communication will not cease but change its form.

(Rodriques, 2005, p. 31)

However, as Jaspers claimed, not every exchange amounts to existential communication (Jaspers, 1990, p. 18). Certainly, interactions consisting in

recreating social roles do not belong to the latter category. He stressed that genuine communication between those who love each other must be free from any agenda. I may not stop being myself, or fear being myself, but I also cannot close myself off from the other person.

Clarification of existence also takes place through the experience of the situation. The concept of situation is of great importance in Jaspers' (Piecuch, 2011, pp. 16–34) and Sartre's philosophy. According to Henryk Pizskalski, the situation in its simplest definition means the position of a human being in some circumstances and his reaction to given circumstances. (Pizskalski, 1978, p. 100). Jaspers presented his theory of boundary situations in *Allgemeine Psychopathologie* and *Philosophie*. Both Sartre and Jaspers repeatedly emphasized that human life consists of being in given situations. For Sartre, this assumption follows from his theory of consciousness conceived of as a movement. Jaspers distinguished between possible situations and boundary situations. While we have a certain degree of control over possible situations, boundary situations are the ones that lie beyond our control and happen to us regardless of our intent.

Here the real point of any thought or expression cannot be what is directly said or meant. It has to do only indirectly with the "I myself" which is by "freedom" and in "communication" as historic consciousness" – with the "I" that comes to itself in "boundary situations", becomes sure of itself in "unconditional acts", fulfils itself as "absolute consciousness", and has no existence as either "subjectivity" or "objectivity" but appears to itself in existence through the tension between these two poles.

(Jaspers, 1969, p. 84)

In the work *Philosophie* Jaspers distinguished five basic boundary situations such as the state of being entangled with the world (i.e. being entangled in situations), death, suffering, struggle, and guilt. Gladys Portuondo explains:

Boundary situations have a historical (geschichtliche) characteristic for the potential Existenz and this is unique for the individual, although one cannot modify or suppress it, but can clarify it by way of active participation in it. The task of philosophy consists in the clarification of the Existenz according to the existential physiognomy of the individual, to the extent that it can open up and encourage the possibility of (self-) reflection within boundary situations and by making it possible

to establish its scope. Death, guilt, struggle, suffering, and foundering as boundary situations express the finitude of the Existenz and, at the same time, its potentiality. Their meaning can only be communicated in a paradoxical way, as opposed to the empirical existence – to which the Existenz, however, has to hold onto, given that this is its only means to manifest itself.

(Portuondo, 2016, pp. 54–55)

Death may serve us as a good example of a boundary situation, as it is not possible for me to decide that I will never die. There are many ways in which death may come into existence in the world as a possible situation, but, since the causes of death are transcendent and incomprehensible, I will never be able to find an answer to the question of why I will die one day. Shedding light on existence consists in an ability to become aware that death is a final and doubtless event in the life of every human.

Existence amounts to a person's being, and more precisely – the possibility of being, which reveals itself only by the way in which a given person acts in a given situation. Jaspersian understanding of the term *existence* differs from its common usage. It also differs from the way it was used by Sartre for whom it meant the state of existing. Jaspers held that existence which has not elucidated itself remains in the sphere of a mere possibility, and shedding light on existence results in its transformation (Piszkalski, 1978, p. 114). In the case of Jaspers, we cannot speak of the fact that existence is pure. Jaspersian existence is defined through the prism of being in a situation, which in Sartre will appear later, as an essence as a logical consequence of the assumption of pure existence – being. Let's now see how the philosophical notions of existence, being, essence, situation and clarification of existence can be applied in the literary context.

### Anna Karenina's existence and essence

The story of Anna Karenina belongs to the literary canon. A young wife of Aleksey Karenin, Anna, meets Count Aleksey Vronsky and becomes his lover. She abandons her husband and as a result becomes an outcast excluded from her social circles. She suffers from depression, exacerbated by her increasing jealousy of her lover. Anna's growing conviction that her lover has stopped loving her pushes her to suicide.

Vladimir Nabokov in one of his essays writes, that:

Anna is not just a woman, not just a splendid specimen of womanhood, she is a woman with a full, compact, important moral nature: everything about her character is significant and striking, and this applied as well to her love. She cannot limit herself as another character in the book, Princess Betsy, does, to an undercover affair. Her truthful and passionate nature makes disguise and secrecy impossible.

(Nabokov, 2002, p. 295)

In the Polish translation of this fragment we can find the word “mask” – we read that Anna’s nature “excludes the use of masks”. In the context of existential considerations, the concept of a mask is very important. Mask or “putting on a mask” is frequently associated with the concept of lies, insincerity, and inauthenticity. According to Nabokov, Anna does not wear such a mask. From Sartrean perspective, we can say that Anna rejects bad faith, that is, she does not adapt her behaviour, her actions to the principles and conventions prevailing in St. Petersburg at the time. As Walter Kaufmann noticed: “Tolstoy was quite determined to attack society and bad faith” (Kaufmann, 1994, p. 6). As Jaspers would put it, Karenina’s existence is authentic; she does not pretend to be someone other than she is. Of course, the reaction of the society to the woman’s open love story is very cruel, but the way society treats the love of this high-ranking woman deserves a separate text. For the purposes of this article I will focus on one scene – the horse race from chapter XXVIII. Nabokov emphasizes that the race scene contains “all kinds of deliberate symbolic implications” (Nabokov, 2002, p. 111). Let’s focus on Anna’s behaviour.

