ISSN: 1734-9923
eISSN: 2300-7621
OAI
DOI: 10.18276/aie.2016.35-02
Issue archive /
35 (2016)
Czy istnienie może być lepsze albo gorsze od nieistnienia? Część I: Ustalanie wartości w ramach dobrostanu
| Authors: |
Mirosław
Rutkowski
Uniwersytet Szczeciński |
| Keywords: | existence nonexistence wellbeing person’s value |
| Data publikacji całości: | 2016 |
| Page range: | 22 (23-44) |
Abstract
CAN EXISTENCE BE BETTER OR WORSE THAN NONEXISTENCE? PART I
The aim of this paper is to examine whether there is any possibility to compare thevalue of someone’s existence with his nonexistence. The final conclusion is thatsuch a comparative evaluation can never be made in a meaningful and valid manner.Nobody can know as well whether he would be better off or worse off created thanhe would have been had he never existed.
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