Analiza i Egzystencja

ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2019.46-01
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Issue archive / 46 (2019)
Problem interpretacji zasady Fiat iustitia, ruat coelum (The Problem of Interpretation of the Principle fiat iustitia, ruat coelum)
(The Problem of Interpretation of the Principle fiat iustitia, ruat coelum)

Authors: Wojciech Lewandowski ORCID
Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II
Keywords: fiat iustitia ruat coelum absolutism justice catastrophe
Data publikacji całości:2019
Page range:19 (5-23)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

The Problem of Interpretation of the Principle fiat iustitia, ruat coelum Most of the consequential and deontological interpretations of the fiat iustitia, ruat coelum principle, do not allow treating it as a basis for resolving practical problems. This article presents a proposal for an interpretation, under which this principle can serve as a practical rule. This interpretation assumes that fiat iustitia, ruat coelum applies to the final decision that affects the assessment of the entire life of the agent or humanity. Success of this interpretation depends on whether the lack of morally permissible possibilities to avoid individual or global catastrophe may serve as a reason for accepting it.
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