Anna attends horse races, where the competitors are officers of the Tsar Army, including Vronsky. Once the race starts Anna forgets about everything around her and her sole focus is on Vronsky. She does not hide her anxiety and fear that her lover may suffer an injury. Anna shows herself in XXVIII and in next chapter of the book: she now leads a double life, and the impossibility of her situation is cruelly and dramatically rendered in the moment of Vronsky’s accident, when she “can no longer contain her emotion before Karenin” (Thorlby, 1987, p. 61). As a matter of fact, Vronsky does have an accident in front of Anna’s very eyes.

Coming back to Jaspers, we may venture to state that what Anna experienced was a boundary situation. The heroin breaks under pressure.

Everyone was feeling horrified; so that when Vronsky fell to the ground, and Anna moaned aloud, there was nothing very out of the way in it. But afterwards a change come over Anna's face which really was beyond decorum. She utterly lost her head. She began fluttering like a caged bird, at one moment would have got up and moved away, at the next turned to Betsy. Let us go, let us go! She said.

(Tolstoy, 1940, p. 461)

In the face of experience that was so emotionally loaded, Anna is no longer able to act in line with social conventions. She gets up from her seat and shouts (in the 2012 film adaptation, she shouts the name of her beloved Vronsky). Marianne Sturman writes that Anna "is the most natural character of all the urban noblemen in the novel. The strength of her inner nature enables Anna to cast off conventional society" (Sturman, 1993, p. 73). Overcome by emotions, she acts on impulse. Her behaviour does not result from a cool analysis – if this had been the case, it would not have been a situation that elucidates existence. In accordance with Jaspersian theory, this elucidated aspect of Anna's existence shows that she attaches more importance to the feelings she has for her lover than to social conventions. The heroine ignores her husband, who, in fear of social embarrassment pleads with her to compose herself. Anna's behaviour and her impulsive behaviour fit Jaspersian theory of a boundary situation that sheds light on one's existence.

Sartre would not have wondered how Vronsky's accident affected Anna. His reflection on Anna's existence would have been limited to an assertion that Anna exists. However, our heroine is being thrown into the world every time she experiences certain situations. Each experience influences her and leaves its mark, changing her and shaping her essence. Anna, as a subject acting in the world, constantly reacts to it. Her reactions affect her environment, i.e. her social circles consisting of the members of Russian upper class. Sartre did not believe in elucidating existence. If he were to analyse *Anna Karenina*, he would have started from his ontological reflections but would have not proceeded to teleological concepts the way Jaspers did. However, Sartre would have undoubtedly been interested in the following scene of Tolstoy's novel. On her way back from the races, Anna confesses to Karenin the truth about her love affair:

No, you were not mistaken, she said deliberately, looking desperately into his sold face. You were not mistaken. I was, and I could not help

being in despair. I hear you, but I am thinking of him, I love him, I am his mistress; I can't bear you; I'm afraid of you, and I hate you... You can do what you like to me. And dropping back into the corner of the carriage, she broke into sobs, hiding her face in her hands.

(Tolstoy, 1940, p. 466)

Karenin is aware of the events happening because during the scene, as Nabokov rightly points out:

Firstly there is the Karenin slant. In the pavilion at the races a military man, Karenin's social superior, a high-placed general or a member of the royal family, kids Karenin, saying – and you, you're not racing; upon which Karenin replies deferentially and ambiguously, "the race I am running is a harder one", a phrase with a double meaning, since it could simply mean that a statesman's duties are more difficult than competitive sport, but also may hint at Karenin's delicate position as a betrayed husband who must conceal his plight and find a narrow course of action between his marriage and his career. And it is also to be marked that the breaking of the horse's back coincides with Anna's revealing her unfaithfulness to her husband.

(Nabokov, 2002, p. 111)

In Sartrean interpretation, Anna transcends the future – she projects in her imagination possible future developments, she creates her being-for-itself. She *is* but also she *is some kind of* – in this situation she experiences feelings of insecurity and anxiety, fearing what is awaiting her and her family.

If we interpret this situation through the lens of Jaspersian theory, it may be stated that Anna's communication with her husband also elucidates her existence. Anna, filled with emotions, tells Karenin that she loves another man. She is frank and honest in her confession, as she bares her soul to her husband. Aleksiej is bewildered. Suddenly Anna reveals herself to him as a different woman as she tells him of her hatred. Karenin's reaction is one of emotional numbness, he doesn't know how to behave at what to do. We cannot tell whether or not he experiences his conversation with Anna as a boundary situation. Jaspers distinguished only five types of boundary situations; however, they are general enough to leave room for various boundaries that individuals may experience. Experience of a boundary situation is solely ours, as it belongs to our inner world.

## Conclusions

Sartre's ontology, based on the dialectics of existence and essence is devoid of teleological dimension. The term "existence" refers here to the state of existing, whereas the term "essence" refers to the manner in which something exists. In *Being and Nothingness* we will not find references to Jaspersian elucidation of existence. In the view of the French existentialist any elucidation of being would have to hide mystical element, as he put it a possibility of insight into one's pure being-in-itself. And this, he claims, is logically impossible, as being-in-itself, i.e. existence always remains veiled by the escape consisting in transcendence towards being-for-itself. If we limit our reflection to the notion of existence, we cannot venture beyond an assertion that something exists.

Obviously, we may also reflect upon Anna's freedom, her responsibility for her own actions, the concept of bad faith characterizing the society, some ethical aspects of her life but all such considerations lie in the domain of essence, i.e. *how* something exists. Nevertheless, Sartrean notion of existence provides a great departure point to consider the ways in which an individual exists in a given situation. Jaspers did not present a detailed analysis of the ontology of being in the way Sartre did, but he can ask for example, if love between Anna and Vronsky was a form of communication.

