Analiza i Egzystencja

ISSN: 1734-9923     eISSN: 2300-7621    OAI    DOI: 10.18276/aie.2019.45-03
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Issue archive / 45 (2019)
Krzywdzenie a przyzwalanie na krzywdę. Część II: Prawo do samoobrony
(Hurting and allowing harm. Part II: A right to self defense)

Authors: Mirosław Rutkowski
Uniwersytet Szczecińśki
Keywords: hurting allowing harm Tooley's machine the principle of moral symmetry third party counterfactual definition of harm third party observer right to self-defense
Data publikacji całości:2019
Page range:17 (43-59)
Cited-by (Crossref) ?:

Abstract

Hurting and allowing harm. Part II: A right to self defense In this article I defence the thesis that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm (or harming) and merely allowing harm to happen.
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