We may notice the emerging scheme: first, according to Sartre's theory, we will say that Karenina *is*. The statement that the heroine exists is a logical and ontological starting point for further considerations. In the next step, it should be determined that our heroine *is some kind of*. At this point we leave Sartre's level of existence and move to the level of essence. The essence of Anna Karenina is for example: her character – sincere; emotions – sensitive; feelings – in love; attitudes – mother, high-society woman, wife, lover; opinion – she does not want to live in bad faith because of social norms; behaviours – she reacts very emotionally to her lover's accident, and so on. All these terms are the essence of Anna and are revealed in specific situations that our heroine experiences. They create Anna, but they do not wholly constitute her as according to Sartre, Anna is still a possibility, is constantly being created, is an unfinished project. Jaspers goes a step further. He states that Anna's existence is elucidated gradually, also in given situations and communication. Anna learns who she is through situations she experiences.

We can note here that it is Sartrean notion of essence and not the notion of existence that can be juxtaposed with Jaspersian concept of existence. Sartre's essence and Jaspers' existence are a certain possibility, they are not cognitively accessible to us, they are revealed in situations (Jaspers' communication in Sartre's philosophy is a situation of being with another human being), and they will never reveal themselves completely.

Despite many differences, Jaspers and Sartre share certain intuitions. Sartre's ontological conception is an interesting addition that complements Jaspers' analyses. Sartrean philosophy of existence is devoid of Jaspersian teleological approach in which transcending movement should aim towards elucidation of existence and result in one gaining a deeper insight into oneself. For Sartre such considerations were superfluous. This is why he referred to his existentialism as atheistic and distanced himself from Jaspers. But, as our analysis shows the concepts of these two philosophers are to a certain degree complementary. What is more, Sartrean philosophy provides us with a certain kind of ontological logic while Jaspers enriches it with elements of usefulness and teleology. Thus, Sartre and Jaspers present us with a very coherent and multidimensional theory of a human being in the world, the theory that can be applied not only to the literary examples but also to our lives.

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THE NOTION OF EXISTENCE IN JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S  
AND KARL JASPERS' PHILOSOPHY  
IN THE LITERARY CONTEXT OF *ANNA KARENINA*

Summary

This paper attempts to explain the notion of existence on the basis of a specific literary example. Firstly, we will analyse this concept in the thought of two most prominent representatives of existentialism: Karl Jaspers and Jean-Paul Sartre. Despite striking differences in the way both thinkers understand the notion of existence, they complement each other. I characterize the approach of each philosopher, indicating the sources of their differences and points where they meet. In the next step I will apply the concept of existence to a specific literary example of the *Anna Karenina*.

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DOI: 10.18276/aie.2020.50-05

ALEKSANDRA DERRA\*

**Holobionts, Symbiosis and New Narratives for the Troubled Times of Donna Haraway’s Chthulucene. Review of Donna Haraway’s (2016), *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene*, Durham–London: Duke University Press Books, pp. 312\*\***

Keywords: Chthulucene, Anthropocene, Donna Haraway, symbionts, holobionts, response-ability

Słowa kluczowe: Chthulucen, Antropocen, Donna Haraway, symbiont, holobiont, odpowiedzialność

### An overview of Donna Haraway’s Legacy

I have grown used to a specific type of experience when reading Donna Haraway’s texts. Firstly, I have always been moved, fascinated, irritated, or disturbed by the unconventional language of her books. They have taken me by surprise by a unique combination of the literary and competence, biology and philosophy, especially

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\*\* The previous Polish version of this review has been published under the title: “*Twórzmy relacje, a nie dzieci*”. *Wspólne życie na zniszczonej planecie w chthulucenie Donny Haraway* in AVANT journal (2017, AVANT, 8 [3], 215–228). Here it has been appropriately adapted and changed.

because I am/have been filtered by a socialisation in (moderate) Scientism and attachment to the programme, or at least proclaimed non-metaphoricalness of the philosophical discourse. Secondly, her philosophical ideas, rich argumentation, examples from the history of science and modern techno-science have not only changed my way of thinking, but sometimes painfully forced me to verify the admissibility of methods or the legitimacy of research priorities in humanities, social sciences, and also biological sciences. Last but not least, her unprecedented sensitivity to the presence of prejudices in science (due to gender, race, age, ethnicity, geographical location, etc.) and awareness of the involvement of science in the system of economic and military connections made me ponder many times over about how I should think about the areas that interest me scientifically and how I should pursue my own.

If we were to enumerate the research areas in which her scientific ideas not only proved to be extremely influential for ongoing discussions, but were also ground-breaking for the development of a specific sub-discipline, one must mention anthropology that made use of the concept of the cyborg, ecofeminism, postfeminism, posthumanism, feminist studies on science and technology or animal research. The most notable and ground-breaking of her texts include *A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century* (1985, Polish edition 2003), *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: the Reinvention of Nature* *Modest\_Witness@Second\_Millennium.FemaleMan©\_Meets\_OncoMouseTM. Feminism and Technoscience* (1997), *The Companion Species Manifesto. Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness* (2003), *When the Species Meet* (2008). As far as the shaping of my own research interests is concerned, I would like to mention two of her lesser-known books. A book version of her doctoral dissertation *Crystal, Fabrics and Fields. Metaphors of Organicism in Twentieth Century Developmental Biology* published in 1976 and *Primate Visions. Gender, Race and Nature in the World of Modern Science* from 1989. In both of them the language which is used to formulate scientific theories is placed at the centre; the impact that certain metaphors have on the coining of the concepts adopted in them, on the shaping of research in a given field, on the modelling of research priorities.

Using the example of the history of developmental biology and primatology, Haraway shows the complex process of constructing a specialized language of these sciences, which does not take place outside the context of the place and worldview of the time in which it is created. It is carried out under the pressure of the binding requirements of scientific and methodological rigour, technological possibilities of a given historical moment, but also under the influence of social expectations or beliefs, which at a given moment become an important element of the described process. Even in these books Haraway will present a view, which is characteristic of her style, that theories formulated in science are not objective, if objectivity is to be

understood as impartiality, neutrality, independence of tools and technology, complete distancing from values and worldview, perspective of the divine. Knowledge is, according to her, always situated (Haraway, 1988), formulated from a specific place, at a given time, in the name of certain values and interests. Its creations and the effects of their activities outside the laboratory can be both positive and negative. It seems that today it is impossible not to notice the latter, especially when we look at the disastrous connection of civilization changes and scientific progress with hyper-individualism, consumerism and the logic of the free market. The reviewed book *Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene* to a large extent deals with what is evil, with our troubled times of anthropocene which are full of difficulties, economic and political tensions, the real perspective of ecological disaster. The authoress reflects on new ways of thinking about the natural world, and thus on transforming the language and methodology of biology, but above all she writes about the extremely urgent need for responsibility and communality, the necessity to create new forms of kinship in order to save oneself and the world.

### The main goals, assumptions and ideas of the book

The book is not too extensive – there are 170 pages of the main text. It consists of an introduction, eight chapters, a bibliography and an index. The history of the editions or first prints of the chapters that make up the book may disappoint the reader who expected a completely new, coherent whole. Only chapter eight, the last of the book, was written specifically for its purpose and contains previously unpublished material, whereas other chapters had been published earlier over the period 2012–2015 in various magazines or collective works. They constitute separate, loosely related stories, in which similar themes told each time from a slightly different perspective, keep reappearing. Inevitably, parts of the book written for different purposes are of different length and have a different structure: in some the authoress focuses more on conceptual decisions, whereas others are more of case studies in which the whole complexity and multidimensionality of the anthropocene subject is at its clearest. The last chapter entitled “The Camille Stories” addresses not only the extremely interesting problem of demographic and ecological threats resulting in economic and social crises, but has also been constructed in a literary, surprising and captivating way. Well, one thing at a time.

What is Haraway’s purpose in the book? Let us take a closer look at the title. The most important thing, as she explains in the introduction, is to face the troubled times in which we happen to live (Haraway, 2016, p. 1). They are troubled not only because they are teeming with various problems, but also because they are incomprehensible, ambiguous, confusing, and difficult to grasp with a thought.

Hence the word “trouble”, derived from the French verb “troubler”, which means “to mix”, “to disturb”, “to cloud”. The point is that one should not only speculate about what will happen in the future, but also not postpone things for later, not deny that things have happened (denialism) or abandon the uncritical and post-Enlightenment hopes that techno-science will fix everything in the future (fixation on technology) (Haraway, 2016, p. 3). This is symbolically represented by another word used in the title – “Chthulucene”, which is derived from the Greek words “khthôn” and “kainos”. “Kainos” is a term used for what is new, refreshing, for what is to begin, whereas “khthôn” means “land”. Haraway explains that in combination they mean “[...] the kind of time and place where we are to learn how to deal with life and dying in a responsible way on a damaged planet” (Haraway, 2016, p. 2). Haraway represents the notion of responsibility, which appears repeatedly on the pages of the book, with a neologism that is peculiarly her own. She spells the English word “responsibility” as “response-ability”, which can be interpreted as “the ability to give answers”, “responding”, “ability to respond”. Yet another goal is to undermine the rhetoric related to the concepts of Anthropocene (which again puts the human being on a pedestal as the most important and distinguished form of existence on Earth) and Capitalocene (which in turn naturalises economic processes, describing them as all-encompassing, systemic, advanced and therefore impossible to be stopped). Haraway urges people to think about making connections with non-human beings (“making kin”) and to act for the purpose of a heterogeneous community. As she writes, we need each other for cooperation that we cannot yet imagine. We will either become someone other than we are today in combination with other beings on Earth, or we will not become anything at all (Haraway, 2016, p. 4). Taking into consideration the great sixth extinction of species, real overpopulation of the world (it is expected that by 2100 the population of Earth will reach 11 billion), gigantic disparities in the consequences that these processes have for the poor and for the rich, as well as deadly pollution and littering of the environment, we will simply die.

As a philosopher, Haraway uses rhetorical figures, the most important of which and, as she admits, the all-encompassing is the “SF figure”, which she represents with a few expressions beginning with the letters s and f. They include “science fiction”, “speculative fabulation” (creating speculative stories), “string figures”<sup>1</sup> (figures made of string), “speculative feminism”, “science fact”. This figure, which

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<sup>1</sup> According to a Wikipedia entry: “A string figure is a design formed by manipulating string on, around, and using one’s fingers or sometimes between the fingers of multiple people. They may consist of single or multiple images or be created and altered as a game, known as a string game, or as part of a story involving various figures made in sequence. A popular string game is cat’s cradle, but many string figures are known in many places under different names.” See: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/String\\_figure](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/String_figure).

is quite mysterious, though perhaps interesting only from philosophical and linguistic perspective, has a significance only to the rhetoric of the text – it is invoked from time to time to show that science needs a story, and these in turn need feminism. Haraway describes it poetically using a play on words: “It matters what matters we use to think other matters with; it matters what stories we tell to tell other stories with; it matters what knots knot knots; what thoughts think thoughts, what description describe descriptions, what ties tie ties” (Haraway, 2016, p. 12). The SF figure does not have a structuring role, nor does it serve as a scaffolding on which the considerations in individual chapters are based. Its purpose is to strengthen the message, the same as in the case of over thirty illustrations that ornament the book and its beautiful cover.

As I pointed out earlier, the chapters in the book are not closely linked to one another. With regard to that, I will look at each of them in turn with varying enthusiasm and perspicacity, depending on the power of the message they carried and how much impact they had on me.

### Complex relationships of post-human creatures

With the title of the first chapter “Playing String Figures with Companion Species” Haraway refers to her earlier works, in which she used the category of “playing cat’s cradle” (Haraway, 1994) and the concept of companion species (Haraway, 2003), in order to capture contemporary subjectivity. She introduces the term “Terrapolis” (Haraway, 2016, p. 11), referring it to the peculiarity of the modern world which is populated by companion species not in the form of post-human subjects, but in the form of compost, a mixture of various beings that enter into complex relationships. Haraway refuses to recognize human uniqueness, but she does not want to take strictly posthumanist stance (Haraway, 2016, pp. 13, 50, 55, 97). It seems that there are several reasons behind her move. Firstly, she identifies posthumanism with “grand narratives” in Jean Francois Lyotard’s sense, as narratives which account for everything in a totalizing manner, hence being deterministic and teleological. Following James Clifford’s idea of “big-enough stories” and her own concept of situated knowledge, she rejects the prospect of providing one big synthetic theory of everything (Clifford, 2013). Secondly, she believes that using the notion of posthuman will result in focusing primarily on humans (even if in a negative way) as a vital point of our conceptions. Therefore she claims “We are compost, not posthuman; we inhabit the humusities, not the humanities” (Haraway, 2016, p. 97, 101, I will explain the concept of humus in what follows). Finally, although she attributes responsibility (as an ability to response – I will write more about it later on) to every possible earthly critter, she simultaneously points out that in particular

cases some critters are more responsible than others. Her position works in accordance with many contemporary views which seriously take into account posthuman predicament, but refuse to accept eurocentrism, nationalism, xenophobia, sexism and racism, which are described as tightly connected with Western European humanism (Braidotti, 2017).

Haraway like Isabelle Stengers believes that dealing with hardships of the modern world must be done with the help of cosmopolitan tools, with the participation of all those who will bear the consequences of the actions taken in it; it must be a multi-species response (Stengers, 2010). The metaphor of playing cat's cradle is meant to emphasise that it is impossible to separate thinking from acting; the game is both a practice of thinking and acting (Haraway, 2016, p. 14). In this chapter the considerations are guided by pigeons, the history of their settlement in cities, how they are treated, the roles they have, the relationships they enter with people and other inhabitants of the world. The authoress emphasises that a whole range of positive effects for people is brought about with the help and participation of pigeons or other creatures, which usually remain unseen. What's more, on account of the mutual cooperation of pigeons and people, the abilities of both people and pigeons are enhanced, which enables completely new activities. She demonstrates that on the example of the Pigeon-Blog project which engages working pigeons, artists, engineers, breeders and pigeon enthusiasts involved in monitoring air pollution in southern California (Haraway, 2016, p. 21). Properly equipped with appropriate machinery, the birds cooperate with their human friends collecting real time pollution data from inaccessible places, which are later transferred to appropriate communication systems on the Internet. This project is not scientific and for this reason, PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals) has contested the use of animals as unacceptable, as it does not serve scientific purposes (Haraway, 2016, p. 23). This initiative made use of the knowledge and experience of pigeon enthusiasts and ordinary people who entered into relations with street pigeons, to broaden the understanding of the community, to go from thinking about pigeons as "rats with wings" to treating them as animals entering into social relations (Haraway, 2016, p. 24). The empowered pigeons had shelters built for them, which were designed for them by the artists, where they could live in harmony with their ecological needs and without damaging the city's resources (e.g. Capsule in Lille, a loft in Batman Park in Melbourne). Haraway emphasises that giving details in the presented stories is of great importance. We are all responsible for the conditions in which different species live, but we are not responsible in the same way – everything depends on ecological and economic differences related to a particular species and the way of life – we need to provide details in order to take this into account, (Haraway, 2016, p. 29).

## The troubles with Anthropocene, Capitalocene and Chthulucene

The subtitle of the second chapter, “Tentacular thinking”, lists the categories of Anthropocene, Capitalocene and Chthulucene. It starts with a question, which is extremely important for the entire book, about what happens when it is impossible to think or act any more without being guided, in both theory and practice, by human uniqueness and individuality (Haraway, 2016, p. 30). According to Haraway, given the incredible devastation of the natural world that man has made, and the uncertainty and unpredictability of the consequences of this devastation, the transitional period in which we now are on Earth must not be called Anthropocene.<sup>2</sup> Hence the proposal to use the term “Chthulucene” with reference to the figure of the “Pimoa Cthulhu” spider, referring to the Goshute language of the inhabitants of Utah (Haraway, 2016, p. 31), and the ocean-dwelling deity or octopus with many tentacles (a kind of spider of the seas). In order to try to use the potential of new modes of thinking about contemporary subjectivity, Haraway introduces the concept of humus and sympoiesis. Humus – the earth’s organic matter – defines a heterogeneous family of creatures that inhabit the Earth from fungi through bacteria, plants and animals. The authoress borrows the term sympoiesis (as opposed to autopoiesis) from M. Beth Dempster and her MA thesis from 1998 in the field of environmental studies. She calls the systems created collectively, in which the flow of information and control are dispersed in its various elements, and their boundaries are not strictly determined, because the system is evolving in a variable way (Haraway, 2016, p. 33). Both contemporary philosophy and biological sciences seem no longer to use concepts built on units that are strictly set apart, individualized entities like genes, organisms or environments (Haraway, 2016, pp. 30, 33). Not only is it impossible for science to be practised like before, but it is impossible to live in the same way as before on the damaged planet on the ruins of capitalism. In this chapter, Haraway calls upon the meditations on the evil by Hannah Arendt, the art of life by Anna Tsing, ethics of Thom van Dooren, the story-telling skill of Ursula Le Guin, the postulate of telling “the story of Gaia” by Bruno Latour. Repeating the postulate by Stengers that it is not about facing Gaia, Haraway calls for the treatment of Gaia/Earth as a systemic phenomenon which builds our planet (Haraway, 2016, p. 43). This call is not just another theoretical appeal and an attempt to build an original system of concepts. One must not stay inactive – the way of thinking must be changed to act at once. At the conference in San Francisco in 2012, Bred Werner argued that from the scientific point of view, the only sensible thing to do in the current situation is

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<sup>2</sup> The debate over the Anthropocene as a concept, phenomenon and set of assumptions, narratives and theses is deftly summarized by Ewa Bińczyk (Bińczyk, 2019).

a revolt, revolution, and collective action. According to him, global capitalism has led to such a rapid extermination of resources that we are not able to predict how human-earth systems will behave (Haraway, 2016, p. 47).

In this chapter Haraway summarizes what exactly she does not like in Anthropocene viewed as a concept, tool, epoch or story. Its story is about death and hopelessness – a situation in which she cannot be driven to act. The human species itself does not make history, which might be suggested by Anthropocene. It is not made by people with the aid of tools and other creatures either – stories about the modern world cannot be stories only about this. Anthropocene is to a large extent supported by utilitarian individualism and the evolution of modern synthesis. We are finally dealing here with an economic aspect – the notions of Anthropocene may be used by high-class intellectuals from affluent countries (Haraway, 2016, p. 49). It hides demons of modernity, determinism, modernisation, division into nature and society, progress and teleology. According to Haraway, we need a story in which another world is not only urgently needed, but also possible. Chthulucene is a suggestion of an alternative story in which people are not the most important protagonists; it is created by the practices of the existence of many creatures, without distinguishing the main character, in troubled times in which the world is not yet finished, and the sky has not yet fallen on everyone's head (Haraway, 2016, p. 55). It is not a global, great and all-encompassing story, but a story without the tinge of apocalyptic panic and the complacency of a sated king.

### **Symbiogenesis, sympoiesis, and kinship, or how to make kin, not babies**

In the following chapters, Haraway presents details related to the category of sympoiesis and the creation of new forms of community and kinship in Chthulucene. Chapters four (5 pages), six (9 pages) and seven (8 pages) are short and do not contain extensive argumentation; they loosely refer to philosophical works, scientific studies, science fiction texts and everyday practices, and contain a metaphor that is typical of the author.

In chapter four, the authoress presents once again how she understands Chthulucene, the extent of changes it brings and ways to respond to them in science and in political and social practices. When considering which catchy slogan could illustrate it, she chooses “Make Kin, Not Babies” (Haraway, 2016, p. 102). Her interesting view on the problem of overpopulation of our planet is worth recalling here. She reminds us that it was feminist thought and activity that constantly demanded that women should have a choice as regards children; that the sense of their existence should not only be boiled down to presence; so that they could choose not to have

children (Haraway, 2016, p. 6). In need of a family, kinship, and bonds, we have to focus on expanding our way of thinking about who our loved ones could be. A relative, according to the initial, primary meaning of the word, meant “logical connections”, and came to mean a member of the family only in the 17th century (Haraway, 2016, p. 103). Our relatives are all those earthly creatures with whom we are connected in a given place and time, all those creatures that we need to look after, also for our own good.

In chapter six, Haraway explores the meaning of the title slogan of the book, “Stay with the Trouble”, which could be understood as a call to face difficulties, to handle them and in a way accept what we have to face in the world today and try to deal with it. For now, Haraway suggests a change in the way of thinking which involves noticing the role of plants, bacteria, fungi with which we communicate and need one another (Haraway, 2016, p. 122). The categories of symbiogenesis and sympoiesis appear here (I will come back to this concept later on) as necessary to describe modern nature. The word “symbiogenesis” may be broken down to components which in Greek respectively mean: “sún”, i.e. “together”, “biosis” – “life”, and “genesis” – “origin”. It is emphasised here that species came to be through integration and symbiosis, which for Haraway means a departure from the fantasy of independent, self-creating and self-sufficient autopoietic systems for the sake of systems that co-create their identity with others, becoming co-responsible for one another. This does not only mean that which is good or idyllic, but also communication, origin from the same matter, care and mutual “mothering”. It is not the first time that Haraway expresses this metaphor in the form of a sequence of words: “mutter, matter, mother” (Haraway, 2016, p. 125) – it also appeared in her text entitled “Situated knowledges”.

In chapter seven, Haraway presents a very interesting way in which Vinciane Despret attempts to describe the nature of field biology research by observing scientists. She appeals to the virtue of politeness to reflect on the specificity of visits made by scientists who observe animals (Haraway, 2016, p. 127). She claims that what scientists do affects the way that animals react to their actions. She gives an example of Amotz Zahavi’s research on Arabian babblers (birds of the *Leiothrichidae* family), who deliberately conducted experiments with birds he observed, not on them (Haraway, 2016, p. 128). It can be said that they carried out the experiments together, effectively communicating with one another. By showing the vital role of communicating with other creatures, Haraway emphasises that for animals to nourish us, we must “nourish” them in daily practices, which involve co-operation, conversation and mutual attention (Haraway, 2016, p. 129). There is no place for them in the modern world of commercial breeding, depersonalised production of

laboratory animals or exploitation of the natural environment regardless of the fate of its multi-species inhabitants.

Much more elaborate chapters three and five require a bit more reading attention. In the chapter three titled “Sympoiesis”, Haraway once again refers to the meaning of this Greek word: “sún” means “together”, whereas “poiēsis” means “creation”, the result of which is “creating something together”. Nothing is created on its own, nobody and nothing is self-sufficient. Haraway’s ontological proposition is to abandon the categories of separate individuals and beings (species, orders, etc.) and instead use the categories of holobionts and symbionts<sup>3</sup>(Haraway, 2016, p. 60). Once again, the ideas of M. Beth Dempster are recalled here with a tedious repetition of the same quotations that we may find earlier in the book. Again, we are talking about the role of modern synthesis in shaping concepts and research tradition in biology; about the departure of life sciences from focusing on separate organisms towards relationship and connections; about the need to study the interspecies, which allows to develop, communicate and maintain the integrity of multi-layered tissues, such as animals (Haraway, 2016, p. 65). Credit goes to the DNA technology and genomics, which allow to show a symbiotic diversity of the animated world (Haraway, 2016, pp. 66–67). Scott Gilbert, Jan Sapp and Alfred Tauber (Gilbert, Sapp, Tauber, 2012) wrote an article on sympoiesis entitled *A Symbiotic View of Life: We Have Never Been Individuals*, the second part of which paraphrases the title of Latour’s book *We have never been modern* (Latour, 1993). Carla Hustak and Natasha Meyers, on the other hand, quoted by the authoress, argued that “presenting nature as a zero-sum game between competing individuals is a caricature of the chemical, biological, material-semiotic world” (Hustak, Meyers, 2012). In this chapter, Haraway draws attention to the fact that changing the scientific dictionary, activism, are not enough to cope with the problems of the modern world, we also need social and artistic actions and stories. In other words, biology, art and politics need each other – projects like Crochet Coral Reef,<sup>4</sup> Ako Project from Madagascar, “Never Alone” game or activities related to the saving of the Hopi and Navajo peoples’ heritage (Haraway, 2016, p. 71), which are presented and illustrated in this chapter.

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<sup>3</sup> Holobionts are assemblages of various species that form separate ecological units, symbionts are organisms that live in symbiosis with other species.

<sup>4</sup> The discovery and recognition that raising sea temperatures contributes to the extinction of coral reef ecosystems led to the dissemination of the Anthropocene concept.

## Response-ability instead of responsibility. Developing the ability to respond

The most moving story of this part of the book is the story of the people of Navajo (Haraway, 2016, pp. 89–97), which also illustrates Haraway's claim that the problem is not that changes occur on Earth, but it is their range and distribution in the world (Haraway, 2016, p. 73). The Hopi and Diné people who live in the Navajo region are now the poorest citizens of the United States. Their story is a tale of violence in the coal industry, whose lobbyists removed the indigenous peoples from places where it was possible to develop energy industry, by means of political tools (US Congress), displacing thousands of people and devastating the natural environment. These relocations did not take place only hundreds of years ago in the old, barbaric times, but in the 1970s and 1980s (Haraway, 2016, p. 75). In the 19th century genocide took place indirectly. In 1863, by the decision of the US Department of War, indigenous peoples were forced to move on foot from Dineath to the Bosque Redondo reserve in Fort Sumner, New Mexico, and for the next five years 9,500 of Navajos and 500 of Mescalero Apaches were imprisoned there. The Churro sheep, which were an important part of the Navajo identity, their culture and social order, were systematically and methodically exterminated. They allowed them to maintain and cultivate the traditions of weaving carpets, which was of a religious and symbolic character. The extermination was carried out with the help of the tools of the War Department, the Ministry of Agriculture and the related scientists, the ideology of the New Deal, modernisation and modern agriculture. In the 1930s, almost all the sheep and most of the goats, which ensured subsistence to these people, were killed (the total of about a million sheep and goats, without any compensation – in 1970 there were about 430 Churro sheep left scattered throughout the reserve). Today, through the activities of such organizations as the Black Mesa Water Coalition (BMWC), attempts are being made to restore energy justice, economic relations that empower the weaker, and fight for climate justice in the south west of the United States, especially the Black Mesa region.

Chapter five entitled – “Awash in Urine. DES and Premarin in Multispecies Response-ability” – heralds the issue of responsibility that runs throughout the book, or, using Haraway's language, developing the ability to respond. And, there we will find a story about the authoress' twelve-year-old bitch Cayenne, which started to take (or rather was administered) synthetically produced on the industrial scale DES oestrogen, to prevent problems with incontinence and protect its heart. This seemingly simple gesture of concern for the welfare of the animal and one's own, however, evokes an anxiety disorder in the author, evoking a whole lot of heterogeneous relationships that we have dealt and are dealing with here. First, the feminist

anxiety, because oestrogen deficiency causes various health deficiencies, closely related to the disappearance of the reproductive potential, applies not only to female dogs, but also to women. As if in the old age, the loss of the hormone resulted in the loss of femininity and required fixing! Second, an anxiety about causing harm. Exposing the human foetus to this drug between 1940 and 1970 resulted in a possible adenocarcinoma; it was speculated that it caused spasms, miscarriages and premature births. Since the 1990s in the United States, it can only be administered to animals and to humans only in rare cases. Another side of the same coin is the (invisible) dependence of people on animals when using drugs. The authoress describes her own experience of taking Premarin during the menopause, which contains natural oestrogens extracted from horse urine. Haraway sadly concludes that as a feminist researcher of science and technology and a long-time animal admirer she will not be able to notice the fate of mares and their “single use” foals when she takes on a menopause. She asks: “Have I forgotten, or never known this? Have I failed to inquire or maybe i simply never cared?” (Haraway, 2016, p. 111). As she emphasises, the relationships between people and animals, between us and non-human relatives, are not innocent, and our responsibility for them is much greater and to a large extent never ends (Haraway, 2016, p. 114). However, to notice this, we need to know the details, be able to see the incredible complexity of connections. Only then will we see where our response should take place. Today we know that “corporations, farms, clinics, laboratories, homes, science, technologies, multi-species existences are interrelated” in time, on a different scale, materially... (Haraway, 2016, p. 115).

### New narrative: “The Camille Stories. Children of Compost”

I have already mentioned that it is only chapter eight, the last of the reviewed book, that is not a reprint and appears in this form for the first time. It is ornamented with nine different illustrations and it has been written with a literary language. Haraway admits that it was created as a linguistic product of imagination at the writing workshop in which the author took part in the summer of 2013 in Cerisy. The task for the participants from each separate group at the workshop was to bring a child to a literary existence and describe its life and those of their descendants for five human generations. In the Haraway group, the story in its original, workshop version was also co-created by a film-maker Fabrizio Terranova and a philosopher and psychologist, Vinciane Despret. The aim of this literary experiment was to create an imaginable fiction without paying attention to the traditional ontological divisions and the existing real ways of living on the damaged planet. According to Haraway, Camille was conceived as a child born for sympoiesis, whose identity was created with other, thanks to other, acting with other, various, diverse creatures inhabiting

the planet (Haraway, 2016, p. 137). These imagination exercises had their limitations imposed by current knowledge about the ruined world, hence in the creation of Camille worlds several rules were adopted (Haraway, 2016, pp. 138–143). None of the compost communities (next generations described in this history of beings) can start from scratch and move to some uninhabited area. They cannot leave the damaged land, but they must try to thrive on it, creating new communities and fixing what they can. Due to the overpopulation of the Earth, it is encouraged that creatures other than human beings are brought to life, freedom of reproduction is retained, but it is assumed that the appearance of each new life entails a change in the structure of the entire community, and it must therefore be part of this process. That is why human children come to the world as symbionts with creatures from some dying species. Learning to co-live with a symbiont and all beings associated with it for the next five human generations is part of the education process. A new creature may choose a gender or not choose it at all, it can freely transform the body, enrich it with micro-organisms from the animal world, expand its perception so as to experience the world as well as the animal creatures symbiotically associated with it. This interference only affects people, it does not involve animals or plants, but because of the changes that take place in the functioning of people, flora and fauna change with them.<sup>5</sup>

Haraway's story covers the life story of five Camilles, from the first born in 2025 to the fifth who dies in 2425. Each one of them starts with listing the following details: "Born in...", "The population is...", "Dies in...", "The population is..." When the first Camille is born, there are eight billion people on Earth, when she dies, there are already ten billion of them. When the fifth Camille dies, there are three billion people living on Earth, two billion of which are human-animal symbionts – more than half of the species living Earth in 2015 disappear. Millions of different creatures make symbionts with humans, while animal symbionts remain unchanged by human genes. Human symbionts take after their animal partners in many respects... During the life of five Camille generations amazing things happen on Earth – one should read about it and imagine it. Haraway describes them coherently and convincingly as a biologist, with the sensitivity of a methodologically-oriented philosopher who is conscious of the history of science, and with a literary grace of a writer. It was worth reading the entire book only for this 33-page long chapter.

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<sup>5</sup> Haraway refers here to "EcoEvoDevo", i.e. to the "ecological, evolutionary developmental biology", in which symbiosis and plasticity in development are treated as factors of evolutionary changes.

Staying with the Trouble is not finished off with a separate conclusion. As it is not the end, but the beginning. Absolutely non-optimistic, sorrowful and pessimistic. Each new beginning, however, brings a new hope.

### Contemporary humans: lack of ready-made recipes, and the need to act

It cannot be denied that the book by Haraway raises extremely current problems not only of contemporary humanities, but also of biological sciences. It poses the question of what concepts and theories should be used to describe today's man; capture their hybridity, entanglement in technologies, economic relations, environmental changes, demographic processes, political and social crises. Is this a post-man living in an overcrowded dying world? Or a symbiont that tries to build relationships with others anew? Part of global humus? The author deals with conceptual problems of contemporary life sciences, their attempts to move away from the dictionary and theories founded on individualized categories and the idea of rivalry. However, what is meant here is not only a matter of words, but that they should give rise to actions aimed at saving the world. Having finished the book the reader will feel lost: there is a lack of consistency, ready-made recipes, arguments that could be used. This would have to do for now. For now, we have to think about how to make kin, not babies. How to extend the family without overpopulating the world. It is really hard for starters...

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HOLOBIONTS, SYMBIOSIS AND NEW NARRATIVES  
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REVIEW OF DONNA HARAWAY'S (2016), *STAYING WITH THE TROUBLE:  
MAKING KIN IN THE CHTHULUCENE*,  
DURHAM–LONDON: DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS BOOKS, PP. 312

### Summary

The aim of the article is to discuss the basic assumptions, theses and solutions of Donna Haraway's book "Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene". The author places the considerations of an American philosopher and biologist against the background of her earlier books and conceptual proposals. She analyses her suggestion of using the category of Chthulucene instead of Anthropocene, the category of sym-poietic system instead of an auto-poietic one, she presents her appeal for creating new forms of kinship and extensive response-ability for each other.

